BOOK REVIEWS
SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER
CANADA, EVIDENCE
TORONTO: RICHARD DE Boo LIMITED. 1955. Pp. xiii, 342, ($12.50)
Some of the lectures in this series of seventeen lectures on Evidence by
prominent members of the Ontario bar would not be considered great con-
tributions to the scholarship of the law. But in this work-a-day world where
not every lawyer can be a law professor there is a real need for instruction
in the work-a-day practices that are largely taken for granted by experienced
practitioners. Until very recently the learning of these practices was left to
the haphazard chance of articled clerkship and the young lawyer was frequently
without adequate training. These lectures, of the variety which Mr. Edson
Haines Q.C., calls, in his talk on Examination for Discovery (pp. 23-45),
lectures, will go a long way to supplement the proper content
“how-to-do-it”
of a university law school’s course in evidence in those provinces, other than
Quebec and Ontario, where reliance is still placed on the unimproved (and
barren) land of articled clerkship.
lecture as Mr. Haines’ own,
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that all the lectures are on this
lesser level of “practicality” or that the “practical” lectures contain not even
the seeds of wholesome academic thought. In fact, the element of academic
is
thought present in such a “how-to-do-it”
sufficient to demonstrate the futility of separating the academic from the practical.
Mr. Haines
tells us how he explains the adversary system to his clients
so as to help them overcome the fear of the unknown and thus to make them
less nervous witnesses. It is, unfortunately, a rather oversimplified statement
compelled by the limits of time and space, but he does suggest, as if it were
significant, that “a lawsuit is [not] a scientific enquiry into the truth.” Of
course it is not, because the scientific method has very little to offer in the
task of enquiring into what happened in a dispute over the facts. When our
sense of values dictates that some protection be given to the disputing in-
dividuals, it is doubtful whether science could find any fairer and more effective
method of enquiring into the truth than the common law trial. Admittedly,
where the adversary character of the procedure is pressed to the extreme,
some of the exclusionary rules of evidence unquestionably result in distortions
of the truth.
For example, Dean Wright, in his estimable lecture on Res Ipsa Loquitur,
dismisses as “unwarranted”, on the “existing principles of the adversary
system”, Judge Frankfurter’s view that a trial judge should have called a
witness on his own motion in order to have all available evidence. Frankfurter
No. 1]
BOOK REVIEWS
J. refused to believe that a trial was a game of blindman’s buff. He was, in my
opinion, quite right, and somehow I feel that Dean Wright would agree that
the “existing principles” might better have been described as court of appeal
authority awaiting clarification in the Supreme Court of Canada.,
It is abundantly apparent from the lecture titles that the “how-to-do-it”
topics as Preliminary Hearings
element varies greatly, from such “practical”
(by G. Arthur Martin Q.C., pp. 1-21), Identification Procedures and Police
“y
Line-Ups (by Charles L. Dubin Q.C. pp. 329-342), Cross Examinaio1.3
Joseph Sedgwick Q.C., pp. 199-214) to such “academic” matters as the H,:irsay
Rule (by J. J. Robinette, Q.C. pp. 279-306) ai:d, by the same contributor,
Circumstantial Evidence (pp. 307-312).
is) present
(as he now
In addition to the “practical lectures”, Dean Wright and Professor J. Des-
two most interesting “academic”
mond Morton
lectures, Dean Wright (pp. 103-36) on Res Ipsa Loquitur (a Latin phrase now
running a close second to Res Gestae as the most meaningless and misleading
Latin tag in the common law) and Professor Morton on Presumptions (pp.
137-153). In the short space of a review it is impossible to comment on all
the contributions, but it would be hard to find a more qualified display of con-
temporary forensic talent in Canada, and the young lawyer will find much of
lectures as well as stimulation of a
immediate value from the “how-to-do-it”
different character provided by Dean Wright and Professor Morton.
This volume of lectures is the second of two major pieces of writing in the
law of Evidence in Canada. The other, of course, is Dr. MacRae’s contribu-
tion to the Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, recently revised by Messrs Auld
and Morawetz. It is of some importance, I think, that both Dr. MacRae and
his successors, and the committee in charge of the Osgoode lectures, have
judicial notice. The
excluded from the subject of evidence
C.E.D. relegates the topic to three pages (671-3 in Vol. 10) under the title
Trials without even a cross reference from the title Evidence. Apparently the
editors revising the second edition plan to follow this classification. Canadian
the topic of
‘Contrast Rule 105 (d) of the Model Code of Evidence which permits the trial
judge the privilege of calling a witness of his own motion. And contrast Professor
Morgan, himself a staunch supporter of the adversary system, in Some Problems of
Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation (1956) at p. 128: “We must
concede that the trial is a proceeding not for the discovery of truth as such, but for
the establishment of a basis of fact for the adjustment of a dispute between litigants.
Still it must never be forgotten that its prime objective is to have that basis as close
an approximation to the truth as is practicable. The emphasis upon the protection of
the adversary and the fact that the result is binding only upon the parties and their
privies have tended to make this objective seem of secondary importance …
It cannot be
too emphatically asserted that such a beclouding of the objective is an abandonment
of the fundamental principle of the adversary system, namely, that each adversary
because of his interest will be- keen to discover and present materials showing the
strength of his position and the weakness of his opponent’s, so that the truth will
emerge to the perception of the impartial tribunal.”
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 4
lawyers who depend on standard works like the C.E.D., or lectures by such
qualified persons as the Osgoode volume here reviewed might be forgiven if
they never learned that judicial notice is not only a main branch of the law of
evidence, but also a most difficult branch. It is, of course, treated, all too
briefly, in standard English works, and Wigmore gives it due place in his
monumental treatise. But since Wigmore’s third edition in 1940 Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis has carried the analysis much farther and the subject
can be said to have made important strides forward in terms of basic legal
analysis in the past fifteen years.2 This review is not the place to expound
Professor Davis’ theory at length, but it is clear that judicial notice is an
ambiguous concept, and its clarification could lead to better briefs (factums)
in our courts and a better understanding of a court’s use of extra record
material.
In his introduction to these lectures on Evidence, Mr. Cyril Carson, Q.C.,
says, of an unsuccessful attempt to introduce the London Resolutions
in
evidence before the Privy Council in a constitutional case, “their Lordships
.. . thus ran no risk of something that was inadmissible in law having some
unconscious effect upon their decision upon the merits of the case.”
(p. xiii).
One can easily imagine a judge having already read the London Resolutions
long before he reached the bench, and having already formed some idea of
their relation to the British North American Act. Is it better to reject the
“evidence” of the London Resolutions and have the judge unconsciously
affected by previous reading, or should we accept the matter as one of which
judicial notice might be taken but insist that intelligent discussion be heard
from the opposing parties? If the latter view is accepted, then the whole
question of how and when matters might be judicially noticed will have to be
reexamined. This task still faces our academic scholars in the law of evidence.
J. B. MILNER.
2 See particularly Davis, Administrative Law
(1951) pp. 487-497, on “Legislative
and Adjudicative Facts.”
No. 1]
BOOK REVIEWS
AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE
By G. D. Nokes, LL.D.
SECOND EDITION. LONDON: SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED, TORONTO: THE
CARSWELL COMPANY LTD. 1956. PP. xxxvl, 480 ($7.25)
This is the second edition of a work first published in 1952. Both editions
have been the subject of deservedly complimentary reviews in the Canadian
Bar Review.’
The new edition has been necessitated by a number of new cases (number-
ing between 250 and 275 if one can judge from the Table of Cases) which
have been decided in the British Isles since the first edition was published.
While the general plan of the book has been retained almost unaltered,
the text has been expanded by more than fifty pages.
The various subjects are treated in an order different from the order
followed by Phipson. The author proceeds from the origin of the various
methods of proof to their application in court. The preliminary part of the
book is devoted to the nature and sources of evidence and special means of
establishing facts. Admissibility of Facts and Admissibility of lHearsay com-
prise parts I1 and III. Then follows Means of Proof and the fifth part deals
with the Burden of Proof and -with Cogency.
The conclusions are supported by reference to jurisprudence,
to authors
both English and American, and to articles in legal periodicals including
several articles published in the Canadian Bar Review. I was unable to find
any reference to Canadian cases (unless decided by the Privy Council) and
all the jurisprudence appears to be English, Scottish or Irish.
The book is a happy combination of the theoretical and the practical. It js
not designed for use by the practicing advocate in Court, as is Phipson or
Cockle, nor is it of much utility to a Quebec lawyer or student. It does
however contain a clear and concise exposition of the general principles of the
law of evidence in England.
GEORGE S. CHALLIES.
1(1952) 30 Can. Bar Rev. 759 (Andr& Nadeau) and (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 871
(J. B. Morton).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 4
CHAPTERS IN HISTORY OF FRENCH LAW
by Walter S. Johnson Q.C. L.L.D.
PUBLISHED: THE LAW FACULTY OF MCGILL UNIVERSITY. MIMEOGRAPH
FORM. 1957. Pp. 295. ($5.00)
Mr. Walter Johnson, dans l’introduction de son ouvrage, souligne avec
raison que le but recherch6 par lui est de permettre A l’itudiant canadien de
langue anglaise de se familiariser dans sa propre langue avec
‘esprit des
la base du droit de la Province de
institutions du droit franqais qui sont
Quebec.
.
Mr. Walter S. Johnson 6tait qualifi6 i plus d’un titre pour ce faire. Tout
d’abord son Mducation et sa culture g~nrale, puis sa connaissance et son
admiration pour les institutions franaises, enfin le fait d’avoir vdcu toute sa
vie dans cette province de langue franqaise, ce qui lui a permis plus qu’A
tout autre de saisir 1’esprit des institutions qu6becoises.
Sans doute, tous les chapitres pr~sent~s n’ont-ils pas la m~me portie. I1 faut
remercier Monsieur Walter S. Johnson d’avoir au moins tent6 de synth6tiser
les complications de ce damier juridique, politique et 6conomique qu’ont
constitu6 les p6riodes f6odales et le moyen-ige.
Un auteur qui n’aurait pas eu cette tournure d’esprit se serait perdu dans
d’infinis d6tails en traitant les aspects des institutions de ]a p6riode Gallo-
Romaine, et de la p~riode Franque.
Monsieur Walter S. Johnson a su 6laguer pour les 6tudiants et dfgager les
traits fondamentaux des
institutions durant ces p6riodes boulevers~es et
complexes. On a l’impression que son livre a su rendre ce sens de la con-
tinuit6 historique des institutions franqaises malgr6 les hachures et les 6v~ne-
ments de l’histoire pure.
L’ouvrage de Monsieur Walter S. Johnson est certainement pour l’6tu-
diant de langue et de formation anglaise un pr~cieux atout.
Louis BAUDOUIN*
*Professeur i la Facult6 de Droit de l’Universit6 McGill, Montreal.
No. 1]
BOOK REVIEWS
LES “JLE9ONS DE DROIT CIVIL” T6me 2
MM. H. L. and J. Mazeaud
EDITION MONTCHRESTIEN, PARIS. 1956. Pp. 1378.
Le deuxi~me volume des legons de Droit Civil est consacr6 d’une part i la
th~orie g~nrale des obligations, formation des obligations, formation des
celle de la responsabilit6 civile dilictuelle et
contrats, leur interpretation, et
contractuelle ainsi qu’ 1’ex&ution des obligations.
Il traite d’autre part des droits r~els principaux, droit de proprit6, pos-
session, accession, et des modes d’acquisition de ces droits.
Les auteurs sont rest&s fid.les
la m6thode employie dans le premier
volume et qui leur 6tait d’ailleurs en partie dict&e par la r&zente r~forme de
leqon est donc assortie d’un
l’enseignement du droit en France. Chaque
sommaire de la leqon proprement dite et de lectures ou d’extraits de d&isions
judiciaires sur le sujet trait6.
I1 faut rendre hommage aux auteurs d’avoir s, donner dans la partie
th~orique sur les obligations des extraits d’articles qui donnent mati~re A
raisonner et non
r~flexion chez l’6tudiant. II faut en effet habituer l’6tudiant
. apprendre les articles du Code. Les auteurs ont consacr6 un
simplement
certain nombre de leqons aux d~finitions et aux classifications des contrats.
C’est li une chose essentielle, car, les unes et les autres cr66nt ou devraient
‘esprit de tout 6tudiant cette sorte de r~flexe juridique qui lui
cr~er dans
permet de retrouver dans son esprit en face de tel ou tel contrat les caract6-
ristiques fondamentales de celui-ci.
Demeur~s fidles i la notion de la cause, les auteurs y consacrent des pages
pleines de clart6 et pr&ision dans une mati re demeurie souvent obscure et
toujours controvers&e. Ils montrent notamment comment certains droits 6tran-
gers tel le droit allemand, suisse ou polonais qui ont rejet6 la cause comme
condition de formation dans certains nombres d’actes juridiques, ont dfi affirmer
le principe d’interd~pendance des obligations n6es du contrat synallagmati-
que que pr&is~ment la notion de cause renferme.
La discussion sans doute trop brave, mais fort bien venue, sur l’engage-
ment unilateral de volont6 est intressante i consulter.
C’est surtout dans le domaine de la responsabilit6 civile d~lictuelle et con-
tractuelle que les auteurs sont pass&s maitres dans P’art de 1’exposition. Ayant
d6ji affirm6 leur doctrine dans leur important trait6 de la responsabilit6 civile
dlictuelle et contractuelle, ils ont su ramasser en une excellente synthse de
110
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 4
quelque trois cents pages les principes g~n6raux de la responsabilit6 civile fran-
Oaise, qui, pour tout juriste sont une source d’enrichissement intellectuel.
I1 faut signaler galernent les leqons consacries i la propri~t6 et A la pos-
session, mati~res difficiles, pleines de subtilit6, dont ils ont su avec la m~me
prbcision faire des pages attachantes.
Louis BATUDOUIN*
*Professeur A Ia Faculti de Droit de
‘Universit6 McGill, Montreal.
