[Vol. 16
Book Reviews
Aspects of Comparative Commercial Law. Edited by Jacob S. Ziegel
and William F. Foster. McGill University, 1969. Pp. xii, 472 ($17.50).
II est rare qu’une oeuvre collective procure au lecteur autant de
satisfaction intellectuelle que celle-ci. L’importance du sujet, la
valeur des participants, la diversit6 des points de vue (au sens
pr6cis de l’image, puisque les participants venaient de plusieurs
nations) et des opinions, permettent que le livre se lise avec un
int6r~t soutenu. Le lecteur n’6prouve qu’un regret: celui de n’avoir
pu entendre les discussions qui, au Colloque organis6 par le pro-
fesseur Jacob S. Ziegel h l’Universit6 McGill en septembre 1968,
ont accompagn6 des rapports de si haute valeur et si bien combin6s
pour donner une vue p6n6trante des sujets.
Trois sujets avaient
t6 mis h l’6tude: la vente, le cr6dit h la
consommation et les ventes avec sftret6 ou r6serve de propri6t6.
L’expos6 du professeur John Honnold sur la codification du
droit de la vente aux Etats-Unis dans le Uniform Commercial Code
ouvre l’ouvrage
il permet au lecteur, une fois de
plus, d’admirer une belle combinaison de rigueur morale et de
vigueur intellectuelle. Dans quelle mesure les dispositions du Code
relatives h la vente pourraient-elles servir de module en Angleterre
et au Canada? A la premiere question, le professeur G.H.L. Fridman
apporte une r6ponse nuanc6e, cependant qu’h la seconde, le pro-
fesseur A.R. Thompson r6pond par un
problbmes contemporains du droit de la vente dans les droits
codifi6s sont alors examin6s:
la responsabilit6 du fabricant en
Allemagne, par le professeur Ernst von Caemmerer, la vente h
temp6rament, la vente de la chose d’autrui en matibre d’automobiles
et la garantie des vices cach6s dans le droit du Qu6bec par le pro-
fesseur Michel Pourcelet. Sur l’unification internationale du droit
de la vente, trois points de vue diff6rents: le Scandinave prudent,
l’Am6ricain ironique, mais constructif, l’Allemand chaleureux et
pressant –
16gitimement, croyons-nous, sont pr6sentds respective-
ment par les professeurs Jan Hellner, E. Allan Farnsworth, Ernst
von Caemmerer.
Le cr6dit ih la consommation, deuxi~me sujet mis h l’6tude,
fait aussi l’objet de trois cat6gories de recherches. Les rdcentes
tendances I6gislatives et judiciaires au Canada, en Angleterre, en
Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis, sont expos6es par les professeurs Jacob
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
S. Ziegel, l’organisateur du Colloque, R.M. Goode, Wolfgang Frhr.
v. Marschall, William E. Hogan. Les deux derniers de ces auteurs
6tudient ensuite la rdglementation du coct de l’emprunt et l’infor-
mation de l’emprunteur h cet 6gard aux Etats-Unis et en Allemagne,
cependant que le professeur R.E. Olley ajoute sur le sujet le point
de vue d’un 6conomiste. Finalement, la situation du cr~ancier et
du d6biteur, lorsque celui-ci est ob6r6 de dettes, au Canada, en
Angleterre, en Allemagne et aux Etats-Unis est observ~e par le
professeur R.C.C. Cuming et John D. Honsberger, Q.C., et les
professeurs Aubrey L. Diamond, von Marschall et John A. Spanogle.
Pour les ventes avec sfiret6 ou r6serve de propri6t6 (secured
transactions), la m~me question 6tait d’abord posse que pour l’en-
semble du droit de la vente: le Uniform Commercial Code (en Yes-
p~ce, son Article 9) est-il <
Abel importerait au Canada sa <
modifiant largement son style et sa pr6sentation et en lui faisant
subir de profondes adaptations aux institutions locales. Un long
rapport de R.M. Goode et du professeur L.C.B. Gower – membre,
faut-il le rappeler, de la Law Commission anglaise –
est si favorable
h l’introduction en Angleterre et dans les pays de Commonwealth
d’tm bon nombre des solutions de fond du Code, qu’il 6num~re en
conclusion les lois dont l’abrogation ou l’amendement devrait accom-
pagner celle-ci. Pour ces auteurs, le Code est le document qui peut
et doit inspirer un rajeunissement radical du droit anglais des
sfiret~s mobili6res. Telle est aussi la conclusion du professeur Byron
D. Sher, qui, pour enseigner aux Etats-Unis, n’en connalt pas moins
les droits anglais et n6o-z6landais de la mati~re. On comprend que
le Dr. Ulrich Drobnig soit plus r6serv6 en ce qui concerne ‘Allemagne
et les autres nations europ6ennes. Il pense pourtant que le Code
pourrait exercer une certaine influence par l’interm~diaire de la
doctrine, dans l’effort notamment qui s’irnpose pour harmoniser
en la matiire les lois des pays du March6 Commun. Pour le Quebec,
le professeur Yves Caron rejoint en quelque sorte Albert S. Abel:
les solutions de fond seraient en g6n~ral acceptables, mais sous
r6serve d’adaptations importantes. L’6tude des ventes avec sfiret6,
h vrai dire, ne se limitait pas h la recherche de la valeur inter-
nationale des dispositions du Uniform Commercial Code qui s’y rap-
portent. Quatre rapports la compl~tent, les professeurs Ian F.G.
Baxter, Albert S. Abel, Harry R. Sachse et Ulrich Drobnig ayant
eu mission d’exposer les conflits de lois en mati~re de sfiret6s,
la compatibilit6 du Code avec la floating charge (ce privilege g6n~ral
sur 1’ensemble du patrimoine tel qu’il se comporte au jour oil le
cr6ancier devra faire valoir son droit), le droit frangais compar6
McGILL LAW MOURNAL
[Vol. 16
b la common law sur les droits du vendeur non pay6, les conflits
possibles entre vendeur et banquier de l’acheteur.
L’ouvrage se termine par un expos6 plein d’esprit et de sagesse
– m6me si un Frangais peut juger certaines de ses affirmations un
peut trop sceptiques h l’6gard du droit codifi6 -: c’est le discours
prononc6 au banquet de cl6ture du Colloque par le professeur
Grant Gilmore sur l’histoire du droit commercial et de la codifi-
cation de celui-ci aux Etats-Unis.
I1 est classique que le compte-rendu d’un ouvrage collectif expri-
me la frustration que ressent l’auteur en constatant qu’il n’a pu
consacrer que quelques lignes au travail de chacun des participants.
Il ne saurait en 6tre autrement en l’espbce. Un lecteur sera plus
int6ress6 par un sujet que par un autre, par tel problme que
par tel autre. Mais, qu’il veuille simplement consulter l’ouvrage
sur un point prdcis ou le lifre dans son entier, il ne sera pas deu.
Par 1industrie des professeurs Jacob S. Ziegel et William F. Foster,
il trouvera dans ce livre, sur quelques-uns des probl~mes fonda-
mentaux du droit commercial contemporain, une mine de documen-
tation et de r6flexions. Grace h eux, une fois de plus, le Canada
aura dtd le fdcond point de rencontre de l’Ancien Monde et du
Nouveau.
A. TuNc*
* Professeur, Facultd de Droit et des Sciences Economiques de Paris.
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada. Edited by B.L. Strayer, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1968. Pp. xiv, 275 ($15.00).
In this treatise we have a comprehensive and systematic analysis
of the process of judicial review in our federal country, that is,
judicial review as the final word on the extent of the legislative
competence of the Parliament of Canada on the one hand, and the
legislatures of the Provinces on the other. This is the author’s
primary emphasis, though he does incidentally give some attention
to related problems of delegation of powers to subordinate officials
or tribunals. Dr. F. R. Scott wrote the foreword, and I agree fully
with his general assessment. He says: “Professor Strayer is to be
congratulated, not only for giving us the first thorough study of
judicial review in Canadian legal literature, but for having done
it with a masterful capacity to steer through the vast confusion
of the case law that cannot but command the respect of theorists
and practitioners alike” (p. vii). One can concur in this, as indeed
I do, and yet question certain of Professor Strayer’s theoretical
points about the roots of the power of judicial review. I will indicate
my doubts later, but in any event they are not major ones when
we consider the great and overriding virtues of the book, which
deserve the primary attention of reader and reviewer alike.
In the first place, the author provides a systematic and detailed
analysis of how federal power-distribution issues have been raised,
or may be raised, through regular forms of litigation initiated by
persons with an interest in the authoritative determination of such
issues by the courts. Thus the citizen has a considerable variety
of ways in which he may seek to avoid the application of a statutory
provision to himself, by alleging it to be ultra vires of the enacting
parliamentary body, at any level in the judicial system. Public offi-
cials may also test statutes in some of these same ways. Professor
Strayer does point to instances where judicial procedures to raise
this type of issue are deficient or missing. Nevertheless, I am left
with the impression that these procedural shortcomings are minor
ones in the over-all picture of opportunities for judicial review.
In addition, in this connection, the book is particularly note-
worthy for a comprehensive and balanced assessment of reference
cases in our constitutional history and practice. The Supreme Court
Act provides that the Government of Canada may put questions
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 16
directly to the Supreme Court of Canada by order-in-council. After
a proper hearing, the Court is required to answer these questions,
with reasons. There are like provisions in the legislation of all the
Provinces, conferring the same power on Provincial Governments
in relation to their respective provincial superior courts. This power
has often been used, by both Federal and Provincial Governments,
to obtain important judgments from the courts on federal power-
distribution issues. Professor Strayer tells us that in the period
1867 to 1966, a total of 197 federal power-distribution cases were
dealt with finally by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
or the Supreme Court of Canada. Of these, 68 were reference cases.
Moreover, as a group, the 68 reference cases were definitely more
important in their political, social and economic impact on Canadian
society than were the 129 other cases, arising out of actual litigatiop
between parties. Important powers for the Parliament of Canada
and the Provincial Legislatures have been established or confirmed
by reference cases. Professor Strayer’s assessment implies that
any politician, provincial or federal, who attacks the authority
of the reference cases in our jurisprudence is swinging a double-
edged sword.
But neither the Australians nor the Americans permit reference
cases in their federal systems. Is Canada better or worse off to have
them ? The author discusses the arguments both ways, and concludes
that, on balance, the reference by order-in-council is a useful and
flexible way to raise federal power-distribution issues for judicial
determination. He finds some of the adverse criticisms valid, but
would correct these defects by reform of the reference system itself,
not by its abolition. For example, he suggests that the questions
to the courts should not be too abstract nor should they be put
prematurely. Moreover, he argues that greater care should be taken
with relevant factual evidence and argument in the hearing of
reference cases. Personally I agree with these conclusions and would
go a little further. It seems to me that the most satisfactory reference
cases have been those in which the Court was questioned about the
validity of a fully drafted bill, or a statute already enacted, so that
the full text of a proposed or actual law was before it.
Mention of greater care concerning relevant evidence in reference
cases leads us to consideration of some valuable general points the
author makes about rules of practice and evidence for all federal
power-distribution cases. He argues that there is a need for better
judicial ascertainment of facts about the legislative effects of a
challenged statute and the social context in which it operates. He
shows that both the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and
No. 41
BOOK REVIEWS
the Supreme Court of Canada have at times in the past accepted
certain rules of practice and evidence that, collectively, would permit
improvement in this respect –
rules concerning judicial notice,
admissions, agreed statements of fact, direct evidence and opinion
evidence of experts. His complaint is that the means at hand are
not yet being used regularly enough, or systematically enough, by
counsel or judges in constitutional cases, including reference cases.
Professor Strayer’s conclusion is: “A more general recourse to facts,
particularly those pertaining to legislative effect, would diminish
the importance of other elements in the adjudicative process and
yield a more realistic jurisprudence” (p. 181).
I agree with this, but would add a caution about a problem to
which Professor Strayer did not address himself. It is all very well
to say that the court should explore facts of legislative effects and
social context, but where does this stop ? The consequences of con-
sequences could be pursued indefinitely. Clearly a court cannot
proceed as if it were a Royal Commission with a large expert staff
and years for research, hearings and reports. Here, as elsewhere
in the law, the judges must stop with proximate consequences and
exclude those that are remote. The judges are accustomed to making
this distinction now in tracing the effects of a negligent act in tort,
or the extent of damages flowing from a breach of contract, for
which a defendant is to be held liable. The extent to which a court
admits evidence of the effects of a statute in a federal power-distri-
bution case, as an aid to functional interpretation of the federal
distribution of powers, needs the same type of limitation. With this
in mind, perhaps Professor Strayer’s point could be re-stated this
way. The court should be more liberal and systematic with its con-
ceptions of what are the proximate, direct or obvious effects for
society of putting the challenged statute into operation, evidence
of such effects to be freely admitted. But still, as the evidence of
this type offered slips off into areas of unduly remote consequences
or other facts, where relevance is very indirect and tenuous, it
should be excluded.
Let me turn now to the theoretical doubts I referred to earlier.
I do not put these forward as serious adverse criticisms, but they
should be mentioned as they do concern the roots of the special
power of judicial review in our federal country, with which the
book is primarily concerned. While, in the end, Professor Strayer
accepts the specially entrenched power of judicial review as part
of the basic constitutional law of Canada, he seems to do so with
some doubts and reluctance. He thereby seems to imply that there
is some element of judicial usurpation, albeit successful usurpation,
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 16
in the establishment of this power. On the other hand, in an essay
in the Canadian Bar Review in 1956, I argued that this power
developed naturally by legitimate constitutional evolution for federal
Canada, out of the long history of the common law jurisdiction of
the English superior courts, which formed the model for the colonial
superior courts. I pointed out as well that the inner logic of fed-
eralism pushed in the same direction, requiring as it did some
institution for impartial determination of federal power-distribution
issues as they arose, under the power-distributing lists of the B.N.A.
Act, between the Federal Parliament and a Provincial Legislature.
Under the influence of both history and logic, it was almost inev-
itable that the traditional courts should, with general consent,
assume this basic interpretative task. It is true that the Provincial
Legislatures control the constitution and procedure of provincial
courts under section 92(14) of the B.N.A. Act, and that the Parlia-
ment of Canada has the same control over the Supreme Court of
Canada under section 101 of the B.N.A. Act. It is also true that in
Britain, no court can question the validity of a statute of the British
Parliament. Professor Strayer seems to argue from this that I am
wrong to say there has been legitimate historical continuity behind
the specially entrenched power of Canadian courts to review statutes
of the Federal Parliament or the Provincial Legislatures for com-
petence, in relation to the primary distribution of legislative powers
in the B.N.A. Act. In effect, he says Canadian superior courts cannot
claim by inheritance a power to review parliamentary statutes for
basic competence that their British counterparts never had in
relation to the British Parliament, at least since 1688. The flaw in
Professor Strayer’s argument is that Canadian courts have never
been faced by the full equivalent of the British Parliament in Canada
or the Provinces, either before or after Confederation in 1867, or
before or after the Statute of Westminster in 1931. At first, after
1867, the courts reviewed the validity of statutes of the Federal
Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures because they were par-
liamentary bodies in the British Commonwealth subordinate to the
British Parliament, and the B.N.A. Act was a statute of that Par-
liament, as well as being a federal constitution. In 1931, as I under-
stand developments leading up to the Statute of Westminster, and
the Statute of Westminster itself, the supremacy of the British Par-
liament was abolished, but not the supremacy of the B.N.A. Act itself
as the Canadian Constitution, distributing basic legislative powers
between the parliaments of Canada and the Provinces. The overriding
power of judicial review for competence was already established in
1931 by history, custom, precedent and the needs of federalism in
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
a British constitutional context. Legally and constitutionally it
simply continued after 1931, and will continue, unless and until
there is change by constitutional amendment. Such amendment is
not within the power of the Parliament of Canada alone or the
Legislature of a Province alone. In my view it would require the
consent of the Parliament of Canada and all the Provinces. No such
amendment is contemplated.
These are very complex questions on which no doubt reasonable
men may reasonably differ. But the burden of my complaint against
Professor Strayer here is that he chooses to raise the basic issue
of the roots of the power of judicial review in a federal system –
our system with our history –
and then really does not deal
with the problem in depth, that is at the level of the first things
of our organized community life. It is not good enough to cast
doubt on the specially entrenched character of the power of judicial
review we are discussing by arguing that the Parliament of Canada,
or a Provincial Legislature, could impair or destroy their respective
court systems, for this purpose or for other purposes, in a number
of procedural or substantive ways. No doubt the Parliament of
Canada could repeal the Supreme Court Act, the Provinces could
repeal their judicature statutes, or Governments could refuse to
appoint any more judges. But all this amounts to saying is that
there can be no built-in safeguards against these primary ways of
committing constitutional suicide. At this level of first things
constitutional, if Members of Parliament and Ministers do not
understand the rules and principles of the system, believe in them,
and do their duty accordingly, chaos and revolution set in. In the
United States, in spite of their formal explicit constitutional special
entrenchment, the United States Supreme Court could be abolished
if the Presidents refused to appoint judges, or the Senate refused
to ratify appointments, or the Congress simply repealed the law
specifying the number of Supreme Court justices. One must assume
that the holders of primary public offices will do their duty ac-
cording to the basic accepted rules of their society. Otherwise, at
this level of first things, all arguments about ‘supremacy’, ‘sover-
eignty’ or ‘legitimacy’ turn out to be circular.
Perhaps I have misunderstood Professor Strayer’s views on the
legitimacy of the power of judicial review under our federal
constitution, and, if so, there is not really even this difference
between us. In any event, in his last chapter, entitled ‘The Future
of Judicial Review’, he does give the legitimate existence and the
importance of the power his full and eloquent support. Among
other things he says:
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 16
Beyond this rather negative role of policing the federal system lies the
broader role of constitutional development. In the process of keeping each
legislative body within its own sphere, the courts should constantly re-
examine the accepted definitions of legislative power. The need and the
opportunity for dynamic constitutional interpretation are both apparent…
It is axiomatic that the constitution, like all law, must adjust to
changing conditions. Change by formal amendment being a practical im-
possibility, change by judicial redefinition becomes a necessity. (pp. 208-9).
I agree heartily with this, and recommend Professor Strayer’s
treatise most highly to all who seek better understanding of our
federal constitution.
W. R. LEDERMAN.*
* Professor of Law, Queen’s University.
