BOOK REVIEWS
LIVRES NOUVEAUX
The Law of Search Warrants in Canada, by James A. Fontana, Toronto:
Butterworth & Company (Canada) Limited, 1974. Pp.xvi, 239. ($25.00).
To meet the need for treatises on specialized areas of Canadian
law Butterworths is making available a new series of publications
known as the “Canadian Legal Monograph Series”.’ The first in this
series is The Law of Search Warrants in Canada.
In the Preface to the book the author records two observations.
The first is that Canadian defense counsel seldom question or fully
explore the use of a search warrant by peace officers:
Once the inevitable answer “yes” is given to the usual question, “Did you
have a search warrant in your possession to enter the premises?” –
counsel generally adopt an I-thought-so attitude and scurry off into some
other area of cross-examination. 2
The second of the author’s introductory observations is that
unlike other areas of the criminal law, Canadian courts have not
placed great reliance on English or other foreign decisions. How-
ever, as the author points out, this is not a remarkable development:
… Canada’s law on this subject has been largely its own legislative home-
brew, at best drawing only its initial statutory phrasing from the English
law. It is entirely consistent therefore that Canada has developed its own
relatively indigenous body of search warrant law, building case upon
case over the years until a fairly comprehensive and intrinsic set of
authorities has materialized3
These observations result in a twofold emphasis throughout the
book: (1) a concentration on the rights of the individual and the
view that the search warrant procedure, “must always be cleaner-
than-clean”; and (2) a strict adherence to Canadian authorities.4
Mr Fontana embarks upon his analysis with the fundamental
principle that every citizen has the right to occupy and enjoy his
home, “however mean or humble, -free from arbitrary invasion and
search”.5 “It
is necessary,” he writes, “to bear this basic principle
1 J. A. Fontana, The Law of Search Warrants in Canada (1974), ix.
2 Ibid., vii.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., viii.
5 The words are those of Mr Justice Morrow in Re McAvoy
(1971) 12
C.R.N.S. 56, 60 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.). The principle found express formulation as
early as Semayne’s Case (1604) 5 Coke 91, 77 E.R. 194, where it was stated:
“The house of everyone is to him his castle and fortress”. Mr Justice Chisolm,
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 22
in mind when analyzing the present law because it has been carried
through virtually unchanged into contemporary law. It is the cardinal
principal in light of which all legal aspects of search warrant use
must be read.”6 With these words the author reflects, at the very
beginning, the first emphasis noted above, i.e., a concentration on the
rights of the individual.
A course is pursued in the opening chapter whereby the general
law on search warrants is examined. Proceeding from the broad
principle just stated, the general search warrant provision of the
Criminal Codea is considered, including: definition and ingredients;7
objects and purpose; the information; causes of suspicion as dis-
closed in the information; description of the nature of the offence;
description of the premises to be searched; and description of the
subject matter.”
in Rex v. Ella Paint (1917) 28 C.C.C. 171 (N.S.S.C.), expressed it this way:
“At common law the dwelling of the subject is held to be immune from
intrusion, unless there is express authority to justify the intrusion, and the
‘person’ of the subject is held equally sacred”. These authorities are all
considered by the author; ibid., 1-2.
6 Supra, note 1, 2.
Ga R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, sA43.
7The author notes and finds it curious that “search warrant” is not defined
in the Criminal Code. Although the term may be self-defining in that it
decrees that a search is “warranted” and that the person to whom it is
directed is “warranted” in carrying out the search, it is much more than that.
Mr Fontana suggests the following definition:
“A search warrant is an instrument issued under the authority of a legislative
enactment, at the discretion of a justice and after certain predetermined
conditions have been met, authorizing a peace officer to enter a specified
building to search for specified goods, pertaining to a specified offence.”
The author goes on to state however that the effect of not including any
precise definition has been to provide the courts with greater flexibility in
ruling on search warrant procedures (at 7). Although there is no omnibus
definition of the term, Mr Fontana notes that the “concept” has tradi-
tionally included the following ingredients:
there should be some physical, documentary manifestation of the autho-
“(1)
rization to search; there are no oral search warrants; (2)
there now must
be some statute law from which it draws its legal existence; (3) it must be
issued by a designated court official who must have determined the existence
of the legislative pre-requisites to his satisfaction; (4) it should authorize (a)
an entry of a specified building, (b) to search for specified goods, with a
view (c) to a specified offence.”
These elements are essential in all kinds of search warrants whether issued
pursuant to federal or provincial statutes (at 8).
8 The Canadian authorities accorded considerable attention by the author
are the following: Shumiatcher v. A.-G. for Saskatchewan (1960) 129 C.C.C.
270 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Bell Telephone Company of Canada (1947) 89 C.C.C. 196
(Ont. H.C.); Re Worrall [1965] 2 C.C.C. 1 (Ont. C.A.); Re Royal Canadian
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
In the second chapter the reader is guided through the various
mechanics involved in the issuance of search warrants. The author
commences with the general duties of the justice which he describes
as falling into three broad categories: (1) to consider the content
of the search warrant information or report in front of him; (2) to
determine, upon what is alleged, whether he has jurisdiction to issue
a search warrant and whether in fact to issue it; and (3) to take the
goods seized into his custodyY Mr Fontana emphasizes that there
is a common denominator among the Criminal Code sections which
authorize a justice to issue a search warrant –
they are all per-
missive:
[T]he justice when considering whether or not the material before him
supports the issue of a search warrant and when considering whether
or not to issue it – must act judicially. He must exercise a judicial
discretion.10
Following the analysis of the duties of the justice, the author
turns his attention toq a consideration of the threefold duty of the
peace officer which is described as: (1) “his duty to provide the
justice with proper and sufficient material in support of the applic-
ation; (2) his duty to properly execute the search warrant”; and (3)
“his duty to take custody of the goods and bring them before the
justice”.”
The remaining sections in this chapter deal with such matters
as the liability of the peace officer involved in the search warrant
process, 2 and review proceedings.’ 3 The latter is noted by the author
Legion (Branch 177) [1964] 3 C.C.C. 381 (B.C. S.C.); Rex v. Solloway Mills
& Co. (1930) 53 C.C.C. 261 (Alta C.A.); and Regina v. Trottier [1964] 4 C.C.C.
321 (Que. Q.B.).
9 Supra, note 1, 47.
10 Ibid., 51.
11 Ibid., 62.
12Ibid., 70. The law respecting the liability of a peace officer for mal-
feasance and negligence in the execution of his duty raises the whole area
of tort law with regard to the conduct of public officials. The author notes
however that “the law as it pertains to his liability in executing process such
as search warrants, is somewhat more confined”, and raises the various
protections afforded him by both statutory and case law. In every case it
is necessary precisely to determine “the terms of the section authorizing the
issue of the search warrant or under which the search and seizure are made”.
A comprehensive review of the law was provided by Mr Justice Aikins of the
British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Royal Canadain Legion (Branch 177),
supra, note 8. See Fontana, ibid., 64, 70-71.
13 Ibid., 75. “The avenues of review open to an individual against whom a
warrant to search has been issued, are … injunction, certiorari, and trial and
appeal”. The author notes that in “the rare case where the owner-occupier has
knowledge that a search warrant has been issued against his premises but
has not yet been executed, he may do one of two things”: (1) wait until the
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
as being characterized by a general reluctance on the part of the
courts to interfere with the process.’ 4
In the third chapter the author proceeds to canvass the law
respecting the execution of search warrants. In contrast to the
issuing procedure, which may vary considerably among the different
statutes and sections
(in effect requiring different supporting
materials), the execution process is relatively uniform regarding
standards and available methods.”
Following an examination of procedural guidelines,’ Mr Fontana
affirms that a “deviation from proper execution procedures is not
necessarily fatal to the process … since two principles will continue
to be effective in so far as the criminal law aspect is concerned:
officer arrives, examine the warrant, and resist its execution if he believe he
has grounds; the matter will be reviewed when he defends an obstruction
charge; and
(2) he may consult his solicitor and try to obtain an in-
junction to prevent the enforcement of the search warrant. “The futility
involved here,” says the author, “is that if the courts ultimately grant the
injunction … there is no abuse of process if the informant corrects his mistake
and obtains a new search warrant, providing it is obtained after the first
one has finally been ruled upon.” Ibid., 15. See also, Solloway Mills & Co. v.
A.-G. for Alberta (1930) 53 C.C.C. 234 (B.C. S.C.).
14 This conclusion is supported by the relatively recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Ontario in Greenback Investments (Hamilton) Ltd v.
O’Connell [1972] 3 O.R. 656 (Ont. H.C.). The applicant sought an injuction
to prevent
the police from obtaining or executing any further search
warrants upon him, having been subjected, so he alleged, to two hundred or so
searches respecting off track betting offences. In refusing to grant the in-
junction, Mr Justice O’Driscoll stated the following at 658:
“In the event that the plaintiff company, through its servants and agents,
is in fact carrying on a lawful business, I am confident that it can be ade-
quately recompensed in damages;
in the event that the plaintiff is not
carrying on a lawful business, then to grant the relief sought would amount
to a direction that under no circumstances could police officers obtain search
warrants and pursue their duties ..
Referred to by Fontana, ibid., 76.
15 Ibid., 85.
1GThe guidelines are the following: (1) “a search warrant should be in” the
possession of the officer at the time of the search”; (2) when the place to be
searched is a dwelling house, a demand to open must be made; (3) the
officer should produce and exhibit the warrant, if asked, and allow it to be
inspected; (4) “the officer need not in all circumstances first demand an
entrance or signify the cause of his coming”; (5) “an officer acting under a
… warrant … may use such force as is reasonably necessary … but … is
liable for any excess”; and (6) whether it is necessary to use force depends
upon the circumstances in each case; ibid., 86. See also, Wah Kie v. Cuddy
(1914) 23 C.C.C. 383, 386-387 (Alta S.C.).
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
“Unlawfully obtained evidence, or evidence obtained in excess of
authority, will still be admissable”Y’
The balance of the third chapter is taken up, among other
matters, with a consideration of: items which may be seized; and
forfeiture and return of seized goods.
In the fourth chapter a number of special provisions for search
are treated, for example: search of common gaming and disorderly
houses; bawdy-houses; seizure of obscene publications; the position
of banks and related financial institutions; and search under pro-
vincial statutes such as liquor searches. The inclusion of such
matters is necessary not only because it adds completeness to the
book but because, unlike the comprehensive search warrant section,
these special provisions generally apply to a restricted class of
offenses and differ not only in requirements but in possible con-
sequences.
The author then turns his attention, in chapter five, to a number
of recurrent problems in the search warrant procedure. Following
a brief summary of the law respecting seizure of fixtures, the use of
successive search warrants, and tricks, the reader is presented with a
concise statement of problems arising from the solicitor-client
privilege and whether a warrant may be executed to search for
client’s goods on the solicitor’s premises.
Mr Fontana outlines three solicitor-client situations which must
be ‘distinguished before the applicability of the search warrant pro-
cess can be considered: (1) “where a legitimate solicitor-client re-
lationship exists and the solicitor is not … implicated in the wrong-
doing; (2) where the solicitor is … implicated either alone or …
with his client”; and (3) “where the solicitor is not implicated, but
the client has used the solicitor’s premises as a repository for the
incriminating materials”. 18
A comparatively long section is then devoted to search of the
person and the far-reaching decision in Re Laporte and The Queen 9
17Furthermore, the author posits that “[a]nything done by the officer will
be presumed to have been done properly unless raised in issue at the trial.
While breaches of proper execution procedure may result in a civil action
against the officer, they will not necessarily affect the criminal proceedings”.
Although it is the duty of the officer to have the warrant with him when he
executes it, is will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that he acted
correctly, and that the warrant was in his possession; ibid., 86. Note also,
Fanning v. Gough (1908) 18 C.C.C. 66, 69 (P.E.I. S.C.).
18 Supra, note 1, 148-151.
19 (1972) 8 C.C.C. (2d) 343 (Que. Q.B.).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
wherein the Quebec Court of Queen’s Bench confirmed that the
common law right to. search the person is basically a right to search
a prisoner: (1) at the time of the arrest; (2) to prevent the com-
mission of a further offence; and (3)
to prevent the disappearance
of evidence. 20
We are then presented with what the author calls “the search
warrant dilemma”, i.e., the situation which sometimes occurs when a
search warrant is issued for a specific charge and goods are dis-
covered pertaining to an unrelated offence.?’ Mr Fontana examines
the position of the officer in three situations: (1) where the officer
executes a search warrant on a gaming house and discovers goods
which are evidence of a Criminal Code offence unrelated to gam-
ing; (2) where the officer executes a Criminal Code section 181
warrant and finds liquor held in contravention of provincial liquor
laws; and (3) where the officer is executing a warrant to search
for liquor issued under provincial liquor legislation and uncovers
goods which are evidence of a Criminal Code offence.22
No discussion of recurrent problems would be complete without
some treatment of unlawfully obtained evidence. Two possible
situations are raised by the author: (1) where the “search warrant
itself is ultimately determined to be invalid … in circumstances
which place the officer in the same position as if he had no search
warrant at all”; and (2) “[i]mproper execution of a valid search
warrant, or execution in excess of the authority granted in the
warrant”.23
The final chapter deals with special federal and extraordinary
powers of search. Beginning with the special process under the
Bankruptcy Act,24 Mr Fontana then turns to The Narcotics Control
Act,25 The Food and Drugs Act,26 The Excise Act, 27 and The Customs
Act.28 The last four statutes are of particular interest because they
all provide three types of search power: (1) “powers to search with-
out a search warrant; (2) powers to search with a search warrant,
20 Supra, note 1, 153-160, esp. 158.
21 Ibid., 160.
22Ibid., 161-162. The author does not limit the possibilities to these cir-
cumstances, noting that the potential combinations are many and varied.
23 Ibid., 175-178.
24R.S.C. 1970, c.B-3.
25 R.S.C. 1970, c.N-1.
26R.S.C. 1970, c.F-27.
27R.S.C. 1970, c.E-12.
28R.S.C. 1970, c.C-40.
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BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
(except for The Customs Act); and (3) powers of search under a
Writ of Assistance”? 9
The book closes with an account of the law respecting writs of
assistance and the very broad powers available to Parliament under
the provisions of the War Measures Act.30
The foregoing brief summary (which does not touch upon all the
aspects of search raised in this book) ought to indicate the thorough-
ness with which Mr Fontana has completed his work. The material
is well organized and unfolds before the reader in a logical pattern.
It might also be added that an appendix at the back of the book
contains a reproduction of basic forms and the relevant Criminal
Code provisions. The appendix is followed by a useful table of cases
and index.
The main criticism which this writer offers is that the leading
cases in the field do not receive the analysis which their impor-
tance begs. Many quotations from various decisions appear through-
out the text which are offered by the author as definitive conclusions
without further comment. There is also a conspicuous absence of
consideration given to dissenting judgments.
However, it must be remembered that this book is not an
academic, comparative law treatise –
and was not intended by the
author or publisher to be such. It is a practitioner’s tool, written
and designed with that purpose in mind. There is no doubt that
there is a need in Canada for works of this nature. If all of us
practicing in the field of criminal law had a command of this
material, Mr Fontana’s first introductory observation would be a
dead letter, i.e., there would be much less scurrying off into other
areas of cross-examination when the inevitable answer “yes” is given
to the usual question, “Did you have a search warrant in your
possession to .enter the premises?”.?’
A. Clayton Rice*
29 Supra, note 1, 196-199.
30R.S.C. 1970, c.W-2.
3 l Supra, note 2.
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Alberta, Edmonton.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
La capacitg de la personne en droit international privd franvais et anglais,
Biblioth~que de droit international priv6, vol. XIX, par H. Patrick Glenn,
Paris: Dalloz, 1975, Ppxv, 284 ($10.80).
L’ouvrage de M. Glenn, en tous points excellent, dont la Biblioth6-
que de droit international priv6 s’est enrichie est issu d’une th~se de
doctorat brillamment soutenue devant la Facult6 de droit de Stras-
bourg. M. Glenn a ddjh retenu l’attention des sp6cialistes frangais
de droit international priv6, tant par la maitrise qu’il r6v~le de la
mdthode comparative que par l’intdr&t m~me du sujet trait6 et des
conclusions auxquelles il aboutit (voir la belle pr6face de M. Bis-
choff).
La capacit6 de la personne est en effet situde au point de rencontre
du droit des personnes et du droit des actes. “Si la capacit6 est une
aptitude personnelle, elle est aussi une aptitude h agir” 6crit juste-
ment l’auteur (p.137, no.153). Cette simple phrase r6sume l’opposi-
tion entre le droit international priv6 frangais, qui part du principe
que la capacit6 est rdgie par la loi personnelle et le droit international
priv6 anglais qui rattache la capacit6 h la loi de l’acte. Mais elle
permet aussi de les rapprocher, car aucun des deux droits ne peut
ignorer le lien rationnel de la capacit6 avec celui des deux p6les qu’il
ne privildgie pas. C’est ce que ddmontre M. Glenn en deux parties,
l’une traitant du r6le de la loi personnelle, ‘autre de la comptence
de la loi de 1’acte ou du rapport juridique.
La premiere partie exprime la position de principe du droit fran-
gais qui s’est form6 par un 6largissement progressif, au cours du
XVIIe et XVIIIe sibcles, de l’exception tr~s limitde consentie par
d’Argentr6 t la r~gle de la territorialit6 des coutumes. Cette solution
a triomph6 ensuite dans 1’article 3, alin6a 3 du Code civil frangais et,
selon l’auteur, elle serait mme le reflet de 1’attitude g6ndrale du
droit frangais faisant de la personne le centre de toutes les relations
juridiques. L’intdr& de cette premiere partie est double. Ii montre
que le droit anglais lui-m6me n’ignore pas le rattachement de la ca-
pacit6 it la loi personnelle, au moins lorsque les actes requ6rant cette
capacit6 sont eux-m6mes soumis h cette loi, ce qui est spdcialement
le cas de la capacit6 matrimoniale (voir le tras intdressant expos6
de l’attitude anglaise h l’6gard des mariages polygamiques p.32, no.36
et seq.) et de la capacit6 testamentaire pour les meubles (p.44, no.47
et seq.). Mais cette premiere partie met surtout en 6vidence les nom-
breuses causes d’dviction de la loi personnelte admises par le droit
frangais. L’auteur en compte huit, ce qui est peut-8tre excessif, mais
il reste vrai que l’ignorance excusable de la loi 6trang~re (jurispru-
1976]
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
dence Lizardi’) s’ajoute h l’ordre public, h -la fraude h la loi et aux
notions de lois de police et d’urgence pour faire 6chec h la compdten-
ce de la loi personnelle et dans des conditions d’autant moins pr6-
visibles qu’elles d6pendent souvent et uniquement d’une apprdcia-
tion par le juge de rensemble des faits de la cause.
La seconde partie invite h parcourir un chemin inverse du pr6c6-
dent. La competence de la loi de l’acte, dans laquelle M. Glenn voit
la position de principe du droit anglais, bien qu’aucune decision
anglaise ne l’ait consacrde express6ment pour ce qui est de la capa-
cit6 de faire des actes juridiques en gdndral (voir p.156, no.177),
trouve elle aussi son origine dans la tradition territorialiste de
d’Argentr6, recueillie en Angleterre par l’intermddiaire des auteurs
hollandais du XVIIe siicle, et corrigde par la distinction anglaise en-
tre l’6tat (status) de la personne et les effets (incidents) et de cet
6tat, parmi lesquels la capacit6 (p.145, no.162). Tandis que l’6tat est
soumis 6 la loi personnelle, la capacit6 en est d6tachde pour 6tre
soumise h la loi .du lieu de l’acte, puis h celle de l’acte lui-mrne, tant
il est vrai que si “[1]a condition juridique de l’individu doit rester
constante … son aptitude h agir peut varier selon les circonstances”
(p.147, no.63).
M. Glenn n’est pas enthousiasm6 par cette distinction. Tout en
reconnaissant que l’application de -la loi de l’acte h la capacit6 6vite
un d6pegage du contrat et assure la s~curit6 du cocontractant, i
montre que, sur le plan thdorique, la distinction status-incidents
rdduit le premier terme h une pure abstraction juridique et que, sur
le plan pratique, elle fait naitre de ddlicats probl~mes de qualifica-
tion. Si la solution 6vite aux auteurs anglais les pi6ges de la distinc-
tion frangaise entre ce qui relive de la cat~gorie capacit6 et ce qui
relive de la cat~gorie acte juridique, elle les contraint n4anmoins h
faire le depart entre la capacit6 et l’6tat et M. Glenn regrette que la
qualification capacit, soit souvent abusivement retenue pour appli-
quer la loi du rapport juridique (c’est-h-dire souvent la loi anglaise)
sans invoquer ouvertement l’ordre public, dans des hypotheses oil
c’est en r~alit6 l’6tat de la personne qui est en cause (voir p.149,
no.168, le refus d’accorder une succession anglaise . un enfant rdgu-
lirement lgitim6 selon la loi de son domicile).
M. Glenn examine en detail l’6tendue de la competence de la loi
de l’acte dans le droit international priv6 anglais et explique h mer-
veille que la capacit6 souffre (ou profite?) de la “flexibilit6” du
droit international priv6 anglais en la mati~re et notamment de
l’hsitation entre la loi du lieu de situation de la chose et la loi du con-
‘ Req., 16 janv. 1861, D.P. 61.1.193, S.61.1.305.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
trat lorsqu’il s’agit de la oapacit6 de transf6rer un droit r6el. Le droit
anglais n’est pas cependant compltement insensible aux liens de
la capacit6 avec 1’6tat de la personne, notamment en mati~re de
protection des incapables oit une certaine “discretion” est laissde
au juge pour reconnaitre des pouvoirs tut6laires conf6r6s h l’dtranger
en application de la loi personnelle de l’incapable. Mais le test de
‘aveu de ce lien par le droit anglais nous paraft 6tre dans les rd-
ponses qui seront donndes aux deux questions suivantes, en matiere
de contrats. L’autonomie de la volont6 permet-elle aux parties, en
choisissant la loi du contrat, de choisir la loi de leur capacit6, ou,
pour ce qui touche du moins h la capacit6, la loi du contrat doit-elle
toujours 6tre ddtermine de faron objective? D’autre part, la per-
sonne pleinement capable selon la loi de son domicile peut-elle 8tre
rdputde incapable –
si la loi
du contrat en decide ainsi? M. Glenn parait opiner pour les r6ponses
qui sauvegardent le lien de la capacit6 avec la loi personnelle, mais
ces questions restent ddbattues en Angleterre.
et le contrat qu’elle a pass6 annuk –
Au terme de son 6tude M. Glenn nous livre le fond de sa pensee.
Il est tris sdvire, peut-6tre m6me trop, h l’encontre du syst~me fran-
;ais et, tout en rendant hommage aux juristes qui l’ont adapt6 aux
exigences modernes, il estime inaddquat le principe du rattachement
de la capacit6 hi la loi personnelle. Mais il hdsite h se ranger derriere
la banni~re anglaise de la loi de l’acte dont le ddfaut le plus grave
est de n’avoir pas subi l’6preuve du temps ni encore donn6 de solu-
tion aux graves probl~mes ddjh signals et qui restent en suspens.
Au fond, c’est plut6t h la mdthode de la r~gle de conflit que s’en
prend M. Glenn, en exprimant une pr6fdrence trbs marquee pour
une solution matdrielle, inspirde de la jurisprudence Lizardi,2 qui
tienne compte dans chaque cas des circonstances de la cause et des
divers int6r&ts h protdger. La solution pourra ddcevoir les amateurs
de certitudes et le lecteur aurait assurdment 6t6 comb16 si l’auteur
avait pu 6toffer davantage ses positions et proposer au moins des
“principes de prdf6rence”, m6me assortis de toute la souplesse nd-
cessaire. II a sans doute craint de ddpasser son propos strictement
comparatif. En tout cas la lecture de cet ouvrage fortement char-
pent6, 6crit dans un style que sa sobridt6 rend particuli~rement effi-
cace et persuasif, montre clairement qu’en cette mati~re fuyante des
solutions insuffisamment nuancdes ne sont pas praticables.
Paul Lagarde*
2 Ibid.
*Professeur de droit international priv6 iL l’Universit6 de Paris I.
19761
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and Method of the Law, revised edition,
by Edgar Bodenheimer, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1975. Pp.xii, 463 ($15.00).
This volume is a revised edition of Professor Bodenheimer’s
1962 work. It maintains the tripartite division of its predecessor, but
contains a largely rewritten second section on the nature and func-
tions of the law, in which the author explores in greater detail “the
psychological roots of the law, the conceptual scope and substantive
components of the notion of justice, and the criteria for the validity
of law” (p.v). Here are considered, along with the “classics”, some of
the more recent writings of such contemporary legal thinkers as
Rawls, Hall, Ehrenzweig, Messner, Verdross, Hoebel and Friedrich.
Bodenheimer’s integration of recent European and Anglo-American
legal literature in this area is an especially valuable and attractive
feature of the book. As in the former volume, the initial section of
some nine chapters is devoted to a critical examination of the history
of the philosophy of law from Plato to McDougal and Lasswell,
while the concluding four chapters (where the treatment of legal
reasoning has also been revised) deal with the sources and techniques
of the law.
Professor Bodenheimer’s treatise is in no sense a mere descriptive
survey. Scholarly, thoughtful, often provocative, and written in a
crisply lucid style, the core of the book develops the author’s thesis
that a legal system “must aim at the creation of order as well as the
realization of justice” (p.246). In Bodenheimer’s words:
In a healthy legal system the values of order and justice are not normally
at cross purposes; on the contrary, they are locked together in a higher
union. A legal system that cannot meet the demands of justice will be
unable, in the long run, to provide order and peace for the body politic.
Justice, on the other hand, cannot be accomplished without an orderly
system of judicial administration which will ensure the equal treatment
of equal situations. Thus the maintenance of order is to some extent
conditioned by the existence of a reasonably sound system of law, while
justice needs the helping hand of order to perform some of its essential
functions. The required synthesis of the two values may be summed up
in the statement that law aims at the creation of a just societal order.
(pp246-247)
Bodenheimer supports his case for the need for a synthesis of
order and justice by referring to the polarities of a system of adjudi-
cation without law which would rest simply on “the free and un-
fettered intelligence of its judges”, and “an orderly, well-articulated
body of rules which fail to correspond to the community’s sense
of justice” (p.248). However wise and impartial judges may be,
opinions must reasonably differ concerning which situations require
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
like decisions, and some degree of normative guidance is necessary
(whether through legislation or social, ethical or religious usages
and customs) in order to ensure a modicum of consistency in the
application of law. At the other extreme, a rigorous but mechanical
social order uninformed by a just standard would be fit only for
Ila society of robots” and would be bound to generate a popular
reaction which could undermine and ultimately topple the legal
regime. As a foremost American natural lawyer the author states:
“The natural-law tradition of ancient and modern vintage has tended
towards the position that a normative system wholly or largely
devoid of justice does not deserve the name of ‘law'” (p.248).
Although Bodenheimer throughout makes clear his own bias
towards natural law, he shares with Jerome Hall a refreshing eclec-
ticism which is capable of absorbing the best insights of the analy-
tical, sociological and other jurisprudential schools into his own
brand of “integrative jurisprudence”. Referring to the efforts of
Hall in the United States and to similar work by Erich Fechner in
Germany, Bodenheimer observes that “the law is a complicated
web, and it is the task of the science of jurisprudence to pull together
the various strands which go into the making of this intricate fabric”
(p.164). If the various schools provide valuable insights, however,
they also betray weaknesses, and it is the task of the “integrative
jurisprudent” to ponder carefully relative merits and defects and
to accept only the best features of each tradition. This Bodenheimer
proceeds to do.
Thus, valuable though social forces may be in explaining legal
control, excessive reliance on them as explanatory factors may
distort one’s perspective by excluding important legal ideals such as
liberty or equality which may also be pertinent in the total social
context. If one considers the historical school of law, its distinctive
insight is that “the national genius of a people may have its share
in the creation of a great legal system”, but it cannot explain, for
example, how the legal systems of Germany or Switzerland could be
successfully transplanted to countries like Turkey and Japan. More-
over, it may be that “[a] truly great legal system will have qualities
which raise it above the limitations of national traits and render it,
at least in some measure, universal in spirit and practical value”
(p.165). While Marxist legal scholars have discussed the close
relationship between economics and law, they have assigned a
disproportionate weight to class antagonisms and should have taken
into account also such collateral matters as power relations, basic
biological facts, ethnological data, religious convictions, ideologies,
value systems and the dictates of reason as possible explanatory
1976]
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
factors. Analytical positivism emphasizes the careful elucidation of
legal concepts from a technical point of view in order to achieve the
aims of consistency and clarity, but at the sacrifice of ignoring the
important psychological, ethical, economic and social foundations
of law. It also errs in defining law simply as “force”, thereby mini-
mizing such factors as authority, legitimacy and values. Legal realism
has acted as a corrective for analytical jurisprudence by stressing the
extra-legal variables affecting the judicial process, but especially in
its early forms it has tended to give insufficient weight to the role
of legal rules in the practical dimension of the law. Bodenheimer’s
conclusion is that the schools generally have been too one-sided in
their preoccupations and have much to learn from each other; per-
haps a new synthesis is now needed (pp.164-168).
The last part of the book deals with formal and nonformal sources
of the law (e.g., legislation, treaties, precedents, “justice”, reason,
equity, public policies, morality, social trends, custom), law and
scientific method, and the techniques of the judicial process. The
chapter on scientific method contains an interesting discussion of
concept formation touching on the nominalist-realist controversy
and the “core and penumbra” problem. In line with his approach
earlier in the book, the author recommends the use of both analytical
(e.g., deduction, induction and analogy) and dialectical (consider-
ation of two contradictory statements should be accepted) modes of
reasoning in their appropriate contexts (pp.385-397). Value judg-
ments may also play a part in legal reasoning, mainly when they
become fixed in constitutional provisions, statutes and other legal
norms, but also when the courts are compelled to rely on general
principles of justice and public policy in the absence of unambiguous
directives (p.400). Bodenheimer’s premises about the nature of law
and legal reasoning impel him to make a strong case for a broad
interdisciplinary legal education embracing history, international
affairs, political theory, economics and philosophy, all of which are
related to a legal system conceived as “a part of the total life of
society” (p.402).
The three parts of the book with their respective historical,
axiological and systemic concerns complement each other nicely.
Professor Bodenheimer has a rare gift for lucidity and compression,
and has eruditely and gracefully discussed the major jurisprudential
controversies from the Greeks onward in this thoughtful and well-
balanced book.
W. H. McConnell*
* Of the Faculty of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
Convention Communautaire sur la Compitence Judiciaire et l’Exdcution
des Decisions, par Martha Weser,1 Paris: Pedone, 1975. Pp. xxix, 773 ($49.00).
Le droit international priv6 de la communaut6 6conomique euro-
p6enne a connu, ces derni6res ann6es, des d6veloppements particu-
li~rement importants. En effet, la Convention concernant la compe-
tence judiciaire et 1’ex6cution des ddcisions en mati~res civiles et
commerciales, sign6e h Bruxelles le 27 septembre 1968 et entr6e en
vigueur le premier f6vrier 1973, a modifi6 les codes de proc6dure
civile des six Etats fondateurs du March6 commun.
Cette Convention a 6t6 adopt6e en vertu de
‘article 220 du Trait6
de Rome qui pr6voit que: “Les Etats membres engageront entre
eux, en tant que de besoin, des n6gociations en vue d’assurer, en
faveur de leurs ressortissants … la simplification des formalit6s aux-
quelles sont subordonn6es la reconnaissance et l’ex6cution rdcipro-
ques des d6cisions judiciaires ainsi que des -sentences arbitrales.”
La Convention d6passe cet objectif, les n6gociateurs s’6tant
apergus que son efficacit6 serait assez restreinte si elle ne r6glait
pas aussi la comp6tence judiciaire des Etats membres. En effet,
‘un des obstacles hi 1’octroi de 1’ex6quatur est invariablement la con-
dition de v6rification par le tribunal requis de la comp6tence du
juge 6tranger.
Centr6 sur cette Convention, mais effectuant une 6tude com-
plete des rigles de juridicfion et d’ex6cution des jugements 6trangers
dans les six pays du March6 commun, rouvrage de M. Weser est un
remarquable outil de travail pour le chercheur et le praticien. Or,
ce dernier est particuli~rement concern6 car, depuis f6vrier 1973,
aucun proc~s comportant un 616ment d’extrandit6 ne peut avoir lieu
dans les six pays sans tenir compte des rbgles de la Convention.
Celle-ci fait compl~tement abstraction de la nationalit6 des parties
et s’applique lorsque le d6fendeur est domicili6 dans un pays con-
tractant et m6me lorsqu’il ne l’est pas, (article 4 et 16). C’est pour-
quoi, 1’importance de cet instrument ddpasse le cadre r6gional oi
il a pris naissance. I1 ne faut pas oublier, h cet 6gard, que les rela-
tions commerciales entre le Canada et le March6 commun sont en
train de se ddvelopper et de tendre vers un accord g6n6ral officiel.3
1 Professeur h l’Universit6 libre de Bruxelles; avocat pros la Cour d’appel
de Bruxelles.
2Y. Loussouarn, Les incidences des Communautds europiennes sur la con-
ception frangaise du droit international privg (1974) 10 Revue trim. de droit
europden 708, h la p. 725.
3 C. Atala, La C.E.E. rgvale le Canada 1 l’Europe, Les Affaires, Montr6al, vol.
XLVIII, no. 10, 8 mars 1976, p. 1.
19761
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
Les noveaux membres du March6 commun sont destinds h deve-
nir t6t ou tard parties h la Convention qu’ils ont robligation d’ac-
cepter comme base de n6gociations (article 63).
Le champ d’application de cette derni~re est 6tendu puisqu’elle
“s’applique en mati~re civile et commerciale et quelle que soit la
natur de la juridiction” (article 1). Sont cependant expressdment
exclus les litiges concernant 1’tat et la capacit6 des personnes physi-
ques, les rdgimes matrimoniaux, les testaments, les successions, les
faillites, concordats et autres procdures analogues, la sdcurit6 so-
ciale ainsi que l’arbitrage.
Dans ces mati6res, les litiges continuent a 6tre rdgis par les traitds
bilatdraux ou multilatraux4 qui lient certains des six Etats ou, h
d6faut de tel trait6, par les r6g.les de leur droit commun.
Il en r6sulte une juxtaposition de r-gles de droit qui semble
avoir inspir6 le plan de rouvrage de M. Weser. Dans un titre pr6li-
minaire, l’auteur 6labore une thdorie gdndrale des conflits de juri-
dictions ce qui est d’autant plus utile que ces conflits sont rarement
6tudids en ddtail dans les traitds de droit international priv6. Ils
semblent 6tre les parents pauvres des conflits de lois, du moins dans
les juridictions civilistes
La premiire partie de l’ouvrage est consacrde a la comp6tence
des tribunaux et aux effets des jugements dans le March6 commun
dans les mati6res exclues par la Convention communautaire de 1968.
La deuxi-me partie traite principalement de cette Convention ainsi
que du Protocole concernant son interpr6tation par la Cour de
justice, sign6 h Luxembourg le 3 juin 1971.6 Elle donne 6galement
un bref aperru du projet de convention entre les Etats de la C.E.E.
relative a la faillite, aux concordats et aux proc6dures analogues.
4 Ainsi, par exemple, en mati6re d’arbitrage, la R~publique f~drale d’Alle-
magne, la France, l’Italie et les Pays-Bas sont parties a la Convention pour
la reconnaissance et l’ex~cution des sentences arbitrales 6trang6res, signde b
New-York le 10 juin 1958; la R6publique f&drale d’Allemagne, la France et
‘Italie sont parties h la Convention europ~enne sur rarbitrage commercial
international, signde a Gen6ve le 21 avril ;1961; la Convention europ6enne por-
tant loi uniforme en mati6re d’arbitrage signde iL Strasbourg le 20 janvier
1966 a 6t6 approuvde par la loi belge du 4 juillet 1972 qui l’introduit dans le
code judiciaire (Moniteur, 8 aofit 1972).
5 H. Batiffol et P. Lagarde, Droit international privd Se 6d., Paris, L.G.DJ.
t.2, no.667 h 694; P. Lrebours-Pigeonni~re et Y. Loussouarn, Droit inter-
(1971)
national privd 9e d., Paris, Dalloz (1970) no. 394 h 429; F. Rigaux, Droit inter-
national privg, Bruxelles, Larcier (1968) no. 39 h 65.
6 Ce protocole est entr6 en vigueur le premier septembre 1975, 1.O. no. L
204/28 du 2 aofit 1975.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
Dans la troisi~me partie, ‘auteur 6tudie les conflits de conven-
tions dans le C.E.E. La Convention communautaire de 1968 r~gle en
effet ses relations avec une s6rie de trait6s 6numdr6s en son article
55. Si ceux-ci sont remplacds par la Convention communautaire de
1968, ils continuent n6anmoins ii produire leurs effets en ce qui
concerne les d6cisions rendues et les actes regus avant l’entrde en
vigueur de la Convention et dans toutes les mati~res auxquelles elle
n’est pas applicable.
M. Weser est d’autant plus qualifide pour aborder ces problbmes
ddlicats qu’elle a publid, d~s 1951, une 6tude fouill6e du Trait6 franco-
belge du 8 juillet 1899 sur la comptence judiciaire, sur l’autoritd et
l’exdcution des d6cisions judiciaires, des sentences arbitrales et des
actes authentiques.
Cette troisibme partie, particuli~rement int6ressante, est com-
pldt6e par I’dtude des moyens destin6s it supprimer ces conflits et par
celle de ‘avant-projet de convention sur la loi applicable aux obliga-
tions contractuelles et non-contractuelles.
Finalement, de nombreuses annexes, formant une quatri6me par-
tie, reproduisent tous les textes dtudids.
Ainsi pr6sent6 par l’auteur dans son cadre complet, l’impact de
la Convention communautaire de 1968 peut Atre dvalu6 dans toute
son importance.
Tout d’abord, ainsi que le souligne avec force M. Weser, la Con-
vention comprend des r~gles de compdtence directes c’est-h-dire qui
ddsignent directement le ou les tribunaux competents pour con-
naitre d’une action intentde dans
‘un des Etats contractants. La
structure de la Convention communautaire est en cela fort diffdrente
de celle de la Convention de La Haye sur la reconnaissance et 1’ex-
cution des jugements 6trangers en mati~res civiles et commerciales,
adoptde en 19668 qui se borne h 6tablir des r~gles de comptence
indirectes s’adressant au juge de 1’exdquatur
La Convention pr6voit des rZgles de compdtences exclusives
dans quelques domaines limitativement 6num6rds dans l’article 16.10
lTraitd franco-belge du 8 juillet 1899, 6tude critique, Paris, Sirey (1951).
8 Recueil des Conventions de La Haye, 6d. par le Bureau permanent de la
Confdrence de La Haye (1973), 106.
9 Pour une comparaison entre les deux instruments, voir M. Weser, Conven-
tion communautaire sur La competence judiciaire et l’exdcution des dicisions,
supra, p. 60, no. 63 et seq.
-0 Par exemple, en mati~re de droits rdels immobiliers et de baux d’immeu-
‘Etat contractant oil est situ6 l’immeuble sont seuls
bles, les tribunaux de
compdtents sans consid6ration de domicile.
19761
BOOK REVIEWS – LIVRES NOUVEAUX
En dehors de ces cas, le crit~re de comp6tence principal est
celui du domicile du d6fendeur s’il se trouve dans un des pays con-
tractants. Ce m~me d~fendeur peut aussi
tre attrait devant le tri-
bunal d’un autre Etat de la C.E.E. dans les cas prdvus -par les articles
5 et 6 de la Convention, par exemple devant le tribunal du lieu oti
‘obligation a 6t6 ou doit 8tre ex6cut6e (article 5(1), 11 ou encore le
tribunal du lieu oii le fait dommageable s’est produit (article 5(3)).12
Si le d6fendeur n’est pas domicili6 dans un Etat de la Com-
munaut6 6conomique europ6enne, le demandeur qui, lui, y est domi-
cili6 peut, comme les nationaux, y invoquer les r~gles de competence
nationales de cet Etat et, notamment, en France, le demandeur do-
micili6 dans ce pays peut y invoquer le fameux article 14 du Code
civil. En d’autres termes, “[lies privileges nationaux devierment
ainsi par le Trait des ‘privileges communautaires’ “13 ce qui n’a pas
6t6 sans inqui6ter fortement les juristes anglais et am6ricains. 14
La Convention contient des r~gles de comptences speciales en
mati~res d’assurance et de ventes h temp rament et elle prfvoit
6galement, dans son article 17, que les parties, lorsque rune au
moins est domicilide dans un Etat contractant, pourront, par con-
vention, attribuer competence exolusive t un tribunal d6signe ou
aux tribunaux d’un Etat contractant.
11 La determination du lieu de l’exdcution de l’obligation a sembl soulever
certaines difficult6s en mati~re de concession de vente exclusive en Belgique,
voir Trib. comm. Bruxelles, 30 mai 1974; Cl. 1975.355. Le tribunal a d6cid6 que
l’exception h la competence du tribunal du domicile du d6fendeur “n’est pas
d’application, lorsque la convention des parties ne contient pas de clause
expresse d6terminant le lieu d’ex6cution de l’obligation ldgale faite au con-
cddant de payer une indemnit6 en cas de rdsiliation unilat6rale d’une con-
cession de vente en Belgique” contra Comm. Liege, 17 mars 1975, ddcision’
inddite cite dans Colloque de Bruxelles sur les Conventions communautai-
res, III, M. Weser, R~gles de compdtence prdvues par la Convention commu-
nautaire concernant la competence judiciaire et 1’exdcution des decisions en
mati~re civile et commerciale (1975) 11 Rev. trim. de droit europ6en 24,
la p. 27, note 1.
12 Pour une interpr6tation prudente de ce crit~re, voir Trib. Gde inst. Paris
(1974) 63 Rev. crit. d.i.p. 696, note
(r6f. et 16re Ch.) 7 et 19 juin 1974,
Lagafde; Cl. 1975.86, note Holleaux.
:1 M. Weser, supra, 276, no. 243.
14Voir pour l’influence de ces dispositions – alors h 1’6tat de projets –
sur
les n6gociations de la Convention de La Haye sur la reconnaissance et 1’ex6-
cution des jugements 6trangers en mati~re civile et commerciale, G. Droz,
Compdtence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le Marchd commun, Paris,
Dalloz (1972) no. 663 et seq.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 22
Finalement, la Convention consacre une distinction fondamentale
entre la reconnaissance des jugements et leur ex6cution. La recon-
naissance est automatique en ce sens que les ddcisions rendues dans
les six Etats ont autorit6 de la chose jugde dans toute la Commu-
naut6 “sans qu’il soit ndcessaire de recourir h aucune proc6dure”
(article 26, al. 1). La reconnaissance ne peut 6tre refus6e que pour
des motifs extr~mement limit6s qui sont constitutifs de i’ordre
public international (article 27).
L’exdcution se fait selon l’exdquatur simplifi6 pr6vu aux articles
31 et suivants.
Notons que le juge statue sans entendre la partie adverse (article
34) et contr6le simplement si la ddcision ne se heurte pas h un des
motifs de refus prdvus par l’article 27. Si l’exdcution est autorisde,
la partie contre .laquelle elle est demandde peut former un recours
contre la ddcision dans le mois de sa signification (article 36) devant
la juridiction ddsignde
. l’article 37.
I1 faut noter la place modeste de l’ordre public. En effet les
rigles relatives h la compdtence dchappent h l’exception d’ordre
public qui ne peut 6tre invoqude que pour dcarter’un jugement 6tran-
ger (article 28).
II dtait hi craindre que le principe, fortement ancrd dans certains
pays, selon lequel aucun traitd ne saurait faire 6chec h la comp6-
tence des tribunaux du for lorsqu’ils sont -saisis d’une demande int6-
ressant l’ordre public 5 ne vienne ddjouer les objectifs de la Con-
vention. Heureusement, l’application de celle-ci a pris un bon d6part
dans ce domaine en France oit l’exception d’incompdtence des tri-
bunaux du for a 6td accueillie en d6pit de l’argument du deman-
deur fondd sur le principe ci-dessus en mati~re de contrats de tra-
vail 16 et dans le domaine, pourtant fortement lid aux lois de police
et de sfiret6, des spoliations. 7
Ce bref expos6 du fonctionnement de la Convention nous a
paru ndcessaire pour mettre en lumi~re toute sa complexit6. Les
r gles qu’eHe dicte, de m~me que celes auxquelles il faut recourir
lorsqu’elle ne s’applique pas, sont exposdes par M. Weser avec une
‘5 En France, voir Soc. 22 novembre 1972, (1973) 62 Rev. crit. d.i.p. 565, note
H. Batiffol; Cl. 1973.721, note Lyon-Caen.
V;Aix-en-Provence (9e Ch. soc.) 10 mai 1974, (1974) 63 Rev. crit. d.i.p. 548,
note G. Droz.
17 Paris (le ch.) 16 d~cembre 1974, Gaz.Pal 1975.1.179, conf. Trib. Gde inst.
Paris (r6Lf.) 7 juin 1974, supra, note 12.
19761
BOOK REVIEWS –
LIVRES NOUVEAUX
remarquable clart6 ainsi qu’avec la profonde maitrise d’un auteur
qui a consacr6 de longues annes h l’6tude de son sujet et des do-
maines connexes.’8 De nombreux tableaux facilitent la consultation
de l’ouvrage rdfdrant imm6diatement le lecteur au paragraphe perti-
nent suivant le genre de litige auquel il s’intdresse.
I1 est rare de pouvoir saluer une oeuvre dont l’utilit6 pratique et
la valeur acad6mique sont i un niveau aussi 61ev6.
E. Groffier*
18 Voir supra, notes 7 et 11 et la longue liste d’articles et de notes diverses de
M. Weser dans la bibliographie de son ouvrage.
* Professeur associ6, facult6 de droit, McGill University.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
No. 3
Vol 22
Montreal
1976
ACCESS TO JUSTICE / L’ACCES A LA JUSTICE
SPECIAL ISSUE
NUMIeRO SPICIAL
PREFACE / PREFACE
The theme for this Special Issue, “Access to Justice”, was chosen
because the Board of Editors believes that although the law has un-
dergone far reaching change in recent years, many basic problems
remain. While law reform and the advent of government programmes
such as Legal Aid have in theory made the law available to all, in
practice “equality before the law ”* remains an elusive goal. We do
not pretend to have found all the answers, but we hope that the
articles in this Special Issue will illuminate some of the problems
which still exist.
We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation
for the enthusiastic response with which this Special Issue was
met by the authors who have contributed to it, and to thank the
Canada Council and the Quebec Legal Services Commission for the
grants which made it financially possible.
Plusieurs probl~mes fondamentaux demeurent sans solution mA-
me si la loi a considdrablement 6volu6 durant ces derni~res annes,
tel est le motif qui a pouss6 la Rddaction i consacrer un numdro
spdcial h “L’Acc~s h la Justice”. Thdoriquement, des rdformes juridi-
ques de m~me que des programmes du gouvernement dont, par exem-
ple, l’assistance judiciaire, ont rendu la justice accessible h tous, mais,
pratiquement, “‘6galit6 devant la loi ‘** est sujette h caution. Certes,
toutes les questions, mais
nous ne prdtendons pas avoir repondu
nous esprons que les articles de ce num6ro special projetteront un
nouvel 6clairage sur quelques uns des problkmes qui subsistent
encore.
Les auteurs qui ont 6crit dans ce numdro ont r~pondu de faron
enthousiaste h notre appel. Nous les en remercions vivement. Nous
remercions 6galement le Conseil des Arts du Canada et la Com-
mission des services juridiques du Qu6bec, la contribution financi6-
re desquels ayant rendu possible la parution de ce numdro.
Special Issue Editor / Rddacteur du numdro spdcial
Michael Prupas
* Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44, s.1(b) (see R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III).
**Ddclaration canadienne des droits, S.C. 1960, c.44, art.1(b) (voir S.R.C. 1970,
Appendice III).
