Saskatchewan and the Amendment of the
Canadian Constitution
B. L. Strayer *
In recent years the Province of Saskatchewan has exerted an
influence in constitutional reform far beyond its importance in size,
wealth, or population. A latecomer to Confederation, the creation of
the Dominion of Canada carved out of the latter’s vast north-western
colonial empire, her early years were occupied in striving for legal
equality with the senior provinces. This accomplished, she turned
her attention to the larger Canadian scene. With all the zeal of a
convert, she became more national-minded than those statesmen who
had called her forth. Conditions were such that she was forced to
identify her interests with those of strong central government. For
thirty years these considerations prevailed until mitigated by the
growth of prosperity at home, of centrifugal political forces through-
out the country, and finally the provincial election of 1964. But even
today a majority of Saskatchewan people and politicians would
favour a strong central government, and would accept with reluc-
tance constitutional arrangements detracting from federal power.
The First Quarter Century: Consolidation
Two constitutional problems were created at the time of Saskat-
chewan’s entry into Confederation in 1905. These arose over the
issues of religion and resources. Insofar as there was any serious
concern over constitutional affairs before 1930, it centred on these
matters and manifested itself in a demand for local autonomy.
When the province was detached from the North-West Terri-
tories, the federal government was busily dumping immigrants into
the area and settling them on Crown grants or “homesteads”. This
was part of a grand design conceived to be in the national interest.
Federal authorities somewhat reluctantly yielded to the demands
for provincial status from Territories Premier F. W. G. Haultain
and his supporters, but they could not risk the possibility of new
provincial administrations frustrating the settlement policies of the
federal government. Hence section 21 of the Saskatchewan Act 1
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
1 STAT. CAN. 1905, c. 42.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
reserved for the Crown in right of Canada all Crown lands, minerals
and water. By section 20 the province was to be paid a subsidy in
lieu of resources revenues. Similar provisions were put in the Alberta
Act of the same year.
In the negotiations leading up to passage of these Acts, Haultain
opposed the qualified provincial status which the Laurier adminis-
tration proposed to confer. His vocal opposition on this and other
issues, including an intervention by him on behalf of the Conserva-
tive party in two federal by-elections in Ontario, led the Laurier-
appointed Lieutenant Governor to overlook him when the first pro-
vincial government was formed.2 This assured the victory of a Liberal
administration in Saskatchewan but did not end the dispute over
resources. Successive governments pressed the federal authorities
for a “return” of Saskatchewan’s natural resources. After federal
settlement policies had been largely implemented Ottawa was re-
sponsive to this demand but had difficulty agreeing with the prov-
ince on proper financial terms. Was the subsidy to be continued in
spite of the return of the resources ? Should Ottawa account for
resources profits from 1905 onward ? These were the contentious
constitutional issues for Saskatchewan before 1930. For example,
in preparing themselves for the Dominion-provincial conference of
1927, where constitutional amendment procedure was one of the
subjects to be discussed, provincial representatives concentrated en-
tirely on natural resources and related financial questions.3 A sum-
mary of the conference proceedings reveals that this was one of
the few subjects on which the province expressed strong views.4
This issue was not settled until March 20, 1930, when an agree-
ment between Ottawa and Regina was signed turning over to the
province her natural resources. As confirmed by statute, the transfer
eliminated the last major evidence of colonial status and with it the
provincial demand for jurisdictional equality.
The other constitutional problem of this era also arose out of
the terms of the Saskatchewan Act. When provincial status was
proposed for Saskatchewan and Alberta, early drafts of the enabling
legislation provided for a system of denominational schools –
a
2 See e.g. Saywell, Liberal Politics, Federal Policies, and the Lieutenant-Gover-
nor: Saskatchewan and Alberta 1905 (1955) 8 SASK. HIST. 81.
31 am indebted to Mr. A. R. Turner, Provincial Archivist, Regina, for his
perusal of the material in question. I am also indebted to Mr. D. H. Bocking
and other m~mbers of the Archives staff for their assistance with various sources
of historical information.
4 Pricis of Discussions, Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1927 (Ottawa, 1928)
at 22-23.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
445
bifurcated and wholly sectarian eductional structure. The resulting
controversy, reminiscent of the Manitoba School question of the
preceding decade, saw strong protests from Haultain’s local autono-
mists and the resignation of Clifford Sifton, Laurier’s Minister of
the Interior. The final compromise, embodied in section 17 of the
Saskatchewan Act, perpetuated the system of public schools with
minority or separate school rights as previously found in the North-
West Territories. Like most compromises, this left both sides dis-
satisfied. Haultain’s group looked upon it as a flagrant interference
with provincial rights and insisted that the province should be al-
lowed to make its own decision as to the proper relationship between
education and religion. The constitutional guarantee of pre-1905 sepa-
rate school rights in the Saskatchewan Act detracted from provincial
jurisdiction over education. It was viewed by many Saskatchewan
imposed by
citizens as a special privilege for Roman Catholics,
Ottawa and subsequently defended by local Liberal administrations.
Wartime and post-war fervour for things Anglo-Saxon and Protes-
tant increased resentment against this system. These sentiments pre-
vailed among large segments of the population during the 1920’s
and aided the formation of a strong Ku Klux Klan organization in
the province in the latter part of that decade. The Klan and others
who harboured anti-Catholic resentment aided in 1929 in defeating
the provincial Liberal party as the body responsible for what they
regarded as a constitutional travesty.5 Shortly therearter the de-
pression made religion and schools fade almost 6 into oblivion as
political issues.
These then were the burning constitutional issues in Saskat-
chewan before 1930. They were mainly inwara-looking, and they
involved issues of provincial autonomy or equality with the older
provinces.
In this context constitutional amendment procedures were not of
first importance. Yet we can perceive some governmental and public
awareness of the prob’em. It will be recalled that in early 1920 the
minister of Justice, Hon. C. J. Doherty, had corresponded with the
provincial attorneys-general concerning the possibility of devising
a Canadian amending procedure. 7 Whatever Saskatchewan’s official
and private reaction was, Premier Martin’s public utterances were
5 See e.g. Wright, Saskatchewan, The History of a Province (Toronto, 1955)
at 212-13.
6 Latent problems remained. For example, when the legislature in 1964 extended
the tax-supported separate school system to secondary schools in urban centres,
the measure proved to be very controversial.
7 Gerin-Lajoie, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto, 1950) at 223.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
unfavourable. He was disposed to “leave things are they are” and
was certainly against giving the power to the Canadian Parliament
to amend without approval by the provinces. (This was probably
never suggested by Doherty.) He also disapproved of a weakening
of ties with Britain. As for any thought of independence from the
Crown, he said that 8
any man who had talked ten yeas ago as some are talking in Ottawa today
.would have been accused of treason … The war has not altered in the least
the legal status of Canada.
These views were criticized by both daily papers in Regina. The
Regina Daily Post argued that the Empire would instead be strength-
ened by formalizing the clearly recognized right of self-govern-
ment. The success of the Empire had resulted from “slackening con-
stitutional bonds and replacing them with bonds of friendship and
mutual respect”Y The Regina Morning Leader took the same general
approach, and advocated an amendment procedure similar to Aus-
tralia’s. It described our constitutional dependence on Great Britain
as “an anomaly that should be removed”. 10 Only the Alameda Dis-
patch, a weekly, attacked the proposed Canadian amendment proce-
dure, cal’ing it an unwarranted attempt at “the separation of the
Dominion from Great Britain and the creation of an independent
state”.”
Premier Martin’s apparently casual remarks about the threat to
the Imperial connection had thus stirred up some public controversy.
A clarification of government policy was given by Attorney General
W. F. A. Turgeon in a speech to a Regina service club on May 12,
1920. He pointed out that recent correspondence with the federal
authorities had nothing to do with the status of Canada as a nation
or. as a member of the Empire. This was a matter beyond the scope
of provincial concern. As for the possibility of a Canadian amending
formula, Saskatchewan had no objection as long as unanimous con-
sent of the provinces was required for amendments affecting pro-
vincial
jurisdiction, provincial property or education
rights. He indicated that these views had been communicated to
Ottawa. 12 This position was approved editorially by the Regina Daily
Post, though it suggested that the consent of a “stated majority”
of the provinces might be sufficient.
legislative
8 Regina Daily Post, March 26, 1920.
9 Id., March 27, 1920, and March 31, 1920.
10 Regina Leader, March 29, 1920, and April 3, 1920.
11 Alameda Dispatch, April 16, 1920.
12 Reported in the Regina Leader, May 12, 1920.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
447
Apparently nothing came of the federal-provincial correspond-
ence in 1920, nor did Saskatchewan take any further initiative in
the matter. The next occasion for official comment on an amending
procedure came at the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1927.
Here the Minister of Justice proposed that Canada should be given
the power of amendment. He suggested a requirement of unanimity
for matters of provincial jurisdiction and minority rights, and ma-
jority provincial consent for other amendments. 13 While the official
record of the conference does not reveal Saskatchewan’s position, other
evidence indicates that the western premiers supported the federal
proposal. Prime Minister King hastily withdrew it, however, when
Premier Ferguson of Ontario and Premier Taschereau of Quebec
voiced strong objections. 14 Even those who expressed approval of a
change were apparently content to let the matter rest at that. Sub-
sequently, at the Dominion-Provincial Conference of April, 1931, to
discuss the draft Statute of Westminster, Saskatchewan supported
the preservation of -the status quo as provided in section 7 of that
Act. It apparently expected a later conference to settle the amend-
ment procedure, as Prime Minister Bennett had promised. At home,
the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix shared these expectations, hailing agree-
ment on the Statute of Westminster as “a decisive step towards the
acceptance of this dominion of national status within the Empire…
No further conference on this subject was ever summoned by Ben-
nett, but Saskatchewan apparently took no initiative at this time
in advancing the adoption of an amending procedure. It took the
combined calamities of depression and drought to arouse and sus-
tain a serious provincial interest in constitutional reform.
1930 to 1960 : The Drive for Centralization
After 1930 the factors of climate, economics and politics all
combined to rid Saskatchewan of complacency and force her to seek
national remedies for her ills.
During the 1920’s, Saskatchewan enjoyed boom conditions which
ill-prepared her for what was to follow. Unsettled conditions in post-
war Europe delayed a recovery of wheat production there, while in
Canada and particularly in Saskatchewan production was growing
rapidly. Almost all remaining arab.e land was settled and this com-
bined with good weather and ready markets abroad made wheat pro-
13 Prois supra note 4 at 11.
14 See Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King: The Lonely Heights (Toronto,
1963) at 235-36.
-1 April 9, 1931 at 11.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
duction spiral.1” Saskatchewan derived over sixty per cent of its
income directly from agriculture (most of it through export) and
much of the remainder was indirectly derived from the same source.’ 7
When the world-wide depression commenced in 1929, it soon was
accompanied in Saskatchewan by an unprecedented period of drought.
Economic conditions and increasing production abroad drastically
reduced the price of Canadian grain. Climatic conditions sharply
reduced production. Federal tariff policies of the early Thirties
kept up the cost of production in a period of rapidly declining reve-
nues. In the words of the Rowell-Sirois Commission:18
Canada’s most serious economic troubles during the thirties had their origin
in the impact of the world depression and drought upon the wheat-growing
industry of Saskatchewan. This industry, upon which the interdependence
and economic integration of the country were chiefly based, suffered the
most unfavourable coincidence of circumstances in its history. If the reper-
cussions upon other sections of the Dominion were widespread and severe,
the conditions in Saskatchewan were nothing short of disastrous. Econo-
mically this area was the most vulnerable in Canada. No other province
was so completely dependent upon the fluctuations in the export market.
Nowhere was production so dependent upon the vagaries of the climate.
Between 1929 and 1933 average per capita income dropped from
the fourth highest of any province to the lowest –
$478 to $135, a
72 per cent decrease. This was in comparison to a national average
decrease of 48 per cent, and to a decrease of only 36 per cent in
Nova Scotia, the most fortunate province in this respect.’0 In 1931
one-half of the rural population was destitute; in 1937 two-thirds
was destitute. Relief costs were equivalent to 60 per cent of all pro-
vincial and municipal revenues. 20
As a result, Saskatchewan had to look to Ottawa for her salva-
tion. Slowly, reluctantly, the federal government came to the aid of
the province and her municipalities. After 1932 the Dominion was
providing about 85 per cent of all relief costs, part in outright grants
and part in the form of loans.2 1 Federal subsides represented about
15 per cent of provincial – municipal revenue, compared to a national
average of 4 per cent.22
16 See Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations
(originally Appendix III of the Rowell-Sirols Report, 1939). (Toronto, Carleton
Library Series, 1964) at 87-90.
17 Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa,
1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Rowell-Sirois Report) vol. I at 121-122.
18Id., at 169.
19Id., at 150.
20 Id., at 169-70.
21 Id., at 170.
22 Id., at 235.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
449
Such experiences dramatically demonstrated for the people of
Saskatchewan their interdependence with the rest of Canada and
with world conditions. They concluded that economic ills had to be
treated at the national level, that only the resources of the federal
government were adequate to cope with major social ills. This new
attachment to centralization necessarily raised the issue of consti-
tutional reform and with it the matter of a suitable amending pro-
cedure. The strong desire for specific constitutional amendments in
favour of federal jurisdiction created a demand for a flexible amend-
ing procedure –
a procedure which could not be blocked by one or
two more fortunate provinces with exaggerated notions of “provin-
cial rights”. Saskatchewan had learned that provincial rights were
of little value where the province had no funds to exercise them.
The establishment and work of the special House of Commons
committee on amendment of the B.N.A. Act in 1935 evoked consider-
able interest in Saskatchewan. The chairman of the committee was
F. W. Turnbull, Conservative Member of Parliament for Regina. In
addition, the terms of the resolution creating the committee were
such as to strike a responsive chord on the prairies: the committee
was to study the best method of amendment whereby (safeguarding
legitimate minority and provincial rights) “the Dominion Govern-
ment may be given adequate power to deal effectively with urgent
economic problems which are essentially national in scope”. The
Regina Daily Star, a Conservative paper, in an editorial of February
18, 1935, noted the work of the committee and current controversy
over the validity of Bennett’s New Deal legislation and concluded
that 23
whatever be the result of the present controversy, the B.N.A. Act will have
to be amended, not to increase the powers of the provinces but those of the
central authority to deal with all problems that are of nation-wide application.
When the committee announced that it was going to invite sub-
missions from the provincial governments, the Daily Star took the
occasion to castigate in advance those provinces who might take the
“provincial rights line”. The editorial writer quoted Arthur Meighen
in warning against too rigid an amending formula.24 The Regina
Bar Association established a comittee to study the problem and
adopted a report on May 8, 1935 with respect to amendment of the
B.N.A. Act. The Association report, which was subsequently submit-
ted to the House of Commons committee, 2
5 did not specify a means
23 Regina Daily Star, Feb. 18, 1935 at 4.
24 Id., March 11, 1935 at 4.
25 See Proceedings, Evidence and Report of the Special House of Commons
Committee on the British North America Act (Ottawa, 1935) at viii.
450
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
of amendment but obviously disapproved of “provincial rights” de-
mands which would bring about inflexibility. It advocated changes
which would allow the federal government to implement social se-
curity measures such as unemployment insurance, old age pensions,
etc. and to control matters such as industrial disputes, hours of labour,
and the use of child labour. It suggested that section 91 should be
amended to provide that where parliament by a special majority de-
clared a measure to be for the peace, order and good government of
Canada such measure would be valid even if it “trenched” on pro-
vincial powers in sections 92 [13] or 92 [16] .26 The Daily Star warmly
supported these views and commended the report to its readers.2 7
When the House of Commons committee issued the invitation
to the provinces to make submissions on the questions before it,
Saskatchewan joined the other provinces
in declining. Like most
other provinces it felt that a Dominion-Provincial Conference would
be the more appropriate vehicle for provincial participation. But
the reply of Hon. T. C. Davis, provincial Attorney General, was by
far the most conciliatory of any provincial response. He acknowledged
that he had been “following with intense interest” the work of the
Committee and suggested that the Report might form a basis for
federal-provincial discussion after it had been submitted to Parlia-
ment for approval. This provincial refusal to make submissions to
the Committee was supported by the Liberal Saskatoon Star-Phoeni, 2
but strongly criticized by the Regina Daily Star.29
Events in the next two years clearly demonstrated the strong
interest of Mr. Davis and his government in an amending proce-
dure. It will be recalled that the House of Commons committee of
1935 in its report recommended the holding of a Dominion-Provin-
cial conference to discuss the method of amendment. Such a confer-
ence met in December of that year. In the constitutional amendment
committee of the conference, three proposals were put forward:
one by Ottawa, one jointly by Ontario and Manitoba, and one by
Saskatchewan. 30 While none of these proposals was adopted, the
Conference decided that there should be a Canadian amending pro-
cedure and that a continuing committee of Attorneys General should
work out a formula for constitutional amendment. Out of this com-
mittee and its sub-committee came a proposal for an amending for-
20 Regina Leader-Post, May 9, 1935 at 1-2.
27 Regina Daily Star, May 13, 1935 at 4.
28 Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, April 20, 1935 at 15.
29 Regina Daily Star, June 10, 1935 at 4.
so Referred to by Hon. T. C. Davis in Journals and Speeches, Legislature of
Saskatchewan, 1936 (Regina, 1936), Appendix at 12.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
451
mu~a. This proposal largely followed a familiar pattern, dividing
the constitution for amendment purposes into (a) matters affecting
Parliament only, (b) matters affecting Parliament and one or more
but not all provinces, (c) minority rights, and (d) matters affecting
Parliament and all provinces. T. C. Davis, in his report 3′ to the
legislature of March 24, 1936, on the work of the Conference and
the committee, indicated that initially it was proposed to amend
matters in group (d) by enactment of Parliament with approval of
the legislatures of two-thirds of the provinces representing at least
55 per cent of the population. While he did not specifically say so,
it is apparent that Davis was prepared to accept such a procedure.
He noted, however, that the Maritime provinces were concerned
about having changes forced on them by the other six provinces
who could form the requisite two-thirds. The proposal had therefore
been modified to provide that where a province voted against an
amendment affecting certain specified matters (including section
92[13] and 92[16],) and the amendment was nevertheless adopted,
it could continue to legislate on the matter in question even if the
amendment denied this power to the approving provinces. Davis
expressed
the hope that this compromise proposal would prove
acceptable to the Maritimes. In fact the committee was not recon-
vened and no further Dominion-Provincial conference was held on
this subject for over a decade thereafter.
Why did Saskatchewan take such an active interest in the de-
velopment of an amending formula ? Attorney General Davis did
not fully explain this to the legislature in reporting on the lengthy
efforts made to establish a procedure. He explained the general
interest of the provinces in this matter on the basis that they had
been losing power by judicial interpretation (the “Bennett New
Deal” cases were yet to come) and wanted a* clear-out definition
of their status, and further that they should have some definite con-
trol over future amendments instead of leaving these in the hands
of the Canadian and Imperial Parliaments. 32 This would suggest that
the dominant motive for constitutional reform was the strengthening
of provincial rights. But Davis nowhere stated that this was the
view of his government. He may have explained the matter in this
way to reassure members of the government and legislature who
might fear centralization. Certainly the acceptance by Saskatchewan
of the two-thirds, 55 per cent formula belied any strong attachment
to entrenchment of provincial powers. Moreover, events in 1937
31 Id., at 13-16.
32 Id., at 6-8.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
indicate clearly the direction in which Saskatchewan’s views were
developing.
When the Government of Saskatchewan presented its brief to
the Rowell-Sirois Commission in December, 1937, it took a strong
line in favour of centralization and constitutional reform to facili-
tate social security measures. This official position was no doubt
the product of the disasters of the Thirties and provincial dependence
on the federal treasury. The constitutional issue had recently been
thrown into sharp focus by the series of Privy Council decisions
handed down on January 28, 1937, striking down the various “New
Deal” measures and denying to the Parliament of Canada power to
implement treaties or deal with labour conditions, unemployment
insurance, and the marketing of natural products.” An early pas-
sage in the provincial submission set the tone by declaring that 34
there is a danger that the motion of provincial autonomy may be pushed
too far. We must also keep in mind that the British North America Act
established a Federal State, likewise with a claim to autonomy, and that the
machinery of government established under our constitution exists only as
a means to the end of human advancement.
theory was described as “unsupportable”, and
The compact
it
was urged that “in such circumstances the principle of unanimity
of consent to constitutional amendment cannot be tolerated”. This
view was reiterated near the end of the brief with the qualification
that “minority rights presently guaranteed under the British North
America Act should not be interferred with in the absence of com-
p’-ete agreement among the provinces”. 35 Apart from this no specific
suggestion was made for an amendment procedure.
In addition to opposing the entrenchment of provincial powers,
Saskatchewan suggested a series of amendments to extend the powers
of the Parliament of Canada. It was urged that power be given to
Parliament to implement treaties, and to legislate with respect to
unemployment insurance, health insurance, crop insurance, invalid
and old age pensions, the regulation of labour conditions, and in-
dustrial disputes (presumably without limitation to recognized fed-.
eral industries). The Dominion was asked to assume responsibility
for all direct re’ief, and for the construction of a trans-Canada high-
saA.G. for Can. v. A.G. for Ont. (Labour Conventions Case) [1937] A.C. 326;
A.G. for Can. v. A.G. for Ont. (Unemployment Insurance Case) [1937] A.C. 355;
A.G. for B.C. v. A.G. for Can. (National Products Marketing Act Case) [1937]
A.C. 377.
34 Submission by the Government of Saskatchewan to the Royal Commission
on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Regina, 1937) at 7.
351d., at 7-8 and 330.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
453
way. A full power of delegation of legislative authority from prov-
ince to Dominion, and a limited power of delegation from Dominion
to province, were advocated.
The Regina Daily Star, ever sympathetic to constitutional reform,
welcomed the clarification of Saskatchewan’s position, which it de-
Fcribed as “recognizing the inevitable”.36 A few days later it criti-
cized New Brunswick as one of the chief opponents of constitutional
amendment. The editorial argued that New Brunswick “must march
along with the rest of us, not attempt to stage a parade of its own”. 37
Before leaving the 1937 submission, we shou.d note the two
lawyers who were most influential in the development of Saskat-
chewan’s official position. The submission was prepared under the
direction of Attorney General T. C. Davis. Davis had had consider-
able experience with the amendment issue. As Provincial Secretary
he had been one of the provincial delegates to the Dominion-Provin-
cial Conference in 1927 where the matter was discussed. He was
made Attorney General within a month after that Conference, held
the post until the defeat of the Gardiner government in 1929, and
was reappointed to it with the return to power of the Liberals in
1934. Undoubtedly one of the ablest members of the Gardiner and
Patterson cabinets of the Thirties, he had a breadth of vision and
an appreciation of social prob’ems combined with a penetrating wit.
He introduced progressive legislation for the relief of hard-pressed
Saskatchewan debtors.38 Some of this legislation still remains, and
in later years was sometimes mistakenly attributed to the “socialist”
government elected in 1944. He strongly protested the actions of
the Bennett government against the army of unemployed (on their
way to Ottawa) which brought about the Regina Riot of July 1,
1935. In the aftermath of the Riot he showed tact and sympathetic
understanding in negotiating with the nearly 2,000 men encamped
at Regina, arranging for their care and later for free transporta-
tion back to where they had begun their ill-starred trip to the
national capital. Although appointed to the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal in 1939, he was pressed into governmental service soon after
the Second World War began. He served in Ottawa for two years
as Deputy Minister of one of the new wartime departments, and
then was called on for diplomatic duties. He was successively High
Commissioner to Australia, Ambassador to China, Head of the Ca-
36 December 10, 1937, at 4.
37 December 14, 1937, at 4.
3 8 E.g. The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1965 c. 103, s. 2, originally
enacted by STAT. SASK. 1934-35, c. 89.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
nadian Mission to the Allied High Command, West Germany, and
later Canada’s first ambassador to the West German Republic.
Davis’ two principal assistants in the preparation of the 1937
brief were drawn from the University of Saskatchewan. They were
Professor G. E. Britnell of the Economics Department, and Dean
F. C. Cronkite, K.C. of the College of Law. As the lawyer of this
team, Dean Cronkite no doubt was the most influential in shaping
the constitutional recommendations. Earlier that same year he had
criticized the Privy Council’s Labour Convention decision in a note
in the Canadian Bar Review. There his concern for a central govern-
ment strong enough to deal with pressing social problems had been
clearly manifested. 39 Apart from his work in the Rowell-Sirois sub-
missions, he played a very significant role in later constitutional
amendment discussions as will be seen.
While the Rowell-Sirois Report declined to deal with the ques-
tion of an amendment procedure, it did make recommendations for
several specific amendments advocated by the Saskatchewan brief.
These included the transfer of power to the Parliament of Canada
with respect to unemployment insurance, old age pensions, 40 labour
standards, 41 and the implementation of labour conventions of the
International Labour Organization. It also favoured a comprehen-
sive power of delegation of legislative authority, operating either
way between Dominion and province.42
After the Rowell-Sirois Commission disappeared as a focal point
for discussion of constitutional amendment, little was heard of the
subject in Saskatchewan during the Thirties and Forties. But before
passing on to the reign of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federa-
tion as the provincial government, it is interesting to see the general
political context of Saskatchewan opinion on constitutional reform
at this time. As we have seen, the Liberal government had by 1937
come out clearly in favour of a flexible amending procedure and a
series of amendments to strengthen federal powers. While the pro-
vincial Conservatives do not appear to have stated an official policy
it may be noted that their main newspaper supporter, the Regina
Daily Star, consistently favoured constitutional reform and deplored
any exaggeration of provincial rights, F. L. Bastedo, K.C., a Con-
servative and prominent Regina lawyer, apparently took a similar
position. He attacked the compact theory in a 1934 Canadian Bar
39 “The Social Legislation References” (1937) 15 Can. B. Rev. 478.
40 Supra note 17, vol. II at 43.
41 Id., at 49.
42 Id., at 72-73.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
Review article 43 and was a member of the Regina Bar Association
committee which prepared the report on the “B.N.A. Act in 1935.
As previously discussed, that report also urged centralization and
was critical of excessive entrenchment. The Regina Bar Association
approved the report, which would suggest that the views stated there-
in were not far removed from accepted public opinion. Later on during
World War II George H. Barr, Q.C., another respected Regina
lawyer, renewed discussion of constitutional amendment in corre-
spondence with various magazine editors. He wanted constitutional
reform and the repeal of section 7 of the Statute of Westminster,
1931 which had denied Canada the power to amend its own consti-
tution. For the existence of section 7 he placed most of the blame
on former Premier Ferguson of Ontario and Premier Taschereau of
Quebec whom he described as “the Imperialistic Tory and the re-
actionary French-Canadian”. 44 While it would be wrong to pretend
that large segments of the population held these or any other views
on constitutional reform, such were the predominant views of those
to whom the public would look for leadership.
Into this situation came the C.C.F. government of T. C. Douglas,
elected in June, 1944. This was the first government formed by the
Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, a national political move-
ment whose basic programme had been laid down in the Regina
Manifesto of 1933. Point 9 of the Manifesto called for 45
the amendment of the Canadian Constitution, without infringing upon social
or religious minority rights or upon legitimate provincial claims to autonomy,
so as to give the Dominion Government adequate powers to deal effectively
with argent economic problems which are essentially national in scope; the
abolition of the Canadian Senate.
Point 9 insisted on a flexible constitution, and declared that it
must be brought into line with the increasing industrialization of the country
and the consequent centralization of the economic and financial power
which has taken place in the last two generations.
43 “Amending the British North America Act” (1934) CAN. B. REV. 209.
44 Archives of Saskatchewan, G. H. Barr Papers, Barr to R. D. Colquette
(Editor, Country Guide) August 20, 1942. Apart from editors, Barr’s other
correspondents in this period included Dr. Ollivier, Law Clerk of the House of
Commons, and Dr. Arthur Beauchesne, Clerk of the House of Commons.
45 It is amusing to note that in 1935 the House of Commons, perhaps un-
wittingly, adopted without objection a resolution embodying almost identical
language except for the reference to the Senate. This resolution, moved by the
C.C.F. leader J. S. Woodsworth, called for the establishment of a committee to
study how the B.N.A. Act could best be amended to achieve these ends. He
obviously borrowed his wording from the Regina Manifesto. Thus was established
the Turnbull committee of 1935 as discussed earlier.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
Thus the Douglas government had a ready-made position to assert
should an appropriate opportunity arise.
That opportunity came in 1950, when the Dominion-Provincial
Constitutional Conference was summoned in fulfillment of an under-
taking given by Prime Minister St. Laurent at the time of the pas-
sage of the B.N.A.
(No. 2) Act, 1949. Premier Douglas welcomed
the occasion for discussion on this matter. 4 Extensive preparations
for the Conference were undertaken in Regina, and a strong delega-
tion selected. Among its members were Dean F. C. Cronkite, whose
part in the preparation of the Rowell-Sirois submission has pre-
viously been noted. Also included was Professor F. R. Scott of
McGill, distinguished constitutional lawyer and one of the authors
of the Regina Manife-to. His preference for a very flexible amending
procedure had been stated quite clearly to the House of Commons
Committee on the B.N.A. Act in 1935. 4
7 He had there favoured a
system whereby matters of joint concern (other than minority rights)
could be amended by a majority vote in the two houses of Parliament
in joint session. The influence of these two lawyers in the formulation,
of a provincial policy must have been considerable.
There is nothing to indicate that opinion in Saskatchewan dif-
fered much from the official C.C.F. position at this time. Memories
of the depression were still strong, and these created sympathy for
reform in favour of strong central government. The recent war
had accustomed the public to centralization. Mr. George Barr of
Regina, writing in the Financial Post on October 24, 1949, hailed
the forthcoming constitutional conference. He attacked the compact
theory, spoke favourably of the U.S. amending procedure, and thus
by implication urged the adoption of a flexible formula. The Sas-
katoon Star-Phoenix on January 10, 1950, the day the Conference
opened in Ottawa, argued for flexibility in the constitution. It sug-
gested this could be achieved either by judicial interpretation or a
suitable amendment procedure.’ 8 These views were probably typical
of informed Saskatchewan opinion on the eve of the 1950 Conference.
In this opening statement 49 on the first day of the Conference
Premier Douglas assumed a predictable position. He stressed what
he considered to be the purpose of a constitutional amendment pro-
cedure: the facilitation of efficient governmental action to serve
46 Douglas to St. Laurent, Sept. 20, 1949. Canadian House of Commons Debates,
1949, (Appendix), at 875-76.
4 7 Supra note 25 at 80-92
4
8 Jan. 10, 1950 at 9.
49 Proceedings of the Constitutional Conference of Federal and Provincial
Governments, January 10 12, 1950. (Ottawa 1950) at 32-40.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
457
social ends. He quoted the statement made by his government to
the Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction of 1945, that
if the satisfying of human needs and the advancement of economic welfare
means constitutional changes, then we are prepared to support constitutional
changes.
The establishment of an amending formula was of secondary
importance. He wanted the federal government to make good its
promises, made at the 1945 Conference, of federal action in fields
of unemployment assistance, old age pensions, health insurance, and
public investment in underdeveloped areas to stimulate employment.
Accepting, however, the task assigned to the Conference, he advo-
cated entrenchment of constitutional provisions respecting language,
education, solemnization of marriage, representation by population
(in the House of Commons) and a maximum length for the term
of Parliament. He urged the adoption and entrenchment of a Bill
of Rights. Apart from these matters, he was opposed to any require-
ment of unanimity of the provinces for changes affecting the dis-
tribution of legislative power.
[T]he tyranny of the minority, exercised through any power of veto is to
be not only guarded against, but is to be feared.
If political institutions are vehicles for social action, then the constitution
is the roadway along which they must travel. In pursuing our deliberations,
we must exercise the greatest care to ensure that we are making of it a
broad highway, and not a dead-end street.
He therefore suggested that for matters of joint concern amend-
ment should be possible with the consent of a majority of the House
of Commons and a majority of the provinces. The Senate was de-
liberately eliminated from the process. In Douglas’ view, a veto
power in the Senate “would be a guarantee only of freedom from
progress”.
Having stated his position on an amending procedure, the Pre-
mier returned to his first concern –
the need for particular amend-
ments at that time. He urged changes which would give Parlia-
ment exclusive jurisdiction over marketing of natural products and
implementation of treaties, and concurrent jurisdiction over labour
disputes and standards. For the provinces he sought the power of
indirect taxation. He suggested a power of delegation as recom-
mended by the Rowell-Sirois Commission. He reiterated his concern
for the solution of pressing social problems without waiting for a
new amendment procedure. His concluding exhortation was “Let it
not be said of any of us that we fiddled while Rome burned”.
A concern for the substance, not the procedure, of constitutional
amendment characterized Saskatchewan’s position at the 1950 con-
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
ference. Procedure was important only in a negative sense –
that
it should not impede socially and economically desirable amendments.
The contrast between Saskatchewan and some other provinces at
this time was the contrast between an activist view of government
and a preference for the status quo. In the range of views expressed
there were various shades of opinion between these two polar posi-
tions, but Saskatchewan was clearly at one pole. The province’s
position is explicable on historical, economic, and political grounds.
Historically, Saskatchewan had little in its experience to make it
jealous of provincial rights. It had no unique racial or religious
institutions, no long history of shared experience, and no geographic
cohesion (being bounded by four imaginary straight lines). Its most
vivid recollection was the depression, with provincial dependence
on federal subventions. Many of the economic factors prevalent in
the Thirties –
such as fluctuations in international export markets
and rising farm production costs –
still remained. Thus it was not
surprising that the position assumed by Premier Douglas was almost
identical (except for the exclusion of the Senate) to the position
of the province’s Liberal government in its brief to the Rowell-Sirois
Commission in 1937. History and economics had not changed, even
if the government had. These factors were reinforced by the social-
ist orientation of the C.C.F. government. Article 9 of the Regina
Manifesto undoubtedly provided ideological justification for views
so consistent with the practical needs of the province.
After the initial remarks had been made by all heads of govern-
ment, the remainder of the January, 1950, Conference was taken
up with rather vague and disjointed discussions of a number of
issues. Some concerned the merits of repatriation versus non-re-
patriation of the constitution. Other discussions involved the effect
of the B.N.A.
(No. 2) Act, 1949. As for the amending formula
itself, agreement was readily reached on classification (for amend-
ment purposes) of the constitution into the various categories sug-
gested by the 1936 committee of experts. The contentious category
was, of course, that pertaining to provisions of concern to Parlia-
ment and all of the provinces (excluding “fundamental rights”).
While there was general agreement that such provisions could be
amended by Parliament plus some special majority of the prov-
inces,50 there was no agreement as to what provisions properly fell
within this category and not within “fundamental rights”. Those
favouring rigidity wished to characterize as many matters as possi-
ble as “fundamental rights” because these were to be amendable
5o Id., at 93.
No. 41
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
459
only by unanimous provincial consent. While no final views were
put forward by any delegation, Premier Douglas strongly objected
to any suggestion that all matters in section 92, and particularly
head 13 (property and civil rights) should be entrenched as funda-
mental rights requiring unanimous consent for amendment. 51 The
Conference ended with a committee of Attorneys-General being as-
signed the task of making the necessary categorization. Recalling
the failure of the 1935 Dominion-Provincial Conference to reconvene
after the appointment of a similar committee, Mr. Douglas stressed
the importance of an early report and a reconvening of the Con-
ference.52
Subsequently the Dominion and the provinces submitted their
views in writing on categorization to the committee of Attorneys-
General. The moment of truth for constitutional amendment came
at the meeting of this committee in August, 1950. A comparison
of the submissions revealed substantial agreement on many of the
less important provisions, but substantial disagreement on the im-
portant provisions. 53 The hard core of the problem was section 92.
At the extremes were Quebec, which wanted to entrench the whole
section, and Saskatchewan which was prepared to entrench only
heads 12 (solemnization of marriage) and 14 (administration of
justice). The remaining heads, in its view, should be amendable by
Parliament and a majority of the provinces. The Dominion was
prepared to concede entrenchment only of 92 [12] and part of 92 [13].
Ontario joined Quebec in wanting to entrench all matters within
92[13] but no other province insisted on this. The views of the
other provinces varied considerably, with each wishing parts of
section 92 entrenched and other parts left for the more flexible
amending procedure.
Once the Attorneys-General had clarified the area of disagree-
ment the full conference was reconvened at Quebec in September.
One detects a certain lack of enthusiasm or reality in its delibera-
tions. Since its earlier meeting the Korean War had broken out and
new problems preoccupied government representatives. Prospects
for any agreement on a procedure were remote. Premier Duplessis
made a strong defense of entrenchment. 54 Premier Douglas stressed
51 Id., at 78-79, 86.
52 Id., at 95-96.
53 Tables showing the position of the various governments on particular sections
are reproduced in Proceedings of the Constitutional Conference of Federal and
Provincial Governments (Second Session) Sept. 25-28, 1950 at 79-84.
54 Id., at 44-46.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
the need for flexibility. He argued that, rather than accepting en-
trenchment of all provincial powers, it would be better to leave
amendment procedures as they were.55 The Conference met in camera
for two and one half days and apparently resolved very little. At
the end the matter was referred back to the Committee of Attorneys-
General with a view to preparation for further discussion at a forth-
coming Federal-Provincial fiscal conference in December. No fur-
ther progress was made thereafter. At the December conference
there was no discussion of an amending procedure. It was agreed
to suspend further de:iberations pending consideration of fiscal
matters and new tax agreements. There the matter was dropped.
There was little if any dissent in Saskatchewan from the posi-
tion taken by Premier Douglas at these conferences. Indeed, he
apparently had the support of the two largest daily newspapers,
and of the opposition Saskatchewan Liberal Party. Both the Saska-
toon Star-Phoenix and the Regina Leader-Post expressed opposition
to excessive entrenchment. They both agreed with Mr. Douglas that
if a flexible procedure could not be devised, it would be better to
leave matters as they were.5? At the following session of the provin-
cial legislature the subject was discussed only briefly and without
a conflict of opinion. It arose when the Premier introduced a resolu-
tion expressing approval of the proposed constitutional amendment
(enacted later that year) conferring power on Parliament with re-
spect to old age pensions. He noted that the federal government
wanted the unanimous consent of the provinces before proceeding
with the amendment. In his view unanimous provincial consent was
not necessary and he hoped that this would not be considered a pre-
cedent. 57 Mr. W. A. Tucker, Leader of the Opposition, doubted that
it would be treated as a precedent. He agreed, however, that unani-
mous consent should not be required for ordinary constitutional
amendments such as those with respect to social security. Unani-
mous consent should be required only for amendments affecting
minority rights.”8 Thus he and his party appeared to be at one with
the C.C.F. government as to the elements of a proper amending for-
mula. When the Doug:as government had spoken on this issue, it
had fairly represented informed Saskatchewan opinion of 1950 and
the following decade.
551d., at 32-36.
58Star-Phoenix, Sept. 27, 1950, at 17, and Sept. 30, 1950, at 17; Leader-Post
Sept. 30, 1950, at 15.
57 Debates of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan (1951), vol. 4, no.
32, at 2.
58 d., at 19-20.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
461
1960 and After: Conflict and Compromise
There was no serious public discussion of constitutional amend-
ment in Saskatchewan during the Fifties, just as there was none
elsewhere in Canada. Nor was there anything to indicate that gov-
ernment or public opinion on this matter had changed in any way.
The passage of time had not diminished the provincial govern-
ment’s interest in constitutional reform, however. At the Dominion-
Provincial Conference on fiscal relations in July, 1960, Mr. Lesage,
newly-elected Premier of Quebec, called for a renewal of discussions
on repatriation of the constitution. He also suggested incorporation
of a bill of rights into the constitution. 51 Premier Douglas, one of
the few heads of government present who had been in office during
the 1950 conferences, warmly endorsed these suggestions. He may
have assumed (unjustifiably) that the recent changes of government
in Quebec and Ottawa would make possible an amending formula
acceptable to Saskatchewan. As a result, Prime Minister Diefen-
baker agreed to convene a conference at the ministerial or official
level on the subject of an amendment procedure. He preferred to
postpone possible discussions of a constitutional bill of rights until
after a Canadian amending procedure had been adopted.0 1
Soon after this Conference the Saskatchewan government com-
menced preparations for the forthcoming discussions on amendment.
An interdepartmental committee was established under the chairman-
ship of Hon. R. A. Walker, Q.C., Attorney General, a toughminded
and resourceful minister. Dean F. C. Cronkite and Professor F. R.
Scott were named as members of the Saskatchewan delegation as
they had been in 1950. There was cautious optiriiism in Regina that
the conflicts which emerged in 1950 could be reconciled.
These expectations were short-lived. In his letter of September
to the initial meeting in
19, 1960 inviting the Attorneys-General
Ottawa on October 6 and 7, Justice Minister Fulton took the sur-
prising step of proposing an interim amendment procedure.0 2 His
proposal was even more startling in its content. It suggested a two-
step approach to the problem. First, the B.N.A. Act could be amended
59 Proceedings of Dominion-Provincial Conference, July 25-27, 1960 (Ottawa,
1960) at 28-29.
60 Id., at 87-88.
61Id., at 107-108.
62 Copies of correspondence on this subject between the Minister of Justice
and provincial ministers between July 1, 1960 and December, 1962, have been
tabled in the House of Commons. See House of Commons Journals, vol. 108 at 307,
vol. 109 at 392-93.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
to allow the Parliament of Canada, with the concurrence of the
legislatures of all provinces, to amend any part of the Canadian
Constitution. This would achieve early “repatriation” of the consti-
tution. Secondly, after this step was completed, the various govern-
ments could agree on some other amending formula which would
then be written into the B.N.A. Act by Parliament with unanimous
provincial consent.
Such a proposition could hardly encourage the advocates of a
flexible amending procedure. The first concrete proposal thus ad-
vanced contemplated complete entrenchment. Moreover, it had ema-
nated from the federal government –
the government one might
have expected to defend the interests of Ottawa against provincial
demands for a veto power. Thus, accidentally or deliberately, Sas-
katchewan was put on the defensive before the conference began.
When the conference opened in Ottawa on October 6, 1960, it
was agreed by the majority that the press and public would not be
admitted to any of the sessions. Partly at the request of Saskat-
chewan and others, it was understood that any government could
release statements to the press with respect to its own position, so
long as it did not reveal the position taken by other governments. 3
Saskatchewan’s opening statement was comprehensive and em-
phatic. While welcoming the opportunity to discuss an amendment
procedure, Attorney General Walker attacked the Fulton proposal
for a two-stage repatriation process. In particular he feared that
once the amendment power had been given to Parliament subject to
the requirement of provincial unanimity there would never be any
better amendment procedure worked out within Canada. The prov-
inces, once having been given a veto power on all matters, could
scarcely be expected to agree to some less advantageous arrange-
ment. Mr. Walker thought the Fulton proposal too pessimistic. He
pointed out that no province at the 1950 conference had insisted on
entrenchment of every single item in the constitution, and he doubted
the necessity of such a condition being attached to the transfer of
amendment power to the Parliament of Canada.
Having criticized the Fulton proposal, the Attorney General of
Saskatchewan made several concrete proposals of his own. He called
on the conference to set itself a “more ambitious and imaginative
goal”. All constitutional instruments should be consolidated into a
single document, with official versions in both English and French.
The constitution should have a flexible amendment procedure for
63 While the author attended the 1960-61 conferences, the account herein of
discussions is confined to general comments and to facts otherwise made public.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
463
all matters except fundamentals and it should contain a Bill of
Rights. In the process of developing the new constitutional arrange-
ments, the public should be kept informed and should be allowed
to make representations.
In conclusion, Mr. Walker contended that the 1950 conferences
had failed because they lacked organization and direction. He there-
fore urged that a preparatory committee of the conference be estab-
lished, that it methodically work out an agenda and procedure for
the next plenary conference, and that it narrow and define the policy
questions which would require decision by the plenary conference.
These suggestions from Saskatchewan were all virtually ignored in
this and subsequent conferences.
The remainder of this two day meeting was taken up with rather
aimless discussions. A few provinces favoured Mr. Fulton’s approach
and a few were strongly against it. Others did not like it but sug-
gested they might accept it if no agreement could be reached for
a better amendment formula. Some attention was given to such a
formula, the preferences ranging from widespread entrenchment of
provincial matters to minimum entrenchment, with one government
suggesting the possibility of a flexible formula subject to the right
of Quebec to override any amendment affecting her Civil Code.
Several delegations indicated they might tolerate widespread en-
trenchment if a procedure for delegation of legislative powers be-
tween province and Dominion (and vice versa) was introduced.
At the end of this conference it was agreed to hold another meet-
ing within a month. In the meantime work was to proceed on both
a formula for transferring the amendment power to Canada from
the United Kingdom, (to be drafted by the Department of Justice),
and an amendment procedure. In furtherance of the latter, each
province was to advise the Minister of Justice ‘as to which sections
of the B.N.A. Act it would insist on having entrenched and those
it would prefer to have entrenched but on which it might be willing
to compromise.
While most delegations had not stated their views as emphatically
as had Saskatchewan, it was obvious even at this point that there
were substantial differences of opinion which would not easily be
eliminated. Agreement was hardly as close as the sanguine official
press release indicated at the end of the conference. But Mr. Fulton
could at least be congratulated for having avoided any open breach
at this time.
Not even Mr. Fulton could dispel or conceal the real differences
of opinion which existed, however. These came to a head at the
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
conference of November 2 and 3. This conference was also signifi-
cant for Saskatchewan because at this session it acquired the un-
justified public reputation as the obstructionist province.
As requested, nine of the ten provinces submitted lists indicating
which matters they wished entrenched, and which matters they
would prefer, but not insist on, having entrenched. The results
showed a great disparity of views. Saskatchewan wanted very
little entrenchment. It insisted on entrenching sections 93, 133, a
Bill of Rights, the amending procedure as finally established, sec-
tion 51(1) and section 51A. It was prepared to accept entrench-
ment of section 92112], 92[14], section 121, and new provisions
for a limitation on the life of provincial legislatures and for a re-
quirement of annual legislative sessions. A number of other prov-
inces indicated a preference for a minimum of entrenchment. Only
two provinces expressed unqualified support for entrenchment of
section 92[13].
In spite of a rambling debate about a number of matters, the
key issue at the November sessions was the extent to which entrench-
ment was to be necessary and acceptable. More precisely, the contro-
versy centered around section 92[13]. At one extreme were a few
provinces, led by Quebec, who insisted on entrenchment of head 13.
At the other extreme was Saskatchewan, which consistently opposed
complete entrenchment. In the middle were a number of provinces
who indicated -they could accept entrenchment of 92[13] (though
unwillingly) if a proper power of delegation were agreed to. While
it was true that Saskatchewan had indicated no intention of accept-
ing entrenchment at this time, it is equally true that some of the
entrenchment supporters had not agreed to a delegation power.
Thus, since several provinces would not accept entrenchment with-
out delegation, further progress was hampered as much by opposi-
tion to delegation as it was by Saskatchewan’s opposition to en-
trenchment.
In the meantime Saskatchewan had tried to avoid the foresee-
able deadlock by introducing a compromise solution. She proposed
that for amendments related to matters other than fundamentals,
enactment by Parliament with the consent of at least two-thirds of
the provinces would be sufficient. This would, however, be subject
to the important proviso that no such amendment could affect prop-
erty and civil rights in Quebec unless ratified by the Quebec legis-
lature (or in the alternative, it would take effect but be subject
to nullification by the Quebec legislature). This compromise, though
evoking considerable interest, was rejected by Quebec.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
465
In spite of obstacles to agreement raised by other provinces, and
in spite of Saskatchewan’s offer of a compromise, she was largely
blamed for the deadlock which developed at this conference. Sas-
katchewan had been most emphatic in stating her views inside and
outside the constitutional conferences. Accordingly, Atttorney Gen-
eral Walker issued a press release during the second day of the
November meeting in which he reiterated his opposition to a com-
plete veto power for each province. He also revealed the compromise
formula which his delegation had submitted. This press release was
quite consistent with the conference decision that each government
was free to make public its own position. Nevertheless, it annoyed
the federal and some other delegations, probably because it would
detract from the usual end-of-conference press release to the effect
that everything was for the best in the best of all constitutional
worlds. As a result, the press was led to believe that Saskatchewan
had single-handedly scuttled the November meeting. The Toronto
Globe and Mail carried this headline on November 4, 1960: “Saskat-
chewan
is Hold-Out. Constitution Parley Finishes in Deadlock.”
On the same day the main headline of Le Devoir read “La position
de la Saskatchewan fait suspendre la conference. Quebec exige:
consentement unanime des provinces pour amender la constitution.”
According to the Montreal Gazette of that day “the Saskatchewan
delegation apparently sounded the only sour note in an otherwise
harmonious conference”. Mr. Fulton told a press conference that
“the Saskatchewan statement of the position (in the conference)
is a very extreme one and therefore unrealistic. ‘ 64 It seemed that
if they could not have an agreement on a new formula, some of the
delegations were determined to have a convenient scapegoat.
From this point onward very little advance was made in the
1960-61 negotiations. While a committee of experts met in November,
1960, to work out details with respect to the education clauses, and
while various drafts of an amending formula were polished and
repolished, the substantive barriers to progress remained. There was
no serious opposition to the entrenchment of education, language
rights, the amending formula itself, and a large portion of the
provincial powers. The disputes area was always section 92[13],
and, associated with this, the need for an adequate delegation power
to offset the evils of entrenchment.
At the January 1961 conference, debate centred again on this
issue. Near the end of the conference Attorney General Walker de-
64 Canadian Press story, as printed in the Regina Leader-Post, November 4,
1960 at 1.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
‘ivered an extensive speech in which he reviewed the history and
significance of Saskatchewan’s position. He reiterated his opposi-
tion to entrenchment of section 92[13] and he explained why his
province did not consider even the widest delegation power to be
an adequate substitute for a flexible amending formula. He con-
cluded by calling for a thorough public discussion of the issues
invelved. He promised that
if, after this is done, the informed opinion of the Canadian people is that our
constitution should be amendable with respect to all matters provincial only
on the condition of provincial unanimity, Saskatchewan will be prepared to
accept that opinion. But in the meantime we are not prepared to see this
conference stampeded into actions which may do great and permanent harm
to the nation.
the most unambiguous,
it
While Saskatchewan’s position was
was not the sole cause of the failure to reach agreement at the
January meeting. Though a number of provinces would accept en-
trenchment only if there were an adequate delegation power, no
generally acceptable delegation power was devised. Moreover, Que-
bec and certain others for the first time raised objections to any
new amendment formula if Parliament were to retain its powers
of amendment under section 91 head [1]. It will be recalled that
section 91[1] had been introduced, without provincial agreement,
by an amendment to the B.N.A. Act in 1949.65 This had caused con-
troversy in the 1950 constitutional conferences, but it had not as
yet been a factor in the 1960-61 proceedings. Its introduction at
this point created a whole new obstacle which had nothing to do
with Saskatchewan’s position. This was overlooked in conference
headlines such as “Saskatchewan’s Objections hold up Amending
Powers”,66 however.
With all of these issues unresolved, few could have taken much
comfort in the agreement that each government would consider a
draft Act which was to be based on conference discussions and cir-
culated at an early date. The official press release, of course, ex-
pressed optimism for early agreement.
During the following months, several provinces stated their
views on the draft Act in letters to the Minister of Justice. The
draft provided for entrenchment of all provincial powers and a
limited power of delegation. In a memorandum of July 6, 1961, the
Government of Saskatchewan expressed its opinion. It re-affirmed
its opposition to entrenchment of section 92[13], disapproved of the
delegation power because it was not sufficiently flexible, and again
65 B.N.A. (No. 2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c. 81 (U.K.).
66 Regina Leader-Post, January 14, 1961.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
467
called for public discussion of the proposals. It also agreed to par-
ticipate in further conferences only on condition that no amending
formula would be adopted without the consent of all provinces. 67
The next conference, in September, 1961, saw no real progress.
The refinement of the draft Act had not altered any of the basic
differences of opinion. Saskatchewan still opposed the entrenchment
provision. No agreement was reached on a delegation formula satis-
factory to those who saw this as a pre-condition for agreement on
entrenchment. Quebec was adamant about the need for a drastic
change in section 91[1] before she could agree to a new amending
formula. No such change was forthcoming. The only significant ac-
complishment of this conference was the agreement to release pub-
licly the text of the draft Act once it had received some technical
revision. This, agreement, reached partly at Saskatchewan’s initi-
ative, would have the effect of airing the whole issue before the
public, and of permitting informed comment and criticism. The
text was accordingly released on December 1, 1961.
No progress for adoption of the Fulton formula was made after
this date. In a letter of January 28, 1962, to Mr. Fulton, Attorney
General Walker rejected the Act because of its requirement for
consent of all provinces for any amendment of provincial powers.
He made this qualification, however: 68
[W]hile the draft proposal does not commend itself to us any more than
certain of its elements did in our discussions at the recent conferences, rather
than object outright, final decision of the Government of Saskatchewan will
be deferred until adequate means are afforded for public discussion.
While some provinces gave the draft active consideration, others
apparently did not. No agreement was reached, even among those
provinces whose demands had seemingly been met by the draft Act.
The Diefenbaker-Fulton initiative had come to naught, and it re-
mained for changes of government at both the federal and provincial
level to bring about agreement.
Before leaving this controversial period, it is important to assess
the roles of the governments of Saskatchewan and of Canada in these
proceedings. Saskatchewan’s position in 1960 and 1961 was charac-
terized by a stubborn opposition to entrenchment, but a willingness
to seek some accomodation with Quebec on another basis.
67While this was thought by some to be an anomalous stand for a province
which generally opposed entrenchment, it was entirely consistent with Saskatche-
wan’s position that the amendment formula itself should be entrenched, along
with language and education rights and certain other fundamental matters.
08 Walker to Fulton, Feb. 28, 1962. See supra note 62.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
Was the opposition to entrenchment merely an outdated bit of
socialist dogma as some suggested ? On the contrary, it was a posit
tion which was not only consistent with the history of the province
as a whole but was also one which enjoyed broad contemporary
support. Within Saskatchewan, editorial opinion generally favoured
the government’s stand at the conferences. 69 One of the most in-
fluential western papers, the Winnipeg Free Press, voiced its objec-
tion to the entrenchment of “property and civil rights”. 70 A debate
on amendment procedures in the Saskatchewan legislature in March,
1961, did evoke some opposition criticism of the Saskatchewan
government as a “hold-out”, and some members suggested it might
be better to agree to complete entrenchment in order to get a Cana-
dian amending procedure. But at the end of the debate, and after a
compromise in wording, the legislature passed unanimously a reso-
lution essentially supporting the government’s stand. The resolu-
tion expressed the hope that agreement would be reached on as
flexible a procedure as possible while protecting certain fundamen-
tals, and asked that before the Conference of Attorneys General
made any final recommendation the whole matter should be thrown
open for public discussion. 71 The Saskatchewan position was also
supported indirectly by the Association of Canadian Law Teachers.
At its June, 1961, meeting it passed a resolution calling on the
federal and provincial governments to make public the proposals
for an amending formula and to arrange public hearings on them.
In June, 1962, after the “Fu’ton formula” was released, the A.C.L.T.
passed a resolution disapproving of it and again calling for public
discussion. Thus Saskatchewan’s attitude towards the formula could
not be considered merely the stubborn opposition of a radical mi-
nority party.
Indeed, it is arguable that Saskatchewan’s policy might have
been otherwise if dictated solely by partisan considerations. It must
be remembered that the C.C.F. had evolved some distance from the
strong pro-centralist position of the Regina Manifesto, 1933.72 The
national party’s Winnipeg Declaration of Principles in 1956 lacked
the strident tones of the earlier Manifesto. With respect to the
constitution it said this:
The C.C.F. believes in Canada’s federal system. Properly applied in a spirit
of national unity, it can safeguard our national well-being and at the same
69E.G. Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, October 12, 1960; id., Nov. 7, 1960; Regina
Leader-Post, Feb. 25, 1961.
70 December 15, 1961 at 29.
71 Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 1961 at 186-187.
72 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
469
time protect the traditions and constitutional rights of the provinces. Within
the framework of the federal system the C.C.F. will equalize opportunities
for the citizens of every province in Canada.
Centralization of legislative power was no longer regarded as a
panacea. By late 1960 the New Party was in formation and in the
summer of 1961 the New Democratic Party succeeded the C.C.F.
nationally. The aspiration of the N.D.P. to become a genuinely na-
tional party dictated efforts at accommodation with Quebec. Had
the Saskatchewan government looked only to party interests,
it
probably would have acceded to the demands of Quebec. It had
maintained its stand at the cost of considerable editorial criticism
within Quebec.
It is therefore an oversimplification to dismiss Saskatchewan’s
position in the 1960-62 period as merely partisan and eccentric.
There were no doubt elements of political dogma in her stand, but
there were many other factors. There was a genuine concern for
the future of effective government in Canada, predicated on the
belief that government intervention in the economy is not per se
bad and that Ottawa will have a legitimate role to play in future
economic and social reforms. This view was also reinforced by
Saskatchewan’s own experience as one of the smaller and less secure
provinces.
It may be argued with some force that Saskatchewan could have
avoided the opprobrium for the failure of the Fulton formula. The
government’s insistence on stating its position publicly, frequently,
and emphatically, made it stand out in contrast to those provinces
who never disclosed their position. It made the Saskatchewan posi-
tion subject to public comment when other provincial positions were
confidential. It probably made formal acquiescence to an entrench-
ment formula easier for some provinces: though they did not want
to see such a formula adopted, they could avoid the unpopularity
of disagreement while assuming that Saskatchewan would prevent
adoption of any such scheme. Saskatchewan might also have con-
sidered other compromises, such as entrenchment of part of section
92[13] without entrenchment of the whole. But it did make an
honest effort at compromise with its proposal which would have
allowed Quebec to opt out of any amendment affecting property and
civil rights. Quebec objected to this because it would constitute
special treatment for her and set her apart from the other prov-
inces. Considering that Quebec leaders had for some time insisted
that Quebec was not a province “like the others”, Saskatchewan
may at least by forgiven for her bewilderment at this objection.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
And what of Mr. Fulton and his government ? No one could
doubt the sincerity, good will and dedication with which Mr. Fulton
approached his task in September 1960. It must also be conceded
that the work of the next fifteen months constituted the longest
sustained attempt at devising an amending formula ever known in
Canada. (The Fulton-Favreau formula hastily agreed to in 1964 was
almost entirely based on the Fulton formula of 1961). This pro-
longed effort was largely due to Mr. Fulton’s persistent prodding
of the provinces and the drafting labours of his own department.
Yet the failure of these conferences could also be laid partly at his
feet.
First one must look at the objective of the federal government
in pressing for an amendment formula. As far as one could ascer-
tain, the only purpose in mind was to achieve, an agreement, no
matter what it might be, in order that the constitution might be
“brought home”. This was, after all, a government which had an
atavistic yearning to participate in nation building – what one
might describe as the “Sir John A. Macdonald syndrome”. Had the
federal government any clear concept of what it wanted the Cana-
dian constitution to be, or any serious concern for the future effec-
tiveness of federal parliaments and governments, it would have
exercised its influence on the settlement of substantive issues in
some consistent manner. Instead, Mr. Fulton was reported as saying
that 7i
the Federal government had not taken sides in any of the disagreements
over an amending formula, but had acted only as a mediator.
A curious position indeed for the only participating government
which had responsibility for national, as opposed to local, interests!
Objectives aside, the mechanics of these conferences were also
ill-conceived. Four meetings, each of two days duration, with a
minimum of communication in between, spread over a year, could
hardly be expected to cope with such fundamental problems. Longer
meetings among officials below the ministerial level would have
been more effective in narrowing the policy issues. This might have
facilitated concentration by the Attorneys General on a limited
number of issues, with orderly progress from one point to another.
There was also a suspicion among some that the draft Act as de-
veloped had within it many difficulties which might have been
brought to light through examination by constitutional experts
across the country. Some of these problems of conference proce-
dure should have been apparent to the federal officials from an
examination of earlier efforts at constitutional reform.
7-3 Toronto Globe and Mail, Nov. 4, 1960 at 2.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
471
After 1962, there is little of note in Saskatchewan’s position
on constitutional amendment except for her sudden agreement to
the Fulton-Favreau formula in 1964. The provincial election of April
1964 had defeated the C.C.F. government by a small margin. A
Liberal government headed by Premier W. Ross Thatcher took
office in May and within a few months was faced with renewed
negotiations on an amending formula. At the Federal-provincial con-
ference in Charlottetown on September 1 and 2, Premier Thatcher
quickly joined in the agreement to accept the Fulton formula with
certain modifications. The most significant change agreed to was
the elimination of Parliament’s exclusive power under section 91[1]
to amend the internal constitution of the Government and Parlia-
ment of Canada. Thus agreement was reached among the eleven
governments because Saskatchewan had reversed its position and
because of the general surrender to Quebec’s demand (not accepted
in 1961) for repeal of section 91[1].
In spite of Saskatchewan’s apparent volte-face, it is clear that
the basic attitude of the provincial government was similar to its
predecessor’s. Before the opening of the Charlottetown conference
Mr. Thatcher said that, like the C.C.F. government, he still believed
that entrenchment should be confined to fundamentals such as lan-
guage, education, and the amending procedure. Referring to the 1961
resolution of the Saskatchewan legislature, he said he hoped that
there would be an opportunity for public discussion of any proposed
change.7 4 At the ensuing conference of Attorneys General in October,
Saskatchewan’s new Attorney General, Hon. D. V. Heald, stated a
preference for less entrenchment than that provided by the Fulton
formula. He also argued that the delegation procedure should be
more flexible, so that the consent of fewer than four provinces would
be required for exercise of the power. 75 In a .1965 resolution ap-
proving the Fulton-Favreau formula, submitted to the Saskatchewan
legislature, the government also called on the Government of Canada
to refer the matter to a committee of the Commons or Senate for
hearings and a report to Parliament. 76
The new government placed a higher value on patriation than
it placed on constitutional flexibility, however. Mr. Thatcher was
reported as saying that 77
74 Regina Leader-Post, Sept. 1, 1964 at 1, 4.
75 As reported by him to the legislature, Debates and Proceedings of the Legis-
lative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 1965 at 1323.
76 Journals of the -Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 1965 at 203-204.
77 Supra note 74.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 12
we value a Canadian constitution highly enough to accept wider entrench-
ment if that is the only means of achieving it.
in
legislature
the provincial
Government spokesmen
justified
approval of the Fulton-Favreau formula on the grounds that a
Canadian amending procedure was important, that in practice the
consent of provincial governments had been obtained in the past
for amendments affecting provincial jurisdiction so that the formula
changed nothing, and that in the future good sense would undoubt-
edly prevail permitting the new procedure to be quite workable. They
admitted a preference for a more flexible procedure but thought
that this formula was the best that could be achieved3 8 Members
of the C.C.F. Opposition did not share this faith in the inherent
rationality of Canadian politicians. They reiterated their criticisms
of an inflexible amending procedure and felt there was little to gain
and everything to lose by adoption of the formula at this time. The
government resolution passed, the House dividing on party lines.
Thus Saskatchewan’s agreement to the Fulton-Favreau formula
was not an abandonment of the province’s long attachment to flexi-
bility in constitutional arrangements. 79 The change was in the new
government’s order of priorities. It wanted an agreement and was
not prepared to stand against the majority view. In a period when
Mr. Thatcher was trying to stamp out what he consiflered to be the
evils of “twenty years of socialism”, he was probably also reluctant
to be identified too strongly with any views held by the former
administration. While he was prepared to press his government’s
point of view on many other matters, this was an issue on which
he was not prepared to fight.
Conclusion
I have attempted to show that since it achieved maturity, Sas-
katchewan has been a consistent supporter of flexibility in constitu-
tional arrangements. I have also tried to show the various reasons
for her maintenance of this position.
Of what significance was.this for the nation ? Did Saskatchewan’s
the only time when she
persistent objections in 1960 and 1961 –
stood out alone against entrenchment of all provincial powers –
78 Debates supra note 75 at 1316-25, 1682-89.
79 Only the Saskatoon Star Phoenix in an editorial, September 8, 1964, inter-
preted Thatcher’s position as a conversion to entrenchment. It praised the Premier
for statesmanship and concluded that the principle of unanimity was “inescapa-
ble”. It thus conveniently ignored its own support in earlier years for a flexible
amending formula.
No. 4]
SASKATCHEWAN AND THE AMENDMENT
473
prevent the patriation of the Canadian constitution ? Later events
suggest not. When, after 1964, Saskatchewan had acquiesced in the
entrenchment formula sought by Quebec, and when all the provinces
had capitulated to Quebec and other demands for repeal of section
91[1], there was still no patriation of the constitution. In the end
it was Quebec alone of all the provinces who declined to give legis-
lative approval to the Fulton-Favreau formula. While the reasons
for this have never been clearly revealed, there appeared to be se-
rious criticism of the formula developing in Quebec generated to
a large extent by the then opposition Union Nationale. At its con-
gress in March, 1965, that party passed a resolution opposing the
formula because it would result in a constitution too rigid for the
best interests of Quebec.8 0 It may be assumed that the Union Nationale
after its election to government in June 1966 will take the same
attitude. This is surely a vindication of Saskatchewan’s earlier oppo-
sition to the formula, also based on a fear of “rigidity”. Quebec,
haiving emerged from the axa of devotion to the status quo, has also
realized that her aspirations for constitutional reform would not
easily be achieved in a system of complete entrenchment. And those
governments, federal and provincial, who were prepared to sacrifice
constitutional flexibility for the sake of agreement have ultimately
gained nothing but frustation and bewilderment.”‘
8oSaskatoon Star-Phoenix, March 22, 1965.
s On March 17, 1966 the Saskatchewan legislature adopted a resolution, as
amended by a government proposal, calling on the Government of Canada to hold
a Federal-provincial conference or refer the matter to a Parliamentary Committee
in order to discover Quebec’s objections to the Fulton-Favreau formula. See Votes
and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, March 17, 1966
at 2-3.
