BOOK REVIEWS
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
A.W.B. Simpson, ed. Biographical Dictionary of the Common Law. London:
Butterworths, 1984. Pp. xxv, 560 [R29.501. Reviewed by Michael G. Bridge.*
There is an old joke concerning a man who, when asked about his
reading of a telephone directory, replies that his enjoyment is marred in
only one respect: the plot keeps changing. While abandoning the undiscri-
minating equality of the telephone directory, this biographical dictionary
supplies a selective and constantly changing cast of characters located in
predictable alphabetical order (except where the conferment of a peerage
has confused the issue), and it has some pretensions to comprehensiveness,
though a few suprising names seem to have gone ex-directory. The style of
entry varies from the barest abbreviation of vital information (e.g., Walton)
to the full-blown and informative two- or three-page entry (e.g., Kelsen,
Llewellyn), and there are numerous vignettes (e.g., Bramwell and the two
Sweets). The selections are generally well done and the book is well pro-
duced, but there are too many typographical errors (or spelling mistakes –
“abberations”, “preceeding”) and an arresting example of dropped lines in
the case of Lord Stowell. Lord Tenterden appears twice as Lord Tenderden,
and anyone looking for Lords Eldon and Nottingham had better remember
their maiden names (Scott and Finch) since a double entry is unaccountably
absent for them. And is that youthful figure in the costume of the 1630s
really Sir Edward Coke, who must have worn ruff collars well into his later
middle age? Was Powell really only about ten years old when he wrote his
treatise on mortgages? Lombroso may well have been the author of After
Death – What? but can he really be credited with statements made two
years after his death?
It is evident from a reading of the whole that the editorial hand has
been imposed lightly on the lengthy and distinguished list of contributors.
In some cases, one may legitimately suspect that a contributor has preferred
hero worship or a subjective slant on legal culture to objectivity. On the
whole, the length of a particular entry is a most unreliable guide to the
significance of the relevant actor’s part in the development of the common
*Of the Faculty of Law, McGill University.
McGill Law Journal 1985
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law. Entries are confined to deceased jurists achieving prominence before
1939, but this limitation has not been consistently followed: Fifoot and
Yntema are included but there is no reference at all to Falconbridge. A
number of non-common-lawyers are included “for fun”. Some of these,
such as the Roman jurisconsults, have had a discernible influence on the
common law via the Digest, while others, such as Portalis, have not.
The dictionary deals primarily with English common lawyers, providing
also a selected list of American and Commonwealth figures. Granted that
the latter group is thus limited, some surprising choices have been made.
Why should Beale (an obviously unfashionable figure today in the United
States, where the heroes of yesteryear tend to be buried near the Kremlin
wall instead of in a glass coffin) be out when Kocourek is in? There is no
reference to Sir Isaac Isaacs in the Australian batch. As for Canadian omis-
sions, Falconbridge has already been noted and there is a distinct shortage
of judges from Western Canada, such as Stuart and Lamont. The English
list, on the other hand, is generally comprehensive and well-balanced. The
major treatise writers are present (with the exception of Dart) and common
law judges are to be found in force (but not Vaughan Williams or Cockburn),
but there is a gaping hole in the ranks of Chancery judges: there is no mention
of Lords Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, perhaps the strongest of the
nineteenth-century Chancery appeal judges, nor indeed of the first Lord
Parker of Waddington, some of whose more obscure brethren like Lord
Atkinson are included. The book is clearly designed, at least in part, to
entertain and interest its readers, but it does also claim to be a dictionary
and the editor’s power of selection should therefore know some limits.
The best parts of this book are the handful of really informative essays,
such as those on Ellenborough, Kelsen and Llewellyn, and the large number
of incisive and amusing entries, many of which are the work of the editor.
The Irish contributions are disappointingly lacking in whimsicality and the
Australian pieces have a distinct tendency to be long, dull and earnest. This
pantheon of latter-day legal saints provides role models for all kinds of legal
careers. Those of us who have chosen to spend our professional lives in law
schools or as legal writers (not necessarily polar opposites) can take comfort
from the presence of “obscure” (Snell, Perkins, Holloway, Powell) and mar-
ginally competent people (Pollexfen was “perplexed”, Pigott wrote a “learned
but baffling” book, E. Christian died “in the full vigour of his incapacity”,
Hill was “utterly confused by his own learning” and Bevers wrote an “ex-
tremely dull” book). We can sympathise with those who took to scholarship
because of matrimonial difficulties (Twiss) or lack of success at the bar
(Benjamin, Pollock, Blackstone), and we can well imagine the travails of
those whose lectures repelled students (Austin, Kent) or who were unable
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
to inject life into their legal prose (Chambers wrote a “dreary treatise” and
Garrow wrote “lifeless prose compensated by clarity and accuracy”).
But there are success stories too. Pollock managed to intimidate his
pupils while Fifoot stimulated the minds of even his weaker students; Hals-
bury was paid 10,000 guineas in pre-devaluation currency for his editorship
of the Laws of England and Accursius grew fat on student fees. Nor is it
all material success. Lords Sumner and Macnaghten secured entry in the
Oxford Book of English Prose and Maitland produced enduring works of
scholarship without notes.
And who said that lawyers are dull? Kelly was “beaten up by roughs”,
Popham was reputed as a child to have been kidnapped by gypsies, Thurlow
fought a duel and Grotius escaped from imprisonment by hiding in a chest.
They are also capable of going out in style –
like Glanvill at the Siege of
Acre, Ulpian and Papinian, who were murdered by Roman guards, W. Mac-
naghten, who was killed by Pathan tribesmen in the Kabul expedition of
1842, Pashukanis, who was liquidated by Stalin, and Stallybrass, who fell
out of a railway carriage. Could the same claims be made for chartered
accountants?
Lawyers can achieve canonisation despite personal shortcomings: Saun-
ders was notorious for his body odour (a “fetid mass that offended his
neighbours at the bar in the sharpest degree”) and Howard sent his son to
a girls’ boarding school. Lawyers have also been known to flirt with the
seamier side of life: Lord Holt had his 1698 salary paid in lottery tickets,
Macclesfield was excessively avaricious in the sale of offices and Bacon
accepted bribes. Nor is sainthood reserved for those, like Pattishall, who
work single-mindedly day and night at their law. Keith, Jones and W. Mac-
naghten were distinguished scholars of oriental languages (Jones rates a
mention in Gibbon’s Decline and Fall), Lord Macnaghten won the Diamond
Sculls at Henley, Lee wrote histories of the Popes and Archbishops of Can-
terbury in Latin hexameters while Bowen translated Virgil into English
hexameters, and Fry and Moulton were accomplished in the sciences (zo-
ology and electricity). On a slightly less-elevated plane, J. Mansfield shot
his own breakfast, Shadwell issued ex parte injunctions from the swimming
pool (with less than full disclosure one hopes), Jervis was an expert at
spotting marked cards, Lord Thankerton practised knitting while on the
bench and Gibson manufactured his own false teeth.
In sum, despite certain shortcomings, this book is a most enjoyable
antidote to boredom and it can be guaranteed to enliven a dull weekend.
606
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An inexpensive soft-cover edition will, however, be necessary if the book
is to reach its market. In the course of reading the book from cover to cover,
which by no means required self-mortification, I was able to find only one
outrageously false statement: namely, that Osgoode Hall is the best-known
law school in Canada.
L.C. Green. International Law: A Canadian Perspective. Toronto: Carswell,
1984. Pp. vii, 352 [$35.00]. Reviewed by Ivan A. Vlasic.*
The ancient subject of international law was taught in Canada for more
than a century before the publication in 1979 of the first Canadian textbook,
An Introduction to International Law by Professors Williams and de Mes-
tral.I Only five years later, a second Canadian textbook of the same size and
of roughly comparable coverage has now appeared on the market.2 Professor
Green’s book, like the Williams and de Mestral book, places special em-
phasis on the “Canadian approach” to international law and is replete with
footnote references to Canadian sources. Like its predecessor volume, the
book is primarily directed to students and practitioners. In terms of pages,
it may be modest (three hundred and fifty pages) when compared with
certain widely used one-volume English textbooks, 3 but in terms of the
topics covered it is quite comprehensive. Thus, in addition to the standard
topics, such as the sources of international law, jurisdiction, state territory,
and the law governing treaties, the book also deals, inter alia, with envi-
ronmental law, extradition, the status of minorities, air law, international
organizations, and the law of armed conflict. No major area of international
law has been omitted, although certain important subjects, including some
of special interest to Canadian jurists, have received less than adequate
attention, as will be detailed below.
Professor Green presents his chosen subject matter in a readable and
straightforward fashion. The text is, for the most part, well documented
with appropriate references, and potentially controversial legal concepts and
rules are treated with caution. For a work originally prepared for the Canadian
Encyclopedic Digest, this approach is understandable and justified. Yet in
a separate manual on international law, addressed to a much wider read-
ership, such a neutral and largely descriptive account of a lively, constantly
evolving and often controversial subject makes the reading a somewhat
disappointing experience, particularly to those familiar with the author’s
previous writings and public appearances. Professor Green is known for his
strongly held, and even more strongly voiced, views on many international
*Of the Faculty of Law, McGill University.
IS. Williams & A.L.C. de Mestral, An Introduction to International Law (1979).
2L.C. Green, International Law: A Canadian Perspective (1984).
3See, e.g., I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 3d ed. (1979); J.G. Starke,
Introduction to InternationalLaw, 9th ed. (1984); D.W. Greig, InternationalLaw, 2d ed. (1976).
McGill Law Journal 1985
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law issues; pungency, at times pugnacity, a zest for polemics, and an un-
shakeable belief in the rightness of his position have long been his trade-
marks –
endearing to some (including this reviewer) but infuriating to
others (more than a few of whom share Professor Green’s sense of infalli-
bility). One suspects that nothing short of a herculean effort in self-control
(or the stern dictates of his publisher) could have produced such a tame
result. By refusing to question both the “mainstream” as well as the “newly
emerging” positions on many controversial issues, Professor Green has sub-
stituted ecumenism for liveliness.
While the overall quality of this publication is good, it does suffer from
a number of shortcomings, ranging from the substantial to the mildly ir-
ritating. The reader should be warned, however, that the following obser-
vations necessarily reflect this reviewer’s own biases and preferences.
A major and immediately noticeable weakness of the book is its index
which is uncommonly frustrating and all too often quite useless. One will
search in vain among the index’s major headings for such standard entries
as “aggression”, “human rights”, “jurisdiction”, “Arctic”, “sovereign im-
munity”, “nationality”, “responsibility of states”, “sea”, “high seas”, and
so on. References, for example, to concepts of the law of the sea will be
found under the heading “maritime frontiers”, sovereign immunity under
“state jurisdiction”, nuclear testing under “environment and pollution”, and
outer space under “air law”. Yet marginal topics for a book of this size such
as “international civil service” and “armed conflict” are accorded major
headings with a number of sub-headings.
On the content side, it is disappointing to discover some serious omis-
sions in a book so wide in coverage. A more discriminating approach to
various subjects would have closed all these gaps without the addition of a
single page. For example, it seems inconsistent, in a short volume aimed
at Canadian students and practitioners, to give the law of armed conflict
forty-four pages4 and the international law of human rights only three pages,5
or to devote a whole page to the interpretation of a relatively minor dispute
between Egypt and the World Health Organization while reducing the Arctic
and Antarctica to a few casual references. Surely both Canadian and foreign
readers have a right to expect a much fuller account of the legal status of
the polar areas, especially the Arctic, from a Canadian textbook on inter-
national law. The author’s (mis)treatment of Antarctica is particularly re-
grettable. This vast ice-covered continent, currently governed by a unique
legal regime established under the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, is reduced to a
4Green, supra, note 2 at 267-311.
5lbid. at 231-3.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
brief footnote reference. 6 Despite the puzzling indifference of successive
Canadian governments towards this continent, the peculiar legal and po-
litical features of Antarctica, its potentially enormous resources, and the
fact that it represents the only part of our planet which remains, by command
of international law, totally demilitarized, surely merit some commentary.
As noted above, the meagre space given by the author to human rights,
clearly a topic of great interest to Canadians, is another disappointing feature
of the book. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights receives minimal
attention, apparently because, as a resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly, “it imposes no obligation on any state and confers no legally
enforceable rights”. 7 Elsewhere (under the general title “State Jurisdiction”)
the author concedes that the Declaration is “looked upon as the standard
of measurement of human rights instruments and the behaviour of states”,
but he nevertheless contends that it “lacks any legal obligatory force”. 8 As
if to underscore his downgrading of this most influential of all human rights
texts as a valuable source of guiding principles for the conduct of states,
Professor Green reduces the vast literature on the international law of hu-
man rights to a few footnote citations. Even in a slender volume, one would
expect some indication of the views on the legal and political significance
of the Declaration held by many eminent jurists and a good many govern-
ments who regard at least some of its principles as being part of international
customary law. While strict constructionists such as King Fahd of Saudi
Arabia will readily agree with Professor Green’s assessment of the Decla-
ration, proponents of human rights will be distressed and those interested
in obtaining balanced information about this body of international law will
have to look elsewhere.
In contrast with the paltry three pages given to human rights, the lengthy
coverage accorded to the law of armed conflict might lead the uninformed
reader to conclude that Canada is set to abandon its traditional role as a
peacemaker, adopting a posture in favour of foreign military adventures. In
a book of this size and scope, forty-four pages devoted to a branch of law
of marginal usefulness to Canadian “students” and “practitioners” is plainly
unjustified, especially when contrasted with the scant space allocated to
other more deserving subjects. However, anyone interested in the law of
war will find this account fairly thorough and lucid, with particularly in-
formative discussion of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 ad-
ditional Protocols on Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict. 9
Copious footnotes containing a wealth of relevant information, as well as
6Ibid. at 94 n. 14.
7lbid. at 231.
8 bid. at 192.
MIbid. at 267-311.
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special emphasis on Canada’s role in the drafting of the 1977 Protocol II,
enhance the value of the narrative. 10 As the laws of war are known to be
honoured more in the breach than in the observance, at least a brief com-
mentary regarding compliance with these laws in more than a hundred
armed conflicts since World War II would have been welcome. A mere
description of various conventions and regulations without reference to
practice can be particularly misleading in this branch of international law.
One would also wish to find some discussion of the legality of nuclear
weapons, which have for decades exerted a profound influence on inter-
national life. In view of the many treaties discussed in the book which are
designed to limit or prohibit the use of certain weapons because of their
particularly inhumane nature, this seems an especially glaring omission. A
laconic statement (in the chapter on “State Jurisdiction”) that “there is no
treaty forbidding the use of nuclear weapons during armed conflict” l is
hardly adequate.
The discussion of sovereign immunity, clearly a subject of considerable
practical interest to Canadian jurists, especially following the adoption in
1982 of the State Immunity Act, 12 is another disappointing feature of this
book. To begin with, three pages of text cannot do justice to this important,
complex and much litigated doctrine.’ 3 Professor Green mentions neither
the United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 14 nor
any of the dozens of cases since decided by the American courts. One would
also expect to find more than just a footnote reference to the United King-
dom State Immunity Act 1978.15 In view of the paucity of Canadian cases
dealing with sovereign immunity (none have been decided so far on the
basis of the 1982 Act), and the rather concise guidelines given to courts by
the statute, Canadian judges will rely heavily on American and British law
and practice. The long excerpt from The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon,16
decided in 1812, is immeasurably less relevant to a modern lawyer than
would be a reproduction of, for example, section 1605 of the FSIA or section
3 of the United Kingdom Act. A claim to sovereign immunity is the type
of issue involving international and foreign law which is most likely to
confront Canadian judges and practitioners. Unfortunately, they will find
the book to be of little assistance.
10lbid. at 307-8.
“Ibid. at 163.
12S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 95. For a brief discussion see Green, supra, note 2 at 158.
13Green, ibid., note 2 at 156-9.
1428 U.S.C., s. 1602 (1976).
15(U.K.), 1978, c. 33. See Green, supra, note 2 at 158 n. 6.
16(1812), 7 Cranch 116 at 118. See Green, ibid. at 156 n. 98.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
Although Professor Green makes frequent references to American sources,
he fails even to mention the revised, tentative draft of the “Foreign Relations
Law of the United States”, most of which has been available since the middle
of 1982. Despite its unofficial character, the first edition of this great cod-
ificatory effort of the American Law Institute 17 has continuously provided
guidance on the rules of international law for American judges, government
officials and practitioners. When adopted in its final form, the new Re-
statement will doubtless continue to be treated by United States jurists as
an authority of considerably greater weight than the writings of any indi-
vidual “most highly qualified publicist”. Canadian readers should have been
alerted to this influential publication.
The treatment of the law governing activities in outer space is also less
than satisfactory, both in terms of coverage (one and a half pages) and
quality, for it consists mainly of excerpts from the Outer Space Treaty of
1967.18 Informed readers will surely be surprised by the author’s assertion
that states “are entitled to object if the satellite is used for espionage”. 19 In
support of this questionable assertion, Professor Green cites the Soviet de-
struction of the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in 1960 (not in 1962,
as the book has it).20 In another section, referring to the Soviet spacecraft
Cosmos-954 which crashed in Canadian territory in 1978, the book over-
looks the subsequent Canadian initiative in the United Nations Outer Space
Committee aimed at supplementing the norms of international law relating
to the use of nuclear power sources aboard satellites. 21 The regulation of
space telecommunication is ignored altogether.
Evidence of careless writing can be found in the author’s definition of
the territory of states. According to Professor Green, the sovereignty of states
extends to “either land or water”. 22 May it not be both? And what about
airspace? Similarly, his claim that “a number of… principles [in the Stock-
holm Declaration on the Human Environment] may be regarded as decla-
ratory of customary law” 23 is plainly wrong, except for Principle 21. Not
surprisingly, he neither specifies those Principles nor offers any evidence in
support of the claim. Further, the absence of any discussion of the concept
of the “Common Heritage of Mankind”, debated for many years in the U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea and now enshrined in the 1982 Convention
‘7American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of United States
(1965).
‘sSee Green, supra, note 2 at 200-1.
‘9Ibid. at 200.
20Ibid. at 200 n. 75.
21Ibid. at 162.
22Ibid. at 203.
23 Ibid. at 162.8
612
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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on the Law of the Sea as well as the Moon Treaty of 1979, is inexcusable.
Quite apart from the fact that two recent international treaties incorporate
this new concept, which also enjoys the support of more than one hundred
states, its legal, political, and economic implications are so great that no
book on international law can afford to ignore it, regardless of the author’s
own views on the matter.
As the above observations illustrate, this book suffers from a number
of weaknesses. Nevertheless, as noted in the beginning of this review, the
book covers a large number of subjects and most of them are treated ad-
equately. By offering the reader a panoramic view of international law in
its application, Professor Green’s text should prove useful as a quick ref-
erence for its intended readership.
P.G. Stein & A.D.E. Lewis, eds. Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory
of J.A.C. Thomas. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1983. Pp. xii, 209 [925.00].
Reviewed by Richard J. Cummins.*
Those of us who recognize the immense value of studies in Roman
Law and wish to see them promoted will be greatly encouraged by this
excellent collection of essays by friends and colleagues of the late Professor
J.A.C. Thomas of the University of London.1 It is a particularly fitting
honour paid to a scholar who, on the evidence of the biographical note2
and the bibliography3 contained in this book, was a tireless promoter of
Roman law teaching and an important contributor to its literature. Professor
Thomas’s strong concern for teaching was clearly reflected in his edition of
the Institutes of Justinian 4 and his very clear and useful Textbook ofRoman
Law. 5
Fifteen essays are collected covering issues in the most important fields
of Roman law scholarship relating to the Institutes. Prominent continental
and British scholars have made contributions; Professor Alan Watson of
the University of Pennsylvania is the only contributor from a North Amer-
ican university.6 Two articles, “Divisio Obligationum’ ‘ 7 by Professor Max
Kaser, Emeritus Professor of Roman Law at Hamburg and Salzburg, and
“Der Schatzfund in Justinians Institutionen”,8 by Professor Theo Mayer-
Maly of Salzburg on treasure trove, are in German; the rest are in English.
The volume is attractively and accurately printed. There are, however,
some small defects in its formal presentation. It has an index of sources
(Index Fontium) but lacks a subject matter and name index. Also, it would
have been helpful to organize the book into sections, putting together articles
covering the same subject matter rather than following an order which, for
the most part, seems random. Some articles translate Latin quotations and
*General Counsel, Mobil Oil Frangaise.
‘P.G. Stein & A.D.E. Lewis, eds, Studies in Justinian’s Institutes in Memory ofJ.A.C. Thomas
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Studies].
21bid. at 1.
31bid. at 187.
4J.A.C. Thomas, The Institutes of Justinian: Text, Translation and Commentary (1975).
5J.A.C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (1976).
6A. Watson, “Justinian’s Institutes and Some English Counterparts” in Studies, supra, note
1, 181.
7Studies, supra, note 1, 73.
8Studies, supra, note 1, 109.
@McGill Law Journal 1985
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others do not; these days authors should always do so. These are, however,
minor defects which the rich subject matter makes one forget immediately.
Roman law scholarship is properly a branch of historical rather than
legal studies as narrowly defined. It represents an attempt to describe legal
institutions at a particular point in time and to trace their evolution. The
study of an ancient institution is not only inherently interesting, but may
contribute to an understanding of contemporary ones, whether etymologi-
cally related or not. The interest a non-specialist legal scholar will have in
Roman law scholarship is less direct than that which a contemporary phi-
losopher, for example, might have in an ancient argument which may still
be pertinent in its original form to the question he is studying. The long
history of Roman law offers, nevertheless, an immense laboratory for com-
parative research.
Four articles deal with obligations: two with the classic question of how
they are divided into categories, 9 one with the formation of contract,’ 0 and
one with the delict offurtum.” Several papers treat the areas of property
and successions: Professor Robert Feenstra’s piece, “The ‘Poor Widower’
in Justinian’s Legislation”‘ 2 (which concerns the issue of forced shares and
includes an interesting discussion of a South African case in which the
relevance of the texts at issue was argued); an interesting article on alluvio
(additions to land by deposit of silt) by Professor Andrew Lewis of the
University of London; 13 the article on treasure trove mentioned above;”‘
and an article entitled “Concealing a Servitude”, by Alan Rodger of the
Edinburgh bar.15 Two articles deal with actions, one on actiones mixtae by
Professor Hans Ankum, Professor of Roman Law at Amsterdam,’ 6 and one
on actio de posito by Professor William Gordon, Professor of Civil Law at
Glasgow.17
Several articles examine broader developments and the subsequent his-
tory of the Institutes. Professor O.E Robinson of Glasgow deals with the
9These include Kaser, supra, note 7 and P Birks, “Obligations: One Tier or Two?” in Studies,
10G. MacCormack, “The Oral and Written Stipulation in the Institutes” in Studies, supra,
supra, note 1, 18.
note 1, 96.
“B. Nicholas, “Theophilus and Contrectatio” in Studies, supra, note 1, 118.
12Studies, supra, note 1, 39.
13A. Lewis, “Alluvio: The Meaning of Institutes 11.1.20” in Studies, supra, note 1, 87.
14Mayer-Maly, supra, note 8.
15Studies, supra, note 1, 134.
‘6H. Ankum, “Gaius, Theophilus and Tribonian and the Actiones Mixtae” in Studies, supra,
note 1, 4.
17W.M. Gordon, “The Actio de Posito Reconsidered” in Studies, supra, note 1, 45.
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
impact of developments in public law on the Institutes. 18 The earlier evo-
lution of the Institute form, of which the work prepared under Justinian is
the most famous example, is addressed by Professor Peter Stein in his article
entitled “The Development of the Institutional System”.19 Professor Paul
Van Warmelo describes the history of the Institutes as a students’ manual. 20
Finally, Professor Alan Watson contributes a short article comparing the
method of organizing material in the Institutes with that of “some English
counterparts” including Blackstone’s treatises. 21
The collection illustrates a broad range of useful approaches to dealing
with Roman material. Some articles are close analyses of a single or several
texts, aiming to arrive at a more accurate and complete statement of the
law on a particular point. Others deal with broader, more jurisprudential
themes. I will refer to several of them, chosen almost at random (for there
are many outstanding ones), in order to illustrate the kind of writing found
in the collection.
Professor O.F Robinson finds interesting evidence’of the intrusion of
public law concerns into the private legal life of Justinian’s times by com-
paring his Institutes with those of Gaius written approximately 350 years
earlier (although both deal almost exclusively with private law).22 This de-
velopment seems to him to parallel that in western countries during this
century where, as in Justinian’s Rome, “one can observe the state at work
trying to make the citizen good, or at least intervening in the private sphere
because it knew better than the individual what was good for him”. 23
Each of the Institutes was an elementary textbook designed to be used
by first-year law students. While a perfect comparison is not possible since
Gaius’ work is not complete, Justinian’s emphasis is clearly different in
several important ways. A young lawyer of Justinian’s time would be more
likely to plan a career in public administration rather than in private practice
as at the time of Gaius. In Justinian’s work, the law is divided into “public”
and “private” branches, 24 a distinction not used by Gaius, and issues of
constitutional, administrative and sacral law are treated. In discussing tutela,
80.F. Robinson, “Public Law and Justinian’s Institutes” in Studies, supra, note 1, 125.
1
19Studies, supra, note 1, 151.
2op. Van Warmelo, “The Institutes of Justinian as Students’ Manual” in Studies, supra, note
1, 164.
2’Watson, supra, note 6.
22Robinson, supra, note 18.
23Ibid. at 126.
24Ibid. at 129.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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Justinian’s Institutes emphasize the public nature of the burden; the admin-
istration is protected by providing that usucapio cannot run against it.25
Justinian’s work is also characterized by a tendency to criminalize offences
as well as a preference for treating problems by focussing on the needs of
the system rather than the individual. 26 This interesting way of dealing with
historical material could, it seems to me, usefully be applied over a longer
time period and to a larger body of texts.
Professor Peter Stein has contributed a rich essay on the development
of the institutional system, 27 that is to say, on the gradual definition of the
categories which make up the structure of the Institutes. Professor Stein
reminds us that even distinctions which seem fundamental, like that be-
tween public and private law or that which divides legal subject matter into
law concerning persons (personae), things (res) and action (actiones), did
not come down from heaven but are working divisions which have evolved
through the application of rhetorical learning. As such, they do not represent
a final scientific achievement to be defended against the disorder of real
life.
The first known rational organization of the civil law is that of Q.
Mucius Scaevola (Consul, 95 B.C.) whose order was practical, treating the
more important concerns first: thus, problems related to wills, legacies and
intestate succession are dealt with at the beginning of his work.28 As pri-
mitive as it may seem, even this early collection shows, in its detail, the
influence of Greek rhetorical techniques of classification. 29
Masurius Sabinus (first century A.D.) refines this structure somewhat. 30
But it is Gaius who, in the second century A.D., imposes on the traditional
material a coherent superstructure of rhetorical origin which, in its broad
outline, still characterizes modern civil codes. Gaius’ tripartite division of
material is not, as far as we know, found in earlier legal literature. 31 Although
he recognizes that no exact equivalent has been discovered, Professor Stein
follows an early author cited by Jhering32 in suggesting that “the tripartite
Introduction to Roman Law (1962) at 122-5 (usucapio).
25Ibid. at 130. See, in general, Thomas, supra, note 5 at 453-4 (tutela); B. Nicholas, An
26Robinson, supra, note 18 at 131.
27Stein, supra, note 19.
281bid. at 152.
291bid.
30Ibid. at 153.
31Ibid. at 157.
32Ibid. at 157 n. 18. This discussion is found in the French translation, R. von Jhering,
L’esprit du droit romain, trans. 0. de Meulenaere, 3d ed. (1887) at 91-2 n. 66. To the regret of
many, Jhering’s great work has never been made available in English. See Nicholas, supra,
note 25 at 1; H.L.A. Hart, “Jhering’s Heaven of Concepts and Modem Analytical Jurisprud-
ence”, in H.L.A. Hart, ed., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983) 265.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
classification was not designed for law but was adapted to it from another
discipline”. 33 Further work will no doubt need to be done on the relation
between rhetorical theory and legal classification.
A substantial account shows how the compilers of Justinian’s Institutes
used Gaius’ categories 34 but interpreted them in a way “which was more
acceptable to them”. 35 As Stein points out:
For Gaius, the civil law was something static. … The arrangement of… material
under three heads enabled him to present a neat, concise scheme. For Justi-
nian’s compilers its attraction was different. They saw law more dynamically,
as an activity. For them Gaius’ three parts of the law could be understood as
referring to the persons of the law who engaged in actions at law concerning
the things of the law, and so all the law could be viewed from these three
points of view. 36
Essays dealing with the basic distinctions on which the structure of works
is based are often unexciting; this one, on the contrary, is a model of the
kind, full of provocative ideas and sharp writing.
Professor Alan Rodger’s article, “Concealing a Servitude”, 37 reflects the
kind of digging in the sources which can lead to fresh insights. He reexamines
the problem posed by the case in which the seller of a house conceals a
servitude which is, however, in fact known to the buyer. In Justinian’s time,
the buyer had no cause of action and the weight of scholarly opinion dis-
cussed by Rodger suggests that this was always the case.38 Rodger argues
that a case presenting these facts described by Cicero in the De 011ciis and
the De Oratore was decided in favour of the buyer on the basis of the seller’s
lack of good faith, thus suggesting that the rule may have been different in
Republican times. 39 Although his argument is convincing, I cannot accept
his conclusion that this result is correct. He wonders whether the decision
to award damages to the buyer may not reflect a “slightly penal approach”
derived from earlier law.40 This suggestion is not pursued here but might
merit further investigation.
It is fitting to close this appreciation by referring to Professor Alan
Watson’s excellent short article, “Justinian’s Institutes and Some English
Counterparts”, 41 in which he examines the extent to which the structure of
33Stein, ibid. at 157.
34Ibid. at 159-63.
35Ibid. at 162.
361bid.
37Rodger, supra, note 15.
38Ibid. at 136.
39Ibid. at 138-9.
40Ibid. at 148.
41Watson, supra, note 6.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
early writings on the law in England follows or departs from the organization
of the material in Justinian’s collection. He shows how early slavish imi-
tation of the categories in the Institutes42 evolved into a freer form of or-
ganization which had little relation to Justinian 43 only to return to the
pattern of the Institutes once again in Blackstone’s work (1765-69). 44
This is a thoroughly fascinating collection. Like any body of good schol-
arly work, it provides confirmation of some old answers, reopens some old
questions, poses some new ones and leaves plenty of further work to do.
42See the discussion of the work of John Cowell (1605), ibid. at 182.
43See the discussion of the work of Sir Matthew Hale (1713), ibid. at 185.
44Blackstone’s use of Justinian’s structure is more sensitive to the nature of his material. As
Professor Watson points out: “The overall arrangement thus’is considerably influenced by
Justinian’s Institutes, but the topics treated, as well as the more subordinate arrangement, are
throughly English.” Ibid. at 185.
Martin L. Friedland. A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the
Development of Canadian Law. Toronto: Carswell, 1984. Pp. 245 [$32.50].
Reviewed by Mr Justice G. Arthur Martin.*
The publication of this collection of essays by Professor Friedland is
both timely and welcome. The essays deal with several areas which are of
current interest in Canadian criminal law and include such diverse topics
as gun control, national security, wiretapping, entrapment and the impact
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the criminal justice
system. The unifying theme of these essays is the development of the law
and the forces which shape that development.
Students of criminal law will, of course, be familiar with Professor
Friedland’s influential works, Detention Before Trial’ and Double Jeopardy.2
Detention Before Trial contributed greatly to changes in Canadian law re-
lating to pre-trial release. Its influence can be seen in the recommendations
of the Canadian Committee on Corrections which were largely embodied
in the Bail Reform Act. 3 Double Jeopardy has also been influential, especially
in the decisions of the courts where it has often been quoted as an author-
itative text.4 A Century of Criminal Justice promises to be an equally im-
portant work.
Professor Friedland’s essay entitled “Pressure Groups and the Devel-
opment of the Criminal Law” 5 examines an entirely different kind of influ-
ence on the development of the law and makes fascinating reading. He finds
acceptable the definition of pressure groups offered by Pross: “Pressure groups
are organizations whose members act together to influence public policy in
order to promote their common interest.”‘ 6 He concludes that the process
of government consultation with “pressure groups” is becoming increasingly
institutionalized, that the trend is toward more open consultation and that
pressure groups will play an increasingly important role in the development
of the law.
The essay on gun control in Canada traces the history of gun control
legislation in this country and contains a comprehensive analysis of the
*Of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
IM.L. Friedland, Detention Before Trial (1965).
2 M.L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy (1969).
3S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 37.
4See, e.g., Gushue v. The-Queen (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 798 at 807, 106 D.L.R. (3d) 152.
5M.L. Friedland, A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the Development of Canadian
Law (1984) at 67.
61bid. at 68.
McGill Law Journal 1985
Revue de droit de McGill
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
present legislation. 7 In Professor Friedland’s view, if Canada had not care-
fully controlled the possession of hand guns during the past century, today’s
crime rate for serious offences would be substantially higher. He points out
that, although pressure groups have been a potent force in the development
of both Canadian and American law, Canadian pressure groups have been
less successful in blocking gun control legislation than their counterparts in
the United States. Professor Friedland attributes this to the fact that the
Canadian political system has brought pressure groups more openly into
the decision-making process. Canadian pressure groups have had the op-
portunity to present briefs before parliamentary and other committees, have
been permitted to participate directly in an advisory capacity, and have
often been provided with government grants to fund their activities.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada is currently engaged in the
massive undertaking of preparing a new criminal code. The essay on national
security,8 which includes a section on wiretapping, and the essay on entrapment 9
should assist the Commission in this endeavour. The essay on national
security was published before the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Lyons v. The Queen.10 Professor Friedland’s prediction that the Supreme
Court would, by a bare majority, interpret the present legislation as per-
mitting surreptitious entry to engage in electronic surveillance if judicial
authorization specifically permitted it proved to be somewhat conservative.
The Supreme Court, by a substantial majority, held that where a judicial
order authorized electronic surveillance of a kind that involved a trespass,
the police were necessarily authorized to enter surreptitiously.
The essay on entrapment was prepared prior to the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Amato v. The Queen.” In that case, five
Supreme Court justices recognized the “defence” of entrapment, although
they differed in their views as to the circumstances under which the defence
operates. I found Professor Friedland’s discussion of the “defence” of en-
trapment and its underlying principles of particular interest. It is clear that
Professor Friedland is satisfied with neither the so-called majority or “sub-
jective” test as applied in the United States nor the minority or “objective”
approach, and instead recommends that the subject of entrapment be dealt
with by legislation. The “defence” of entrapment will no doubt be included
in the proposed criminal code.
7lbid. at 113.
8 bid. at 141.
9Ibid. at 171.
10(1984), 15 C.C.C. (3d) 417, [1985] 2 W.W.R. I (S.C.C.).
“(1982), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 418, 69 C.C.C. (2d) 31.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
In the essay entitled “Criminal Justice and the Charter”,12 Professor
Friedland analyses the principal judgments under the Charter which had
been delivered at the time the essay was written. He maintains that it would
not be surprising for the courts to use section 7 in cases where there is a
delay before the accused is charged, assuming that “delay” in section 1 l(b)
is limited to delay after the charge. His prediction was proven accurate in
R. v. Young’ 3 where the Ontario Court of Appeal held that, under the cir-
cumstances, the laying of the charge violated the accused’s rights as guar-
anteed by section 7. Professor Friedland’s analysis of the double jeopardy
provision in section 11(b) of the Charter is also, as one would expect, ex-
tremely helpful.
Professor Friedland concludes that the courts have taken a careful but
broad approach to constitutional guarantees under the Charter. The essay
was prepared prior to the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Hunter v. Southam Inc.14 dealing with the Charter guarantee against
unreasonable search or seizure. It is, I think, clear that the Charter has, to
date, had an impact on the criminal justice system that has exceeded the
expectations of many. One might perhaps wonder why this has been so in
a mature and democratic country. I think the answer is to be found in the
gradual erosion of certain fundamental rights over a period of years in
certain areas of the criminal law –
a deterioration so gradual that it has
passed virtually unnoticed. The chickens, so to speak, have come home to
roost. The full impact of the Charter will be reflected, not only in the de-
cisions of the courts, but also in legislation which will complement the
various provisions of the Charter. For example, following the decision of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Noble,15 which held that writs of
assistance under the Narcotic Control Act 16 and the Food and Drugs Act 17
contravened the Charter, the government moved quickly in Bill C-1818 to
abolish writs of assistance altogether.
The book’s final essay examines three murder trials which occurred a
century ago. Professor Friedland’s conclusions will be of interest to all stu-
dents of criminal law. This series of essays will not disappoint the expec-
tations of those who have long respected Professor Friedland’s contribution
to the reform of Canada’s criminal justice system.
12Friedland, supra, note 5 at 205.
13(1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 520, 13 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (C.A.).
14(1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641.
15(1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 643, 42 C.R. (3d) 209 (C.A.).
16R.S.C. 1970, c. N-I, s. 10(3).
17R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27, ss 37(3), 45(1).
‘8Bill C-18, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1985, 1st Sess., 33d Par., 1984-85 (assented to
24 April 1985) ss 196(2), 200(2).,
R. Romanow, J. Whyte & H. Leeson, eds. Canada … Notwithstanding: The
Making of the Constitution :1976-1982. Toronto : Carswell/Methuen, 1984.
Pp. xxi, 286 [14.95 $1. CommentO par G~rald-A. Beaudoin.*
Les juristes, les politicologues et les historiens vont consacrer bon nombre
d’ouvrages au rapatriement de la Constitution canadienne. C’est deja
commenc6 P1 Cet & vnement crucial en lui-m~me s’est produit un peu plus
d’un an apr~s le c6l~bre r~ferendum qu~b~cois du 20 mai 1980 sur la sou-
verainet6-association. Ces deux &v6nements font d~sormais partie de l’Histoire.
Les circonstances qui ont entour6 l’adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle
de 1982 sont de naturd A susciter des commentaires et des prises de position
qui vraisemblablement ne feront jamais l’unanimit6. 2 Trop de passions se
sont soul6v~es, trop de points de vue se sont violemment affront6s pour
qu’on en vienne rapidement A la s6rbnit6. I1 faudra compter avec le temps !
L’ouvrage Canada … Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitu-
tion: 1976-1982 ne saurait passer inaperqu. L’un des trois auteurs, Roy
Romanow, fiat 1’un des acteurs du rapatriement. Les deux autres, le pro-
fesseur John Whyte, constitutionnaliste et Howard Leeson, politologue, fi-
rent partie de l’6quipe de la Saskatchewan. Les auteurs s’en expliquent dans
la preface de leur ouvrage.
Tout ouvrage important sur le rapatriement de la Loi constitutionnelle
de 1982 suscite l’int&et. D’abord parce que cette loi constitutionnelle contient
une formule d’amendement, 3 une charte constitutionnelle des droits, 4 des
modifications A notre loi fondamentale, 5 reconnait et confirme les droits des
peuples autochtones. 6 C’est la plus grande r6volution constitutionnelle de-
puis 1867 comme le temps qui passe ne manquera pas de l’illustrer. En
*Professeur titulaire, Universit6 d’Ottawa, Facult6 de droit, Section de droit civil.
Mentionnons par exemple, R. Sheppard & M. Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a
Canadian Constitution (1982) et G. R~millard, Le fdralisme canadien: le rapatriement de
la Constitution, t. 2. (1985).
2Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, adopt~e en tant qu’annexe B de ]a Loi de 1982 sur le Canada
(R.-U.), 1982, c. 11.
311 s’agit des articles 38 A 49 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, supra, note 2.
aLa Charte canadienne des droits et libertis constitute ]a Partie 1 de l’annexe B de la Loi de
1982 sur le Canada, supra, note 2. Elle comprend trente-quatre articles.
5L’article 50 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, supra, note 2 ajoute l’article 92A A la Loi
constitutionnelle de 1867 (R.-U.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3. Cet amendement relatif aux ressources
naturelles est loin d’6tre negligeable.
6Voir les articles 25 et 35 de Ia Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, ibid. ; voir aussi ‘article 37.
@Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1985
1985]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
second lieu, parce que les circonstances qui ont entour6 son adoption ne
laissent personne indifTrent.
Les auteurs remontent 6 1976. Bien sfir, ils auraient pu partir de 1968,
de 1960, voire meme de 1927 lorsque se tint la premiere conference cons-
titutionnelle sur le rapatriement et la formule de modification constitution-
nelle, apr~s la c~lbre Dclaration Balfour de 1926. 7 I1 s’est pass6 beaucoup
d’Mvnements entre 1927 et 1976, notamment l’amendement St-Laurent de
1949,8 la formule Fulton-Favreau, 9 la formule de Victoria.’ 0 L’histoire com-
plte du rapatriement remonte au moins i un demi-sicle.” Les auteurs ont
concentr6 leurs efforts sur les annes 1976-1982.
Les faits sont les faits, dit-on ! Cependant certains sont plus connus que
d’autres. Quelques-uns demeurent encore inconnus. De plus, ils ne sont pas
tous interpr~t~s de la m~me fagon, peu s’en faut, par ceux qui les ont vcus
ou par ceux qui les ont observes. II faut savoir gr6 aux trois auteurs de les
avoir relat6s et d’en avoir donn6 une interpr6tation. Nous souhaitons que
d’autres auteurs et observateurs en fassent autant.
Louvrage comprend neuf chapitres. Je traduis les themes : <
droits et libertes >, <
pitres, on le voit, portent des titres aguichants.
Le chapitre 7, intitul << The Week That Was > est certes Pun des plus
int~ressants. Les Mvnements du 2 au 5 novembre 1981 et la nuit de 4
novembre ont donn6 lieu A plus d’une interpr6tation. Les auteurs relatent
les vnements avec force details. Je souhaiterais lire la version de d’autres
auteurs et observateurs cr~dibles. L’auteur de la pr~sente recension a lui-
meme assist6 A cette conference comme observateur et commentateur pour
7Voir G.-A. Beaudoin, Le partage des pouvoirs, 3e 6d. (1983) aux pp. 451-9.
8L’alin6a 91.1 fut ajout6 A l’Acte de l’Amnrique du Nord britannique (no 2) 1949 (R.-U.), 13
Geo. 6, c. 81. Ce paragraphe est abrog6 par la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, supra, note 2. Cet
amendement est connu sous le nom d’amendement St-Laurent.
9Voir Beaudoin, supra, note 7 aux pp. 454-5.
‘0Voir ]a < Charte constitutionnelle canadienne 1971 > reproduite dans Canada, Conference
constitutionnelle: d~libdrations (Victoria, 14 juin 1971), appendice B. Le rejet de la Charte de
Victoria en juin 1971 par les autorit6s qu6bcoises A leur retour au Qu6bec a fortement d6plu
au Premier ministre Trudeau. Ce n’est qu’apr~s un certain temps que les conferences consti-
tutionnelles ont repris. Dix ans plus tard, en novembre 1981, M. Trudeau cette fois passa outre
au refus du Qu6bec.
“Voir P. G~rin-Lajoie, ConstitutionalAmendment in Canada (1950). Voir Canada, Minist~re
de la Justice, Modification de la Constitution du Canada (G. Favreau) (1965).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
les m6dias et croit que seul le recul du temps contribuera A replacer certains
6v6nements dans leur perspective propre.
Les trois auteurs illustrent bien le fait que les deux ordres de gouver-
nement ont fait des compromis. Le compromis n’est-il pas l’instrument des
politiciens ? Monsieur Trudeau et certains premiers ministres provinciaux
ont accept6 des solutions qu’ils avaient clairement rejet6es auparavant, comme
en t6moigne la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982. En mati~re de n6gociation
constitutionnelle, rien n’est jamais sfir.
On demeure ici surpris de la fagon dont les grands compromis politiques
se font. Les passions sont vives dans l’ar~ne politique et les int6r~ts conflic-
tuels. Monsieur Trudeau a mis le prix pour obtenir le rapatriement: il a
accept6 une formule d’amendement qu’il n’aimait gu~re, la possibilit6 d’un
statut particulier auquel il s’est toujours oppos6, et, enfin, une clause d6-
rogatoire pour trois secteurs de la charte. Cette clause faut-il le dire n’6tait
pas de sa creation !
Les provinces pour la plupart tenaient a l’agrandissement de leurs pou-
voirs plus qu’I une charte constitutionnelle. Elles ont accept6 cette derni~re
apr~s avoir fait quelques gains, notamment avec l’article 92A et apr~s avoir
impos6 leur formule d’amendement. Les constitutions seront toujours A base
de compromis, m~me si on ne s’y habitue pas.
Le ton de l’ouvrage est narratif, bien sfir, et parfois plus politique que
juridique. En ce sens, on peut dire qu’il int6ressera les historiens et les
politicologues tout autant que les juristes.
Les auteurs consacrent quelques pages A la Commission P6pin-Ro-
barts,12 au c6lbre Bill C-60.13 Ils ne manquent alors pas de souligner que
le Qu6bec n’a pas donn6 son accord. Ils terminent leur ouvrage sur une
interpr6tation: << We have reinvented Canada. Did we lose its soul ? >
Ce n’est pas une mauvaise fagon de terminer pareille 6tude. En effet,
il reste beaucoup A accomplir, malgr6 tout ce qui a
t6 r~alis. Comme le
soulignent les trois auteurs dans le neuvi~me, chapitre, il reste inter alia A
obtenir l’accord du Quebec, A faire la r6forme du S6nat, A identifier les droits
des peuples autochtones.
Le compromis reste donc clairement inachev6. II existe plus d’une fagon
d’y arriver. Le Qu6bec s’y emploie. P~quistes et lib6raux provinciaux y vont
de leur suggestions. A l’automne 1984, le Premier ministre Mulroney avait
ouvert la porte. Le Premier ministre Lvesque apr~s son virage de janvier
‘2Canada, Commission de l’unitE canadienne, Se retrouver: observations el recommandations
(janvier 1979).
13P.L. C-60, Loi constitutionnelle de 1978, 3e sess., 30e Lg., 1977-78.
1985]
BOOK REVIEWS
1985 se declarait pret A prendre le
mai de la meme ann6e faisait des propositions constitutionnelles. 15 Le projet
d’accord ne comporte pas trop de surprises. Certaines demandes s’inspirent
du rapport Pepin-Robarts. La plupart reprennent les revendications tradi-
tionnelles du Quebec, comme les limites au pouvoir de depenser, le droit
du Quebec de determiner sa langue officielle, un droit de veto en ce qui
concerne les institutions federales, l’6cart du pouvoir de reserve et de d6-
saveu, le rapatriement de la competence relative au mariage et au divorce,
un nouveau partage en matiere de communications, un amendement A l’ar-
ticle 96, et bien sfir, la pleine compensation financiere en cas d’exercice du
droit de retrait.
Cependant la demission de Monsieur Levesque enjuin 1985 et la course
A la chefferie du parti quebecois ont reporte cette discussion a plus tard. On
s’interroge. Aura-t-elle lieu avant les prochaines elections provinciales ? Qui
sera i la table de negociation ? Les p6quistes, les lib6raux ? Le constitu-
tionnaliste Gil Remillard parle d’etapisme pour l’accord du Qu6bec. 16 I1 est
permis de croire que cet accord prendra de longs mois. Son contenu final
est impossible A prevoir.
Se pose aussi la question de la reforme du Senat. La proposition du
Ministre Crosbie 17 du printemps de 1985 s’inspire en principe de la reforme
de la Chambre des Lords de 1911. Elle semble actuellement en suspens. Vu
le changement de gouvernement en Ontario et l’absence du Quebec A la
table de negociation, il est improbable que le consensus prevu a la formule
d’amendement soit obtenu.
La question de l’identification et de la determination des droits des
peuples autochtones va prendre un certain temps. Le probleme est colossal.
I1 est dommage qu’au printemps de 1984 et de 1985 les onze premiers
ministres n’aient pas tous accepte le principe du gouvernement autochtone
automne. I1 faut y arriver d’ici 1987.18
Cette recension nous suggere quelques reflexions que nous resumons
en six points.
14Voir B. Descfteaux, << Le 'beau risque', derni~re 6dition >, Le Devoir [de Montreal] (Sup-
pl~ment) (31 janvier 1985) 19.
15Qu~bec, Projet d’accord constitutionnel: propositions du Gouvernement du Quebec (1985),
document de 39 pages comprenant 26 propositions.
16Voir Particle de M. Vastel, << Mulroney adopte, fl son tour, l'6tapisme: en s'adjoignant Gil
Rmillard comme conseiller constitutionnel >, La Presse [de Montreal] (25 juillet 1985) A 1.
17Dans un communiqu6 de presse du 7 juin 1985, le ministre de la Justice propose un droit
de veto suspensif de 30 jours A l’gard des projets de loi de finances et de 45 jours pour les
autre projets de loi.
‘8Le premier amendement constitutionnel depuis le rapatriement de la Constitution porte
sur les droits des peuples autochtones et fift proclam6 le 21 juin 1984.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 30
A –
II est effarant de constater combien si peu d’acteurs en si peu de
temps prennent des d6cisions qui affectent tant de monde pour si longtemps.
C’est souvent le cas en Histoire. On discute encore des intentions de Sir
John A. Macdonald et de Sir Georges-2tienne Cartier A Charlottetown, A
Qu6bec et A Londres. On a beau dire que les questions ont auparavant
t6
discut~es ad nauseam, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’A un moment donn6
une volont6 ferme change le cours de l’Histoire en quelques heures.
B – Certains se sont demand6 pourquoi les Canadiens ne se sont pas
donn6 ici m~me au Canada une nouvelle Constitution. Nous avons eu l’oc-
casion de nous pencher sur ce probl~me avec les professeurs Orban, Bergeron
et McWhinney dans un ouvrage collectifintitul Mkcanismes pour une nou-
velle Constitution.’9 Le Canada a pr~fer la continuit6 juridique. Il a juri-
diquement r~par6 l’anomalie de l’article 7 du Statut de Westminster de 1931
en se servant du < vieux processus >, pour employer l’expression de la Cour
supreme dans l’avis sur le rapatriement. 20 A la r6flexion, le constituant de
1981 a eu raison, meme s’il reste de graves lacunes A combler! Rien n’in-
dique que nous aurions pu nous entendre sur la composition de la Consti-
tuante et sur les r~gles du jeu; au contraire !
C – La Cour supreme ajou6 en 1981 et en 1982 un r6le dont on ne
peut exag6rer l’importance. En 6mettant l’opinion qu’un appui substan-
tiel > des provinces 6tait n~cessaire, sur le plan de la convention constitu-
tionnelle, avant d’acheminer la R~solution aux autorit6s britanniques, notre
plus haut tribunal forgait en pratique la tenue d’une conference constitu-
tionnelle et engageait les acteurs politiques A s’entendre. En 6mettant ‘avis
en 198221 qu’aucune convention ne reconnaissait un veto au Qu6bec, la
Cour pronongait ainsi la 16gitimit6 du rapatriement qui, sur le plan juridique,
6tait d6ja r6gulier.
D – Le compromis de novembre 1981 s’est fait rapidement. Trop
rapidement! La formule d’amendement laisse beaucoup A d6sirer. Elle pro-
t~ge mal le Qu6bec. II n’y a pas de compensation financi~re dans tous les
cas de retrait mais seulement pour l’ducation et la culture et, surtout, elle
offre peu de protection au Qu6bec au sein des institutions centrales. On a
19G.-A. Beaudoin, < M6canismes d'1aboration d'une Constitution nouvelle)) dans G.-A. Beaudoin et aL, Mecanismes pour une nouvelle constitution (1981) 89 aux pp. 106-11. 20Renvoi: risolution pour modifier la Constitution (1981), [1981] 1 R.C.S. 753, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1. 21Dans l'affaire d'un renvoi dt la Cour d'appel du Quebec concernant la Constitution du Canada (1982), [1982] 2 R.C.S. 793, 45 N.R. 317. 19851 CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE prevu l'unanimit6 pour changer la composition de la Cour supreme. I1 fau- drait faire de meme pour le S6nat. II y aurait ici tout un article A 6crire sur les conditions d'acceptation du Quebec. 22 E - D'aucuns suggerent que les amendements constitutionnels soient ratifies par le peuple. Qu'en est-il aux Etats-Unis et au Canada? La cons- titution americaine du 17 septembre 1787 fat ratifi6e par des d6legues des ttats designes A cette fin par le peuple de chaque ttat.23 Les dix premiers amendements de 1789 connus sous le nom de Bill of Rights furent ratifies selon Particle V de la Constitution.24 L'Acte de l'Amtrique du Nord britannique de 1867 (maintenant designe sous l'appellation de Loi constitutionnelle de 1867) ne fut pas ratifi6 par le peuple canadien. C'est une loi britannique qui donnait suite aux Resolutions des Pres de la Confederation. Cependant, les auteurs de cette constitution federale se maintinrent au pouvoir. Ils ne furent pas desavoues par le peuple. Mais il n'y eu aucun plebiscite aucun referendum sur les Resolutions de Quebec et de Londres. 25 La Loi constitutionnelle de 1982 qui prevoit une formule d'amendement n'impose aucun pl6biscite ou referendum mais le consentement de la ou des assemblees legislatives concernees. 22Nous avons d~jA esquiss6 une solution. Voir G.-A. Beaudoin, < Le veto et le retrait: esquisse d'une solution >, Le Devoir [de Montreal] (23 janvier 1985) 9.
23Voir C.D. Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia (1966). L’article VII de la Constitution du 17
septembre 1787 pr6voit:
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the Estab-
lishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.
Bowen, ibid. aux pp. 323-4 donne les noms des 39 personnes venant de 12 2tats qui apposrent
leur signature. Cinquante-cinq personnes avaient particip6 aux d6bats comme d6l6gus.
L’entrfe en vigueur de ]a nouvelle Constitution avait W fix~e au 4 mars 1789. Comme le
rapporte B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law (1972) a ]a p. 328, onze ttats avaient ratifiA6 le texte
A cette date; deux autres suivirent rapidement; un quatorzi6me le Vermont fut admis le 18
fevrier 1791. Le processus 6tait d~mocratique. Le peuple dans chaque ttat choisissait des
dldIgus sur la recommendation de la legislature ; et ces d~l~gus se pronongaient sur la rati-
fication de Ia Constitution.
24Voir A. Tunc & S. Tunc, Lesyst me constitutionneldes A tats-Unis d’Am~rique, vol. 2 (1954).
Les auteurs dcrivent A la p. 495 n. 13:
Les dix premiers amendements ont W votes ensemble par le premier Congr~s du
25 septembre 1789 et, conform~ment A l’article V de la Constitution, sont entr~s
en vigueur le 15 dfcembre 1791, ayant W ratifies par onze 2tats sur quatorze.
25Voir J.-C. Bonenfant, La naissance de la Confederation (1969) aux pp. 21-2 ofA l’auteur
relate que < [d]6s le lendemain de la Confederation, le gouverneur g6n~ral [...] Lord Monck
appela John A. Macdonald A former un cabinet.)) Ce dernier une fois constitue comprenait
treize ministres dont quatre du Quebec. Les 6lections fed~rales et qufbfcoises furent fix~es au
debut de septembre 1867. Elles furent remport~es par les conservateurs qui 6taient les partisans
de ]a Confedration. <(La Nouvelle-Ecosse [6crit J.-C. Bonenfant] cependant envoya A Ottawa
17 dfput6s sur 18 avec mandat de s'opposer au nouveau regime, mais l'habilet6 de John A.
Macdonald allait bient6t vaincre cette difficult.>
628
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 30
F – C’est le Quebec, depuis sa R~volution tranquille, et m~me avant,
qui a suscit6 la tenue des grandes conferences pour adapter notre Consti-
tution aux r~alit~s de l’heure. C’est pourtant la seule province qui n’a pas
donn6 son accord en 1981. Cet accord doit venir. Le Canada anglophone
se doit de saisir l’importance cruciale de cet accord et de faire les compromis
qui s’imposent.
II est heureux que l’ouvrage Canada Notwithstanding: The Making of
the Constitution : 1976-1982 ait 6t 6crit. I1 apporte un clairage et un point
de vue int6ressant sur un 6pisode fort troubl6 de notre destin. II est valable
et il remplit un r6le.
Nous aurions pr~fer voir les renvois en bas des pages plut6t qu’A fin
des chapitres. I efit peut-8tre 6t6 souhaitable d’ajouter A l’ouvrage le texte
de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, encore qu’il ne s’agisse pas l d’une
n~cessit6 absolue.
L’ouvrage comprend un index bien fait qui aide le lecteur A se retrouver
dans le labyrinthe des d~marches des acteurs du rapatriement.
