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Aspects of the Law of Judicial Sequestration in Quebec
Introduction
The recourse in judicial sequestration is an interlocutory and
conservatory proceeding which seeks to place into the hands of a
third party’ property or proprietary rights directly or indirectly
affected by the principal litigation. This interim remedy is often
associated with seizure before judgment and is frequently mistaken
for a proceeding under bankruptcy legislation.
To obtain an order of sequestration the petitioner must, by
affidavit, but preferably by testimony of witnesses,2 establish a
prima facie right which would be irreparably prejudiced or jeopar-
dized if the remedy were not granted. As well, the petitioner must
demonstrate that alternative recourses, such as injunctions, are
inappropriate in the circumstances Since sequestration effectively
constitutes dispossession of the property (in some sense similar
to judicial seizure before judgment)
the petitioner must allege
gross or fraudulent mismanagement of the property which ne-
cessitates urgent judicial intervention. 4 In some circumstances joint
sequestrators may be appointed to undertake the administration.5
The recourse is subject to the discretion of the judge seized with
the petition on the basis of proof presented, and the appeal courts
will only revise the exercise-of such discretion with great reluctance.(
The subject matter of this recourse can be as diverse as the
subject matter of litigation. Instances involving the proposed inter-
vention of a sequestrator may include the administration of com-
pany affairs or share certificates during a dispute between com-
368.
‘But see Giroux v. Pelletier [1962] C.S. 453.
2 Pouliot v. Sauvd [1969] B.R. 613.
3 Timrod Mining Co. v. La Socidtg Mini~re Louvem Inc. [1972] C.S. 361,
4 Levy v. Cohen and Savage [1966] C.S. 461; Grimaldi v. Pierce (1934) 37
R.P. 7 (C.S.); Gagnon v. Tdtrault [1958] B.R. 309; Be-St Realties Corp. v.
Quintal [1948] B.R. 139; Metropolitan Loan Corp. v. Fairways Holding Inc.
[1955] R.P. 170 (C.S.); Globe Textiles Ltd v. Brandon Shirt Mfg [1953] R.P.
132 (C.S.).
.5Gennari v. Zervos [1966] C.S. 433.
6 Lessard v. Ulliac [1965] B.R. 325; Blouin v. The Louise Wharfage and
Warehouse Co. (1896) 5 B.R. 377; Bagordo v. Mignacca [1954] B.R. 85.
1977]
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
peting shareholding factions, or prior to corporate liquidation; 7
intrafamilial disputes regarding a testator’s estate or matrimonial
property;” and interim management of an. immoveable subject to
a hypothecary or dation en paiement claim or action en passation
de titre9
It is evident that the judicial mandate accorded to the seques-
trator should be clearly defined, whatever the circumstances giving
rise to this remedy, especially in view of the enormous costs in-
volved in dispossessing one of the parties of the moveable or im-
moveable in question.’
Unfortunately, existing legislation provides little assistance. Few
qualifications are required -of the nominee for sequestrator. The
manner of administration and the very term of the sequestration
are unclear, and the nature of remuneration for the sequestrator
remains unsettled. Little guidance for the sequestrator in the
course of this administration is supplied by the legislator nor is
full protection assured to the parties involved in the litigation. In
7 Cavanaugh v. Machabee [1969] B.R. 871; Stephen v. The Montreal, Portland
& Boston Ry (1884) 7 L.N. 62, 85 (C.S.); Bonneville v. Salvas [1916] 49 C.S.
253; Baran v. Danko [1965] B.R. 618; Gennari v. Zervos, supra, note 5;
Doyer v. Acadia Acceptance Corp. [1967] R.P. 308- (C.S.).
8 Levy v. Cohen and Savage, supra, note 4; Crevier v. Yelle [1963] C.S. 147;
Soci~t9 Nationale de Fiducie v. Yelle [1963] C.S. 161; Monfette v. Mainville
(C.S.); Gourde v. Bilodeau [1954] C.S. 421;
[1963] C.S. 208, [1964] R.P. 41
Zablocki v. Zablocki and Mejercik [1968] B.R. 258; Paquin v. Morand [1962]
B.R. 657; Houghton v. Delle Parmenie Lafortune & Lareau (1939) 42 R.P.
401
(C.S.).
9 Vaillancourt v. Faust (1927) 30 R.P. 136 (C.S.); Giroux v. Pelletier, supra,
note 1; Gagnon v. Thtrault, supra, note 4; Proulx v. Langlois [1962] R.P.
97 (C.S.); Lessard v. Ulliac, supra, note 6. See generally, the Commissioners’
Report of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1965, art.742, 290; Shaink v. Dus-
sault [1956] C.S. 164, 170; Metropolitan Loan Corp. v. Fairways Holding Inc.,
supra, note 4; But see Les Entrep6ts Frigorifiques Martineau Inc. v. Les En-
trep6ts Frigorifiques Laberge Inc. [1976] C.S. 1351.
10 The judicial sequestrator is a court-appointed mandatary of the parties,
and does not become a conventional sequestrator simply because the parties
to the dispute have, following the granting of the petition, agreed on a
nominee to the position. The nominee, in his dealings with third parties, is
generally subject to the rules of mandate and will consequently engage
his personal liability if he fails to conform to the various requirements
contained in arts.1715-1719 C.C. See the use of the appellation “mandat
judiciaire” in Gennari v. Zervos, supra, note 5; arts.1822, 1827 C.C.; System
Theatre Operating Co. v. Pulos [1955] S.C.R. 448. The parties to the litigation
cannot by private act revoke the “mandate” without judicial intervention:
art.748 C.C.P. But see art.1794 C.C. assimilating sequestration to deposit:
C.F.M.G. Inc. v. Pinto, C.S.M., no 500-05-013200-777, 5 Aug. 1977, per Dugas I.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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short, the terseness of the governing provisions’
be desired.
leaves much to
This paper, then, will deal with various shortcomings in present
legislation and will propose ceftain amendments in an attempt to
overcome these deficiencies.
Qualifications of the Judicial Sequestrator
While the Civil Code does not specifically stipulate the qualifi-
cations for the nominee sequestrator, Pothier in Traitg de la procd-
dure civile prescribes two requirements. He states that the func-
tion of the sequestrator demands
the nomination of a person
having adequate experience in the administration of the object
and sufficient assets to provide for compensation to the parties
in the event of his default. 2 The Code of Civil- Procedure provides
a further requirement; it is evident from the phrasing of articles
743 and 746 that the nominee cannot be one of the parties to the
litigation.:3
However, the Civil Code, in one respect, expressly qualifies
the nomination: the disabilities imposed upon corporations include
the prohibition against a corporate entity acting as a judicial se-
questrator.’4 Although the letters patent governing the incorpora-
tion may give the company the power to act as a sequestrator, the
corporate entity cannot assume the function unless specifically
authorized by special legislation. 5
1827 C.C.; 742-750 C.C.P.
“Arts.1823,
‘ 2 Oeuvres de Pothier 2d ed. (1861), Bugnet (ed.), vol.10, 136, para.307.
“‘On doit nommer pour sdquestre un homme suffisant, c’est-h-dire capable
de bien administrer les biens sdquestr6s; solvable, pour r6pondre de son
administration; r6sidant proche du lieu ojh sont situ6s les biens qui doivent
Ztre s6questr6s, pour &tre h port6e de r6gire et gogiverner les biens sdques-
tr6s. II ne doit 6tre ni parent ni alli6 du juge qui le nomme….
13 See also art.667 C.C.P.
14Art.365 C.C. Where the court of first instance errs in law by naming a
corporate sequestrator, the court of appeal may maintain
the order of
sequestration but replace the moral with a natural person. In such a case,
the acts performed and contracts executed by the corporate sequestrator
within the scope of its putative sequestration bind the parties involved in
the litigation.
‘1 See Drovers National Bank of Chicago v. Capital Funds (IAC) Ltd and
Place Champlain (1972) Corp [1976] C.A. 104, 105: “The last paragraph of
article 365 C.C. is indeed quite specific on this point. Counsel for Capital
Funds appears to have beeii taken by surprise by this argument. We ac-
cordingly granted him a delay to answer it and particularly to determine
19771
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
Although an attempt is being made to more strictly define the
requisites to nomination,'” at present the rules respecting the
nominee can only be determined by analogy to current legislative
structures involving common administrative elements: tutorship,
,uratorship, judicial advisorship, testamentary executorship, trustee-
ship, mandate and deposit. Without entering into a detailed com-
parative analysis, it is fair to say that existing legislative structures
reveal the following relevant qualifications for nomination: (1) the
nominee must not be in a position of conflicting personal and
official interests; 17 (2) the nominee must be physically and mentally
capable of coping with the demands of his position;’ 8 and (3)
the
nominee must have administrative competence and a previous re-
cord of honest performance. 9 Further reference to comparable
judicial nominees such as expert surveyors, auditors, practitioners
and liquidators20 indicates that the restrictions facing the nominee
parallel those forming the grounds for recusation of a judge 2
Under current law, no more express requirements are demanded
of the judicial than of the conventional sequestrator, corporate ad-
ministrators excepted. The sequestrator does not have to be licens-
ed nor carry membership in any professional body recognized by
the Code des Professions.22 He cannot be an unemancipated minor,
but may be female.23 Prior to his nomination, he is not required
to demonstrate proof of solvency, previous management experience,
whether any special legislation conferred upon A.E. LePage & Westmount
Realties Inc. the right to act as sequestrator notwithstanding article 365
C.C. We have received no further submission in this connection and there-
fore conclude that there is no special legislation. Under the circumstances,
I am of the opinion that we should adopt the suggestion made by Counsel
before us and appoint as sequestrator the officer of A.E. LePage & West-
mount Realties Inc. who has in fact been acting, the witness Sidney Pinto”.
See also art.908 C.C.; art.1041 C.C.; Baudry-Lacantinerie and Wahl, Traitd
de droit civil 3d ed. (1907), vol.XXIII, 692, para.1291.
‘(Report on Administration of the Property of Others (1976), C.C.R.O.,
Montreal, XLII, 9-13, 35 et seq.
17Arts.269, 311, 337a, 1484, 1706 C.C.
8Arts.274-282, 907, 1800 C.C.
‘9Arts.285, 917, 981d C.C.
2OArts.414, 425, 762, 810 C.C.P.
21 See art.234(1) (2) (4) (6) (8) C.C.P. See also the position of inspectors under
the Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.B-3, s.94(11).
22 S.Q. 1973, c.43.
23 Unemancipated minors would be precluded by art.290 C.C., which would
s qualitg. Emancipated
result in the absurdity of the tutor’s nomination
minors are probably precluded because of the practical restrictions on the
activities mentioned in arts.319, 320, 231, 233 C.C. But see arts.1707, 1708 C.C.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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or lack of interest in the property.24 Although the petitioning party
is often required to provide security for costs of the sequestration,
the nominee himself is not obliged to provide a performance bond.2
It should be kept in mind that the legislator has placed foremost
emphasis on the wishes and consent of the parties regarding the
choice of nominee. 26 Thus, the promulgation of additional legislative
requirements for nomination might, in given circumstances, ad-
versely affect the attempts of the parties to minimize costs or
maintain a continuity of commercial operations in the property
under sequestration.
There is, however, one express qualification for nomination
which might be subject to severe scrutiny. Recent years have seen
the growth and popularity of industrial and real estate management
companies specifically organized for, and commercially active in,
administering apartment and office buildings as well as manufactur-
ing complexes. This present day reality has superseded the legislative
reasoning expressed in article 365 C.C. which prohibits the use of
corporate sequestrators.2 7 Although parties theoretically avoid this
prohibition by appointing a representative of a management com-
24The role of judicial sequestrator of an immoveable is not incompatible
in the same person with the function of a liquidator of a real estate enterpri-
se which owns the immoveable: “Sequestre”, Juris classeur, arts.1896-2091 C.C.
para.111.
25Regarding the character and qualifications of a trustee under bank-
ruptcy legislation, see Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.B-3, ss.9, 23(7)(8), 173.
2 8At.743 C.C.P.
2’rThe classical authors have repeated the distinction between natural and
artifical incapacities suffered by corporations mentioned in arts.365 and
366 C.C.: Commission for the Codification of the Laws of Lower Canada
relating to Civil Matters (1865), Bk 1, arts.19, 235, 352; Mignault, Le Droit
civil canadien (1896), vol. 2, 353-54; Trudel, Traitg de droit civil du Qudbec
(1942), vol.2 492; de Lorimier and Vilbon, La Biblioth9que du Code civil de la
province de Quebec (1874), vol.3, 207 et seq. Art.365 C.C. reads as follows:
“In consequence of the disabilities which arise from their corporate
character they can neither be tutors nor curators, nor can they take
part in meetings of family councils.
They cannot be entrusted with the execution of wills or any other ad-
ministration which necessitates
the taking of an oath, or imposes
personal responsibility.
They cannot be summoned personally, nor appear in court otherwise
than by attorney.
They cannot sue nor be sued for assault, battery or other violence to
the person.
They cannot serve as witnesses nor as jurors before the courts.
They can neither be guardians nor judicial sequestrators, nor can they
19771
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
pany to act as a sequestrator, it is evident that such a nominee
utilizes the accounting, janitorial, and accessory services offered by
the management company.28 In light of the often consensual nature
of the nomination, it appears incongruous that corporations may
act as conventional, but not judicial, sequestrators.
Duration and Termination
The sequestrator is by law discharged upon the delivery of the
property to the party entitled to it in virtue of the judgment; he
cannot be discharged earlier except by the court and for cause.2 9
Since the court is empowered to initiate the ordering of a sequestra-
tion as well as to name the actual administrator 0 it is, therefore,
logical that the court be further entitled to terminate the sequestra-
tion prematurely for just reason 3 However, even without cause,
the court may indirectly bring about the discharge. For example, if
the property is of a perishable nature or liable to depreciate rapidly,
or if the cost of the sequestration is not in proportion to the value
be charged with any other functions or duties the exercise of which
might entail imprisonment.”
Given the wording and sequence of art.365 C.C. one might conclude that
the prohibition against corporate sequestrators arises from the impossi-
bility of imprisoning a company. If such were the sole reason for the
prohibition, then the last paragraph of art.365 C.C. would no longer have
general effect, in virtue of art.1, para.4 C.C.P. which declares:
“Notwithstanding any contrary provision of any general law or special
in cases of
act, imprisonment in civil matters
contempt of court.”
is abolished, except
However, it would seem that the reason for the prohibition is more widely
related to the basic lack of human substance in the artificial corporate
entity. See, e.g., art.365, para.2 C.C.P. which refers to:
“… administration which necessitates the taking of an oath, or imposes
personal responsibility.”
It might be argued that the most effective means of compensating for the
impossibility of corporate oaths and direct responsibility of corporate
members is to permit the nomination of a company as a judicial seques-
trator with attendant responsibility, in the event of default or negligence,
upon the corporate directors who may be sworn in as duly authorized re-
presentatives of the sequestrator.
One remaining question arises; whether trust companies are capable of
acting as judicial sequestrators in light of the power granted to perform
the function of a “sequestrator”: Trust Companies Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c.287,
s.2(7).
28 E.g., Scanti Investments Ltd v. Kaussen [1975] C.S. 463.
2
) Art.748 C.C.P.
30 Arts.742, 743 C.C.P.
3l Art.17(17) C.C.
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of the object to be maintained, the judge may order such object
to be sold, in effect terminating the sequestration 2
Where the sequestration runs to maturity, that is, to the granting
of a judgment for the disposition of the property, the sequestration
would appear not only to survive beyond the date of the judgment,
but as well, beyond the expiry of the delays for appeal. By declaring
his discharge to be effective only when he decides to make actual
delivery of the property, the Code of Civil Procedure gives the
sequestrator himself the right to determine the final date of his
function. 3
The practical consequence of protracting the duration of the
sequestration until the date of actual delivery is to permit the
sequestrator to put his house in order, especially where the object
of the sequestration is an immoveable requiring various administra-
tive and maintenance tasks. Should the sequestrator refuse for no
apparent reason to deliver the property to the person entitled to it
within fixed delays, the court may abruptly declare the sequestrator
discharged for cause. While it might seem preferable to provide a
stricter means of determining the date of delivery, the costs incurred
pending actual delivery might be chargeable to the sequestrator
personally3 4 thus providing a deterrent to procrastination on his
part.
Costs
The costs of the sequestrator include all fees, commissions,
disbursements and generally all expenditures incurred in maintain-
ing the object under his control in addition to the fee or remunera-
tion of the sequestrator himself. The law, however, does not ex-
pressly recognize any tariff of fees strictly applicable to the ad-
ministration. The administrator may receive payment by taxing
n2 Art.747 C.C.P.; art.1821 C.C.; the alienation of the object of the seques-
tration either by the consent of the parties to the ligitation or by authoriz-
ation of the court would have the effect of removing the purpose of difficulty
which initially gave rise to the extraordinary recourse in sequestration:
compare arts.1804, 1805 C.C.; Bddard v. Owens (1906) 8 R.P. 81, 86 (B.R.).
3 3 Art.748 C.C.P.
34ArtA78 C.C.P. See also Mignault’s argument regarding indemnities due:
“Mais il faut, pour que le sdquestre soit ddchargd, que la partie accepte
les biens. S’ils sont d6tdriords par la faute du siquestre, on comprend qu’il
faut autre chose que leur remise; le sdquestre ne sera alors ddchargd que
cette partie l’indemnit6 h laquelle elle a droit”: Le
lorsqu’il aura payd
droit civil canadien (1909), vol.8, 179.
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COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
his costs at the office of the prothonotary, subject to revision and
appeal of the costs taxed.3 5
The remuneration for administration is set by reference to the
commercial rates in use, often with regard to the schedule of real
estate commissions published by the Montreal Real Estate Board.
Such tariff is certainly not binding on the court in determining
taxable costs38 but has provided a useful indicator for the setting of
remuneration.
The sequestrator may seek the aid of a commercial management
firm to administer the daily chores involved in operating and
maintaining a residence or office structure. In such a case, the
sequestrator may pass on the rates charged by the management
firm as well as an additional charge for services personally per-
formed by himself.37 Where the administrator requires legal and
auditing counsel, or must pay leasing and agents’ fees in order to
properly fulfill his mandate, such expenses form part of the costs
of sequestration without any derogation from the rate of remu-
neration specifically due to the sequestrator. It might very well
be argued that management and counselling fees should be con-
tained within and not added to the chargeable fees of the seques-
trator himself, especially if one takes the view that the administra-
tor is not entitled to a fee of office38 but compensation for actual
work performed.
The Sequestrator and the Court
The court serves both as the overseer and effective source of
authority for the sequestrator 3 9 In the course of his functions the
sequestrator may require clarification of his judicial mandate.
Does it, for example, require him to effect certain repairs, to
35Arts.486, 750 C.C.P.; System Theatre Operating Co. v. Pulos, supra, note
10; W & H Management International Ltd v. Sterling Bank and Trust Co.
[1976] C.S. 1146; Maillet v. Fontaine (1912) 21 B.R. 426.
36 Compare, Dalling v. Brun [1953] C.S. 29; but note art.1024 C.C.
37Scanti Investment Ltd v. Kaussen, supra, note 28: such costs are not
judicial costs of the advocates, and consequently cannot be alleged in a
demand under art.65 C.C.P.
38 See Roch and Par6, Traitd de droit civil du Qugbec (1952), vol.13, 326,
who consider that while the position of sequestrator is not a “charge pu-
blique”, the costs arising therefrom are privileged as law costs under
arts.1994(1) and 2009(1) C.C.
39 Chalifoux v. Lafontaine (1930) 48 B.R. 1; regarding artA65 C.C. see C6td v.
C6t6 [1957] R.P. 343.
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negotiate or settle accounts with creditors having proprietary rights
over the object administered, or to make expenditures of significant
sums. In order to avoid incurring personal liability for negligent
mismanagement, the sequestrator often seeks the consent of the
parties to the litigation before acting in a given situation. Where
the parties are uncooperative or otherwise refuse to grant consent,
the sequestrator must seek judicial advice.
Unfortunately, however, article 745 C.C.P. permits the seques-
trator access to the court specifically for authorization to act
beyond the limits of pure administration. Thus, a restrictive reading
of this article would preclude the administrator from seeking ju-
dicial counsel on a matter falling within the ordinary scope of his
authority40
The economy of the law would normally refrain from imposing
upon the courts the obligation to dispense legal advice but since the
sequestrator is appointed by the court his situation is exceptional.
Furthermore, the recent expansion of the limitations to standing,
contained in article 55 C.C.P.,14 argues in favoiir of complete access
to the courts for the sequestrator, by way of a motion for directions.
The most desirable form of recourse which might be implemented
is that currently contained in bankruptcy legislation which permits
a trustee to apply to the court for written directions in relation to
any matter affecting the administration of the estate 2
The Sequestrator and the Parties to the Litigation
The parties to the litigation are responsible for both the initia-
tion of an order of sequestration as well as the nomination of a
suitable administrator. The parties, as well, are jointly and sever-
ally responsible for the payment of the costs and remuneration of
the sequestrator following taxation by the prothonotary.43 While
the parties are not given any explicit supervisory role regarding
the nominee’s administration it is evident that the administrator
must, in performing his daily functions, take into account the best
40 See e.g., Bissegger v. M.G.A. Development Corp. [1974] R.P. 265
(C.S.).
4 1 E.g., arts.448, 453 C.C., 462 C.C.P. Although testamentary executors and
trustees under a will have often resorted to the declaratory recourses for
clarification of administrative problems, the costs and delays involved are
certainly not suited to sequestration requiring a minimization of expenses:
see authorities cited in Sama, The Scope and Application of the Declaratory
Judgment on Motion (1973) 33 R.du B. 493, 499, 506-507.
42 Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.B-3, s.16(1).
43 Art.750 C.C.P.
19773
COMMENTS – COMMENTAIRES
interests of the parties, thereby minimizing his own personal
responsibility for mismanagement. The litigants are, however, im-
plicitly required, or at least given the right, to bring to the court’s
attention the fact the object under sequestration is liable to rapid
depreciation or that the costs of custody and maintenance are
reaching excessive proportions. 44 Although the litigants are not
given an active function, they are in practice frequently called
upon by the sequestrator to give their consent or tacit approval
to various repairs, leasing practices or insurance proposals.
Conflict arises between the parties and the sequestrator where
each litigant has competing rights requiring immediate resolution.
For example, second ranking hypothecary creditors who are brought
into litigation involving a first ranking hypotbecary claim or dation
en paiement right might wish to exercise their rights to a forced
assignment of rentals in virtue of their mortgage deed. In order
for the sequestrator to properly administer the immoveable, it is
essential that he be in receipt of all rentals and fruits arising from
the property in question. Competing claims over rentals are often
resolved by reference to the judgment ordering the sequestration,
which usually expressly stipulates the right of the sequestrator to
receive all rentals in preference to any of the claims of the parties.
Where the judgment fails to make such provision, the tenants, faced
with competing notices by both the sequestrator and hypothecary
creditor, are forced to deposit the monthly rentals in the office of
the court. Even though the judgment ordering the sequestration
is silent on the issue of conflicting rights, it may be argued that the
sequestrator has rights to revenues overriding those of the parties
the costs owed the sequestrator by the
on the following bases:
parties would ordinarily be paid out of the revenues accruing from
the property; all parties4 5 are bound for payment of the costs; and
the taxation of such costs entitles the sequestrator to a first ranking
privilege.40 Furthermore, it is of the essence of the remedy that the
sequestrator should not be sterilized in his function by cutting off
his source of operating funds.4 7 While the effect of the judgment in
sequestration may be to play havoc, temporarily, with the rights of
the various interested parties, there is no doubt that the court has
taken into account the disruptive quality of the remedy before
issuing its order.
44 Art.747 C.C.P.
45 Roch and Par6, supra, note 38, 314.
46 Art.2009(1) C.C.
47Bddard v. Owens, supra, note 32.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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One way of ensuring the minimization of conflict is to permit
interested parties to petition the court on a point of clarification
in the same way we suggested the sequestrator be permitted to seek
judicial counsel on matters affecting his administration. While it
might be cautioned that such recourse would open the doors to a
flood of petty complaints from the competing parties, it would
appear that the alternative, namely the untimely termination of
the sequestration, is much more drastic in effect.
Conclusions
The sparse nature of the governing legislative provisions has
resulted in unnecessary ambiguity regarding the roles and func-
tions of the interested parties. Considerable clarification may be
achieved by the addition of the following suggested amendments:
(1) the imposition of grounds of recusation for the nominee to the
sequestration similar to those contained in article 234 C.C.P.; (2)
the abolition of the prohibition against corporate sequestrators
with, perhaps, personal liability for the acting directors or repre-
sentatives of such corporations; (3)
the formal termination of the
sequestration following the expiry of the delays to appeal the final
judgment; (4) the enactment of a tariff of taxable costs for seques-
trators; and (5)
the introduction of a formal recourse permitting
a motion for directions by the sequestrator and the interested
parties. In short, under current law there is no reason why the
court must be required to create a judicial monster in the form of
what it would otherwise consider just relief to remedy an urgent
situation.
Lazar Sarna*
* B.A., B.C.L. (McGill), member of the Bar of Montreal.
