BOOK REVIEWS
REVUE DES LIVRES
Traitd de Droit Compard, par LtONTrN-JEAN CONSTANTINESCO, Paris: Librairie
G~ndrale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1972-1974. 2 Vols. Pp.283 ($27.85).
Le droit compar6, h l’6poque moderne, connait de plus en plus
d’adeptes et de plus en plus de succ~s. Le r6seau complexe des
communications entre les hommes, l’universalisme des problRmes
auxquels nos soci6t6s sont confront6es, font que le juriste va sou-
vent chercher ailleurs soit des modules pour sa propre rdglemen-
tation, soit un 616ment de comparaison qui lui permet de d6noncer
les carences ou les lacunes de son propre droit. Notre pays, plus
que bien d’autres, est peut-Atre l’un de ceux pour lesquels le droit
compar6 est une r6alit6 concrete et sensible, puisqu’il est au con-
fluent de deux grandes traditions juridiques, la tradition de droit
civil romaniste et la tradition du common-law.
On a souvent cependant l’impression que le droit compar6 se
r6sume h une comparaison primaire d’616ments de solutions, de
textes ou de concepts juridiques et donc qu’il n’existe pas h pro-
prement parler, une m6thode et encore moins une science du
droit compar6. A ceux qui penseraient ainsi on doit conseiller la
lecture du Traitd-de Droit Compar6 du Professeur L6ontin-Jean
Constantinesco. Cet ouvrage marquera certainement une 6tape im-
portante pour le droit compare en tant que science pour deux
raisons. D’une part il d6mystifie enfin le caract~re <,simpliste,, du
droit compar6 que tant de juristes non avertis lui attachent, en
montrant combien acomparer,, n'est pas seulement se livrer h
l'analyse superficielle d'616ments de droit 6trangers piges sans
discrimination dans les divers droits nationaux. A cet 6gard, prin-
cipalement dans le premier tome, l'auteur pose le dilemme clas-
sique qui a, pendant si longtemps divis6 les comparatistes eux-
m6mes: le droit compar6 est-il simplement une m6thode ou est-il
vraiment une science autonome? Les observations et les conclu-
sions personnelles de l'auteur sur cette question h la suite de ce
que 1'on pourrait appeller l'autopsie de l'dchec du d6veloppement
du droit compar6 en tant que science (p.207 et seq. du Tome I) sont
particulibrement int6ressantes en ce qu'elles se rattachent h une
analyse rationnelle et syst6matique des motifs sous-jacents aux
dffficult6s 6prouvdes par le droit compar6.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 21
D'autre part, l'ouvrage de M. Constantinesco est la d6monstra-
tion vivante du fait que pour ,,faire,, du droit compar6 il est ndces-
saire de se plonger aux racines philosophiques et sociologiques du
droit. La tr~s grande 6rudition dont fait preuve l'auteur et sa
bonne connaissance du droit et de la thdorie juridique allemande,
montrent l'importance des connaissances de base qui doivent ser-
vir de fondement tant h la micro qu'h la macro comparaison.
Le premier de deux tomes d'un ouvrage que l'auteur annonce
en trois volets est consacr6 h une introduction au droit compar6,
le second h la m6thode comparative. Dans le tome premier, l'au-
teur justifie tout d'abord 1'int6rt, pour ne pas dire l'engouement,
des juristes de l'6poque moderne pour le droit compar6; puis, dans
le Livre II,
il retrace d'une faron tr~s vivante et tr~s perspicace
l'histoire du droit compar6 ant6rieurement et post6rieurement au
c616bre congr~s de 1900. Enfin, dans le Livre III, intitul6 ((Incer-
titudes du droit compar6>,, il fait 6tat de la controverse que nous
signalions plus haut, pour enfin conclure en nous livrant sa pens6e
sur les v6ritables objectifs du droit compar6.
Le second tome s’ouvre sur l’examen de ce que l’auteur appelle
la ocomparabilit6, pour ensuite traiter h fond de la m6thodologie
du droit compar6 que l’auteur divise, d’une fagon fort int6ressante,
en trois phases: la connaissance des termes h comparer, la com-
prdhension de ceux-ci et enfin la comparaison elle-mAme. Pour
chacune de ces phases, 1’auteur nous propose une s6rie de r~gles
mdthodologiques. Enfin, ce second tome se termine par un long
d6veloppement sur les buts et les fonctions de la m6thode com-
parative (buts et fonctions pratiques et th6oriques).
Le lecteur comparatiste, ou celui-lh meme qui aime le droit
compar6, trouvera intdressante la lecture de cet ouvrage. C’est
plus qu’un trait6 de droit compar6 traditionnel; c’est en fait un
trait6 de la philosophie du droit compar6 et une systdmatisation
pr6cieuse de la m6thode comparative. On y trouve une foule de
renseignements, de nombreuses observations et constatations per-
sonnelles h l’auteur. Le style en est parfois ardu mais on comprend
aisdment ce fait lorsque, apr6s les premieres pages, on se rend
compte de l’optique thdorique et philosophique de l’auteur. En
bref, un excellent ouvrage et un apport certain hi la science com-
parative. Le lecteur partagera sans doute notre impatience dans
l’attente du troisi~me volet de ce trait6.
Jean-Louis Baudouin *
* Facult6 de droit, Universitd de Montrdal.
1975]
BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES
Tribunals and Government, by J.A. FARMER, London: Weidenfeld and
Nicholson, 1974. Pp250 (S5.75).
Tribunals and Government is a short book by a New Zealander
about administrative tribunals in the United Kingdom. After a
brief Introduction, Dr Farmer discusses the role of statutory
tribunals in four areas of government intervention: economic poli-
cy, labour relations, social welfare and rented housing. These four
chapters are followed by what is described as a case study –
a
more detailed examination of the use of a particular tribunal in
the regulation of economic policy. Finally, in his last two chapters,
the author compares administrative tribunals with the regular
courts and assesses the role of administrative tribunals.
This is the seventh book in Weidenfeld and Nicholson’s The
Law in Context Series and the dust jacket describes the series as
embodying “a radical departure in scholarly legal writing”, as
“treating legal subjects from a broader base than has been normal
in the past, using material from other social sciences, from busi-
ness studies and from any other discipline that helps to explain
the operation in practice of the subject under discussion”, an
orientation which “will be at once more stimulating and more
realistic than the bare exposition of legal rules”.
After reading this, my immediate reaction was that Dr Farmer
was going to assess the usefulness of administrative tribunals as
a means of effective government. Do they really work? What have
been their accomplishments? The author, however, in his Preface
and Introduction was somewhat less ambitious. He saw his role
as one of first, providing information and material about admin-
istrative tribunals and secondly, of dispelling the traditional myth
that tribunals are “little more than cheaper, quicker, more informal
courts” (Preface, p.XI) and demonstrating that tribunals are a
very “mixed lot ” (p.2), properly regarded as forming “a part of
the administration” (p.4) rather than as an offshoot of the judicial
system.
Certainly, in the very last sentence of the Introduction (p.14),
it is stated:
It is a thesis of this book that tribunals (of considerably differing kinds)
provide an increasingly important instrument of management by which
all [governmental] functions can be exercised.
The description that follows does indeed establish that tribunals
are important in the United Kingdom in that there are a lot of
them, an ever-increasing number for that matter, making an ever-
increasing range of decisions affecting as ever-increasing spectrum
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 21
of society. However, whether those decisions are being made effec-
tively is seldom assessed. Is regulation by this tribunal having the
deserved impact? Would it have been better to have left this deci-
sion with the appropriate department of state? Of course, Dr
Farmer records the obvious failure of the National Industrial Rela-
tions Court, a court which has subsequently been abolished by
the Trade Union and Industrial Relations Act, 1974. However, even
in his detailed case study (ch.6) of the use of Industrial Tribunals
to decide whether a particular business qualified for exemption
from the now-repealed Selective Employment Tax (S.E.T.), Dr
Farmer goes no further than demonstrating that the Tribunals
approached their decision-making functions in a reasonably sensi-
ble fashion. Whether the Tribunals furthered the S.E.T.’s objectives
of diverting manpower resources from service to manufacturing
and whether the use of a tribunal with that particular mandate
was the best way of deciding upon entitlement to exemption are
not assessed, except that it is concluded that using the Tribunals
was “taking an awful chance” (p.165).
So much for what the book is not and possibly what it could
not have been, particularly without much more research and in
just 199 pages of text covering a multitude of tribunals. As an
account of some of the major administrative tribunals in the
United Kingdom, the book contains valuable factual reading for
an outsider as well as for the British law student at whom this
series is particularly aimed. It builds upon the description of
British administrative tribunals found in such standard texts as
Griffith and Street, The Principles of Administrative Law and
Garner, Administrative Law in that it contains far greater legis-
lative detail and frequently looks at the legislative and general
political history as well as the actual functioning of the tribunals
being studied. As such it will hopefully generate many more spe-
cialized tribunal studies.
The second objective of the book, to dispel the myth that
tribunals are no more than mini-courts, is also achieved. How-
ever, I do question whether this objective is anything more than
one of destroying a straw castle. When it is asserted that “[t]ra-
ditionally, in fact, tribunals have been seen as a part of, or at
most complementary
to, the judicial system” (p.3), I am very
curious as to who has traditionally viewed them in that light.
Perhaps for an Administrative Law teacher in a Canadian context,
who is familiar with Canadian and American regulatory agencies
and their often broad economic objectives, the myth is somewhat
more obvious, despite the court-like procedures frequently adopted
1975]
BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES
by those agencies. However, such British texts as Griffith and
Street and Garner and even the review-oriented de Smith (Judicial
Review of Administration Actions) do not see tribunals simply
as mini-courts but are quite clear as to their important (quanti-
tatively) and varied role in government and administration. Quite
frankly, this seems no more than another Hewartism which did
not deserve a second burial and, if this is the “newness” in Farmer’s
approach, it is disappointing.
Structurally, the book is somewhat confusing. Chapter 8
is
entitled “The role of administrative tribunals” but all except the
last six pages of that chapter discuss criteria for distinguishing
administrative tribunals from courts. I would have thought this
more readily fitted into chapter 7, entitled “How different are
tribunals from courts?”, which in fact concentrates almost exclu-
sively on the place of precedent in the proceedings of administrative
tribunals as opposed to the courts. Indeed, in so far as distin-
guishing courts from administrative tribunals relates to the scope
of the whole study, it may well have been appropriately placed at
the beginning of the book rather than the end. It is also strange
that in the six pages of chapter 8, where the role of administrative
tribunals is discussed, Dr Farmer draws upon a new example
instead of drawing together the lessons, if any, to be learned from
the relevant chapters of the book (chs.2-6).
Perhaps my view of this book is somewhat jaundiced by the
fact that I read it with K.C. Davis’s Discretionary Justice –
A Pre-
liminary Inquiry in mind and just after re-reading Professor G.E.
Palmer’s brilliant series of lectures, Mistake and Unjust Enrich-
ment and just before reading Paul Weiler’s In the Last Resort.
I found the style somewhat pedestrian and at times clumsy. Per-
haps despite the dust jacket’s claim this was inevitable with so
much descriptive material. However, even this does not excuse
statements such as “This confusion which has resulted in the
interpretation of the alternative offer provision can be seen from
contrasting the following
(p.60) when the
author’s intention was not that the two sets of cases be contrasted
one with the other but rather that the cases within each set be
contrasted.
two sets of cases”
Also, a number of the assertions made by the author were either
conclusory or cryptic. Why, for example, was the decision of the
High Court in Morton Sundour Fabrics Ltd. v. Shawl “unfortu-
nate” (p.57)? Merely because the High Court interfered and reversed
1 (1967) 2 I.T. R 84.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 21
the expert tribunal or because reversing the tribunal led to an
unsound result? If the latter, where was the unsoundness? It was
certainly not self-evident to me. In another example, why is fair
return on capital, a concept very familiar to observers of North
American regulatory agencies, a “fairly unsound” method “of
arriving at a fair rent” (p.139)?
Again, in dealing with the place of precedent in administrative
tribunal proceedings, Dr Farmer, after citing such diverse author-
ities as Dworkin in his article The Model of Rules2 and Adam
Kuper in his work on African tribal councils 3 (“using material
from other social sciences”!) for the proposition that principles
are all important in any sensible decision-making process, goes on
to give an example of how tribunals, like the courts, have applied
the principle that a man should not profit from his own wrong
(pp. 178 -179). The example given from tribunal decision-making
is the burden that the applicant has in transport licensing cases
to convince the Transport Tribunal that he has not “wrongfully
abstracted” business from existing carriers. On further investiga-
tion, what seems to be in issue in such cases is whether the grant
of the application will harm any existing carriers economically
and whether the applicant has in his presently-licensed activities
taken business away from other existing carriers which he is now
seeking to use as an evidential basis for further licences. Against
such a background the use of the word “wrongfully” by a tribunal
to support a decision not to grant a licence assumes the correct-
ness of a policy which is highly restrictive of competition and
which penalizes efficiency and as such the word is both self-serving
and question-begging. Indeed, a reading of the report ot the case
from which the “wrongfully abstracted” test allegedly emerges
(L.M.S. Rly v. Motor Carriers (Liverpool) Ltd.4) reveals that the word
“wrongfully” was never used in either the first instance or appeal
decisions. Also, to assert that a licence will not be granted unless
the applicant establishes that the grant of the licence will not
affect the business of existing licensees is primarily aimed at pre-
venting a perceived “wrong” in the future –
not at preventing
a person taking advantage of his own wrong.
To the Canadian reader, Tribunals and Government provides
an interesting commentary on British administrative agencies
though, in so far as it does not deal in any detail with local
2 (1967) 35 U. Chi. L.Rev. 14.
3 Kuper, Councils in Action (1971).
4 (1935) 23 Traf. Cas. 164.
1975]
BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES
government tribunals and such important national bodies as the
Race Relations Board, it is somewhat incomplete. Also, it scarcely
lives up to its billing as being “a radical departure in scholarly
legal writing” though it does emphasize rightly that both in the
United Kingdom and Canada there is need for more detailed
studies of administrative tribunals in action, a need which in
Canada is presently being met at least partly by the National Law
Reform Commission’s agency studies.
David J. Mullan*
Les grands arrats de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle au Canada, par Herbert
Marx, Montreal: Les Presses de l’Universit6 de Montrdal, 1974. Pp.761 ($24.00).
Si comme on peut lire dans l’avant-propos
etc. La troisi~me partie est consacrde aux libert6s publiques.
Le choix des d6cisions nous parait convenable; il y en a pros de
80 si l’on compte les arr~ts r6sum6s.
L’aspect le plus d6cevant de cet ouvrage est incontestablement
la faiblesse en qualit6 et en quantit6 des commentaires. Lorsqu’on
acquiert ou consulte un ouvrage de cette nature, on ne s’attend pas
h avoir la reproduction int6grale des arr6ts. C’est d’ailleurs ce qui
se produit ici: dans la plupart des arrts l’auteur proc~de
t un
ddcoupage qui oblige le lecteur s~rieux h recourir aux Recueils de
Jurisprudence. On s’attend cependant it avoir une prdsentation con-
venable des arr~ts ainsi que des commentaires substantiels. Or, les
quelques rares annotations sont soient insuffisantes, soient super-
ficielles. Songeons par exemple au Chapitre VI intitul6: La paix,
1’ordre et le bon fonctionnement)> (pp.201 – 281) on ne trouve qu’une
note d’une page et un rdsum6 d’une demi-page de l’arr6t Wartime
Leasehold Regulation ([1950] S.C.R. 124). On ne retrouve aucun com-
mentaire dans le reste de cette partie consacrde au partage des com-
p6tences (pp.283 h 597).
A part 1introduction de cinq pages, F’ouvrage de 761 pages com-
prend 14 ou 15 pages d’annotations, c’est-h-dire une dizaine de notes.
De plus, certaines sont d’une faiblesse 6tonnante: par exemple le
paragraphe de la page 99 sur ,ca notion g6n6rale de 16galit)
se lit
ainsi:
La 1dgalitd est un principe tr~s gdndral, sur lequel reposent plusieurs autres
principes. I1 est difficile d’en prdciser exactement le sens, m~me s’il est
accept6 de tous. Certains n’y voient que ]a justice par opposition h la
tyrannie, d’autres le congoivent plut6t comme un ensemble de rZgles et
de pratiques qui sous-tendent nos institutions. D’autres aussi affirment
qu’il ne s’agit que d’un principe de justice consacrd par notre Constitution.
Dans notre contexte juridique, on peut adopter comme d6finition minimale
de ce principe le fait que ]a puissance publique est, comme n’importe
quel citoyen, soumise droit et qu’il doit exister des moyens pour le lui
faire respecter.
La note de la page 34 sur la rdglementation procddurale du con-
tr6le judiciaire de la 16galit6 constitutionnelle ne prdsente gu~re d’in-
tdr~t dans le contexte.
19751
BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES
Qu’il me soit permis de mentionner que le Chapitre IV (pp.99 a
146) sur ,de principe de l6galit6>, pourrait, sans grave lacune, 6tre
supprim6 car il s’agit de questions qui concernent avant tout le
Droit Administratif: l’affaire de l’Alliance et 1’affaire Roncarelli v.
Duplessis traitent respectivement du fondement de contr6le judi-
ciaire de la 16galit6 administrative et des limites au pouvoir discr6-
tionnaire de l’Administration.
On ne saurait comparer cet ouvrage avec le <
l’excellent petit ouvrage de Peter H. Russell, Leading Constitutional
Decisions (Carleton Library). Ces derniers demeureront indispen-
sables pour l’6tudiant francophone.
I1 ne fait pas de doute que la traduction des arr~ts peut faciliter
l’enseignement et les travaux pratiques; toutefois, je crois qu’il est
prdfdrable d’inciter les 61ves t dtudier la jurisprudence dans le texte
original sauf s’il s’agit de la traduction officielle que nous obtenons
depuis 1970. La connaissance de la langue anglaise est iL notre avis
essentielle h l’6tude s6rieuse de notre droit public, notamment de
notre droit constitutionnel.
En un mot, cet ouvrage est pour moi d6cevant.
Patrice Garant*
The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed
Jurisdictions, edited by Joseph Dainow, Louisiana: Louisiana State University
Press, 1974. Pp.xvii, 350 ($US 16.00).
This book consists of a number of essays on the authoritative
force of case law and doctrine incivil law and mixed civil and
common law jurisdictions. It is edited by Professor Joseph Dainow,
who is Director of the Institute of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana
State University and an eminent modem exponent of civilian systems
of law. The essays span the legal systems of Quebec, Louisiana,
France, Germany, Italy, Scotland, South Africa, Israel and Mexico,
the authors making up a list of distinguished names, many of them
well-known.
The first topic, “The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian
Systems of Louisiana and Quebec”, is dealt with by Professor Jean-
* Vice-doyen i la recherche, Facult6 de Droit, Universit6 Laval.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 21
Louis Baudouin of the University of Montreal. The Law of Louisiana
is further examined, this time from the point of view of the judge,
in two subsequent articles, one by Mr Justice Albert Tate Jr and the
other by Mr Justice Mack E. Barham, both of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana. Professor A.M. Yainnopoulos of Louisiana State University
writes on “Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of Law in
Louisiana and France”, and the discussion of French law is rounded
out by translations from Droit Civil by Professor Carbonnier and
of “Supereminent Principles in French Law” from Professor Rend
David’s book French Law. German, Italian and Scots Law are
dealt with respectively by Professor Karl Larenz, Professor John
Henry Merryman of Stanford University and Professor David M.
Walker, Regius Professor of Law at the University of Glasgow.
The Law of South Africa is discussed by Professor Ellison Kahn
of the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, who writes
on “Doctrine and Judicial Decisions in South Africa”. The position
in Israel, a jurisdiction in which English common law and principles
borrowed from modern civil law jurisdictions mix with Ottoman
law, is discussed in two articles by authors from the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. The first, “Codification and Case Law in
Israel”, is by Mr G. Tedeschi, Professor of Civil Law and Mr Y.S.
Zemach, Lecturer in Law. The second, entitled “Judicial Lawmaking
in Israel”, is by Mr U. Yadin, Professor of Law and Deputy Minister
of Justice. The final essay is “Stare Decisis, Doctrine and Juris-
prudence in Mexico and Elsewhere”, by Professor Woodfin L. Butte
of the University of Texas. The book concludes with a “Selective
Bibliography” by Professor Charles Szladits of Columbia University.
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and a multi-author
book is liable to be judged by its weakest contributions. It is a
pleasure to be able to say that there are none in this anthology
of articles on the role of binding and persuasive authorities in
civilian and mixed jurisdictions. Every article is interesting and
informative, and makes within its special field an important contri-
bution to jurisprudence.
In its entirety, the book allows us to compare the approach
taken to the same basic problems of legal argument and judicial
law-making by countries having little in common other than the
civilian elements in the ancestry of their legal systems. Yet the
impression gained is one of concurrence rather than divergence,
not only among the various members of the civil law family, but also
between the civil law and the common law. Without trying to
minimize the differences between the two traditions, one can say
that while there is a fundamental difference between their theoretical
1975]
BOOK REVIEWS – REVUE DES LIVRES
conceptions of the role of judicial decisions, in practice the approach
is quite similar. Courts everywhere follow precedents, their own or
those of superior courts, not only because no judge enjoys being
overruled, but also because litigants legitimately expect that in
deciding their cases, the courts should follow established juris-
prudence. Whether cases are decided the same way by “reason
of authority” or by “authority of reason” makes little difference to
the parties in the final result. Judges in both civil law and common
law jurisdictions, though supposed only to “find” the law, in fact
“make” and always have made it, even if only “interstitially”; indeed,
they have no choice in the matter.
There was a time when it was believed that there was an un-
bridgeable gulf between civil and common law systems. Today it is
widely realized that both form part of the same Western European
tradition. The great Continental codifications – Code Napol6on,
have become thickly encrusted with case
B.G.B., the Swiss Code –
law and it is no longer possible to find the solution to any significant
legal problem without referring to the cases decided over the last
three decades or so. Conversely, in the common law jurisdictions,
statutes are growing in number, constricting the area based purely
on precedent, and the doctrine of stare decisis is being relaxed. What
was once believed to be a chasm turns out to be little more than
a ditch, and one which is becoming filled in as time progresses.
The process is greatly helped by The Role of Judicial Decisions and
Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions.
This is a stimulating collection of essays, which will appeal to the
civil and common law lawyer alike.
H. R. Hahlo*
* Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University.
