[Vol. 17
Book Reviews
The use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, by ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS
and AJ. THOMAS JR., 1970, Southern Methodist University Press. Pp. 332, 10.00
(Hardbound).
The concept “Law of War” is one which to many is by itself
a contradiction in terms. War symbolizes the “beast” in man, a
“beast” which knows no law and no limits. Modern experience
shows that, in particular, technical limits on the savagery of war
are of little effect. Humanitarian warfare, a common ideal in the
innocent days before 1914, brings smiles even to the least sophis-
ticated of those who have the benefit of knowing subsequent history.
Nonetheless, Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. S. Thomas Jr. set
out to demonstrate that at least in the field of chemical and biolog-
ical weapons legal limits do exist, but that they are pitifully inad-
equate. With a somewhat gruesome detachment, perhaps with some
dead-pan humour, they analyse their subject in considerable detail.
They succeed in making out something of a case at least for the
inadequacy and in writing an interesting, readable book.
The work is divided into two parts. The first deals with the
international law termed “conventional” –
basically treaty law.
Custom is a very uncertain limitation, since at least two major
powers, Russia and Germany discount it almost completely. On
the other hand the making and the violating of treaties on this
subject has become an established and treasured ritual in the
international community.
In 1899 the Hague Gas Declaration outlawed the “use of projec-
ticles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
deleterious gases.” Narrow interpretation of the underlined words
permitted the signatories to indulge in the mass gas-warfare of
World War I. Following that war the word “gas” became so horrible
to the general public, that a more complete “protocol” was drawn
up in Geneva in 1925, and later signed by most countries (though
often with reservations). The authors point to the fact that gas was
not used in World War II, save possibly by Japan (a non-signatory)
as proof that the protocol was to some degree observed.
However, another interpretation could be put on the belligerents’
continence. In the book we find, for example, that the very length
of the eastern front made the use of gas of strategically dubious
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
advantage. In addition, since all countries had stockpiled gas, the
fear of mass retaliation created a situation comparable to today’s
atomic balance of terror. Instead of giving Hitler passing marks
for observing international rules, which the authors do, I would
rather propose that gas was not used because no one thought it
advantageous to use it.
This conclusion is strengthened by the fact (shown by the
authors) that after World War II, “illegal” “chemical and biological
weapons were frequently resorted to. The Yemeni civil war, and
the U.S. interventions in Korea and Viet-Nam are the examples
cited. It is true that the U.S. never ratified the Geneva Protocol
and thus technically was not bound by it. Yet this was not the
American explanation. The U.S. authorities resorted, instead, to
rather ingenious casuistry distinguishing their weapons from the
forbidden ones. All in all, the American position resembled in every
detail the World War I rationalization of -the Hague agreement.
The precarious nature of the international law on this question
is made altogether obvious in the entire second part of the book.
This part deals with international law beyond treaties, a “common”
law which binds all states at all times. This law includes formal
“custom” or “usage” which is of considerable importance as the
source of international law principles, but of little practical effect
since some major powers downplay it, and another concept called
“general” principles of law recognized by civilized nations.” Again
certain major powers (especially the U.S.S.R.) claim this element
is of no great significance. It seems to be, generally, a sort of dialec-
tic law, embracing two opposing principles, the principle of military
necessity and that of humanity.
It goes without saying that the exigencies of military necessity
(permitting states to do whatever they must to win) takes priority
over the not too tender “humanity” of war. Everyone knows war is
inhumane. The authors show that international law forbids it to
be unduly inhumane. In particular, it limits the use of chemical
and bacteriological weapons (subject to “military necessity” and
treaty).
It follows if we accept this, that the battle of Ypres was more
inhumane than the bombing raids of World War II, and that the
ancient use of poisoned arrows was a violation of law, in contrast
to the modern wars usually fought according to the “rules of the
game.” Surely this cannot be taken seriously!
The authors are very frank about the relative ineffectiveness
of the “rules of chivalry.” They show the tortured reasoning of
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 17
state leaders that proves that poison may not be poison, that
chemicals may not be chemicals, and that killing may sometimes be
regarded as a kind deed. They do show that some form of law
occasionally invoked exists. What they fail to prove is that the law
is obeyed as well as invoked. It seems to me that, to date, the law’s
chief use is whipping up public indignation about what the other
side has done.
The fault I would venture to say is not with any treaty, or any
state but with the entire concept of war and with that most widely
accepted of old rules of international law, the principle of national
sovereignty. As long as the theory persists that states may go to
war if they choose, and that, save where they bind themselves, they
are the absolute arbiters of their decisions, and of what “military
necessity” is, we shall have the painful necessity of forming “hu-
mane” rules of slaughter and the even more painful spectacle of
these rules being disobeyed.
To sum up, the authors state and analyse the “rules” of inter-
national law regarding chemical and biological warfare with great
clarity and elegance. It is difficult not to sympathize with their
concluding cry for more effective controls (e.g. as to manufacture).
However, one may wonder (along with the U.S. Senate when it
refuses to ratify the Geneva Protocol) why one form of killing
is more reprehensible than another. Chemicals warfare is part of
a larger machine of murder. It is, in my view, a general outlawing
of “war” that we must strive for. The experience of the Kellogg-
Briand pact demonstrates that this is only possible in the long run
if we throw out the tired old notion of national sovereignty, and
the accompanying paraphenalia of “self-determination,” “patrio-
tism,” and “independence,” which today make up the verbal armory
of the international lawyer, and even more, of the demagogic
politician.
Julius GREY *
*Member of the senior Editorial Board of the McGill Law Journal.
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
East European Rules on the Validity of International Commercial Arbitration
Agreements by Ludwig Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, 1971, Manchester University
Press. Pp. 332, $11.00.
Me Ludwig Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski (L.R.Z.Kos) du Barreau
de Montrdal, professeur h l’Universit6 d’Ottawa, vient de publier,
par les soins du Manchester University Press, une 6tude de 332
pages qui a pour titre: cEast European Rules on the Validity of
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements)>.
L’oeuvre est d’un int6r6t consid6rable, car l’arbitrage conven-
tionnel pr6side h toutes les relations commerciales entre, d’une
part, les citoyens et les gouvernements de l’Ouest, et, d’autre part,
les citoyens et les Etats de l’Est.
Ces relations s’exercent, en effet, par l’entremise de l’arbitrage
conventionnel.
M6me si une planification 6tatique de l’6conomie constitue un
d6nominateur commun de 1’U.R.S.S., de l’Albanie, le d’Allemagne
de l’Est, de la Bulgarie, de la Hongrie, de la Pologne, de Ia Rou-
manie, de la Tch6coslovaquie et de la Yougoslavie, il reste que
ces Etats poss~dent des l6gislations particuli~res en la mati~re et
r~glementent par des proc6dures appropri6es la r6daction des en-
tentes arbitrales.
Retracer leurs lois et leurs r~glements et consigner leur inter-
pr6tation constante 6taient 6. la fois une t5.che laborieuse et telle-
ment p6rilleuse qu’elle semble avoir d6courag6 toute initiative de
d6couverte et de synth~se.
Juriste, sp6cialiste en droit international et, ce qui ne nuit
pas ht rentreprise, polyglotte, l’auteur a relev6 le d6fi et d’une main
sfire de ses manoeuvres, il dirige en toute s6curit6 ses lecteurs dans
un labyrinthe oi, livr6s at eux-m6mes, ils risquaient de se perdre.
La connaissance des trait6s internationaux et des lois particu-
li~res des pays de l’Est et des r6glementations qu’ils imposent est
indispensable ht la validit6 des conventions d’arbitrage et ht leur
homologation par des organismes permanents ou ad hoc, institu6s
h cet effet.
Le premier chapitre est consacr6 h la capacit6 des parties de
signer un compromis d’arbitrage, une convention arbitrale ou une
clause compromissoire. La convention internationale sur l’arbitrage
commercial de 1961 la pr6suppose.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 17
L’auteur explore en tout premier lieu la ldgislation de I’U.R.S.S.
Une revue mensuelle, publide en frangais, en anglais et en allemand,
dresse la liste des organismes accr6dit6s
. signer des ententes
entre commergants intdrieurs et ext6rieurs. Le Ministre du com-
merce ext6rieur dirige ces organismes dans leurs n6gociations. Les
soci~t6s qui font commerce avec l’6tranger sont soumises aux dis-
positions rigoureuses de leur charte et au contr6le de l’Etat.
L’auteur rappelle la doctrine au sujet de la personne morale,
i.e. de la soci6t6 distincte de ses membres, quant h sa capacit6 de
contracter. Elle peut s’obliger sur ses biens et subir l’exdcution
des jugements. Ndanmoins, ses obligations n’engagent pas la res-
ponsabilit6 de l’Etat. Mais, elle n’6chappe pas h la juridiction des
cours de justice 6trang6res.
Les contrats conclus avec l’Etat central ou avec l’une de ses
r6publiques sont 6tudi6s h fond par l’auteur.
La capacit6 des citoyens sovi6tiques, m6me domicilids h l’6tran-
ger, est rdgie par la loi de I’Etat sovidtique; celle du citoyen 6tranger
h sa loi nationale.
La Bulgarie subordonne la capacit6 de ses citoyens h sa propre
loi. Celle des personnes morales h la loi du si6ge social; des soci6tds
h la loi otL s’exerce la g6rance de l’entreprise.
La Tchdcoslovaquie n’impose aucune restriction t la capacit6
des personnes physiques ou morales dans le commerce international.
La capacit6 d6pend de la citoyennet6 du sujet.
En Hongrie, la lex patriae d6termine la capacit6.
I1 en est ainsi de la Pologne. Une Cour d’arbitrage, institude
au sein de la Chambre de commerce ext6rieur, tranche les con-
flits de juridiction.
L’Allemagne de l’Est, la Roumanie et l’Albanie appliquent aussi
la lex patriae; la Yougoslavie, la loi du status personnel, aux per-
sonnes physiques; Ia loi du siege social aux personnes morales.
Le chapitre deuxi~me est consacr6 aux ententes commerciales
par l’arbitrage et, plus pr6cis6ment, aux protocoles ou formules
de contrats d’arbitrage commercial, h la suite de la Convention
internationale de Gen~ve du 21 avril 1961, telle qu’appliqude dans
les neuf pays de l’Est.
La mati~re d’arbitrage, en fonction des conventions
interna-
tionales, dont celle de New York de 1958, fait l’objet du troisi~me
chapitre.
Le quatri~me chapitre porte sur la constitution des Conseils
d’arbitrage permanents ou ad hoc dans les pays de l’Europe de 1’Est.
No. 4]
BOOK REVIEWS
En Pologne, en Tchdcoslovaquie et en Yougoslavie existent des
Cours d’arbitrage au sein des Chambres de Commerce extdrieur.
Le chapitre cinquieme resume les conclusions gdndrales au sujet
de la capacit6 juridique et des conflits de juridiction.
Des appendices fortement annot6s reproduisent les textes des
d~crets (celui de l’Albanie est publi6 en frangais), des lois et des
r~glements des Conseils d’arbitrage et ils citent les textes de toutes
les conventions internationales, celles de Gen~ve (1923, 1927, 1961),
de New York (1958), de la Banque Internationale (1965) et de la
Commission 6conomique pour l’Europe des Nations Unies (1966).
La bibliographie est tr6s riche et couvre six pages.
Une table des mati~res rdf~re aux sentences arbitrales de six
pays de l’Est.
L’index alphabdtique est complet et bien ordonn6.
En rdsum6, il s’agit d’une oeuvre qui apporte hi la science juri-
dique internationale une contribution de toute premiere valeur qui
lui manquait.
Philippe FERLAND *
* Juge h la Cour provinciale de Montrdal et ex-professeur h l’Universit de
Montrdal et t l’Universit du Quebec et secr~taire de l’Institut Canadien Inter-
Amricain de Recherche.
