A West Indian Looks At Canadian Federalism
Fred. A. ]Phillips *
One who has witnessed the birth and death of a -federal system
(viz., the West Indies Federation)1 within the span of four years,
and who was also fortunate enough to observe at close quarters the
attempt to make it work may perhaps be excused for presuming to
express his thoughts on Canadian federalism and constitutionalism
at this juncture. The questions which have exercised the writer’s
mind after a year’s sojourn in the Province of Quebec include the
following, which will be considered in this paper
–
–
(a) How far can the Federal government go to accommodate
Quebec if Confederation is to be preserved ? Can any lesson in this
connection be learned from recent federal experiences in the West
Indies
(b) Have “the people” of Canada been sufficiently consulted ?
Is there any good reason why there should continue to be
(c)
in a revised Canadian constitution no reference to the existence and
add jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ?
(d)
Is there not a case for the inclusion of human rights provi-
sions in any new constitutional instrument ?
(e) What is the possible future of Canadian Federalism ?
General Principles
Before considering these questions seriatim, the writer must em-
phasize his full awareness that, unless those concerned in Canada
* LL.B. (Lond.); Senior Lecturer, University of the West Indies; Member
of the English Bar; Ex-Cabinet Secretary, Federation of the West Indies;
Research Fellow, Faculty of Law and Centre for Developing Area Studies,
McGill University, 1964/1965.
The writer acknowledges his gratitude to Prof. Bora Laskin for his construc-
tive comments on this paper. The paper is a statement of the writer’s personal
views.
‘The Federation was inaugurated at the beginning og 1958 and comprised
the territories of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Grenada, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent, Dominica, Antigua, St. Kitts and Montserrat. It was dissolved on
31st May, 1962, the very day it was due to become an independent country.
Thereafter two of the constituent units became independent within the Com-
monwealth. The other eight are still British Colonies.
No. 4] WEST INDIAN LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 345
are prepared to see each other’s view-points, Confederation will
continue to be in jeopardy. No one knows this better than a West
Indian, for we have seen (and continue to see) the principle of com-
promise at work. We have in fact adopted as our own, the view of a
distinguished Canadian writer, set out in these terms :
“Modern federalism is essentially a compromise. It grows out of an
attempt to reconcile the views of those who prefer provincial or state in-
dependence. Between these two groups stand the trimmers, who frame a
scheme which strikes a balance and enables union to take place.” 2
There can be no doubt that in the case of Canada the problem
has from the start been one continual adjustment and accomodation.
Indeed it may well not have been possible to devise a federation at
all unless the Founding Fathers had decided that (to cite but one
example) payment of unconditional subsidies would be made by the
Federal Government to the Provinces.3 But there must always be
a limit to compromise and this brings us to the first question posed
above.
(a) The Position of Quebec
Quebec has always stated, and continues to state, her case.4 It is
no doubt a powerful case which must be studied with scrupulous care
by all who wish to see federalism preserved in Canada. There was,
however, a time in the early days of confederation when even the
understandings which now prevail were lacking. One notable example
was when it became necessary shortly after the union to sever the
government of the United Province of Canada, when the question of
the disposition of assets and liabilities arose. This became a major
issue, as a result of which the matter was referred to the “arbit-
rament” of three arbitrators. The arbitrators had nothing to guide
them as to the basis on which they could proceed and upon a formula
being proposed,5 there was violent disagreement between the Quebec
Judge Day – and the Ontario arbitrator, as a result
representative –
of which the Quebec representative resigned. It will be recalled that
2 J. A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincial Governments in Canada,
p.vii-Preface. In this work the author graphically describes the extent to which
the device of increasing subsidies sometimes on a fictitious basis (in dealing
with population figures, for example) was adopted to lure some provinces into
confederation, e.g., Prince Edward Island, and also to keep others in, e.g., Nova
Scotia.
3 On the basis of sec. 118 of the B.N.A. Act 1867 (now repealed).
4 Scott and Oliver, Quebec States her Case. See also Jean-Luc Pepin, Feder-
alism: Canadian Forum Dec. 1964, 206-210.
5 By the Dominion representative, Col. J. H. Gray.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
the only course left at that stage was for the Dominion and Ontario
arbitrators alone to render a report.0
The Dominion representative was of the opinion that the division
of the surplus debts “should be based upon the origin of the several
items of the debt… and be apportioned and borne separately for
Ontario and Quebec as the same may be adjudged to have originated
for the local benefit of either”. Quebec, however, violently disagreed
with this decision, mainly on the ground that its finances were un-
healthy and that such finances could not withstand a further expen-
diture of nearly five million dollars assessed as Quebec’s share. In
the long run the Federal Government decided that it would be in the
interest of all concerned to assume the excess debt – Sir John A.
McDonald urging at the time that such an assumption would “establish
harmony” between the two provinces. 7 The Dominion assumed the
excess debt in 1873 by scaling up the joint debt allowance due to
Quebec and Ontario by $10,506,100, but in making this concession
to Ontario and Quebec it clearly became necessary to increase by a
proportionate amount the debt allowances to the other provinces
as well. 8
As one contemplates the position at the time of Confederation
one cannot help asking the question : Would it have been possible
to retain Quebec as a contended province unless the Fathers were
prepared to ensure that its financial welfare should be protected at
a time when its resources were scarce and it was anxious to play its
part as a partner in the union.
In granting a concession to one province, it is always necessary
for a federal government to consider the effect on the other sections
of the union; and the early history of Confederation illustrates this
pointedly. One further example will suffice. As a result of the terms
granted to the provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia upon
their entry into the union, New Brunswick evidently felt that it
too should receive some increased subsidy. It accordingly despatched
a delegation to Ottawa to plead its cause to no avail. But it will be
recalled that just about this time the U.S.A. happened to be negotiat-
ing a treaty 9 with Canada for the abolition of the export duty on
timber floated down the St. John’s River for shipment to the U.S.A.
The B.N.A. Act had provided for New Brunswick to be permitted,
6 S. P. Dom. 1873, No. 27.
7 The Ottawa Times May 17th and 19th, 1873, for reports of Sir John A.
McDonald’s speeches.
8Dominion Statute 1873 c. 30.
9 The Washington Treaty 1871.
No. 4] WEST INDIAN LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 347
despite the statutory provision for a Customs Union, and abolition
of excise duties,1 0 to levy an export duty on provincial timber.’,
Since no treaty with the U.S.A. denying New Brunswick’s right to
export timber could be negotiated without the latter’s approval and
the Dominion was proposing a complete removal of the duties, the
question arose as to how the quantum of compensation was to be
determined ? Although the sum that accrued to the province yearly
from the dues amounted only to $60,000 to $70,000 –
and even though
the amount of timber being floated down the river was declining –
the Federal Government offered New Brunswick compensation to the
tune of $150,000 a year –
thus granting the province in another
guise the increase it had sought only a short time before.
In more recent times it has become clear to Canadians that the
Hungarians, the Jews, the Ukranians, the Italians, the Poles, the
Irish and other minority groups in various parts of Canada continually
object when they see special attention being paid to the rights of
French Canadians without similar thought being given to theirs.
Minority consciousness is thus fostered.
There is here a striking parallel in some respects with the West
Indies Federation. Because of a number of compromises that had
taken place in the pre-federal period and in the early days of Fed-
eration, the Federal Government was weak at the centre. Jamaica,
which was largely responsible for this situation, continued to make
requests for special concessions and arrangements on the ground that
it was different from the others in a number of respects, including
population, area and resources. Each time a concession was granted
one or other of the territories would come up with some special request
which could not lightly be ignored. A particular instance in the
economic sphere would serve to underscore this point.
When the Federal Government was inaugurated in 1958 there
was only one oil refinery in the British West Indies and that was
in Trinidad. In March 1959 the Government of Jamaica announced
that agreement had been reached between that Government and Esso
Standard Oil (S.A.) for the establishment of a Jamaica oil refinery.
Every effort was at the time being made by the Federal Government
to introduce Customs Union and internal free trade within a reson-
able time and when the Government of Trinidad was asked for its
comments on the Jamaica project, the former quite understandably
reacted violently. It severely criticised the Federal Government’s
stand that the project was in the interest of the Federation as a whole,
10 B.N.A. Act 1867, sections 121 and 122.
11 Ibid. section 124.
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in the light of the clear admission by the Federal Cabinet that although
the agreement between the Government of Jamaica and Esso did
not confer a legal monopoly on the company, it effectually eliminated
competition from outside. In a letter to the Prime Minister of the
Federation from the Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, the Premier
expressed the “considerable concern” of his government and made
these comments, inter alia :
“If notwithstanding the Federal Government’s responsibility under the
constitution the intention is to delay the introduction of Customs Union
until the special requirements of every vested interest have been met, then
it would appear that the Govrnmnt of Trinidad and Tobago should retain
its freedom of action in respect of the parallel principle of freedom of
movement of persons within the Federation. It would be unfair to expect
of this governement that it should continue to pursue a liberal policy in
respect of the movement of persons when, with the endorsement and sanction
of the Federal Government, other unit territories are pursuing a contrary
policy in respect of the movement of goods”. 12
The fact is that there was at all material times a sharp conflict
of opinion between the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad as to
the type of federal structure that was appropriate to the West Indies.
The Trinidad Government wanted a strong central government 13
capable of developing and integrating the economy of the area while
the Jamaica Government insisted on greater provincial autonomy and
a week centre.14
After more and more concessions had been granted to Jamaica,
the Premier in the summer of 1960 (without reference to the Federal
Government or any constituent unit) procured the passage of an Act
to provide for the holding of a referendum to decide whether the
territory should remain in the Federation. This was the extent to
which it was prepared to stretch its ideas on provincial autonomy.’5
The result was that a majority of the Jamaica electorate in September
1961 voted against that country remaining in the Federation, which
was accordingly dissolved on 31st May, 1962, to the great distress
12 Economics of Nationhood (published by the Office of the Trinidad Premier
and Minister of Finance 11th Sept., 1959) Appendix “A” (iii) p. 29, para. 11.
13 A full statement of the case for a strong central government is set out in
the “Economics of Nationhood” op. cit.
14 The Jamaica case is set out in their Ministry Paper No. 3 of 1959.
25 The matter is fully discussed by J. B. Miller in the West Indian Economist,
Vol. 4 No. 9 March 1962, 11-26. The whole issue of the causes of dissolution of
the Federation are set out by J. H. Proctor in an article “Constitutional Defects
and the collapse of the West Indies Federation”: Public Law, Summer 1964,
125-151. See also H. W. Springer: Reflections on the Failure of the first West
Indian Federation (Harvard University Centre for International Affairs: Occa-
sional Paper No. 4 July 1962).
No. 4] WEST INDIAN LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 349
of all West Indians who have the welfare of the whole area at heart.
Trinidad and Jamaica then became independent countries in August
1962. Before long British Guiana, which did not join the union, is
likely to become independent; so will British Honduras. Barbados,
the Leeward Islands and the Windwards are also likely to form a
new federation 16 and become a separate independent state if they
can iron out their differences. The net result is that there are likely
to be at least five independent Commonwealth states with a total
population of under five million in the Caribbean.
This is the price the West Indies area is paying for failure to insist
on a central government which could command the respect of, and
at the same time be able to collaborate with, the various island
governments for the good of all concerned. This is the price the
people of the area are paying for complacency in the face of mounting
political and economic tensions. As the writer has contemplated the
Canadian scene over the past year, he thinks he has in some quarters
detected a measure of unconcern and over-complacency which cannot
do the Canadian federation any good if it is to be preserved. Quebec’s
problems must clearly be squarely faced; but they must also be sen-
sibly tackled with due consideration for the rest of the union.
(b) Consultation with the People
I have felt impelled to ask myself whether a new “home-grown”
constitution for Canada would by now have become a reality if “the
people” had from the start (say from 1950) been permitted to take
an active part in discussing and thinking about it. It does not seem
enough that only the legal representatives of the people (in the form
of Provincial Attorneys General and the Federal Minister of Justice)
should have been allowed to become involved in such an exercise.
The preparation and drafting of a Bill to repatriate the Canadian
Constitution is the concern of all. 17 It has struck me as inconceivable
that it should have taken so advanced and progressive a country as
Canada fifteen years’ negotiation and discussion in arranging the
16 At the present time it is felt in some quarters that Barbados wishes to
become independent on its own. The island has an area of 166 square miles
and a population of over 220,000.
17 In this respect the writer respectfully endorses the words of Prof. F. R.
Scott in “Our Changing Constitution”: Proceedings of the Royal Society of
Canada (Third Series. Vol. iv, 1961). Prof. Scott states at p. 93: “It
is our
country and our future that is being planned and we –
should
have our chance to be heard at the appropriate time before our governments
have taken up fixed positions”.
the citizens –
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
repatriation of the constitution and in finding an amending formula
the end not being in sight, even now. One writer charitably attrib-
–
utes this to the fact that constitutional development in Canada has
been “piecemeal, protracted and accomplished with propriety”.18 When
one thinks of the place of constitutional development in other lands
over the past decade, one is puzzled over the length of time that has
elapsed without any decision being reached. On January 10th, 1950,
the then Prime Minister, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, in opening the
proceedings of a constitutional conference, seemed to sound a note
of urgency, thus :
“The purpose of this conference is to seek together to devise a generally
satisfactory method of transferring to authorities responsible to the people
of Canada the jurisdiction which may have to be exercised from time to
time to amend those fundamental parts of the constitution which are
concern alike to the federal and provincial authorities”.19
Later in the same proceedings the Prime Minister admitted
“The constitutional act which established the Commonwealth of Australia
in 1900 and the South Africa Act which established the Union of South
Africa in 1909 both made provision for amendment of those constitutions
within the borders of the respective countries… Canada is today the only
nation in the Commonwealth lacking full capacity to amend its own con-
stitution by its own action and our country is indeed the only sovereign
state in the world which lacks this power”.
That was fifteen years ago but the position today is still the same.
Since then the other Commonwealth countries which have become
independent and capable of amending their constitutions include
Ghana, Malaya, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago,
Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Malawi, Zambia, Gambia and Malta. These
countries may be under-developed economically but, by comparison
with Canada, they are highly developed constitutionally.
There can be no doubt that in the case of Trinidad and Tobago
consultation with the people hastened the process of constitution-
making. In January 1962 the People’s National Movement –
the
governing Party –
decided that Trinidad should become an independ-
ent country within the Commonwealth thereby severing its ties with
the Federation, as Jamaica had elected to do three months previously.
The Trinidad Governement appointed a Constitutional Adviser, draft-
ed a constitution which was then circulated to all sections of the
community in every corner of the island –
to the Bar Council, the
Is Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians.
1951 C.B.R. Vol. No. 10: 1038-1079. See also F. R. Scott: Our Changing Con-
stitution op. cit 93.
19 Proceedings of the Constitutional Conference of Federal and Provincial
Governments. January 10-12, 1950, p. 6.
No. 4] WEST INDIAN LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 351
Law Society, Medical and Dental Associations, Teachers’ Groups,
the Civil Service Association, Cane Farmers’ Groups, Village Boards,
County bodies. Memoranda were invited from organizations and in-
dividuals. These were submitted in their hundreds to the Cabinet
which then convened a series of public meetings at Port of Spain’s
main Civic centre (Queen’s Hall) where public debate on the issues
took place. The proceedings were broadcast. Several revisions of the
Draft Constitution resulted from this public canvassing and debate.
The Bar Association was represented by one of Trinidad’s most out-
standing lawyers who attacked several points in the draft (that
lawyer having since been appointed as Chief Justice). It was therefore
fit and proper that the Trinidad Constitution should begin with the
words: “We the people of Trinidad and Tobago”. 20 The constitution
was subsequently taken to London for further consideration by the
U.K. Government and enactment by Parliament. In this connection it
is respectfully submitted that no constitutional instrument or amend-
ment should be considered by reference to individual Ministers of
as is the so-called “Fulton/Favreau” formula. Politicians
Justice –
come and go, but the union is and should be a creation of the People.21
(c) The Judicial Arm
I turn now to what strikes me as a most fundamental omission
from all the Canadian Government’s proposals for repatriation of
the constitution, viz., why the judiciary and its jurisdiction are not
part of the basic law in the Draft Bill. The Fulton-Favreau formula
20 This is the kind of expression that, according to K. C. Wheare, characterises
an outochthonous constitution. Eire furnishes the best illustration of a truly
“home-grown” type of constitution. When the Irish Free State Act of 1922 was
re-enacted in 1937 to give Eire its new constitution, the draft was presented to,
but not enacted by, the Dail. This body was asked simply to discuss, amend
and approve it. After it had performed that function, the constitution was sub-
mitted to the people in a referendum –
their approval constituting the actual
enactment of the Constitution – The Plebiscite (Draft Constitution) Act, 1937
(No. 16 of 1937) which was referred to as the “draft constitution approved by
Dail Eireann”.
In the opinion of K. C. Wheare, the Irish procedure created a break in legal
continuity. He concludes: “It showed to other Commonwealth countries a method
of making a break with the past and of conducting what in law was a revolution”
Wheare: Constitutional Structure of the Commonwealth, 1961 Chap. 4, 93/94.
21 The Constitution of the United States begins with the words: “We, the
People of the United States in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our posterity, do order and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America”.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
is silent on the fundamental importance of the Supreme Court. It is
quite unnecessary at this stage to plead for its inclusion since so
many Canadians, including some of Canada’s most eminent constitu-
tional jurists, 2 2 have already done so in no uncertain terms. Such a
provision is made in the constitution of every independent country
which I have been able to examine. Is there any reason why the omis-
sion of 1867 and subsequent years should not now be corrected? In
urging this, it is not that one has any apprehension that the sanctity
of the rule of law is in jeopardy or that the judiciary will not continue
to maintain the high traditions which now distinguish it. Here clearly
is a case where constitutional “propriety” is not being observed; and
there is still time to remedy it.
(d) Human Rights Provisions
Enough has already been said over recent years on the desirability
of enshrining human rights provisions in the Federal Constitution.
But it is puzzling to understand what could have motivated the enact-
ment of a Bill of Rights for Canada 2 3 at a time when active (if
unduly protracted) consideration was being given to arriving at
some autochthonous expedient for “nationalising” the constitution. It
seems so elementary to emphasise the importance of embodying such
provisions in the basic law of the country rather than in an ordinary
Act of the Legislature which can be revoked at any time, but it may
be that the framers of the Bill of Rights despaired of ever being able
to reach agreement on a new constitution in the immediate future.
It was out of a recognition of the basic importance of such provi-
sions that the independence Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 24
adopted a large part of the opening section of the Canadian Bill of
Rights as its first Chapter. It is also revealing to see what use the
Trinidad draftsmen made of the Preamble to the Canadian Bill of
Rights which begins as follows:
The Parliament of Canada, affirming that the Canadian nation is founded
upon principles that acknowledge the supremacy of God, the dignity and
worth of the human person and the position of the family in a society of
free men and free institutions”.
The Preamble to the Trinidad Constitution opens with these words:
(a) have affirmed that
the Nation of Trinidad and Tobago is founded upon principles that acknowl-
“Whereas the people of Trinidad and Tobago –
22 For example, Laskin op. cit. p. 1039.
2 3 An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms. 8-9 Eliz. II, S.C. 1960, ch. 44.
24 Sections 1 and 2 of the Second Schedule to the Trinidad and Tobago (Con-
stitution) Order in Council 1962. (S.I. 1962 No. 1875).
No. 4] WEST INDIAN’LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 353
edge the supremacy of God, faith in fundamental human rights and freedoms,
the position of the family in a society of free men and free institutions, the
dignity of the human person and the equal and unalienable rights with which
all members of the human family are endowed by their Creator”.
Whereas in the Canadian Act it is the “Parliament” which affirms,
in the case of the Trinidad Constitution it is the “people” who do the
affirming.
There is no lack of precedent from which Canada can draw for
similar constitutional provision if it does not want to follow Trinidad’s
example –
itself derived from a Canadian precedent. The Federal
Republic of Germany,25 after reciting that all the power of the state
derives from the people, goes on/to include a caption “Rights of the
People” under which will be found the following three articles:
“6. All citizens have equal rights before the law.
7. Men and women have equal rights.
8. Personal freedom, the inviolability of domicile, the secrecy of correspond-
ence and the right to reside in any place are guaranteed”.
In the Indian Constitution adopted in 1949, Part III deals with
fundamental rights which will be mentioned here, in the interests of
space, only under the broad headings of the right to equality, the right
to freedom of religion, cultural and educational rights, the right to
property, and the right of constitutional remedies. The Republican
Constitution of Nigeria provides for cognate rights.26 Similarly
Jamaicia 27, Uganda 28, and Kenya 29 all made human rights provisions
in their Constitutions on attaining independence. So did Tanganyi-
ka 0.
Here again, therefore, Canada remains aloof in constitutional
terms, in that fundamental human rights are expressly provided for
only at the federal level by Act of Parliament. Two courses are open
to the constitutional experts if the matter is to be put right, viz,
either that the provinces enact separate Bills of Right, as has been
done in the U.S.A. or that there be specific provisions made in any
2,9 See Constitution of the Federal Republic approved on 30th May 1949 and
Known as the Bonn Constitution.
26 See Chapter III of an Act to make provision for the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1960. No. 20 passed 1st Oct. 1963.
27 Chapter 3 of the Second Schedule of the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in
Council 1962 (1962 No. 1550).
28 Chapter 3 of the Schedule of the Uganda (Independence) Order in Council
1962 (1962 No. 2175).
(1963 No. 1968).
December 1962.
29 Chapter 2 of Schedule 2 of the Kenya (Independence) Order in Council 1963
so Preamble to Constituent Assembly Act No. 1 of Tanganyika passed on 9th
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
new constitution for these rights to operate in respect of all citizens
throughout Canada. In the latter case the Canadian Bill of Right of
1960 will presumably have to be revoked.
(e) The Future
What then can be said of the future of Canadian Federalism? It is
common ground that federalism is not a static concept, and that in a
federal union there must always be adjustment to meet changing
needs and altered circumstances. There are those who even believe
that federalism is a form of government which has outlived its use-
fulness. Foremost among these was the British political scientist,
Harold Laski, who after a visit to the U.S.A. in 1939 wrote an
obituary on Federalism31 In his paper Laski spoke of .the unsuit-
ability of the federal form of government for America in this way:
“Imposed solutions from a distent Washington, blind as it must be blind,
to the subtle minutiae of local realities, cannot solve the ultimate problems
that are in dispute. The wider the powers exercised from Washington, the
more ineffective will be the capacity for creative administration. Regional
wisdom is the clue to the American future. The power to govern must go
where the regional wisdom resides. So restrained, men learn by the exercise
of responsibility the art of progress”.
There seem to be many today in Canada who would readily en-
dorse Professor Laski’s assessment in general terms and with specific
reference to Canada. In so far as the U.S.A. is concerned there can be
no doubt that Laski’s strictures have proved inaccurate. Dean Roscoe
Pound once said:
“No domain of continental extent has been ruled otherwise than as an
autocracy or as a federal state”.32
On this basis, Canada will have to decide which of the two masters
it will serve.
But an even more direct answer to Laski is furnished by Nelson D.
Rockefeller, the present Governor of New York, who has written as
follows:
“Why has our federal system worked so well ? Why has it been able
to foster and adapt itself to fantastic growth and change over 175 years
while preserving our fundamental human goals ? The answer lies in the
nature of the federal idea and in the leadership which it summons. The
truth is that in our federal system the sources of productive power,
initiative and innovation are to be found at all levels of government, and
31 Harold Laski: “The Obsolescence of Federalism”
in the New Republic,
May 3rd, 1939, pp. 367-8.
32 Pound: “Law and the Federal Government” in Federalism as a Democratic
Process (1942) p. 23.
No. 4] WEST INDIAN LOOKS AT CANADIAN FEDERALISM 355
they forever interact on each other, with the initiative depending importantly
on where the most dynamic leadership exists…” 33
There can be no doubt that what the author says of the U.S.A.
is even more applicable to Canada at the present time.
Canada is an affluent society but it has still to come of age consti-
tutionally. The design of its own flag is clearly a step in the right
direction. But the matter does not end there.
The writer cannot escape the feeling that Confederation in Canada
has not moved with the times. He submits that the country must
decide once and for all whether it will move forward (constitutionwi-
se) from prosiac conservatism to dynamic progress and what route
it wishes to follow. When that decision is made those who control
the country’s destiny must be not only courageous but cataclysmic.
Quebec with its very special position in the union must of course
do nothing to obstruct that process –
so long as the Federal Govern-
ment is prepared to recognise Quebec’s unique position 34 and arrive
at reasonable and constructive compromise. At present there seems
to be something more than an uneasy truce which the Royal Commis-
sion on Bilingualism and Biculturalism characterises as a crisis: their
“initial diagnosis” beng described thus:
“All that we have seen and heard has led us to the conviction that
Canada is in the most critical period of its history since Confederation. We
believe that there is a crisis, in the sense that Canada has come to a time
when decisions must be taken and developments must occur leading either
to its break-up or to a new set of condition; for its future existence. We do
not know whether the crisis will be short or long. We are convinced that
it is here. The signs of danger are many and serious… We are convinced
that it is still possible to rectify the situation. But a major operation will
perhaps be unavoidable. The whole social body appears to be affected. The
crisis has reached a point where there is a danger that the will of the
people to go on may begin to fail”.” 5
These are strong words. My year of research at McGill has con-
vinced me that there is abundant merit in them but that the people
of Canada have the capacity to rise to such occasions of crisis in the
interest of their future well-being and continued prosperity.
33 Rockefeller: The Future of Federalism 1962, pp. 34-37.
34 One wonders whether the fact that Quebec has recently opted out of twenty-
nine “share cost” programmes is not a case of the writing on the wall as far
as the maintenance of Canadian Federalism is concerned and whether Quebec
may not collaborate with the Federal Government in a more positive way.
35 A Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Bi-
culturalism (English and French Version) Chapter 7, p. 133 (English Section).
