Book Reviews
Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence, Ed. SaLhany & Carter, Toronto:
Butterworths & Co. (Canada), 1972, Pp. iii, 392 ($33.00).
Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence is the fourth volume of
Canadian Legal Studies published by Butterworths of Canada and,
given the complex nature of the subject and the dearth of Canadian
writing in the area, it is perhaps the most ambitious in the series to
date. It is therefore disappointing that, as a contribution to legal
literature, it is, in the opinion of this reviewer, seriously flawed.
As the learned editors, Messrs Salhany & Carter, point out in the
preface, the voluminous nature of the law of evidence required them
to be selective in their choice of topics for study. However, the
wisdom of their decision to confine these studies to the law of
“criminal” evidence is open to serious question. There are certain
well-established differences between the common
law rules of
criminal and civil evidence affecting, in particular, the standard of
proof, the competence and compellability of the accused and his
spouse, the admissibility of confessions and dying declarations
and the rules of corroboration. However, these distinctions are
greatly over-shadowed by the basic similarities between the rules of
criminal and civil evidence stemming from their common origins in
the jury trial and the adversary process, and their common aim
of the ascertaining of truth.
The division between the rules of criminal evidence and civil
evidence at common law rests less in theoretical distinctions than in
the stringency of their general application. In civil trials, the rules
of evidence are subject to waiver by the parties: in criminal trials
it is the duty of the judge to ensure that the rules of evidence are
observed. It is perhaps worthwhile in this context to recall the
remarks of Wigmore:
There is but one system of rules for Criminal and for civil trials. This
is the more worth emphasizing for the title “Criminal Evidence” has
tended to foster the fallacy that there is some separate group of rules,
or some large number of modifications. On the contrary, much is lost in
utility by attempting a separate treatment; for most of the large princi-
ples of Evidence are equally illustrated in both kinds of trials, and
cannot be adequately followed either in theory or in authority, if the
precedents in either class of cases are ignored.’
I Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, 3d ed. (1940), 16-17.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. 3
The artificiality of the division between criminal and civil rules of
evidence is illustrated in this volume by frequent references to pro-
vincial Evidence Acts and civil decisions.
A second general reservation about Studies in Canadian Criminal
Evidence is the overall description of the varied contributions as
“studies”. Without resorting to terminological quibbles, a “study”
normally consists of a detailed, critical analysis of a chosen topic
documented with adequate citation and collateral references to aid
the interested reader in undertaking further research in the area.
While some of the chapters in Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence
undoubtedly satisfy this suggested criterion and represent valuable
contributions to Canadian legal writing, others would be more
accurately described as “comments” or “notes” because of their
brevity and superficiality.
In the first category, one would certainly includ6 “Admissions and
Confessions” written by the Honourable Samuel Freedman, Chief
Justice of the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which is perhaps the most
satisfactory chapter in this book. In 36 pages, replete with valuable
references to Canadian, English and American sources, the Honour-
able Chief Justice has written a comprehensive analysis of the law
governing confessions in Canada, which is characteristically lucid
and thorough. Despite the self-imposed limitation of the editors to
“the rules of evidence in a criminal trial” in the preface one might
have wished to see R. v. Van Leishout2 cited for the proposition
that the rule in Ibrahim’s case 3 extends to quasi-criminal offences
and some critical discussion of or allusion to the apparent anomaly
illustrated by R. v. Towler4 and R. v. McLean & McKinley,5 whereby
the admissibility of a confession obtained by trickery apparently
depends on the mode of deception employed. If, as in Towler, a
person in authority successfully deceives the accused into believing
that he is a fellow prisoner rather than a policeman, any resulting
statement is admissible without regard to R. v. Ibrahim. As Macfar-
lane, J.A. stated in Towler : “It cannot be said that his mind was
affected by inducements held out by a person in authority when he
does not think that the persons who make the inducements are
persons in authority”. But, if the police falsely tell an accused that his
co-accused has confessed and thereby induce the accused to make a
confession, the deception by the police will constitute grounds for
2 (1943), 52 O.W.N. 746 (Co. Ct.).
3R. v. Ibrahim, [1914] A.C. 599 (P.C.).
4 (1968), 65 W.W.R. 549 (B.C. CA.).
5 (1960), 31 W.W.R. 89 (B.C. S.C.).
6 (1968), 65 W.W.R. 549, 553 (B.C. CA.).
19731
BOOK REVIEWS
excluding the confession (R. v. McLean & McKinley, see also R. v.
Frank 7). These cases illustrate the shifting rationale of the Ibrahim
rule adopted in Canadian Courts. The decision in R. v. Towler is
justifiable upon “The Criterion of Truth” while R. v. McLean &
McKinley is explainable only if “Fairness to the Accused” or “The
Due Administration of Justice” are viewed as the underlying bases
of the rule in R. v. Ibrahim. But the distinctions themselves would
seem to place too high a premium on the ingenuity of police tactics
and demonstrate the need for development of a coherent doctrine
of “Entrapment” in Canada.8
The study on “Character Evidence” by the Honourable C.P. Hartt
of the Ontario Court of Appeal and current Chairman of the Federal
Law Reform Commission is also valuable to academics and practi-
tioners. Given the breadth of “Character Evidence” as a topic for
critical analysis, the approach of the learned contributor, which
consists of a broad analysis of the philosophy underlying the law
governing character evidence and a detailed discussion of s. 12 of
the Canada Evidence Act,9 is understandable. However, it is regret-
table that similar fact evidence gets little mention, since the doctrine
is ripe for reappraisal. It might have been preferable if the editors
had devoted two chapters rather than one to the important topic of
Character Evidence.
The chapter on “Corroboration” by the Honourable A. E. Branca
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal is long and detailed but none
of the 84 pages is devoted to a statement and a critical evaluation of
the rationale of the doctrine. There are few if any references to
collateral sources, despite the relative abundance of legal writing
in this area, and the extracts reproduced from leading judgments are
too numerous and often too long, making the narration difficult to
follow in places.
It is unfortunate that this essay was written before two recent
decisions of the House of Lords which limit the rule against mutual
corroboration to accomplices.’0 These decisions conflict with Paige
v. The King,” and if the same willingness to re-evaluate and rational-
ise the unnecessarily complex doctrine of corroboration is exhibited
by the Supreme Court, it seems likely that the law on mutual
corroboration as expounded here by the learned Judge will be
7 (1969), 69 W.W.R. 588 (B.C. C.A.).
8 E.g. R. v. Pratt, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 52 (N.W.T. Mag.Ct.); R. v. Pettipiece
(1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 133 (B.C. CA.).
9 R.S.C. 1970, c.E-10.
loD.P.P. v. Hester, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1056 (H.L.); R. v. Kilbourne, [1973]
2 W.L.R. 254 (H.L.).
“1[19481 S.C.R. 349.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 19, No. 3
changed. R. v. Dyer, an important Canadian decision concerning the
definition of an accomplice, was handed down too late for inclusion
in his study.’2
Among those contributions which one is tempted to categorize
as “comments” or “notes” are a five-page statement of the Hearsay
Rule by Mr Carter and an eight-page contribution by the Honourable
Antoine Rivard of Quebec entitled “The Functions of Judge, Jury
and Counsel – Co-operation in Search of the Truth”.
Mr Carter’s account of the Hearsay Rule is, no doubt, intended
to be read in conjunction with his co-editor’s chapter of “Exceptions
to the Hearsay Rule” which it immediately precedes. But, however
one views it, as an exposition of the Hearsay Rule, it is inadequate.
While hearsay is properly defined to include assertive conduct (e.g.
Chandra Sekera v. The Queen 13), no mention is made of the contro-
versy concerning implied assertions by conduct and the Hearsay
Rule. 4 Of greater significance is the absence of any account of the
ramifications of the Hearsay Rule, which has succinctly been describ-
ed as extending to “the prattling of a child and the mouthings of a
drunk, the encyclical of a pope, a learned treatise, an encyclopedia
article, a newspaper report, an unverified rumor from anonymous
sources, an affidavit by a responsible citizen, a street corner remark
(and) the judgment of a court….”‘ The practical consequences of
the Hearsay Rule might have been illustrated by a more detailed
analysis of the facts and judgments in Myers v. D.P.P.,1 which is
mentioned in the text.
The usual reasons for excluding Hearsay Evidence are dealt with
in a single fifteen line paragraph and there is no attempt to evaluate
the foundations upon which this controversial, exclusionary rule of
evidence is based. There are no collateral references to the writings
of Morgan,’ 7 Cross,’ 8 Baker 10 and Wigmore, 20 and one is left with
the impression that this chapter is too slight to be of much value.
12 (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 376 (B.C. CA.).
13 [1937] A.C. 220 (P.C.).
14Cf. Cross on Evidence 3d ed. (1967), 383-386 and Phipson on Evidence
11 ed. (1970), 274-275.
15 Loevinger, Facts, Evidence, and Legal Proof, 9 Western Reserve Law Rev.
154; reprinted in Henson, Landmarks of Law (1960) 422, 432.
16 [1965] A.C. 220 (P.C.).
17 Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177.
Is Cross, op. cit., 380458, (1956) 72 L.Q.R. 91.
19Baker, The Hearsay Rule (1950).
20Wigmore, op. cit., vol. V.
1973]
BOOK REVIEWS
The companion study entitled “Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule”
written by Mr Salhany, co-editor of this volume, contains some of
the detailed analysis which Mr Carter’s article lacks. However, it is
doubtful whether R. v. Leland,2 ‘ which held that spontaneous excla-
mations are not admissible to prove the facts they contain and are
thus not exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, would be followed today.
It is true that McRuer, C.J.H.C. in reaching this conclusion adopted
the views of the editors of the 8th edition (1942) of Phipson in pref-
erence to Wigmore who regarded spontaneous exclamations as an
exception to the Hearsay Rule. However, the editors of Phipson’s
current 11th edition (1970), citing Teper v. The Queen,2 2 now agree
with Wigmore that spontaneous exclamations are an exception to
the Hearsay Rule.s
Reference should have been made to s. 30 of the Canada Evidence
Act as well as to s. 36 (not 35(a) (ii) as appears in the text) of The
Ontario Evidence Act 2 4 when dealing with the “business records”
exception enacted since Myers v. D.P.P.
While Ares v. Venner2 5 is mentioned, the possibilities of this
Supreme Court decision, which adopted in civil proceedings the
minority view of the House of Lords in Myers v. D.P.P., thereby re-
serving a discretionary power to create new exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule, might have been discussed in greater depth.
Other chapters include a useful study entitled “Burdens of Proof
and Presumptions” by His Honour Judge L. Graburn of the County
Court of York, Ontario, which is marred by the constant use of
outdated references and was unfortunately published before the
interesting decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. Appleby 26 was
available, one on “Documentary Evidence” by Clay Powell, and a
study of “Identification Evidence” by Mr Carter.
The two chapters devoted to the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation representing the contrasting views of the Honourable Edson
Haines of the Supreme Court of Ontario on the one hand and
Arthur Maloney and Paul Tomlinson on the other one are disappoint-
ing. Mr Justice Haines’ article has already appeared twice before
21 [1951] O.R. 12 (CA.).
22 [1952] A.C. 480 (P.C.), recently followed in Ratten v. Reginam, [19713
3 All E.R. 801 (P.C.).
2 Phipson, op. cit., 80-82.
24 R.S.O. 1970, c.151.
25 [1970] S.C.R. 608.
26 (1972), 16 C.R.N.S. 35 (S.C.); noted in (1972) 7 U.B.C. Law Rev. 107.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. 3
its inclusion in this book2 and the discussion is not as interesting
as the exchange of views on the same subject between Professor
Rupert Cross of Oxford and Professor Field of Harvard.28
There is little attempt by the editors to integrate the individual
studies by means of cross-references between related topics, such as
“Corroboration” and “Identification Evidence”, or “Opinion Evid-
ence” and “Character Evidence”.
In summary, while the idea of publishing essays on aspects of
Canadian law should be encouraged, the overall quality of Studies
in Canadian Criminal Evidence is disappointing and makes it an
expensive purchase at $33.00.
Saul Schwartz *
2 7 Originally an address delivered to the Academy of Medicine at Toronto
(1970), published in The Law Society Gazette (1971), 78
28 (1970-71) 10 S.P.TJ. (XI) 66.
* Assistant Professor of Law, McGill University.
1973]’
BOOK REVIEWS
International Bibliography of Air Law, 1970-1971, by Wybo P. Heere.
Sijthoff, Leiden; Oceana Press, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 1972. Pp. xxvi, 569. ($28.50).
Upon the publication of this most comprehensive bibliography
on air law, which Dr. G. F. Fitzgerald characterizes as a labour of
love, Mr. Heere has every justification for feeling satisfied. Every
entry in it has been closely considered with the aim of reducing
time spent by the user in searching through the staggeringly volu-
minous literature on the subject. The compilation of any compre-
hensive bibliography, especially one like this, in which the ma-
terials are arranged according to an in-depth classification scheme,
is a painstaking process, requiring great patience and devotion.
Mr. Heere’s work demonstrates these qualities and deserves the
recognition of the air law community.
No bibliography of a major subject area, consisting as air law
does of a tremendous quantity of richly varied materials, can claim
to be complete. Mr. Heere’s work is no exception, as the entries
listed in the name index indicate. As well as those omissions ex-
pressly enumerated in the preface, such as space law, case law,
legislation, treaty texts and unpublished manuscripts, the work also
excludes such materials as national and international documents,
contributions of legal societies (such as the International Law Asso-
ciation and the Institut de Droit International) as embodied in their
annual reports, and materials on air law which form part of other
works not solely devoted to the subject.1 Furthermore, Heere’s
coverage of unpublished manuscripts raises queries. An unpub-
lished term paper written by this reviewer in 1963 is listed, while
a number of valuable titles, likewise available in the Law Library
of McGill University, have been omitted. This reviewer extends a
sincere invitation to Mr. Heere to visit this library before pro-
ducing the supplement to his work.
An unfortunate shortcoming of the work is its superficial
coverage of the large amount of valuable material available in
scientific journals on aviation and air transport. There are, in
these journals, not only articles on national aviation policy and
economic regulation of air transport, but also good articles on air
law per se. For example, the useful discussion of the Warsaw Con-
1 For example: McDougal, Myres S., H.D. Lasswell and I.A. Vlasic, Law
and Public Order in Space, (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1963).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. 3
vention of 19292 which appears in the November 29, 1971 issue
of the ITA Bulletin does not appear to be listed in the bibliography;
nor do recent articles by Mankiewicz 8 and Venkatramish.4
A subject bibliography may be arranged either alphabetically or
in a classified fashion, as in Mr. Heere’s work. In the latter case,
the successful fulfillment of the objectives of the work depends
on the accessibility of its analytic index, on the logic of the group-
ing of topics, and on the conceptual breakdown of the subject
matter. To take issue with the classification scheme used in the
work, its grouping of the topics, or some of the headings chosen
would be merely academic. On the whole, the work conforms well
to generally accepted modes of classification, arrangement, and
characterization. There is, however, one reservation, namely, the
chronological listing of titles under topics. Admittedly, a chrono-
logical listing facilitates search for current materials, but it also
considerably impairs ease of locating works of a specific author.
The usefulness of any analytic index to material listed in a
classified fashion depends, for the most part, on the comprehen-
siveness of coverage of relevant terms, the intelligence brought to
bear on the selection and establishment of categories of subject
headings, and the soundness of the characterization of a particular
topic as falling within these divisions. With more care and effort,
Mr. Heere could have been more successful in accomplishing this
basic function. For example, “supersonic aircraft” cannot be found
in the main alphabet; nor can the entry be found under “aircraft”.
Neither can the topics “innocent passage” or “intrusion of air-
craft” be located.
Such reservations aside, Mr. Heere’s work is a landmark con-
tribution to the progressive development of the law of the air. Its
significance and value have already been widely recognized. Improve-
ments along the lines suggested above could enhance its value. This
bibliography, even in its present form, however, deserves a place
on the shelves of research libraries wherever air transport is of
importance – which today means everywhere.
Kuo-Lee Li *
2 137 L.N.T.S., at p. 12.
3 R.H. Mankiewicz, La convention de Montrdal (1971) pour la repression
d’actes illicites dirigds contre la sdcuritd de l’aviation civile, (1971) 17 Annuaire
Frangais de Droit International 855.
4K. Venkatramish, Does the Chicago Convention Permit Joint or Inter-
national Registration of Aircraft, (1971) 11 Indian J. of Int’l. L. 435.
* Head of Public Services Department, Law Library, Faculty of Law, McGill
University.
19731
BOOK REVIEWS
Expropriation et f~dralisme au Canada, by Andr6e Lajoie. Les Presses de
l’Universit6 de Montrdal: 1972, Pp. xii 328. ($8.50).
Canadian federalism prevents land planning. If the federal
government wants to use land for a post office, and the provincial
government wants to use the same land for a school, the federal
government always wins out. If a company given powers of
expropriation by the federal government wishes to expropriate
a provincial legislative building, and the expropriation is necessary
to the exercise of one of the company’s powers, the company may
do so. When a province wants to expropriate unoccupied land held
by a federal Crown corporation, it is not entitled to do so. A province
may not nationalize the property of a federal company in the
province, or even a provincial company owned by a federal company,
unless the nationalization does not paralyse or prevent the function-
ing of the federal company. There is no such restriction on a
federal nationalization of a provincial company. No organization
in Canada establishes priorities for land use. Nor is such an
organization possible as long as the British North America Act,
as interpreted, gives priority to any land use for federal purposes
over any land use for provincial purposes.
These are the problems to which Andr6e Lajoie addresses herself
in her recently published work entitled Expropriation et f~dralisme
au Canada. The book is not a legal tome on the constitutional law
of expropriation. It is, rather, a well documented policy paper. The
author has worked in collaboration with the Province of Quebec’s
task force on expropriation, which reported in 1968. The adminis-
trative system she advocates is similar to that proposed by the
task force.
The book contains much that one would not expect to find in
a legal textbook. There is a substantial discussion of administrative
structures necessary for a satisfactory expropriation process. There
is a highly speculative presentation of the constitutional law of
expropriation in other federal countries that sits easier in a work
examining policy alternatives than it would in a book of legal
reference. The book also omits some matters one would expect
to find in a legal textbook. There is no subject index. Nor is there
a table of cases or statutes cited.
On an organizational level the work is analytically exhaustive,
posing such questions as whether there can be expropriation by
virtue of the royal prerogative, whether the power of expropriation
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. 3
is limited to immovables, or whether it is limited to goods in
the private domain. On a case exegesis level, the work is more
controversial. For instance, the author suggests, on the basis of
the Willis case,’ that any administrative structure that is established
to receive delegated powers of land planning from both federal
and provincial governments should not be incorporated. However,
the Bonanza case,2 although not a case of delegation, suggests
that an incorporated administrative board is even less open to
question than an unincorporated board.
The argument of counsel for the respondent in the Willis case,
as it appears from the judgment of Mr. Justice Rand,3 is that though
delegation of the federal government to a provincial incorporated
board is possible, delegation of the federal government to a provin-
cial unincorporated entity is not. Provincial legislative jurisdiction
over companies is limited to companies with provincial objects
However, all this limitation means is that the provinces themselves
cannot grant provincial corporations powers in respect of objects
outside of the province; the federal government can make such
a grant to a provincial corporation. Common law corporations
created by a grant of a charter or letters patent from the executive
authority of a province could receive a grant ab extra of powers
in respect of objects outside the jurisdiction of the province, where
the charter was granted before the province joined Confederation.
This power is the executive or royal prerogative, continued after
Confederation. A provincial statute might of course limit or remove
the royal prerogative
to create companies. But the provincial
legislatures are no more limited than their executives and may create
companies by statute with the same capacities that their executives
can or could have created. Since, however, an unincorporated
entity created by a province does not have its source in the
prerogative, it can have a capacity, according to counsel for the
respondent in the Willis case, only in relation to local law. This
argument, which the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Rinfret, found
“ingenious” was rejected by the Supreme Court. Whether the
Board was considered as an entity or as the individuals who
composed it, it could receive powers from outside.
Ms. Lajoie’s conclusion, that provincial administrative structures
with delegated federal power, when incorporated, are legally more
1 P.E.L Potato Bd. v. H.B. Willis Inc., (1952) 4 D.L.R. 146 (S.C.C.).
2 Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King, [1916] 1 A.C. 566 (P.C.).
3P.E.L Potato Bd. v. H.B. Willis Inc., (1952) 4 D.L.R. 146, at p. 166.
4 Section 92(11), British North America Act, 1867.
.19731
BOOK REVIEWS
questionable than such structures, when unincorporated, prompts,
in part, one of the two major differences in policy recommendations
she has with the Quebec Task Force on Expropriation with which
she worked. The Task Force recommends that its land planning
structure be an office or organization separate from any government
ministry and gives the structure powers, viz., the power to acquire
and dispose of property, which would require the structure to be
incorporated if it were to be distinct from the executive. Ms. Lajoie,
on the other hand, recommends that the policy planning part of
any land planning structure be a section of a government ministry,
responsible directly to the executive. Within the present federal
system, there would have to be eleven such policy planning groups,
one under the direction of a federal cabinet minister, and one
for each of the provinces under the direction of a provincial
cabinet minister. Secondly,
there should be an administrative
structure for each province, independent of political direction,
to which both the federal government and the province would
delegate. The structure would manage expropriation operations,
but would not manage all land planning operations. A land planning
management structure would require a legal personality in order
to be independent from the executive and cabinet direction because
it would have to buy, sell and transfer property. If Ms. Lajoie
did not have the reluctance about incorporation she does show,
she would probably have continued to recommend that policy
planning be separate from administration and be under ministerial
direction, but might well have supported a single administrative
structure for all of land planning, rather than a separate one for
expropriation management.
The main constitutional changes that the author recommends
to meet the problems she has posed are that the favoured position
of federal government property and of federal companies should be
abolished, and that, when there is a conflict between expropriation
for federal purposes and expropriation for provincial purposes,
rather than the federal expropriation always prevailing, the criterion
of public interest should be used to resolve the conflict. The criterion
of public interest would be applied by an expropriation administra-
tion from which there could be an appeal to a superior court having
jurisdiction over both the administration as such and a proposed
tribunal dealing at first
those
expropriated.
the rights of
instance with
The recommendation that the administrative tribunal rather
than the expropriation superior court should be, at first instance,
responsible for the control of the administration is the author’s
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 19, No. 3
second main divergence from the Task Force recommendations.
The Task Force recommended that its proposed administrative
tribunal be responsible, at first instance, for deciding questions
of both the rights of those expropriated and control of the
administration. The disadvantage Ms. Lajoie sees in that proposal
is that it would make the tribunal a superior court and give the
Governor General of Canada power, by virtue of section 96 of the
B.N.A. Act, to appoint its judges. However, whether it is worthwhile
going through organizational contortions to relocate the appoint-
ment power is questionable, since, at least in theory, the same man,
the best man available, would be appointed to fill any vacancy
that occurred, no matter who was appointing.
According to the author, even the implementation of the changes
she recommends still leaves a major obstacle to rational land
planning in Canada, i.e., the division of powers between the federal
government and the provinces. The Coughlin case, which the
author refers to as allowing the incorporation of federal laws in
provincial laws or the incorporation of provincial laws in federal
laws, and the inter-jurisdictional delegation, from the law-making
body to an administrative body, of the administration of these
incorporated laws, allows more than that. It supports the adoption
by one jurisdiction of another jurisdiction’s laws as they may
exist from time to time and the delegation of the administration
of these changing laws to an organ established by the second
jurisdiction. As well as a single land planning administrative unit
for Quebec established, say, by the province, there could be a
single land planning policy unit, established by the province,
recommending changes in law and regulations. A federal statute
saying that expropriations within federal jurisdiction would be
administered by the Quebec unit according to Quebec law as
it exists from time to time would appear to overcome the division
of powers obstacles.
If, contrary to the previous remarks, the Canadian form of
federalism is an insuperable obstacle to the establishment of a single
land planning unit for a province, it nonetheless need not be
condemned. When a major societal danger is the manipulation
by a technocratic bureaucracy of the public for the ends of the
establishment, our anachronistic federalism, which may prevent
this manipulation and control being
imposed with complete
efficiency, can be welcomed rather than regretted.
David Matas *
5 Coughlin v. Ont. Highway Transport Bd., (1968) 68 D.L.R. (2d) 384.
* B.A. (Man.), M.A. (Princeton), B.A., B.C.L. (Oxon.).
