BOOK REVIEWS
COMPTES RENDUS
Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas [:] Essays on the Constitutional History,
Public Law and Federal System of Canada. Par W. R. Lederman. Toronto: Butterworths,
1981. Pp. xiii, 442.
Le partage des pouvoirs. Par G~rald A. Beaudoin. Ottawa: editions de
tawa, 1980. Pp. xix, 432.
Introduction.
‘Universit d’Ot-
Pour 6viter toute m~prise, il faut le dire et le souligner ds le depart: les
commentaires suivants ne sont pas d’unjuriste ou d’un constitutionnaliste
analysant deux ouvrages de collgues r~put~s dans sa propre discipline
professionnelle. N’6tant ni l’un ni l’autre, mes propos seront ceux d’un
“consommateur” de cette science plut6t que ceux d’un “producteur” ou
d’un “fabricant” de la “science constitutionnelle”; au surplus, ceux d’un
“consommateur” inscrit dans un contexte bien precis, celui du Parlement,
et lui-mame engag6 dans le d~bat constitutionnel, notamment au cours de la
phase 1980-82 de ce d~bat.
Ainsi s’explique que j’aie finalement renonc6 A r’analyse globale des
deux ouvrages qui m’6taient effectivement demand~e. J’aborderai leur
6tude d’un point de vue plus 6troitement circonscrit etje m’en tiendrai aux
passages ou chapitres off les auteurs 6voquent des questions ou abordent
des themes susceptibles, soit d’6clairer le d~bat constitutionnel en cours au
moment de leur parution, soit d’interpr~ter les vnements intervenus
depuis lors ou ceux qui pourraient se produire dans l’avenir imm~diatement
pr~visible.
Ainsi s’explique 6galement quej’aie . ce point tard6 A terminer ce texte
cens~ment destin6 A 8tre une simple recension. L’orientation quej’entendais
lui donner exigeait que soit connue la r6ponse A certaines questions qui sont
demeur~es en suspens jusqu’au seuil de la pr~sente annie.
Dans cette perspective manifestement conjoncturelle, mes commen-
taires s’6chelonneront sous les rubriques suivantes:
I.
Les questions constitutionnelles pos~es par le projet du 2 octobre
1980.
La r~ponse des deux auteurs a ces questions;
II.
III. La r~ponse de la Cour supreme aux questions des provinces;
IV.
V.
Les deux auteurs et le jugement de la Cour supreme;
La conference de novembre 1981 et les compromis qu’elle a engen-
dr~s;
McGILL LA WJOURNAL
(Vol. 27
VI. Que nous r6servent les lendemains du rapatriement?
Mais avant d’aborder ces questions,je me dois de dire aux deux auteurs, ne
serait-ce que bri~vement, tout l’int6r&t qu’on trouvera A la lecture de leur
ouvrage et tout le profit qu’on en tirera.
Le professeur Beaudoin rindique lui-m~me dans son avant-propos,’
son ouvrage n’a pas la pr6tention d’8tre un trait6 de droit constitutionnel.
Son but est plus modeste. Cela n’est vrai, cependant, qu’en un sens: certes
l’ouvrage ne couvre pas tout le champ du droit constitutionnel et se limite A
‘6tude du partage des pouvoirs au Canada; mais, outre le fait que ce
domaine constitue l’un des principaux chapitres de notre droit constitu-
tionnel, sinon le principal chapitre, la fagon dont l’auteur l’explore et
l’analyse conf~re A son ouvrage l’ampleur et la qualit6 d’un v6ritable trait6.
Un trait6 qui vient combler une lacune consid6rable aussi bien pour les
non-juristes francophones et les 6tudiants en droit ou en sciences politiques
qui disposaient jusqu’ici de relativement peu d’ouvrages en frangais sur le
sujet, que pour les professeurs, praticiens ou magistrats de ]a science
juridique qu’il aidera “A se retrouver plus facilement dans le labyrinthe des
arr~ts et renvois sur le partage des comptences au Canada.” 2 Mais il y a
plus que cette valeur purement utilitaire dans l’ouvrage du professeur
Beaudoin. D’une part, en effet, il ordonne et inscrit les nombreux mat6-
riaux dont il devait tenir compte dans une probl6matique coh6rente pour le
present; d’autre part, il en d~gage des orientations qui ouvrent pour ‘avenir
la voie aux modifications et aux transformations susceptibles d’adapter le
partage des pouvoirs dans la f6d6ration canadienne aux n~cessit6s des
temps nouveaux.
D’une certaine fagon, l’ouvrage du professeur Lederman engage le
lecteur dans une voie similaire. Mais il le fait d’une toute autre mani~re,
celle d’une sorte d’approfondissement des r6flexions amorc6es par le profes-
seur Beaudoin. A partir de themes en apparence particuliers, mais analys6s
avec une subtilit6 que ne manque pas de souligner le professeur Corry dans
la pr6face de l’ouvrage, le professeur Lederman nous confronte A des
r6flexions qui encouragent le d6passement ainsi que ]a consid6ration des
principes et des valeurs fondamentales dont on vit quotidiennement, mais
dont on n’est pas n6cessairement encore conscient.
Si diff6rents qu’ils soient par leur facture et par leur style et sans doute A
cause de leurs diff6rences m~mes, les deux ouvrages se compl~tent l’un et
l’autre. Telle est du moins l’impression qui s’est d6gag6e de leur 6tude
simultan~e et de leur confrontation.
I Voir G. Beaudoin, Le Partage des pouvoirs (1980), A la p. ix.
2Ibid.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
I. Les questions constitutionnelles pos6es par le projet
du 2 octobre 1980
I1 n’est point besoin ici de raconter tous les 6vnements qui ont entour6
le r6f6rendum de mai 1980, notamment, ‘engagement solennel pris par le
Premier ministre Trudeau aupr~s de ses compatriotes qu6b6cois de renou-
veler le f6d6ralisme canadien s’ils optaient pour le Non. Rappelons seule-
ment que, d6s le lendemain de ce r6f6rendum, M. Trudeau et ses acolytes se
sont affair6s A engager rapidement un processus destin6 pr6sum6ment A
remplir la promesse faite au peuple qu6b6cois: ds la fin de mai, tourn6e
6clair des provinces par le Ministre de la justice; puis conf6rence des
premiers ministres en juin pour 6tablir ‘ordre du jour des pourparlers A
venir; nombreuses conf6rences des ministres responsables du dossier
durant 1’6t6; et finalement, en septembre, nouvelle conf6rence des premiers
ministres destin6e A mettre au point un projet acceptable pour les deux
ordres de gouvernement.
Deux bilans contradictoires ont 6t6 tir6s au terme de cette conf6rence
au sommet: pour le pr6sident de la conf6rence des premiers ministres des
provinces, des progr~s consid6rables avaient 6t6 accomplis qui devraient
6tre parachev6s A une conf6rence ult6rieure enjanvier 1981; pour le Premier
ministre du Canada, constat d’6chec total et d’impasse, A partir de quoi,
apr~s consultation de son cabinet et de son caucus, il aviserait quant aux
actions A entreprendre par la suite. La suite, ce fut le projet annonc6
spectaculairement le 2 octobre, et pr6sent6 le 6 octobre A un Parlement
convoqu6 A cet effet une semaine plus t6t que pr6vu.
Pour ceux qui ont suivi le d6bat constitutionnel depuis une quinzaine
d’ann6es et observ6 les comportements du Premier ministre Trudeau au
cours de cette p6riode, sa proposition que le Parlement procde unilat6ra-
lement n’6tait pas, A vrai dire, surprenante. A diverses reprises, il avait
lui-m~me 6voqu6 de fagon plus ou moins voil6e cette possibilit6, notam-
ment au cours des pourparlers de 1975-76; A l’poque, pour le Premier
ministre Bourassa tout au moins, la menace et le danger d’un rapatriement
unilat6ral 6taient A ce point r6els qu’il en fit l’un des deux motifs majeurs de
rN1ection pr6matur6e de novembre 1976, afin de solliciter du peuple qu6b6-
cois un mandat clair dans les n6gociations pr6vues avec le f6d6ral A la suite
du consensus intervenu entre les provinces sur plusieurs modifications
importantes A la pr6sente constitution.
Mais ce n’est pas seulement le caract~re unilat6ral de l’action propos6e
au Parlement qui a 6tonn6 les observateurs, c’est plut6t la nature et
r’ampleur des changements associ6s au rapatriement ainsi effectu6 unilat6-
ralement. Que le projet du 2 octobre 1980 aie eu un caract6re sans pr6c6-
dent, le Premier ministre lui-meme en 6tait parfaitement conscient. L’ar-
gument des 54 ans d’6chec dont il se servait abondamment pour justifier la
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(Vol. 27
procedure propos6e r6v6lait et illustrait que le projet 6tait en rupture avec ]a
tradition.
Point n’est besoin d’entrer ici dans les d6tails du projet. Rappelons
simplement qu’il ne proposait pas uniquement de rompre le dernier “lien
colonial” qui rattachait encore le Canada au Royaume-Uni par la simple
abrogation des articles pertinents du Statute of Westminster.3 11 6tait
manifeste que le projet utilisait le lien colonial encore existant pour mettre
en place une proc6dure permanente d’amendement constitutionnel qui
donnait au Parlement un pouvoir extraordinaire de renverser via un r6f6-
rendum l’opposition des provinces A un amendement quelconque relative-
ment au partage des pouvoirs: le Premier ministre a souvent dit qu’il
s’agissait l6 d’un 616ment majeur de son projet dont il s’est fait lui-meme le
th6oricien et A propos duquel il a employ6 l’expression dead-lock breaking
mechanism. 116tait manifeste que le projet inscrivait, dans l’op6ration du
rapatriement ainsi conqu, des changements majeurs de substance dans les
comp6tences 16gislatives des deux ordres de gouvernement, le plus signifi-
catif de ces changements ayant pour objet une charte constitutionnelle des
droits.
Telle 6tait donc la signification du projet Trudeau de ‘automne 1980. 11
posait du point de vue constitutionnel, deux questions fondamentales:
1. D’une part, le Parlement canadien pouvait-il 16gitimement proc6der
unilat6ralement A ‘adoption de la r6solution soumise?
2 D’autre part, le Parlement du Royaume-Uni devait-il 16gif6rer automa-
tiquement dans le sens indiqu6 par la r6solution du Parlement canadien?
II. La r~ponse des deux auteurs i ces questions 4
Compte tenu de la date/h laquelle les deux auteurs ont vraisemblable-
ment termin6 la r6daction de leur ouvrage, on comprend qu’ils n’aient pas
eu le loisir d’61aborer longuement sur ]a “constitutionnalit” du projet du 2
octobre. L’un et ‘autre avaient, cependant, expos6 bien auparavant les
jalons doctrinaux susceptibles de fonder une opinion de leur part sur le
sujet. Le professeur Lederman, au chapitre 28 de son livre, se prononce sur
le projet. i1 en est de m~me du professeur Beaudoin qui consacre ]a majeure
partie du chapitre 16 de son ouvrage Ai la question de l’amendement
3 The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo.V, c. 4 (U.K.), (R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No 26).
4 Dans cette partie, on s’en tiendra, il va de soi, A ]a version d’octobre 1980 du projet, la
r6daction finale des deux ouvrages consid6r6s ayant manifestement 6t6 termin6e bien avant
que le projet ait 6t6 modifiM par divers amendements adopt6s par le Parlement au printemps
de 1981. D’ailleurs, ces amendements n’en ont pas chang6 ]a substance “constitutionnelle”
comme le souligne la Cour supreme dans le verdict m6me qu’elle a rendu.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
constitutionnel. C’est dans le cadre de cette analyse qu’il exprime son
opinion sur le sujet qui nous intfresse.
A. Le Sinat et la Chambre des communes pouvaient-ils engager le
processus de rapatriement sur la base du projet soumis sans le consente-
ment des provinces?
La rfponse du professeur Lederman est catfgorique:
The Trudeau Government now proposes two types of basic constitutional change –
the
special entrenchment of certain specified human rights and freedoms, and also new
methods for amending the basic elements of our constitution in Canada. In my opinion,
both changes directly affect federal-provincial relationships and so require not only the
approval of the Parliament of Canada but as well the agreement of all the Provincial
Governments.5
Et il fonde cette opinion sur les motifs suivants:
I can now spell out the reasons why I consider these proposed changes to be contrary to
constitutional law. The method of instituting them should comply with the fourth
Favreau principle requiring unanimous consent of the Provinces as well as of the
Parliament of Canada. To get new methods of amendment you have to employ the old
method of amendment one last time. To my mind, the rule of law itself requires this
element of continuity. Moreover, the present requirement for unanimity has been
supported by high authority. The fourth Favreau White Paper principle was quoted
with approval by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Senate Reference Case, Decem-
ber 21, 1979, though this case did not concern directly the situation that confronts us
now, involving as it does the British Parliament as well as th- Canadian Parliament.
So, whether I am right or wrong, there are good grounds for considering the proposed
Constitution Act, 1980 to be unconstitutional. I suspect that at some point the issue will
have to go to court, because such uncertainty has to be cleared up and this is the only way
to do it.6
Pour le professeur Beaudoin, la nfcessit6 du recours aux tribunaux
s’imposait 6galement. Apr6s avoir rappel6 qu’il y a plus d’une 6cole de
pensfe sur la question du rapatriement unilat6ral et r6sum6 la th6se des
deux principales d’entre elles, il conclut effectivement qu.”[i]l reviendra aux
Cours A se prononcer dans ce dfbat fondamental.” 7 Mais il ajoute
immfdiatement:
Dans nos Essais sur la Constitution nous avons 6crit qu’en droit strict le rapatriement
sans
‘accord unanime des provinces 6tait possible. I1 y a plus d’une forme de
rapatriement.8
5 W. Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas [:] Essays on the Consti-
tutional History Public Law and Federal System of Canada (1981), A la p. 441 [nos
italiques].
6 Ibid., A la p. 442 [nos italiques].
7 Beaudoin, supra, note 1, A la p. 357.
8 Ibid. [nos italiques].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
Dans les Essais en question, je relive les passages suivants oil cette
opinion se serait exprimre, les seuls, sauf erreur, off elle l’aurait 6t6.
En droit strict, Ottawa pourrait proc~der au rapatriement unilatrral meme si de nom-
breux prrc~dents et une certaine convention ou pratique constitutionnelle vont A
‘encontre. 9
II n’est pas certain que les Chambres 16gislatives frdrrales voteraient une Adresse si le
Quebec s’y opposait fermement. Un rapatriement unilatrral A ce stade-ci apparait mal
indiqu6.
La demande A Londres doit-elle 6tre pr~c~d6e du consentement unanime des provinces?
En droit strict, ce consentement n’est pas obligatoire. Les auteurs semblent s’accorder
surce point tandis que lajurisprudence est muette, les cours n’ayant pas 6t6 saisies de la
question. Mais, bien sir, la formule d’amendement 6tant une des pieces maitresses de ]a
Constitution, on n’imagine gu~re qu’une seule partie puisse en dicter le contenu. Ce
serait aller carr~ment A rencontre de l’esprit mime du ffdrralisme sur les bases duquel on
voudrait bdtir un nouveau pays. Absolument rien ne laisse croire qu’ii pourrait m8me en
8tre question. Si pareille menace a dejA pu exister (ce qui A mon avis est fort discutable),
il ne saurait plus en tre question. Quand M. St-Laurent en 1949 proc~da unilat6rale-
ment A un mini-rapatriement, il prit soin d’excepter les articles 91 A 95, 133,20 et 50 qui
sont tr~s importants et d~clara que si jamais on mettait au point une formule grnrrale
d’amendement, il consentirait A remettre en question l’amendement de 1949. 9a
Pour le professeur Beaudoin, le projet de resolution tel que propos6
aurait-il &6, en droit strict, constitutionnel, malgr6 l’opposition d’une majo-
rit6 de provinces? Nous avons soulign6 le mot unanime dans le deuxi~me des
textes cites. L’emploi de ce terme signifie-t-il qu’en droit strict l’unanimit6
des provinces n’est pas requise, mais que l’accord d’une majorit6 d’entre elles
le serait? Sauferreur, il n’y a pas de rrponse A cette question cruciale dans les
deux ouvrages du professeur Beaudoin.
Sur ce point sprcifique du degr6 de consentement requis de ]a part des
provinces, le professeur Lederman se prononce sans 6quivoque comme on
l’a vu dans les passages cites. A son avis, la r~gle de l’unanimit6 au Canada
fait partie intrgrante de notre “loi constitutionnelle” prrsentement en
vigueur: “[W]e are under the rule of unanimity now in this respect by virtue
of the existing request and consent rules.” 0 Faute de cet accord unanime, le
projet aurait 6t6 “unconstitutional… and by ‘unconstitutional’ I mean
contrary to our present constitutional law.””
B. Advenant que le projet suive au Canada le cours trac6 par le
gouvernement, le Parlement de Westminster aurait-il l’obligation de
l’entdrinerpurement et simplement?
9Voir G. Beaudoin, Essais sur la Constitution (1979), A lap. 25 [nos italiques].
9a Ibid., A la p. 442 [nos italiques].
10 Lederman, supra, note 5, A la p. 85.
” Ibid., A lap. 438.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
Sur ce point, la position du professeur Beaudoin ne semble pas particu-
liRrement ferme, au moins dans le Partage des pouvoirs:
Le parlement londonien sur le plan de l’amendement de l’Acte de 1867 a toujours pleins
pouvoirs. En pratique le Parlement du Royaume-Uni acckde A une demande f~d&ale.
Une convention constitutionnelle rinvite A agir.
[Mais] [c]eci ne veut pas dire qu’il a toujours agi de faqon automatique. 12
Et il conclut de nouveau que la Cour aura A se prononcer 1-dessus.
Quant au professeur Lederman dans le chapitre 5 de son ouvrage oil il
traite du Process of Constitutional Amendmentfor Canada et qui a d’abord
6t6 publi en 1966-67 pr~cis6ment dans le McGill Law Journal, il s’exprime
de la fagon suivante:
With all due respect to both groups of opponents of the Fulton-Favreau Formula, it
does seem that some of them must be harbouring the hope that there might be
circumstances in which they could persuade the British Government and Parliament to
amend the Constitution of Canada respecting the distribution of legislative powers in
disregard of the convention requiring unanimous consent of the provinces before the
Canadian Parliament requests such an amendment. I do not think the present conven-
tion permits the British Government and British Parliament to override any provincial
dissent in this type of constitutional matter. In the face of any provincial dissent, I think
the present convention requires that the British Government and Parliament do
nothing, simply regarding the request from the Canadian Parliament in these circum-
stances as improper, that is as unconstitutional or illegal. It would be intolerable
reversion to colonial status to suggest that the British Government or Parliament could
be or should be involved in any substantial way in decision-making as to whether or not
to modify the federal distribution of legislative powers in Canada. If they were asked to
override provincial dissents in this type of matter, they would be substantially
involved. 3
En d’autres termes, il y a une sorte de concordance directe ou de
complmentarit6 entre ce qui doit se faire au Canada et ce qui doit se faire A
Londres. Sans doute Westminster doit-il, par convention, agir selon ce qui
lui est propos6 par le Parlement canadien, mais cela suppose que le Parle-
ment canadien lui-meme a procrd6 dans le respect de la convention en
vigueur au Canada meme.
Tout compte fait, sur les deux questions fondamentales soulevres par la
d6marche unilat~rale du Parlement canadien que proposait . l’6poque le
gouvernement frdrral, Messieurs Beaudoin et Lederman apportaient en
octobre 1980, des rrponses pour le moins discordantes, sinon diam6trale-
ment opposres. Mais l’un et l’autre s’accordaient sur un point: ils reconnais-
saient tous deux qu’il appartenait aux tribunaux de trancher le d6bat.
12 Beaudoin, supra, note 1, aux pp. 355-6.
13 Lederman, supra, note 5, A Ia p. 86 [nos italiques].
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
Tel n’6tait pas le point de vue du gouvernement f6d6ral A la meme date: il
en avait la conviction, sa d6marche 6tait 16gale; au surplus, il y avait assez
longtemps (54 ans) que le problme du rapatriement habitait les consciences
canadiennes (comme si tous les canadiens n’en dormaient plus depuis 1927);
il fallait donc prockder sans d61ai et ainsi de suite.
Dispensons-nous de raconter ici en d6tail les phases A travers lesquelles
on aura fait passer la “conscience collective” pour en arriver finalement au
printemps de 1981:
–
Le d6bat aux Communes et au S6nat pour r6f6rer A un Comit6 mixte des
deux chambres le projet de r6solution, d6bat qui s’est termin6 par l’applica-
tion du r~glement de cl6ture;
–
Les travaux du Comit6 mixte dont le rapport a 6t6 finalement soumis le
13 f6vrier 1981, travaux jalonn6s de nombreuses discussions de proc6dure,
notamment au sujet de la t616diffusion des s6ances, de l’invitation A divers
groupes A pr6senter leurs vues sur le projet devant le Comit6, etc.;
–
La publication en janvier 1981 par le Foreign Affairs Committee de ]a
Chambre des communes britannique d’un rapport intitul6: British North
America Acts: The role of the Parliament; la th6se soutenue dans ce rapport
correspondait sensiblement i celle du professeur Lederman dont nous avons
fait 6tat; pour la r6futer, le Ministre de lajustice du Canada devait publier en
mars, une brochure intitul6e: Le r6le du Royaume- Uni dans la Constitution
canadienne, ce qui a amen6 le Foreign Affairs Committee A rectifier dans un
second rapport certaines interpr6tations faites par le Ministre de lajustice du
rapport initial;
–
Le d6bat aux Communes et au S6nat sur le rapport du Comit6 et la
pr6sentation d’une nouvelle version du projet de r6solution comportant un
certain nombre d’amendements au projet initial;
–
Le recours de trois provinces A leurs cours d’appel respectives pour
soumettre certaines questions relatives a ]a constitutionnalit6 du projet de
r6solution, et la r6f6rence A la Cour supreme des d6cisions rendues par les
trois cours d’appel;
–
L’accord sign6 le 16 avril par huit provinces sur un projet de rapatriement
comportant exclusivement le rapatriement proprement dit et une formule
g6n6rale d’amendement.
Tous ces vnements et tous ces facteurs ont certainement jou6 un r6le
pour amener, en fin de compte, le Premier ministre Trudeau A “capituler” et A
consentir A ce que le Parlement suspende son vote final sur la r6solution, et
attende la d6cision de la Cour supreme sur la constitutionnalit6.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
III. La r~ponse de la Cour supreme aux questions des provinces
Notons tout d’abord que la Cour supreme ne se prononce pas sur le
“bien-fond6″du projet, mais exclusivement sur les questions qui lui ont 6t6
soumises et qui ne portaient pas sur celui-ci.
Rien dans [les] motifs [expos6s] ne doit 6tre interpret6 comme une approbation ou une
condamnation du projet de formule de modification, de la Charte des droits et libertis
ou de r’une quelconque des dispositions dont r’adoption est recherch6e. Les questions
soumises A cette Cour ne requi~rent pas qu’elle approuve ou condamne le contenu de ce
qu’on a appel6 ‘la proposition globale’. 14
Le Manitoba et Terre-Neuve ont pos6 trois questions identiques i la
Cour supreme.15 Le Qu6bec, par contre, a inscrit dans la formulation de ses
questions des nuances importantes qu’il faudra souligner.
A. Une premi~re riponse: le projet de risolution porterait atteinte a l’au-
toritd ldgislative des ligislatures et au statut ou r6le des ldgislatures ou
gouvernement provinciaux au sein de lafdration canadienne
La premiere question pos6e par Terre-Neuve et le Manitoba 6tait la
suivante:
!. L’adoption des modifications ou de certaines des modifications que l’on d6sire
apporter A la Constitution du Canada par le ‘Projet de resolution portant addresse
commune A Sa Majest& la Reine concernant la Constitution du Canada’ aurait-elle un
effet sur les relations f6d6rales-provinciales ou sur les pouvoirs, les droits ou les
privileges que la Constitution du Canada accorde ou garantit aux provinces, A leurs
16gislatures ou OL leurs gouvernements et, dans l’affirmative, i quel(s) 6gard(s)? 16
Celle du Qu6bec se formulait comme suit:
A. La Loi sur le Canada et la Loi constitutionnelle de 1981 si elles entrent en vigueuret
si elles sont valides A tous &gards au Canada, auront-elles pour effet de porter atteinte:
(i) A ‘autorit6 legislative des 16gislatures provinciales en vertu de la constitution
canadienne?
(ii) au statut ou r61e des 16gislatures ou gouvernements provinciaux au sein de la
f6d6ration canadienne? 7
La r6ponse de la Cour supreme a 6t6 unanimement affirmative aux deux
questions. A cette r6ponse affirmative, la Cour apporte cependant la pr6ci-
sion que voici:
14 Constitutional Amendment References 1981 (1981) 39 N.R. 1, A la p. 103.
Is Terre-Neuve y a ajout6 une quatri~me question, mais il ne nous semble pas n~cessaire
d’en faire hat dans le cadre du present article.
16Voir supra, note 14, A la p. 58.
17 Ibid., A la p. 59 [nos italiques].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
R6pondre simplement par “oui” A la question I et A ]a question A suffit dans les deux
cas, meme si la question I soul~ve aussi le pointde savoir”A quel(s) 6gard(s)” cela aurait
un effet sur les relations f6d6rales-provinciales et les pouvoirs, les droits ou les privilfges
provinciaux. Les procureurs ont convenu que si cet aspect de ]a question I devait 8tre
explor6, cela am~nerait ]a Cour et eux-mdmes A entrer beaucoup trop dans les d6tails;
pour l’instant, une r~ponse affirmative au point principal de la question satisfait toutes les
parties en cause. 8
Nonobstant cette mise au point qui semble limiter la port~e de ]a
d6sicion sur cet aspect du projet de r6solution au seul constat qu’il a “un effet
sur les relations f6d6rales-provinciales, etc.,” il y a lieu de noter au passage
qu’en r6pondant “oui” A la deuxi~me partie de la question qu6b6coise, ]a Cour
s’est trouv6e i pr6ciser que cet effet ne portait pas seulement sur “les
pouvoirs, droits ou privil6ges” des provinces, mais aussi sur leur statut au
sein de la f6d6ration canadienne.
Au surplus, la Cour elle-m~me souligne quelle serait rampleur de cet
“effet” dans l’expos6 des motifs de la r6ponse majoritaire donn6e A la
question 2:
Alors que si le projet de Charte des droits devenait loi, chacun des chefs de comptence
16gislative provinciale (et f6d6rale) pourrait 8tre touch6. En outre, la Charte des droits
aurait un effet rdtrospectivement de rime que prospectivement de sorte que les lois
ddicties par une province i lzvenir de mime que celles ddictdes dans le pass, meme
avant la Confdddration, seraient susceptibles detre attaquoes en cas dincompatibilitd
avec les dispositions de la “Charte des droits ” Cette Charte diminuerait d onc l’autorit6
16gislative provinciale sur une 6chelle d~passant reffet des modifications constitution-
nelles ant6rieures pour lesquelles le consentement des provinces avait 6t0 demand6 et
obtenu.19
II n’y avait done aucun doute pour tous les juges de ]a Cour supreme: le
projet de r6solution portait atteinte A ‘autorit6 16gislative des l6gislatures et
au statut ou r6le des l6gislatures ou gouvernements provinciaux au sein de ]a
f6d6ration canadienne.
B. Une deuxieme reponse el plusieurs volets: la constitution canadienne
n’habilite, nipar statut nipar convention, le Sdnat et la Chambre des
communes L faire modifier la constitution canadienne; elle les habilite
lefaire njanmoins, du point de vuejuridique.
C’est en r6ponse A la question B du Qu6bec que ]a Cour prononce ce
jugement en apparence paradoxal, du moins pour des non-juristes.
Question B – La constitution canadienne habilite-t-elle, soit par statut, convention ou
autrement, le S6nat et la Chambre des communes du Canada A faire modifier la
constitution canadienne sans ‘assentiment des provinces et malgr6 ‘objection de plu-
sieurs d’entre elles de fagon A porter atteinte:
181bid., A lap. 69.
19Ibid., A ]a p. 245 [nos italiques].
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
(i) A l’autorit6 l6gislative des 16gislatures provinciales en vertu de ]a constitution
canadienne?
(ii) au statut ou r6le des 16gislatures ou gouvernements provinciaux au sein de la
f~d6ration canadienne?20
R6ponses:(i)a) par statut, non;
b) par convention, non.
Le juge en chef et les juges Estey et McIntyre r6pondraient
qu’il n’y a pas de convention A 1’effet contraire.
c) du point de vuejuridique, oui. Lesjuges Martland et Ritchie
dissidents r6pondraient “non”.
(ii) a) par statut, non;
b) par convention, non. Le juge en chef et les juges Estey et
McIntyre r6pondraient qu’il n’y a pas de convention At 1’effet
contraire.
c) du point de vuejuridique, oui. Lesjuges Martland et Ritchie
dissidents r6pondraient “non”.
La m~me r6ponse est substantiellement donn6e, mais de fagon
apparemment moins paradoxale, A la question 3 de Terre-Neuve et du
Manitoba.
Question 3 – Le consentement des provinces est-il constitutionnellement n6cessaire
pour modifier la Constitution du Canada lorsque cette modification a un effet sur les
relations f~d6rales-provinciates ou altre les pouvoirs, les droits ou les privilfges que la
Constitution du Canada accorde ou garantit aux provinces, A leurs 16gislatures ou A
leurs gouvernements?21
R~ponse: – Pour les motifs donn6s en r6ponse A la Question 2, du point de
vue de la convention constitutionnelle, oui. Lejuge en chef et
les juges Estey et McIntyre dissidents r6pondraient “non”.
– Du point de vuejuridique, non. Lesjuges Martland et Ritchie
dissidents r6pondraient oui.
Sur quoi donc se fonde cette “habilit6 juridique” du S~nat et de la
Chambre des communes qu’aucun statut ou convention ne leur octroie? Sur
le fait qu’en ce qui les concerne, il ne s’agit formellement que d’une r6solution
et sur le fait qu’ils ont tout pouvoir d’adopter des r~solutions quel qu’en soit
‘objet ou la substance.
Voici ce qu’on peut lire dans May, Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and
Usage of Parliament (1976, 19e 6d.), un trait6 majeur sur la procedure parlementaire
britannique (A la p. 382):
(Traduction) Lorsqu’une question est approuv~e, elle prend soit la forme d’un
ordre ou d’une r~solution de la Chambre. Ces deux termes sont utilis~s dans les
20 Ibid., A la p. 59.
21 Ibid., A la p. 58.
REVUE DE DROITDE Me GILL
[Vol. 27
proc6s-verbaux de la Chambre pour toutes les propositions sur lesquelles il y a
accord, et ‘application du terme est soigneusement r6glement~e selon la teneur
de la proposition. Par ses ordres, la Chambre dirige ses comit6s, ses membres, ses
fonctionnaires, le d6roulement de ses propres procedures et les actes de toutes les
personnes vis6es; par ses r~solutions, la Chambre 6nonce ses propres opinions et
ses buts.
On retrouve cc passage presque textuellement dans Beauchesne, Parliamentary’ Rules
and Forms (1978, 5e 6d.), A lap. 150. La Loisurle Senat et la Chambre des Communes,
S.R.C. 1970, chap. S-8, art. 4 et 5, renforce ce que dit ]’art. 18 de l’Acte de l’Amdrique
du Nord britannique, modifi6 en 1875.
La fagon dont les chambres du Parlement proc~dent, celle dont une assemble lgisla-
tive provinciale proc6de est dans chaque cas une question d’auto-d~finition, sous
r~serve de prescriptions constitutionnelles pr~pond6rantes, ou de prescriptions auto-
impos~es par la loi ou internes.22
Aussi la Cour conclut-elle:
L ‘lment central ici est l’autoritd totale en droit des deux chambresfiddrales de inener
comme elles le veulent leurspropresprocidures et donc d”adopter la risolution qui dolt
gtre soumise h sa Majesti pour que le Parlement du Royaume- UniJ’ donne suite. Que
cc soit par son texte ou par implication, l’Acte de l’Amirique du Nordbritannique ne
r6git pas cc pouvoir ni n’exige qu’il soit assujetti A la sanction provinciale. Le Statut de
Westminster ne l’impose pas non plus. Au mieux, il laisse les choses comme elles
l’taient avant son adoption. L’6volution qui a suivi est sans effet sur la situation
juridique.23
En somme, c’est au titre de la pure proc6dure et en ‘absence de statut ou
de convention le prohibant, que le S6nat et ]a Chambre des communes
peuvent du point de vuejuridique adopter validement le projet de r6solution
en cause, abstraction faite de sa substance et quel qu’en soit l’objet. Heureu-
sement la Cour ne s’en est pas tenue au point de vuejuridique ainsi d6fini par
la seule proc6dure. Elle a aussi abord6 ]a question importante de ]a subs-
tance: une d~marche unilat6rale du S6nat et de la Chambre des communes
aupr~s du Parlement du Royaume-Uni par l’intern6diaire de la Reine pour
rapatrier la constitution et la modifier radicalement est-elle ou n’6tait-elle
pas constitutionnelle?
C. La Courprononce l’inconstitutionnalitd duprojet de risolution du point
de vue de la convention constitutionnelle
C’est par une majorit6 de sixjuges contre trois que la Cour supreme aura
inscrit une decision v6ritablement historique dans notre jurisprudence
constitutionnelle par la r~ponse qu’elle a donn6e A ]a question 2 du Manitoba
et de Terre-Neuve. 24
22 Ibid., A lap. 81.
23 Ibid., A ]a p. 104 [nos italiques].
24 De m~me qu’A raspect conventionnel de la question B du Quebec, supra, note 20.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
2. Y a-t-il une convention constitutionnelle aux termes de laquelle ]a Chambre des
communes et le S6nat du Canada ne peuvent, sans le consentement pr6alable des
provinces, demander A Sa Majest6 la Reine de d6poser devant le Parlement du
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord un projet de modification de
la Constitution du Canada qui a un effet sur les relations f6d~rales-provinciales ou les
pouvoirs, les droits ou les privil~ges que la Constitution du Canada accorde ou garantit
aux provinces, A leurs 16gislatures ou A leurs gouvernements?
OUI.25
Plus explicitement, comme il est dit en conclusion A l’expos6 des motifs
de la d6cision:
Sans exprimer d’opinion sur son degr6, nous en venons A ]a conclusion que le consen-
tement des provinces du Canada, est constitutionnellement n~cessaire A l’adoption du
“Projet de resolution portant adresse commune A Sa Majest6 la Reine relativement A la
Constitution du Canada” et que l’adoption de cette r6solution sans ce consentement
serait inconstitutionnelle au sens conventionnel 2 6
A la rigueur, il pourrait suffire, dans le cadre que nous nous sommes
traces, de rapporter ainsi la d6cision de la Cour sur cette question. Mais on ne
saurait d6cemment passer sous silence l’importance en elle-m~me d’une telle
decision, et son importance encore plus grande dans la conjoncture ofi elle a
6t6 rendue, l’une et rautre largement illustr6es par la port6e du projet constitu-
tionnel et l’ampleur des d6bats qui avaient amen6 l’intervention de la Cour.
On ne saurait non plus, passer sous silence la qualit6 de l’expos6 des
motifs sur lesquels la d6cision s’est fond6e: qualit6 de l’analyse, il va sans dire;
mais aussi qualit6 p6dagogique, si ron peut employer un tel qualificatif A
propos d’un texte de caract~rejuridique. L’intention manifeste de pr6senter
les choses de fagon didactique se r6v~le d6jA dans le fait que la Cour s’est
donn6e la peine, ce qu’elle ne fait pas toujours, de structurer son expos6 par
l’emploi de sous-titres significatifs m~me pour des profanes. La meme
qualit6 p~dagogique se r~v~le 6galement dans le style m~me de l’expos6: clair
et pr6cis, il force en quelque sorte la compr6hension.
D. La Cour a-t-elle rdpondu i une question qui ne lui dtait pas explici-
tement posde: l’accord requis des provinces doit-il 9tre unanime ou
simplement “substantiel’7
Dans les jours et les semaines qui ont suivi, on a interprt6 l’expos6 des
motifs de la decision de la Cour, comme si elle r6pondait effectivement A la
question qu’on vient d’6voquer. Le professeur Lederman lui-meme semblait
de cet avis dans rarticle qu’il publiait le 10 octobre 1981 dans le Financial
Post:
25 Supra, note 14, A la p. 258.
26 Ibid.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
The group of six judges then went on to refine the definition of the phrase “agreement
with the provinces”. They said this did not mean the agreement of all the provinces. One
may speculate they mean that, at least, the agreement of a majority of the provinces
containing a majority of the country’s population is required. Or, they may have in mind
some wider measure of consensus by some other test. In any event, the group of six, if one
may so describe them, was definite in finding that unanimous provincial consent is not
required by the existing convention.27
Mon analyse du jugement ne me conduit pas A une conclusion aussi
catrgorique que celle du professeur Lederman. II me semble, au contraire,
que la Cour a 6t6 attentive A ne passe commettre explicitement quant au rejet
de l’unanimit6 comme r~gle drfinissant le degr6 du consentement requis des
provinces pour que soit respect~e ]a convention dont elle declare ‘existence.
II subsiste au moins des doutes A cet 6gard.
II est vrai que le passage suivant de l’expos6 des motifs pourrait signifier
que la Cour a rejet6 l’unanimit6.
Le procureur de la Saskatchewan convient que ]a question doit recevoir une r6ponse
affirmative mais sur un fondement different. I1 soutient que la convention existe
effectivement et qu’elle exige un certain degr6 d’accord provincial. Le procureur de ]a
Saskatchewan soutient en outre que ]a resolution soumise A la Cour n’a pas requ un
degr6 suffisant de consentement provincial.
Nous devons dire tout de suite que nous sommes d’accord avec ]a position du
procureur de la Saskatchewan sur ce point.28
Dans ce passage, A quoi se rrf~re cependant l’expression “sur ce point”?
Se r~f~re-t-elle exclusivement au fait que la “resolution soumise Ala Cour n’a
pas requ un degr6 suffisant de consentement provincial” ou A ‘affirmation
que ]a convention exige seulement “un certain degr6 d’accord provincial”? I1
est vrai 6galement qu’un autre passage semble indiquer que l’unanimit6 ne
remplit pas l’une des trois conditions requises pour 6tablir ]a convention.
I1 semble clair que, bien que les precedents pris isol~ment favorisent ]a these de l’unani-
mit6, ‘on ne peut dire que tous les acteurs dans les precedents aient accept6 le principe de
l’unanimit6. 29
Mais, A supposer qu’elles 6quivalent au rejet de l’unanimit6, comment
concilier les citations qu’on vient de rapporter avec le passage suivant, ofi la
Cour semble bien formuler le principe gdndral dont elle s’est inspir~e?
I1 ne convient pas que la Cour congoive dans ‘abstrait uneformuleprcise qui indique-
rait en termespositifs quel degr6 de consentement provincial est n6cessaire pour que la
convention soit respectre. Les conventions, de par leur nature, s’61aborent dans l’arrne
politique et il revient aux acteurs politiques, et non A cette Cour, de fixer l’6tendue du
consentement provincial n~cessaire. 30
27 Financial Post, 10 octobre 1981, A la p. 9 [nos italiques].
28 Voir supra, note 14, A ia p. 233 [nos italiques].
291Ibid., A lap. 248.
30 Ibid., A la p. 253 [nos italiques].
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
En 1’esp~ce, toutefois, les informations dont la Cour disposait lui
indiquaient clairement que huit provinces s’opposaient au projet de r6solu-
tion. Une telle donn6e lui fournissait, “en termes n6gatifs”, si l’on peut dire,
une partie de la d6finition du degr6 sp6cifique de consentement requis.
Aussi, conform6ment A son habitude de ne pas aller au-delh de ce qu’il faut
dire pour r6gler un probl~me concret tel qu’il lui est pos6, on comprend que,
dans l’espkce, la Cour s’en soit remise t une sorte d’6vidence “n6gative” de
sens commun:
I1 suffit que la Cour decide qu’au moins un degr6 appr6ciable de consentement provincial
est n6cessaire et d6cide ensuite si la situation qu’on lui soumet y satisfait. En l’esp~ce
l’Ontario et le Nouveau-Brunswick sont d’accord avec les projets de modification alors
que les huit autres provinces s’y opposent. Aucune norte concevable nepermettrait de
penser que cette situation est a la hauteur. Elle ne r~v~le nettement pas un degr6 d’accord
provincial suffisant. On ne peut rien ajouter d’utile A cet 6gard.3 1
A mon sens, la Cour n’a pas voulu aller plus loin que cette sorte
d’6vidence “n6gative” que deux provinces ne suffisent pas. C’est pourquoi,
me semble-t-il, elle insiste dans la conclusion cit6e pour affirmer que le
consentement des provinces du Canada est constitutionnellement n6cessaire
. l’adoption du projet de r6solution, mais, sans exprimer dopinion sur son
degri. Si elle avait voulu exclure cat6goriquement runanimit6 comme degr6
positivement requis, il me semble qu’elle l’aurait indiqu6 sans 6quivoque
dans la conclusion m~me off elle d~clare rexistence de la convention
constitutionnelle.
Au surplus, m~me si l’on interpr6tait l’expos6 de ses motifs dans le sens
du rejet de l’unanimit6, il resterait h savoir si parmi le nombre requis de
provinces, certaines provinces devraient se trouver comprises, d’autres pou-
vant ne pas l’tre. Autrement dit, la d6finition pr6cise du degr6 de consente-
ment proincial requis comporte-t-elle une double dimension qualitative et
quantitative? Sans doute, toutes les provinces doivent-elles atre plac6es sur
le meme pied du point de vue juridique; doivent-elles l’etre 6galement du
point de vue de la convention?
E. La Cour a-t-elle ripondu implicitement ?tune question quon ne lui
posait pas, mais qu’elle s’est posie it elle-mgme: le Parlement du
Royaume- Uni a-t-il toute libertd d’adopter ou de ne pas adopter la
lgislation proposie dans la “rdsolution canadienne”?
Pour ce qui est de la libert6 du Parlement du Royaume-Uni de 16gif6rer
ou de ne pas lgif6rer conform6ment .une r6solution canadienne, la Cour en
fait 6tat lorsqu’elle aborde la question 3 des renvois du Manitoba et de
Terre-Neuve et la partie B (raspect juridique) du renvoi du Qu6bec.
31’ Ibid.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
(Vol. 27
II y a deux aspects g~n~raux de l’affaire qui se divisent en plusieurs points distincts: (1)
l’autorit6 des deux Chambres f6d6rales de proc~der par r6solution lorsque cela a un
effet sur les pouvoirs provinciaux et les relations f~d6rales-provinciales et (2) le r6le ou
l’autorit6 du Parlement du Royaume-Uni de donner effet A la r6solution. Le premier
point porte sur ]a n6cessit6 de d~tenir un pouvoir 16gal de d~clencher le processus au
Canada; le second porte sur 1’existence ou le d6faut d’un pouvoir I6gal aux mains du
Parlement du Royaume-Uni pour donner effet A la resolution qui n’a pas requ
l’assentiment des provinces. 32
Sur ce deuxi~me aspect, la Cour affirme d’abord que “l’autorit6 du
Parlement britannique ou ses pratiques et conventions ne sont pas des
affaires sur lesquelles cette Cour se permettrait de statuer.”33 Plus loin,
cependant, discutant de “l’argument de l’acte direct-indirect”, elle affirme ce
qui suit:
[O]n confond la question du processus, qui est la question fondamentale en l’espce, et
celle de la competence du Parlement britannique. La competence de ce parlement est,
pour les motifs d6jA expos6s, enti~re et il lui appartient A lui seul de decider d’agir et du
mode d’action.34
Ces deux passages mis ensemble me paraissent justifier l’affirmation
que la Cour elle-m~me reconnait
‘enti6re libert6 du Parlement du
Royaume-Uni d’agir ou de ne pas agir pour donner suite b. une r6solution
canadienne. I1 s’agit lA d’un point majeur qu’il fallait souligner, ne serait-ce
que pour situer dans une perspective correcte du point de vue juridique
certains arguments avanc6s par le gouvernement f6d6ral au cours du d6bat
sur la r6solution.
IV. Les deux auteurs et le jugement de la Cour supreme
Deux questions se posent A. ces propos: la premiere concerne les concor-
dances ou discordances entre les opinions que les deux auteurs avaient
exprim6es sur ]a constitutionnalit6 du projet et lejugement de ]a Cour Ai cet
6gard; la seconde a trait A leurs r6actions au jugement m~me de la Cour.
A. Les deux auteurs avaient ii lafois tort et raison, mais pas de la meme
mani~re ni sous le mime rapport
En statuant que le S~nat et ]a Chambre des communes avaient, du point
de vuejuridique, le pouvoir d’adopter le projet de r6solution, ]a Cour semble
bien avoir confirm6 la position adopt6e par le professeur Beaudoin qu’en
“droit strict” la d6marche unilat6rale du Parlement canadien n’6tait pas
“inconstitutionnelle”. Le professeur Beaudoin n’ayant toutefois pas claire-
ment expliqu6 ni la signification ni les fondements de sa th6orie du “droit
strict”, on ne saurait dire si cette signification et les motifs sur lesquels il
32 Ibid., A lap. 70.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., A la p. 95.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
s’appuyait coincidaient avec ceux de la Cour. A d6faut d’une concordance,
et dans la signification r6elle et dans les motifs, prenons du moins acte de la
coincidence dans la conclusion et dans le verdict: “en droit strict” (version
Beaudoin) et du point de vuejuridique (version Cour supreme), le projet de
rdsolution pouvait 8tre “16galement” adopt6 par les deux Chambres. Sur
l’aspect conventionnel, le professeur Beaudoin ne s’est pas prononc6, sauf
pour exprimer, comme nous l’avons vu, des doutes sur l’existence de la
convention et pour souhaiter A ce propos, une d6cision de la Cour.
Pour ce qui est du professeur Lederman, c’est sous l’angle de la conven-
tion constitutionnelle que la Cour confirme son opinion. Mais elle lui donne
tort du point de vuejuridique en refusant de reconnaltre qu’une convention
constitutionnelle puisse devenir une r~gle de droit. Elle lui fait, mme A ce
sujet, rhonneur de r6futer la these qu’elle lui attribue:
Le professeur Lederman s’appuie notamment sur une s6rie de decisions d6ja exami-
ndes, dont les motifs de sir Lyman Duff dans l’affaire des Conventions de travail. I1
explique le saut de ]a convention A la loi comme s’il y avait une common law du droit
constitutionnel qui tirerait son origine de la pratique politique. Ce n’est tout bonne-
ment pas le cas. Ce qui est d6sirable comme limite politique ne se traduit pas en une
limite juridique sans qu’il existe une loi ou un texte constitutionnel imp6ratif. La
position pr6conis6e est d’autant plus inacceptable quand il dit qu’un acquiescement ou
un consentement appreciable des provinces est suffisant. Bien que le professeur
Lederman ne veuille pas donner un droit de veto A rfle-du-Prince-Edouard, il en
donnerait un A l’Ontario, au Qu6bec, h la Colombie-Britannique ou A rAlberta. Ce
serait mettre les tribunaux dans une situation impossible.3 5
Que les r~gles 6nonc6es dans le Livre Blanc publi6 en 1965 sous ‘autorit6
du Ministre de la justice, l’honorable Guy Favreau, notamment celle que le
Parlement canadien ne demandera pas A Londres d’effectuer une modifica-
tion A la Constitution affectant les relations f6d6rales-provinciales sans le
consentement des provinces, aient constitu6 effectivement des “r~gles de
droit constitutionnel” aux yeux du professeur Lederman, la chose ne fait pas
de doute. Ainsi, 6crit-il dans l’un des deux articles auxquels se r~ffre
pr~cis6ment la Cour supreme:
There may be some doubts about the status of these rules. Are they full-fledged
constitutional laws or are they something less? Are they merely political conventions of
the constitution that do not have the force of law and which can, to some extent at least,
be varied or disregarded? In my view these rules are basic constitutional laws in everj,
sense and should be recognized as such by the governments and parliaments concern-
ed, including the British. 36
La Cour n’a pas accept6 cette these. Mais dans sa r6futation elle affirme
que “la position pr6conis6e par le professeur Lederman est d’autant plus
3 5 Ibid., A la p. 80.
36 Voir Lederman, supra, note 5, A la p. 95 [nos italiques].
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
inacceptable quand il dit qu’un acquiescement ou un consentement appre-
ciable des provinces est suffisant.” 37 LA-dessus, avec tout le respect qui lui
est dfije dois dire que la Cour semble avoir confondu la position prise par le
professeur Lederman quant h la procedure d’amendement en vigueur dans
l’tat actuel des choses, et celle qu’il prend quant A une nouvelle procedure
d’amendement,
la premiere procedure devant obligatoirement atre
employee pour mettre en place la seconde. Comme il l’indique lui-meme:
So, we do have in Canadian constitutional law a full-fledged amending process for the
specially entrenched parts of the Canadian constitution, and we may now note that this
includes the amending process itself. No doubt we may need a new amending process
that is somewhat more flexible than the present one, probably along the lines of the
proposals at the Victoria Conference of 1971. But, in order to accomplish that, we
would have to follow the existing amendment procedure one last time to institute the
new procedure, and then, for the next amendments after that the new procedure would
govern. This formula ensures the constitutionality of change, even in the amending
formula itself.38
B. Les rdactions des auteurs aujugement de la Cour
A notre connaissance, le professeur Beaudoin n’a publi6 aucun com-
mentaire sur lejugement de la Cour supreme. Le profesieur Lederman, par
contre, n’a pas mis de temps A r~agir. Dans les quelquesjours qui ont suivi le
jugement, il publiait dans le Financial Post un article ofi il tirait les cons6-
quences pratiques de cejugement dans la conjoncture d’alors, celle d’octobre
1981:
My main point can now be very simply made. The essence of Canadian federalism and
independance, so far as a basic constitutional amendment is concerned, is in the
constitutional convention just quoted. To act constitutionally, one must obey not only
the strict law of the constitution but also the established conventions of the
constitution.
This is now a binding obligation of the government and Parliament of Canada and of
the governments and Legislative Assemblies of the Provinces. This is the effect of what
the majority group of six judges in the Supreme Court of Canada has said.
Also, thanks to the judgement of the group of six, the Supreme Court of Canada has
made a major contribution to the solution of our current constitutional dilemmas. The
convention, requiring a substantial measure of provincial consent (but not unanimity)
is now authoritatively recognized. This should send the federal government and the
provinces back to the bargaining table for settlement of ourproblems by the necessary
consensus in Canada.39
37Supra, note 14, A la p. 80.
3 8 Voir Lederman, supra, note 5, A la p. 97 [nos italiques].
39 Voir supra, note 27.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
J’ai d6jA dit pourquoi il me semble loin d’atre certain que la Course soit
prononc6e sur le rejet de l’unanimit6 comme “mesure” du consentement
requis des provinces. Cela mis A part, la conclusion du professeur Lederman
sur la n6cessit6 et robligation “constitutionnelle” pour le f6d6ral et les
provinces d’un retour A la table de n6gociation s’imposait sans contredit.
V. La conference de novembre et les compromis qu’elle a engendr~s
Le jugement de la Cour supreme plagait le gouvernement dans une
situation pour le moins embarrassante en lui ouvrant, somme toute, deux
voies divergentes: la voie de la “l6galit”, d’une part, et celle de la “constitu-
tionnalit” d’autre part. Ou bien il proc6dait sous le couvert d’une 16galit6
bien fragile puisqu’elle reposait en fin de compte sur une sorte de “non-
ill6galit”; il rompait alors avec une “convention constitutionnelle” claire-
ment d6clar6e par la Cour et ouvrait ainsi la porte A ce que Westminster
refuse d’ent6riner le projet. Ou bien il renongait d6finitivement A agir
unilat6ralement et tentait de nouveau de se “16gitimer” en obtenant le
consentement des provinces avec tousles risques que cela pouvait comporter
quant A la substance du projet.
Le Premier ministre 6tait absent du pays le jour du jugement. Ainsi
laiss6 A lui-meme et A son temp6rament, le Ministre de la justice n’a pas
h6sit6 A s’engager dans la voie de la 16galit6, et A proclamer qu’il fallait
proc6der sans autre d6lai, i la demi~re 6tape parlementaire canadienne.
Cependant, m~me A distance, le Premier ministre a rapidement perqu que la
situtation cr66e par le jugement de la Cour n’6tait pas plus simple que la
situation ant6rieure. Au contraire, il eut 6t6 tout de meme g~nant de
poursuivre sans autre consid6ration, dans la 16galit6 sans doute, une 16galit6
de proc6dure et de forme, mais en mrme temps dans l’inconstitutionnalit6,
une inconstitutionnalit6 de substance et de contenu.
Passons sur les tractations secretes dont on a su, par la suite, qu’elles
s’6taient amorc6es d~s le 28 septembre 1981. Passons aussi sur les h6sita-
tions, les flottements et les 6quivoques des d6clarations publiques. En fin de
compte, le Premier ministre, plus conscient que son Ministre de lajustice du
dilemme dans lequel il se trouvait, d6cidait de convoquer pour le d6but de
novembre 1981, la nouvelle conf6rence f6d6rale-provinciale que le Premier
ministre Lyon avait propos6e en septembre 1980, pour janvier 198 1.
Cette “conf6rence de la derni~re chance” devait produire deux r6sultats
majeurs: d’une part, quant A sa substance, le projet de r6solution serait
radicalement transform6; d’autre part, ‘accord des provinces destin6 A
l6gitimer l’op6ration comprendrait toutes les provinces, sauf le Qu6bec qui
en serait exclu.
Pour ce qui est des changements substantiels apport6s au projet, il
suffira d’en 6voquer deux pour en montrer rampleur:
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
a) La plupart des dispositions de la’ Charte des droits tomberaient sous le
coup d’une clause “nonobstant” qui permettrait au Parlement canadien
et aux 16gislateurs des provinces de 1gif~rer A rencontre de celles-ci, A la
seule condition de le sp6cifier clairement.
b) Les formules g6n6rales d’amendement propos6es par le f6d6ral seraient
remplac6es par celle que sugg6raient les huit provinces dissidentes, mais
cette derni~re serait tronqu6e de ‘une de ses modalit~s essentielles, ]a
compensation financi~re pour une province qui ne sejoindrait pas aux
autres pour transf6rer du f6d6ral lune de ses comptences actuelles.
En toute objectivit6, il faut le reconnaltre, il s’agissait IA de changements
radicaux. Soucieux d’obtenir raccord du plus grand nombre possible de
provinces, le gouvernement f6d~ral leur a fait des concessions majeures pour
parvenir A ses fins. Malheureusement, A la conf6rence de novembre, les
concessions les plus significatives se sont faites A r’gard de toutes les
provinces, “couvrant” ainsi tout le pays, en s’arr~tant toutefois aux fronti~res
du Qu6bec. Mais celui-ci s’est retrouv6 dans une situation inacceptable: sans
la compensation financi~re retir6e, A l’initiative f6d6rale, de la formule
d’amendement convenue par les huit provinces dissidentes dans raccord du
16 avril 1981, l’imposition de la clause relative A la langue d’enseignement
aux minorit6s 6tant par ailleurs maintenue, le Qu6bec ne pouvait A bon droit
etre partie au soi-disant compromis du 5 novembre.
Engag6 dans la recherche d’un consensus A tout prix de ]a part des
provinces, le f6d6ral a n6anmoins sous-estim6, au cours de ]a conf6rence, le
degr6 de tol6rance de certains groupes dans la soci6t6. Ces groupes ont
vivement r6agi par la suite, ce qui a amen6 certains correctifs A ‘accord du 5
novembre, notamment en ce qui concerne l’galit6 des sexes et les droits des
autochtones. Quant au Qu6bec, vraisemblablement A la requite du parti de
l’Opposition A l’Assembl6e nationale, le f6d6ral a conc6d6 que la clause de
“compensation financi~re” soit partiellement restaur~e et puisse s’appliquer
A ‘Nducation et autres domaines culturels d’une part, et d’autre part, il a
consenti A ce que le crit&re de la langue maternelle dans rapplication de la
clause relative A la langue d’enseignement, par opposition au crit~re de ]a
langue dans laquelle les parents ont 6t6 eux-m~mes 6duqu6s ne s’applique au
Qu6bec qu’au moment oi l’Assembl6e nationale en d6ciderait ainsi.
Ces diverses concessions post6rieures A ]a conf6rence du 5 novembre,
n’ont effectivement satisfait ni les autochtones ni les Qu6b6cois. En ce qui
concerne le Qu6bec, il s’est donc retrouv6 seul avec lui-m~me, sans autre
recours que celui de poser, sans 6quivoque, la question de savoir si aux
termes de la convention d6clar6e par la Cour supreme, il devait atre n6cessai-
rement compris dans le consensus requis au titre de cette convention.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
VI. Que nous r6servent les lendemains du rapatriement?
Nous n’avons sans doute pas fini de tirer toutes les cons6quences de la
s6rie d’6v6nements qui auront entour6 le rapatriement de la Constitution en
1982; peut-etre pas tellement les cons6quences constitutionnelles qui pour-
raient d6couler du jugement de la Cour supreme, mais surtout les cons6-
quences politiques dont est porteuse la situation cr66e par les conclusions de
la conf6rence de novembre.
Pour ce qui est des cons6quences constitutionnelles, il se peut qu’elles
soient limit6es aux circonstances propres et exclusives A raffaire du rapa-
triement. Celui-ci une fois accompli et une formule g6n6rale d’amendement
mise en place, la convention constitutionnelle 6tablie par la Cour dans le
contexte ofi il fallait recourir A Londres pour amender notre constitution
n’aura plus de raison d’etre. Si importante qu’aura pu 8tre sa port6e “histo-
rique”, elle sera devenue en quelque sorte d~su~te. Mais il s’agit lA proba-
blement d’une interpr6tation trop courte de la d6cision rendue par la Cour.
J’imagine que les constitutionnalistes auront A se pencher sur le sujet et iront
plus avant dans l’analyse de ses implications.
I1 n’en va pas de m~me en ce qui concerne les cons6quences politiques. I1
est bien 6vident, en effet, que l’absence du Qu6bec dans le consensus du 5
novembre est susceptible de transformer radicalement le climat des relations
entre le Qu6bec et le reste du Canada. Ce n’est cependant pas le lieu
d’analyser ici tout ce qui pourra d6couler d’un rapatriement effectu6 dans ces
conditions.
Par ailleurs, il est tout aussi 6vident pour l’ensemble des provinces que
les lendemains du rapatriement de la constitution ne seront pas n6cessaire-
ment des “lendemains qui chantent”. A cet 6gard, il suffira de rappeler deux
textes du Premier ministre du Canada, le tr~s honorable Pierre Elliot
Trudeau. Le premier est emprunt6 au discours qu’il faisait au diner-b6n6fice
du Parti lib6ral du Canada (Section Colombie-Britannique) A Vancouver, le
24 novembre 1981. Le Premier ministre y expliqua les raisons fondamen-
tales de son entree en politique en 1965:
I entered federal politics in 1965, along with some other people in this hall, precisely
because I felt that the pendulum in my province, which was Soon to bejoined by all the
other provinces, the pendulum had swung too far off center. And the swing had to be
moderated. [nos italiques].
Le second est extrait de la conf6rence de presse qu’il donnait au Th6atre
national de la Presse, A Ottawa, le 3 d6cembre 1981:
I think this is just stage one of the constitution reform – and that is maybe why I have
to stay on a little longer. We’ve got all the aces. We’ve got the right of disallowance;
we’ve got the right of reservation; we’ve got the declaratory power; we’ve got the
expropriatory power on the peace, order and good government …. [nos italiques].
590
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
Ces deux citations indiquaient d6jA, d~s le mois de decembre, ce A quoi il
fallait s’attendre aux lendemains d’un rapatriement effectu6 dans les condi-
tions que l’on sait.
Plusieurs gestes pos6s et diverses d6clarations faites depuis lors sont
venus alimenter et confirmer les appr6hensions les plus inqui~tantes quant
au genre de f6d6ralisme qui s’6tablira d6sormais dans le pays. Le “f~d6ra-
lisme coop6ratif” serait mort, parait-il. Par quelle sorte de f6d6ralisme ceux
qui ont 6mis ce certificat de d6c~s veulent-ils le remplacer? Par un f6d6ra-
lisme “unitaire”? Par un f6d6ralisme “parall~le ? Souhaitons que la
“conscience collective” canadienne s’6veillera assez t6t pour emp~cher l’irr6-
versible & cet 6gard, de la meme mani6re qu’elle s’est 6veill6e pour emp~cher
le projet de l’automne 1980 de se r6aliser.
L’honorable s6nateur Arthur Tremblay
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. By Charles Fried. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp. 162.
The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations. By Ian Macneil.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. 164.
When Grant Gilmore declared eight years ago that contract was dead he
must have known what he was doing.’ The yield of thoughtful contract
scholarship in the brief time since has been nothing short of remarkable and
the authors of Contract as Promise and The New Social Contract are
certainly not alone in rising to the bait set by Gilmore. What is it, then, about
these two books in particular that make them appropriate subjects for
treatment in a single review? Apart from the fact that they are almost
identical in length and each has the word “contract” in the title, these books
seem on first impression to have little in common. The two authors draw
their inspiration from very different scholarly traditions. Charles Fried
moves confidently in the realm of liberal moral philosophy from Hume and
Kant through to Rawls; Ian Macneirs heritage derives more from the great
social theorists like Marx, Weber and Durkheim. The style and approach of
the two authors could hardly be less similar. Fried is the logician, carefully
stating his thesis, justifying its premises, and defending its application step
by step. Macneil is the psychologist, circling his subject, offering sugges-
tions, examples and insights until on one more turn around the light goes
on. Each has a different view of the nature of the individual and his relation
to society, a different definition of contract, and a different conception of the
function of law. Yet reconciling all these differences is a shared conviction
and a common purpose. The conviction is that law is a mirror reflecting
what society deems important and the purpose is to uncover through the law
of contract the social and moral roots of human cooperation.
I. Contract as Promise
In Contract as Promise Charles Fried continues to pursue his project of
providing a non-utilitarian account of moral and legal obligation. 2 In a
lucid and confident style he develops a liberal theory of justice and presents
the reader with a challenging reinterpretation of the law of contract based
upon the traditional moral principles of individualism.
The foundation of Fried’s account of contractual obligation is a deep-
rooted deontological moral theory; that is, a theory of duty that distin-
guishes clearly between what is right and what is good and provides princi-
ples of right and wrong actions independent of the consequences of those
I G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974).
2 Fried’s earlier works in this vein include Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and
Social Choice (1970) and Right and Wrong (1979).
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
actions. For Fried, the primary background value from which these princi-
ples derive is a respect for individual autonomy –
the right of individuals to
pursue their own conception of the good. Deontological theory is usually
contrasted with consequentialism (of which utilitarianism is a variety) which
judges the moral quality of an act by reference to the results of the act. It is
Fried’s view that the consequentialist nature of modern contract jurispru-
dence fails to take persons seriously as moral beings and is therefore
incompatible with the moral roots of contract. The principles of individual
autonomy and self-determination have taken something of a beating since
the days of Herbert Spencer, and Fried’s effort stands alongside the work of
modern libertarians such as Friedrich Hayek 3 and Robert Nozick4 in reas-
serting these as the primary values of a liberal society.
The resulting product is a modern restatement of the will theory of
contract and in this Contract as Promise is also a direct attack on almost
everything that has been written in the last half century about the jurispru-
dence of contract. Fried denies the proclaimed merger of contractual and
tortious principles of justice5 and rejects the argument that contractual
obligation is based on the protection of reliance or the prevention of unjust
enrichment. 6 Similarly, he dissents from the view that the institution of
contract is based on utilitarian considerations such as economic efficiency 7
or that the law of contract should incorporate and promote communitarian
ends and values such as distributive justice8 or altruism.9 Fried’s thesis is that
contracts are binding only because they are based on the promises of
rights-bearing individuals, and that the act of promising alone provides a
sufficient basis of obligation.
Fried derives the argument for the binding force of promises from the
Kantian principle of individual autonomy.’ 0 Individual self-determination
in a liberal society requires that we be secure in our persons and property and
that we be allowed a maximum of freedom to pursue our own ends. The
only limitation upon this freedom is that we refrain from violating the
autonomy of others. Yet some ends are available to us only if we can enlist
3 F. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of
Justice and Political Economy (1976), vol. 2, The Mirage of Social Justice.
4 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
5 Gilmore, supra, note 1.
6 Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages [Parts land 1] (1936)46
Yale L.J. 52 and 373; P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (1979).
7 R. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw(1977). R. Posner& A. Kronman, The Econom-
ics of Contract Law (1979).
8 Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice (1980) 89 Yale L.J. 472.
9 Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685.
10 Compare Kant’s treatment of the duty to keep a promise: “[H]e who intends a deceitful
promise to others sees immediately that he intends to use another man merely as a means,
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
the assistance of others and the moral problem, therefore, is to secure their
cooperation without doing them wrong. Such cooperation must be volun-
tary, but to be of value we must also have moral grounds for expecting it.
The most important mechanism for securing this kind of cooperation is
trust:
[I]t was a crucial moral discovery that free men may yet freely serve each other’s
purposes: the discovery that beyond the fear of reprisal or the hope of reciprocal
favour, morality itself might be enlisted to ensure not only that you respect me and
mine but that you actively serve my purposes …. Trust becomes a powerful tool for
working our individual wills in the world.”
To make a promise is to employ a convention whereby we commit
ourselves to the future. The promise triggers or invites trust. It is binding
not because it may be relied on or because it may secure some benefit for the
promisor, but because to break a promise is to abuse “a shared social
institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.”‘ 2 By abusing trust
the promise breaker uses others in a way that denies their status as moral
beings. This is the promise principle and for Fried it explains the foundation
of contractual obligation and can be used to illuminate the entire body of
contract doctrine. The principle stands in opposition to other possible bases
of legal obligation and in Fried’s view explains why contract is not dead and
cannot be collapsed into tort.
Because promises lie at the heart of contract Fried reaffirms the principle
that the appropriate quantum of damages for breach is measured by the
expectations created by the promise. Although he devotes scant attention to
the point, it is a crucial one since, as he notes, the most serious attack on the
promise principle centres on the argument that the purpose of contract
damages is to protect reliance.
In their famous article The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,13
published in 1936, Fuller and Perdue argued that the strongest cases for the
enforcement of promises were instances in which as a result of the promise
the promisor received some benefit or the promisee suffered some detriment
without the latter containing the end in himself at the same time. For he whom I want to use
for my own purposes by means of such a promise cannot possibly assent to my mode of
acting against him and cannot contain the end of this action in himself. This conflict against
the principle of other men is even clearer if we cite examples of attacks on their freedom and
property. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to make use
of the persons of others merely as a means, without considering that, as rational beings, they
must always be esteemed at the same time as ends, i.e., only as beings who must be able to
contain in themselves the end of the very same action.” I. Kant, Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals, (trans. L.W. Beck 1959), 48.
“1 C. Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981), 8.
‘2Ibid., 16.
13 Supra, note 6.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
in reliance on the promise. They also argued that the actual remedies
granted by the courts, though often disguised as expectation damages, were
in fact motivated by a desire to protect reliance. The corollary of this view is
that where there has been no gain by the promisor or reliance by the
promisee the case for enforcement is weaker. In proclaiming the death of
contract Grant Gilmore also emphasized the increasing dominance of the
norms of unjust enrichment and reliance as the bases of contractual obliga-
tion,’ 4 and the view that the law of contract has little to do with the
enforcement of promises or the will of the parties has received historical
support from both Morton Horwitz 5 and Patrick Atiyah.’ 6
Horwitz has argued that the enforcement of contracts in the pre-
classical era was based on a “title theory of exchange.” Prior to the develop-
ment of a sophisticated market economy the main function of contract was
to facilitate the simple exchange of goods and the remedy for breach of
contract was an action for the price of the goods, i.e., restitution. The courts
were reluctant to grant expectation damages for breach of a purely execu-
tory agreement and contractual obligation was based not on promises or the
will of the parties, but on community standards of fairness.’ 7 Moreover,
where the contract came into conflict with community notions of justice,
courts and juries were not loathe to give precedence to the latter. The
emergence of the will theory of contract in the nineteenth century was not a
legal recognition of the moral force of promises, but simply a response to the
demands of a developing credit economy.
Similarly, Patrick Atiyah has argued that modem lawyers have mistak-
enly taken the executory agreement as the paradigm of contract and have
therefore been misled into thinking that the expectation interest created by
promises is the basis of contractual obligation. 8 Atiyah’s view is that, at
least in earlier times, a simple promise was not a sufficient basis of obliga-
tion. Promises, he argues, did not create obligation, but were merely
evidence of some pre-existing or independent duty owed and recognized by
the promisor. Such a duty might arise because of the relationship between
the parties (e.g., the common callings), some prior or expected benefit to the
promisor, some reliance by or detriment to the promisee, or even a
pre-existing moral obligation. When modem lawyers say that contractual
obligation has always been based on promises, urges Atiyah, they fail to see
14 Supra, note 1.
15 M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (1977), 160-210.
16 Supra, note 6.
17 Horwitz’s suggestions about the role of nonpromissory principles of justice in early
contract law are by no means immune to criticism. See, e.g., Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis
and the History of Contracts (1979) 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533.
18 Supra, note 6.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
the existence of this dependent basis of obligation: “The notion that a
promisee was entitled to have his expectations protected, purely and simply
as such, as a result of a promise and nothing else, was not generally accepted
in eighteenth-century law.”19
Even in the case of the purely executory agreement, where the promisor
has received no benefit and the promisee has suffered no detriment, the
source of obligation need not be located in the promise alone. First of all,
argues Atiyah, such agreements are much rarer in the real world than they
are in the textbooks. Secondly, the relatively weak remedies available for
breach of the wholly executory agreement cast doubt on the assertion that
the law takes promises seriously. Finally, there may be good reasons for
enforcing executory agreements that do not depend on the moral force
of the promise. For example, promises are apt to be relied on, therefore the
promise is enforced on the basis of a presumption that it has been relied on,
or alternatively, mutual promises are devices for allocating risks and as a
matter of social policy or allocative efficiency they ought to be enforced. 20
It is one of Fried’s primary objectives to refute these theoretical and
historical speculations for they suggest that promises are neither a necessary
nor sufficient basis of legal obligation. They suggest that the enforcement of
contracts rests not so much on a respect for individual autonomy but on
consequentialist and communal standards of justice.
In rejecting the argument that reliance is the source of contractual
obligation Fried refers neither to the historical evidence nor the decided
cases. Instead, he argues that as a matter of moral theory it is circular and
incoherent to suggest that the protection of reliance is the reason for
enforcing promises. For Fried, reliance theory puts the cart before the
horse. There is no general moral principle that if B suffers harm by relying
on A, then A has done some wrong to B. Fried’s example is that if one
person rents an apartment because his neighbour plays chamber music, the
neighbour does no wrong by deciding to play elsewhere. 2′ People suffer
disappointment in reliance on others every day without there being any
moral grounds for complaint. Law, like morality, does not protect reliance
in the abstract because to do so would entail an unjustified and impractical
restraint on individual liberty. Reliance on one person by another is pro-
tected only when there are moral or legal grounds for claiming such protec-
tion, and in the law of contract these grounds are provided only when a
promise has been given. Thus, in the law of contract reliance is not a
sufficient basis of obligation, but is incidentally protected only because of
19 Ibid., 142.
20 Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations (1978) 94 L.Q.R. 193 and
Promises, Morals, and Law (1981).
21 Fried, supra, note 11, 10.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
the anterior assumption that the promise gives grounds for expecting per-
formance. Promises are not enforced in order to protect reliance; reliance is
protected because promises are binding. “There is reliance because a prom-
ise is binding, and not the other way around. ’22
Just as contractual obligation cannot ultimately be based on reliance,
neither is it appropriate in Fried’s view to limit damages for breach of
contract to the reliance measure. To require a promise breaker to pay only
for the harm or loss actually suffered would not only undermine the force of
the promise and deprive the promisee of his full entitlement, but would
violate the autonomy principle by failing to hold the promisor responsible
for his choice:
[Rlespect for others as free and rational requires taking seriously their capacity to
determine their own values…. Others must respect our capacity as free and rational
persons to choose our own good, and that respect means allowing persons to take
responsibility for the good they choose…. If we decline to take seriously the assump-
tion of an obligation because we do not take seriously the promisor’s prior conception
of the good that led him to assume it, to that extent we do not take him seriously as a
person. 23
Fried correctly perceives that almost every textbook doctrine of contract
law presents some challenge to the theory of contract as promise. The
doctrine of consideration requires some additional element over and above a
mere promise as a condition of enforcement. When consideration is ana-
lyzed in terms of benefit and detriment, or in terms of values exchanged, the
emphasis seems to shift once again from promises to external standards of
fairness or considerations of utility. The requirement that an offer must be
accepted and that it may be revoked any time before acceptance also raises
the question of how seriously the law takes promises per se. Excuses for
mistake, impossibility and frustration seem to indicate that collective stand-
ards of fairness are available to override the promise and to allocate the risks
and losses of social interaction on the basis of nonpromissory principles of
justice. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the expanding notions of
good faith, duress and unconscionability limit the freedom of the parties to
determine for themselves what their relationship will be, suggesting again
that communal notions ofjustice may take priority over the promise princi-
ple. As the courts become increasingly willing to relieve parties from the full
consequences of their promises, social judgements about the substantive
fairness of the contract assume a more important place in the scale of
reasons for the enforcement of contracts.
Fried addresses each of these problems in turn. He argues, for example,
that the doctrine of consideration is too internally inconsistent to provide an
2 Ibid., 19.
2-1 Ibid., 20-I1.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
alternative theory of obligation. He suggests that the contradiction between
the formal requirement of exchange and the rule that the court will not
examine the merits of the exchange will or should lead to the erosion of the
doctrine and he proposes that consideration might be replaced with a more
candid inquiry into whether the promise was intended in a sufficiently
serious manner to merit legal enforcement. Similarly, Fried denies that the
promise principle is threatened by the use of nonpromissory principles of
justice to resolve cases of mistake and frustration. In fact, he argues that it
would be wrong to resort to the intent of the parties in these cases because
they occur only where there is a gap in the agreement, or an accident to
which the parties never addressed their minds. He says:
In all of these cases the court is forced to sort out the difficulties that arise when the
parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on which these cases
cannot be resolved is on the basis of agreement –
that is, of contract as promise. The
court cannot enforce the will of the parties because there are no concordant wills.
Judgment must therefore be based on principles external to the will of the parties.2 4
The fact that there are such gaps in the law of contract is not, in Fried’s view,
fatal to the will theory of contract. If the parties have addressed themselves
to the problems that arise, their agreement will govern. To the extent that
they have not agreed it is not inconsistent with their individual wills or
autonomy to say that their relations must be governed by the residual
categories of civil liability.
Nor are doctrines such as duress and unconscionability examples of
communal notions of justice overriding the promise principle. On the
contrary, such techniques are actually required in certain cases to preserve
individual autonomy. The reason why a promise procured by duress is not
binding is because duress is a form of wrong-doing – a threat to violate the
rights of an individual. Such a threat is a violation of the autonomy principle
and therefore an illegitimate means of securing another’s cooperation.
According to this explanation the limits of legitimate judicial supervision of
contract are defined by the rights of the parties. The courts are not justified
in refusing to enforce hard bargains unless the bargain was procured by a
rights violation. When the courts exceed these boundaries (as they some-
times do in cases of unconscionability) they are engaging in a form of
redistribution of wealth at the expense of a particular individual. Although
Fried does not deny that redistribution is a legitimate goal of the liberal state,
the principle of equality requires that the burden of redistribution be born
collectively and must therefore be pursued through taxation.
Contract as Promise is an outstanding contribution to the growing body
of literature renewing an examination of the relationship between legal and
24 Ibid., 60.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
moral theory, and Fried’s statement of the promise principle is a forceful
one. No longer will the modem critics of the will theory of contract have the
luxury of aiming their volleys at straw men, for Fried’s reformulation rests
on a carefully considered moral theory and is convincingly applied to
explain the law. In fact, the most remarkable thing about this book is Fried’s
rare ability to apply moral philosophy to practical examples and rules of law
in such a sensible and coherent manner.
Whether or not we agree that the moral force of promises can be derived
solely from the value of individual autonomy will depend both on how
seriously we take the autonomy principle and on our intuitions about
promising. In what way do we use another person illegitimately, or violate
his autonomy, if we fail to keep a promise to him but do him no harm? If a
promise has not been relied on and the promisor has secured no unfair
advantage, is the moral case for the enforcement of the promise as strong?
Are we so committed to the autonomy principle that we will agree with Fried
that resort to community standards of fairness to override promises is in all
circumstances an illegitimate exercise? Do we really fail to treat individuals
as moral beings by granting them some relief from bad choices? Fried’s
answers to these questions will seem harsh to some and the summary nature
of some of his analysis leaves room for debate.
The issue that will spark even greater controversy among those trained
in law is whether the promise principle accurately describes the law of
contract. Even if we accept with Fried that as a matter of moral theory a
promise is binding whether or not it has been relied on, it is far from clear
that the law has ever embraced this principle or that it is even moving in that
direction. 25 It is not necessary to dispute the morality of promising to deny
that a promise is a sufficient basis of legal obligation. The law of contract
does have roots in what we would now call tortious principles ofjustice and
the law has never enforced promisesper se. A major theme in the history of
contract is the way in which the common law courts have developed criteria
for the determination of which promises merit legal enforcement and until
recently it was thought that the doctrine of consideration served this func-
tion. Although many readers will happily agree with Fried about the inco-
herence of this doctrine, its central position in contract theory is at least
evidence of a real reluctance in the common law to recognize a “mere”
2 Roscoe Pound, a great supporter of the promise principle, had his doubts: “Today,
what we were taking to be the last step in bringing the law of contracts into complete accord
with the precept of morals has been, at least for the time being, arrested and we are told that
the supposed moral foundation is illusory. Men are not to be bound by promises. They are
only to be held to bargains. The Marxian economic interpretation, the rise of the service
state, and the humanitarian theory of liability, in different ways and in varying degrees, have
seemed to be leading to a radically different view of the significance of a promise.” Pound,
Promise or Bargain? (1959) 33 Tul. L. Rev. 455, 455.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
promise as a sufficient basis of obligation. Consider, for example, the unease
felt by the courts in the fifteenth century when common law lawyers first
began to plead assumpsit for broken promises not resulting in actual harm:
“if this action be maintainable on these facts, for every broken Covenant in
the world a man shall have an action for Trespass.” 26
Consideration is not yet dead, and even some of its more vigorous critics
have shied away from the consequences of a general regime of enforceabili-
ty.27 And if consideration is on the wane it seems more likely that its place
will be taken by a reliance or commercial efficacy test than a general rule of
enforcement.28
Similarly, a number of the remedial doctrines of modem contract law
contradict Fried’s thesis. If the law was concerned to enforce promises
specific performance would be a more natural remedy than damages; and
even measured by the full expectation – do not enforce prom-
damages –
ises. The law often requires nothing of the contract-breaker where the
innocent party suffers no harm. A buyer who can obtain equivalent goods at
the same price on the market does not for practical purposes have any claim
against a seller in breach; and a seller who can dispose of his goods on the
market (at least where demand exceeds supply) has no claim against a buyer
in breach.29 Indeed, the innocent party is sometimes required by the doctrine
of mitigation to take steps to save the party in breach from the full conse-
quences of breaking his promise. This would seem to conflict with Fried’s
notion that a respect for autonomy requires that the promiser be held fully
responsible for his choices.
Fried recognizes that the main weakness of the will theory of contract
lay in its attempt to reduce the whole of the law of contract to the will of the
parties. Troublesome doctrines such as mistake, frustration and uncons-
cionability that could not easily be explained were either accommodated
through the use of such strained fictions as presumed intent, implied terms
and objective interpretation or else were rejected no matter how harsh the
result. For Fried, these manceuvres only played “into the hands of those
who see nonpromissory principles of fairness at work throughout the law of
contract.”30 Fried makes his version of contract more palatable by recogniz-
ing the limitations of the promise principle and admitting that there are
26 Watkin’s Case Y.B. Hil. 3 Hen. VI F. 36, pl 33 (1425).
27 Consider the retreat of Denning L.J. (as he then was) in Combe v. Combe [195 I] 2 K.B.
215 (C.A.).
28 J. Swan, Consideration and the Reasons For Enforcing Contracts in B. Reiter & J.
Swan, Studies in Contract Law (1980), 23. See, e.g., Dawsonv. Helicopter Exploration Co.
(1958) 12 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.).
29 Victory Motors Ltd v. Bay’da [1973] 3 W.W.R. 747 (Sask. Dist. Ct).
30 Fried, supra, note 1I, 63.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
many gaps in the law of contract that must be filled by nonpromissory
principles ofjustice. Thus he accepts thatjustice may sometimes require that
reliance be protected in the absence of a promise 3′ and recognizes that in
cases such as mistake and frustration principles external to the will of the
parties must be invoked to settle disputes. But he denies that these conces-
sions affect the notion that the basis of contract is promise because these
external principles are supplementary only.
This manner of accommodating nonpromissory obligation is not entirely
convincing. First, it seems both artificial and circular to save a definition of
contract simply by labelling as noncontractual all obligations that do not fit
within the definition. This approach is reminiscent of the nineteenth century
view of private law with its rigid insistence on maintaining the distinction
between private and public interests and its strained attempts at keeping
separate the categories of private law itself. To admit that there are non-
promissory bases of liability that may be imposed on parties in a contractual
relationship, but to maintain that those obligations have nothing to do with
contract, seems unrealistic.
Although Fried might agree that it would be impractical to teach a
contracts course confined to an examination of promissory obligation
alone, he would not agree that the distinction between the promissory and
the nonpromissory was an artificial one. The existence of a promise does
someimes make a crucial difference to the rights of the parties and general
civil obligations may often be varied by contract. Nonpromissory obligation
lies in the realm of the good, promissory in the realm of the right, and to the
extent that autonomy remains a value the two realms must be kept separate.
Perhaps a more serious defect than its apparent artificiality is that
Fried’s treatment of nonpromissory obligation seems inconsistent with his
overall project. In the end it is questionable that he has succeeded in
resurrecting the law of contract or in restoring the value of autonomy to a
central place in legal theory. On the contrary, after digesting Contract as
Promise one must wonder whether Fried has not really succeeded in show-
ing that Grant Gilmore was right after all.
In the nineteenth century, and in modern libertarian literature, the
notion of individual autonomy was seen to require not only that contracts be
enforced, but that other civil obligations be kept to a minimum. The fellow
servant rule, the doctrine of volenti, and the early products liability cases
denying recovery in the absence of contract were all expressions of the idea
that private law should generally be confined to the enforcement of rights.
In the name of autonomy individuals were to be left free to pursue their
31 For example, Fried approves of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. 133 N.W. 2d 267
(Wisc. 1965).
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
own conception of the good. But in this century, the growth of private law
has been primarily in the area of nonpromissory liability and it is now almost
a clich6 to say that the movement in law is from contract back to status. The
expanding scope of negligence, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
unconscionability, and reliance-based liability are but a few examples of
what Manfred Rehbinder has called the “socialization of law.” 32 These and
other developments reflect the increased awareness in this century that ends
cannot always be left to take care of themselves and that one of the legitimate
functions even of private law is to pursue the good.33
In attempting to reconcile this transformation with the promise principle
Fried departs from libertarian quarters and gives up too much. Even if the
development of nonpromissory norms is not inconsistent with the promise
some of these norms, such as unconscionability, are
principle -and
inconsistent –
it does at least point up the decreasing relevance of promises
in defining the relations between individuals in the modern world. That
nonpromissory obligations cannot be viewed simply as filling the gaps left by
promises is, of course, even more apparent when we turn to legislation. In
the name of social welfare, whole patterns of human behavior have been
removed from the realm of consensual regulation altogether and what has
been left to individual choice is increasingly circumscribed and directed by an
ever-expanding body of statutory enactments.
Fried’s dilemma is one that is typical of modern liberalism. He is torn
between a desire to defend a traditional view of individual liberty and a
reluctance to deny the legitimacy of the institutions of social justice. His
solution is to set up contract as the preserve of autonomy and to’erect a fence
around that preserve in the form of the promise principle. But the border is
shrinking. If the life of contract is promise, and the only value served by
contract is autonomy, then Fried’s elegant arguments provide us with a good
reason to regret the passing of contract, but no reason to suppose that it is
not passing.
II. The New Social Contract
For anyone familiar with the work of Ian Macneil it will come as no
surprise that the view of contract that emerges from The New Social
32 Rehbinder, Status, Contract and the Welfare State (1971) 23 Stan. L. Rev. 941, 947.
33 ,”This century has seen the early growth of a different conception of law; a conception in
which law is gradually … changing its purpose from the upholding of an abstract autonomy
of the will and a concrete securing of gains and acquisitions to an active social and public
concern in the protection from exploitation of the economically weaker members of society,
the regulation of terms and conditions of contracts of employment, the imposition on the
community as a whole the responsibility of caring for its less fortunate members.” R.
Graveson, Status in 7he Common Law (1953), 45
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
Contract differs fundamentally from Fried’s account. 34 With Macneil we
move out of the world of the autonomous rights-bearing individual and into
a world where every person is inextricably bound to others by a complex web
of interdependencies and relations. Macneil is more interested in the socio-
political underpinnings of modern exchange relations than in traditional
moral or legal theory, and while he recognizes that promising does play a role
in the life of an individual his main concern is to illustrate the importance of
the nonpromissory norms which underlie contractual behavior.
The horizons of Macneil’s legal landscape extend further than Fried’s
and if Fried’s definition of contract leaves the impression that there is little
left of contract in the modern world then Macneil’s definition leaves the
impression that there is little left but contract. “The modern technological
world,” he says,
is, par excellence, one founded on contract. Specialization and exchange run rampant.
Constant planning is presupposed. Exercise of choice is endemic, whether the choice of
those most directly affected or of others. Power and its exercise are everywhere. Far
from being dead, contract has swept the world- as a pessimist might say-like the
plague. 35
This faith in the vitality of contract is possible only because for Macneil
contract is not about law or the enforcement of promises. Rather, contract is
a social phenomenon resulting from the division of labour, the need for
exchange, and an ability to make choices and plan for the future. It is
nothing less than the total of “the relations among parties to the process of
projecting exchange into the future.”36
In Fried’s view, promises are the primary device by which exchange
relations are created and only the gaps are filled by nonpromissory norms.
But for Macneil the gaps are widening and the nonpromissory norms are
becoming increasingly important. Promises are fragmentary, based on
limited information, and often sabotaged by the fallibilities of the parties
themselves. Moreover, while promises may be one “projector” of exchange
relations, they are by no means the only one. Such relations are also created
and governed by custom, habit, kinship, status, hierarchies, and even the
existing exchange patterns of the status quo. Exchange relations simply
cannot be confined to the contracts of the textbook but must also include
such diverse phenomena as marriage, partnerships, collective agreements,
pensions, and bureaucracies.
34 Much of what is contained in The New Social Contract is drawn from Macneil’s earlier
articles and books. See, e.g., The Many Futures of Contracts (1974) 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691;
Contracts: Adjustment of Long Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law (1978) 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854; Contracts: Exchange Transac-
tions and Relations, 2d ed. (1978).
35 1. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations
(1980), 71.
36 Ibid., 4.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
is
the
transaction
isolated economic exchange
For Macneil, the demise of classical contract theory and the ensuing
funeral ceremonies (taking the form of a wake in some quarters) for the law
of contract were the result of the narrow law-oriented definition of contract
and an obsession with the discrete transaction as the only model of exchange.
of
The discrete
microeconomics. The ideal discrete transaction is one where the whole of the
relevant future is brought into the present through the devices of promise
and consent. The relationship has a distinct beginning, duration and ending
and all of the obligations are specified and well defined. Everything is
planned for, all the risks are allocated, and the remedies are certain and fixed
at the time the relationship commences. Although the pure discrete
transaction is a fiction, the closest we might come to it is the simple exchange
between strangers of goods for money. The classical analysis of such a
transaction is unconcerned with the identity of the parties or their social roles
and assumes that there are no relevant relations between them other than
those fixed by consent. Society is disinterested in the transaction, only two
parties are affected by it, and all that holds the relation together is self-
interest and law. 37
It is a consistent theme in Macneil’s work that the discrete transaction is
an inadequate model for the description of modern exchange relations and
therefore an inappropriate foundation upon which to construct a law of
contract. While the discrete transaction is short-lived and assumes a limited
number of parties the modern relation may have no identifiable beginning or
fixed duration and often involves large numbers of people, as in the case of
the trade union and the collective agreement. Because relations are more
complex and open-ended (e.g., installment contracts, service agreements) it
is often impossible to specify all of the obligations at the outset and the
effectiveness of substance planning is greatly reduced. Wider aspects of the
parties’ personalities and social identities are involved in modern exchanges
than in the discrete transaction (spouses, partners, managers, advisers and
37Compare Lawrence Freidman’s description of nineteenth-century contract
law:
“[T]he “pure” law of contract is an area of what we can call abstract relationships. Pure
contract doctrine is blind to details of subject matter and person. It does not ask who buys
and who sells, and what is bought and sold …. The abstraction of classical contract law is not
unrealistic; it is the particular renunciation of the particular, a deliberate relinquishment of
the temptation to restrict untrammeled individual autonomy or the completely free market
in the name of social policy. The law of contract is, therefore, roughly coextensive with the
free market. Liberal nineteenth-century economics fits in neatly with the law of contract so
that of the law of
viewed. It too had the abstracting habit. In both theoretical models-
contract and that of liberal economics- parties could be treated as individual economic
units wliich, in theory, enjoyed complete mobility and freedom of decision…. In fact there
was never any point at which the law of contract corresponded exactly with such an
economic theory. But in a rough way, the rise and fall of contract paralleled the rise and fall
of liberal economics as a working philosophy.” L.M. Friedman, Contract Lar in America:
A Social and Economic Case Studi’ (1965), 20-1.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
foremen) and the web of interdependence and contractual solidarity is
therefore more intricate. Finally, the power exercised by the parties to the
discrete transaction derives primarily from the legal rules protecting
property, is exercised prior to the commencement of the transaction, and
thereafter is static. In modern relations power derives not only from law but
from an
the
dependencies created by the relation itself. Power is therefore more
complex, dynamic and shifting throughout the life of the relation.
individual’s place in a social or economic matrix and
Contract law is based upon norms which both describe how people do
behave and how they should behave if exchange is to work. According to
Macneil, these norms are common to all forms of exchange behavior, but
certain of them increase in importance according to whether the behavior
tends towards the discrete or relational poles of contract. Because the
discrete transaction is isolated from all nonconsensual relations between
the pjarties and attempts to bring the future perfectly into the present, it is
dominated by the norms of consent and planning, or in Macneil’s
terminology, discreteness and presentiation. But the different nature of the
relational contract requires the intensification of different norms. Consent
and planning remain important, but because of the greater complexity of the
relation the focus of planning shifts from the substance of the transaction to
the procedures for maintaining the relation, and consent becomes little
more than a triggering mechanism which brings into play a wide variety of
unanticipated consequences.
In the discrete transaction, where consent defines all, the reliance,
restitution and expectation interests are protected only when they can be
linked to a promise, but as the effectiveness of planning and consent are
reduced, these interests assume a more independent status and if the relation
is to work must receive protection even in the absence of a promise.
Similarly, because the discrete transaction assumes that planning and
consent are sufficient to protect these interests, the social identity of the
parties is irrelevant and each can be treated simply as a property owning
utility maximizer. But in the more complex world of the modern relation,
social roles become increasingly imporant as instruments which define the
relation and facilitate reliance. 38 Take, for example, the relevance of social
role in cases of misrepresentation, undue influence and unconscionability. It
therefore becomes a central value of relations that roles be well-defined and
consistently maintained.
The longer life of the relation and the more personal nature of the
commitment of the parties means that the preservation of the relation
becomes a value. The remedies of the discrete transaction are inappropriate
and greater efforts must be made to harmonize potential conflicts within the
38 On the relevance of social role in the welfare state, see Rehbinder, supra, note 32.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
relation. This, in turn, increases the importance of trust, good faith and
flexibility. Finally, it is Macneil’s view that as contractual relations become
more complex, larger and longer-lasting (e.g., the bundle of contractual
relations of the multinational corporation), they come to resemble small
societies, and other “supracontractual” norms such as distributive justice,
dignity and equality must be attended to if the relation is to survive.
The underlying
In a characteristically
thesis of The New Social Contract is
that a
preoccupation with the norms of the discrete transaction has resulted in the
inadequacy of modern contract law to explain or regulate modern
contractual relations. The concepts of consent and planning have been
overloaded and applied to forms of exchange behavior that tend more
towards the relational pole.
terse reference to
bureaucracies, Macneil makes a lovely point about the inability of discrete
norms and rules to deal with the modern relation. The bureaucratic
organization is at least putatively based on the norms of the discrete
transaction; consider, for example, the obsession in such organizations with
job descriptions, power, planning and paper. But the effort to turn the
bureaucracy into a bundle of discrete transactions is spurious; “everyone
knows it will not work. Illustrative of this is that the very best way to bring
almost any bureaucratic enterprise to a grinding, clashing halt is to work to
rule, as many labour unions learned long ago.” 39
Macneil illustrates the need for a more relational foundation for contract
law by considering the problem of “the battle of the forms” and the concept
of agency. The traditional rules of offer and acceptance and the resulting
inability of the law to deal with situations where an offer and acceptance vary
is the result of the all or nothing approach to obligation dictated by the
discrete transaction. In the real world of relations, consent and agreement
are often relative matters and relations of trust and exchange are created by
imperfect communications. The law runs in circles only when it attempts to
force such relations into the mold of the discrete transaction and explain
them solely by reference to the norm of consent. Similarly, it is Macneil’s
view that the discrete rules of agency, based on the concepts of property,
consent and authority, are inadequate in a “world without principals.” The
nature of modern relations is such that agents can no longer define their
function simply by tracing lines back to a single source of power and
authority. Power over property in relations is diffuse (consider even the
simplest corporation) and principals have been replaced by hierarchies and
constituencies. The traditional law of agency simply cannot explain the role
of the agent in the modern world, or harmonize the competing claims and
interests that pressure any member of a relation.
One of the disappointing aspects of The New Social Contract is that
Macneil avoids making concrete proposals about how relational norms
39 Macneil, supra, note 35, 77.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 27
should be translated into solutions to the problems posed by modern
relations, and what might be the appropriate institutions for implementing
these new solutions. The explanation may lie in the fact that there are no
general solutions; different forms of behavior require different processes and
Macneil is not about to fall into the same trap as the classical theorists by
proposing a single model. What is clear, however, is that the answer to
relational problems such as the battle of the forms and agency must be
derived from the norms of trust and reliance, flexibility, harmonization of
conflict and role integrity, and that the rigid remedial institutions of discrete
law are less appropriate than administrative processes, negotiation and
arbitration.
Although The New Social Contract is largely a sociology of modern
exchange, Macneil’s vision of contract is not without a moral basis, and like
Fried he locates the morality of a contract in trust. To the extent that
relations work they foster in individuals a belief in social solidarity -the
faith that we can depend on others. This belief has moral roots and is itself a
moral force; but as might be expected, Macneil differs from Fried in his
analysis of the moral foundation of solidarity. He finds no moral basis for
solidarity in the discrete transaction because it fails to take persons first as
members of society. Based only on individualist concepts, it “rips the
individual out of society, out of the relations in which real life self-interest
operates.”40 The search for a shared morality that is the source of social
solidarity and trust must therefore go deeper than individualism. The moral
foundation of contract emerges only when it is recognized that individuals
are-and must be-in relations of interdependence from which they
cannot extricate themselves and that they therefore share a common
conscience. 41 We all have common stock in existing forms of technology and
capital investment and as the division of labour increases so does the
importance of all the common contract norms. Law contributes to social
solidarity by providing stability, facilitating cooperation, making possible
continued interdependence, and expressing the norms and practices that are
most essential to social cooperation. Insofar as law preserves the solidary
belief it has a moral foundation and a moral force.
The New Social Contract is a provocative book full of insights and
suggestions that will strike a resonant chord in anyone who is sometimes
dissatisfied with the narrowness of traditional legal thought. It is tempting to
criticize Macneil for biting off more than he could chew –
for trying to be, in
his words, anthropologist, sociologist, economist, political theorist and
40 Ibid., 96.
41 Macneil’s terminology and discussion of social solidarity is largely based on E.
Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society’ (1947). The main difference is that Macneil is more
optimistic about the possibility of a shared morality in a highly specialized society.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
philosopher (and all in 164 pages!) – but in a field of inquiry that desperately
requires a multidisciplinary approach it would be wrong to fault an author
for being overly ambitious.
In attempting to provide a conceptual
framework that unites what are usually taken to be disparate forms of
human behavior and separate categories of legal thought Macneil has done
legal scholarship a valuable service. And although
this conceptual
framework is presented at a high level of abstraction, Macneil’s view of how
the world works is much more realistic than anything that emerges from the
contracts textbook.
In some respects, Macneil’s account of contract is more convincing than
Fried’s because he does not attempt to reduce the values served by the law of
contract to a single principle. Macneil recognizes that values conflict, and in
the “Post-Technique” world of the new social contract there is no “one best
way” to get things done. Power, planning and bureaucracy compete against
humanism and spontaneity and the function of law should be to balance
values and seek only “a good way” to get things done.
But in the end, Macneil’s enterprise is not entirely successful.
Style, of course, is a matter of personal preference, but it is often difficult
to discover the precise meaning beneath Macneil’s cryptic examples and
terse literary references. Similarly, even more than Fried, much of Macneil’s
analysis is simply too brief, and in places, non-existent. The New Social
Contract was originally presented as a series of lectures, but the true cause of
these discontents, I think, is that the magnitude of Macneil’s project required
a very broad brush. Readers wishing a more closely analyzed presentation of
the concepts introduced in The New Social Contract would do better to turn
to Macneil’s earlier articles. 42
Not wishing to “review the book that should have been written” 43 I
would simply register some disappointment that Macneil does not treat the
law as it is and the law as it ought to be in a more concrete way. The models
of the discrete and
relational contracts are useful constructs for
understanding how law might work, but Macneil fails to follow where these
models lead except for a final impressionistic excursion into the world of
“Post-Technique”.
Finally, The New Social Contract shares with Contract as Promise a
tendency to neglect legal developments that detract from the force of the
argument – a tendency common to much critical scholarship. MacNeil’s
case for the inadequacy of neoclassical contract law is not wholly convincing.
Although he admits
law makes “many a relational
concession”,44 he maintains that without a relational foundation it must
that modern
42 Supra, note 34.
43 Parker, A Field Guide to Book Reviewing (1967) 20 J. Legal Educ. 169.
4 Macneil, supra, note 35, 72.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
(Vol. 27
ultimately fail. Recent legal developments suggest that we need not be so
pessimistic. The modern regulation of exchange does utilize relational
processes. The growth of arbitration, negotiation and conciliation, the
increasing access of labour and consumer groups to the centres of decision-
making, institutions such as ombudsmen and community mediation,
pipeline hearings and even the increased public sensitivity to the economy
created by Statistics Canada and the popular press are all examples of
relational approaches to exchange. On a more mundane level, contract law
itself is showing signs of an increasing sensitivity to relations. Relations need
not always founder on the discrete rules of offer, acceptance and
consideration.45 Remedies are becoming more flexible in response to the
recognition that different types of exchanges involve different interests.46
Developments such as misrepresentation and estoppel illustrate an increas-
ing sensitivity to the fact that there are non-discrete forms of exchange
behavior and also hint at a growing awareness of the importance of social
roles. One could go on. Restitution, undue influence, unconscionability,
mistake and frustration all have their relational aspects. If Macneil can see
no hope in any of this then his vision of where contract should go rests on a
concept of legal change that is not justified by any reading of history.
Other readers will find much more that is controversial in both Contract
as Promise and The New Social Contract. Those who see a role for welfare
aims in the law of contract will question Fried’s moral premises, and others
will be uncomfortable with Macneil’s tendency to weigh values in terms only
of what works. Many will disagree with the norms that both authors discern
beneath the surface of contract, or perhaps even with the assumption that it
is possible
to discover norms beneath such a complex historical
phenomenon. And, of course, there is always room for combat on the
interpretation of legal doctrine. That these books will generate this type of
debate is a measure of their success and they both deserve a wide audience.
The law of contract provides an ideal battleground for questions about the
nature of justice, the structure of rights and the function of law. Both Fried
and Macneil have thought long and hard about these questions and anyone
who is interested in the problem of values in law will profit from their work.
James Cassels*
45 See, e.g., New Zealand Shipping Co. v. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. 1975] A.C. 154
* Of the Faculty of Law, University of Victoria.
(P.C.); Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co., supra, note 28.
46″See, e.g., Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon [1976 ] Q.B. 801 (C.A.); Jarvis v. Sit-an Tours
Ltd[1973] 1 Q.B. 233 C.A.: Sky Petroleum Ltdv. V.ILP. Petroleum Ltd[ 1974] ! W.L.R.
576 (Ch.).
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
Reconcileable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law. By Paul C. Weiler.
Toronto: Carswell, 1980. Pp. xi, 335.
Readers of a recent novel written by John Irving have been treated to
The World According to Garp. Readers of this particular book are
presented with The World of Industrial Relations According to Paul Weiler.
Professor Weiler begins each chapter with a description of facts drawn
from a specific labour law case, provides an analysis of the law applied in
the circumstances, and finally suggests how, with certain changes, differ-
ent labour statutes might have been better able to handle the problem.
The result provides an enjoyable and interesting piece of reading. For the
most part, the book should not be approached as a text to help the labour
lawyer solve his or her next case. It must be considered required reading
for anyone interested in the more theoretical aspects of labour law. At
the same time it will also provide interesting reading for first-year indus-
trial relations students.
Weiler was President of the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board during some of the most turbulent years in the province’s recent
history. In the preface, Weiler expresses the hope that his treatment of
principles will go beyond the boundaries of his immediate experience.
His discussion is consistently based on problems and issues which emerge
in the context of British Columbia labour law, however, and this leads
him to ignore certain other interesting industrial relations ideas.
A case in point is his treatment of the strike/lockout issue. Only a
passing reference is made to the Qu6bec “anti-scab” law and even then it
is unfortunately described in a way which inaccurately reflects the law.
Discussing the “anti-scab” law, Weiler states:
That legal rule rests on the premise that once the employees have voted in favour of
strike action, this majority verdict should bind not only the employees in the unit at
that time, but also anyone the employer might want to insert in bargaining unit work
[sic] in their place; whether existing employers [sic], or new hirees, or non-unit
personnel, or even members of management.’
In fact, the law allows the employer to use supervisory and other non-
bargaining unit personnel so long as they were employed prior to the legal
beginning of negotiations.2
It should be said that a good deal of what is discussed in the book is
common ground to most people with a minimum amount of experience
in labour relations or labour law. However, various parts of the book do
indeed discuss interesting issues, at times in a novel manner. It is instruc-
tive to consider Weiler’s discussion of some of them.
I p. Weiler, Reconcileable Differences: New Directions in Canadian Labour Law
(1980), 77.
2 Labour Code, L.R.Q., c. C-27, s. 109.1(a).
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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Perhaps the strongest chapter in the book is the opening one.
Entitled “Free Collective Bargaining by Canadian Workers”, it com-
mences with an analysis of the United Bank Workers’ (a local of the
Service, Office and Retail Workers Union of Canada, S.O.R.W.U.C.)
campaign to organize the banks in British Columbia. Their initial target
was the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce’s Victory Square Branch
in Vancouver, and their certification petition was heard by the Canada
Labour Relations Board in the case of S. O.R. W. U. C. v. C.LB. C.3 The
Board rejected the bank’s argument that anything but a national unit
would spell the death knell for bargaining in Canadian banks and certi-
fied the single branch unit. 4 Yet the bank, after S.O.R.W.U.C had won
about twenty-five more certifications, refused the union’s offer of regional
negotiations. As Weiler points out: “So much for the heartrending plea
about the need to avoid industrial instability in the fiscal fiber of the
nation.” 5
Weiler’s discussion of this case is interesting because the question of
appropriateness is often one of the few defences or tactics left to an
employer once a union has succeeded in having a majority of the
employees sign membership cards. Moreover, the tactical nature of any
industrial relations scenario is well illustrated by the bank’s later refusal
to bargain regionally.
In discussing S.O.R.W.U.C., Weiler goes on to point out the prob-
lems this small homegrown, unaffiliated union had with the Canadian
Labour Congress. He is to be commended for mentioning this part of the
S.O.R.W.U.C. story because it certainly illustrates the fact that, at best,
unions practice only selective solidarity.
In Chapter One, Weiler also asks, what material benefits does the system
of collective bargaining through trade unions really bestow on employees?
After a fairly detailed analysis, he concludes that unions do raise the
compensation of unionized workers relative to non-unionized workers by
some ten or fifteen percent. However, the interesting point of this discussion
is that unions do not succeed in increasing labour’s share of corporate
profits. Companies adjust and increase prices in order to raise profits –
prices to which the non-unionized worker is as likely to contribute as the
unionized one. Hence, Weiler concludes that the non-unionized worker is
the big loser. Whether or not the reader agrees, the analysis is well
reasoned.6
3[1979] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 99.
4 Supra, note 1, 18-9.
5Ibid., 19.
6 Ibid., 24 et seq.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
Another interesting topic which Weiler explores is the “National Day
of Protest” organized by the C.L.C. on 14 October 1975 in order to
protest wage and price controls. This part of the book 7 raises questions
similar to those brought out by Weiler in his discussion of S.O.R.W.U.C.
because it has ramifications regarding the legal issue of what constitutes a
strike. The British Columbia Board held that it did not constitute a
strike,8 while the Ontario Board held that it did. 9 Unfortunately, very
little analysis of how these two boards reached opposite conclusions is
given. In my view, the “Protest” was no different from a wildcat strike on
a plant-wide level. If the British Columbia Board could decide that the
“Protest” was not a strike due to its political nature, where does that
leave the classic definition of a strike as a concerted cessation of work by a
group of employees?
Weiler offers an interesting discussion of rights arbitration. He correctly
points out that it has become a very expensive proposition. One reason for
this is that certain arbitrators are more popular than others, and thus are
burdened by heavier case loads. Consequently, the delays become longer
and the financial stakes become higher. Consider, for example, the case of
an employer who dismisses an employee. The parties may agree upon an
arbitrator who can’t hear the case for a yeai. If the employee is reinstated, he
will receive back pay for that year. Hence the discussion of s. 96 of the British
Columbia Labour Code,’0 which deals with this matter, is certainly relevant
for policy makers in other provinces. A way of streamlining the system
would be welcome.
Chapter Five is entitled “The Structure of Collective Bargaining”. The
case study in this chapter concerns Malton Airport in Toronto. It provides a
good illustration of the problems that can arise when many bargaining units
make up the work force of a given company or service. The unions involved
can virtually paralyze the service. While Malton Airport has remained fairly
free of labour unrest, this is not usually the case under such circumstances.
The British Columbia Railroad also had several bargaining units at one
point, and labour relations were chaotic for a number of years. The result
was economic hardship for the railway, the public and the union. The
British Columbia Labour Board imposed a council of trade unions, forcing
all the unions to bargain with the employer at the same time. Weiler’s
discussion of the results of this experiment is relevant beyond the boundaries
7 Ibid., 57 et seq.
8 British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers [1976] 2 Can. L.R.B.R. 410.
9 Douglas Ltd v. United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America [1976] 2 Can.
L.R.B.R. 410.
10 Labour Code, R.S.B.C. i979,1C. 212.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
(Vol. 27
of British Columbia. Moreover, he is to be commended for recognizing its
limitations.
Finally, Chapter Seven, entitled “Making a Virtue out of Necessity:
Strikes by Essential Public Employees”, also deserves to be noted. Weiler
concludes that another actor is needed on the labour law scene -an
Essential Services Dispute Commission, a body to be made up of a
blue-ribbon panel of industrial relations notables. While this reviewer has
doubts about the benefits of increasing the size of the bureaucracy, the
idea deserves some consideration since it would provide a body other
than the elected legislators to deal with essential services disputes. How-
ever, Weiler’s model commission would have no power to issue any legal
edicts of its own. In my view, this caveat will render the commission
useless. Either give it the teeth to be effective or don’t create it.
This book is basically concerned with policy questions, and offers easy
and interesting reading for anyone in search of a good overview of
industrial relations.
Thomas M. Davis*
* Of the Bar of Qu6bec.
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
Le rdgime canadien de lapropridtd intellectuelle (excluant les marques de commerces). By
Serge Pichette. Montreal: L’Ecole des Hautes 2tudes Commerciales (1979). Pp. 275.
Much of the literature on the Canadian law of intellectual property
stresses, quite properly, the British model. There is a point, however, where
property law of a general nature assumes importance, and few authors turn
their attention to the civil law of Qurbec in this regard. Fortunately, Le
rdgime canadien de lapropridtd intellectuelle fills this void. As a bonus, the
author treats the reader to comparative observations on the European
legislation in this field.
Me Pichette is affiliated with the Patent and Trade Mark Institute of
Canada, and is a professor at the Universit6 de Montreal. Such biographical
miscellanea are not apparent from the text. The publisher, although
devoting a page to the aims of the Hautes tudes Commerciales, neglects the
author entirely. Following this lead, Me Pichette plunges into a plan du
travail without preface or introduction. The book is divided into five
independent parts which deal with patents, assignment and licensing, know-
how, industrial design and copyright. There is no treatment of the law of
trade marks. An index of subject matter, as well as case names, is lacking.
The first part of the book dealing with patent law is its least satisfying
section. Itis a superficial gloss on the subject, with almost no analysis of the
cases cited. Little attempt is made to update the well-known book by Dr
Fox’ on which this author relies very heavily. Reference to British
jurisprudence is conspicuously absent. For example, the “Cripps question”
is paraphrased without credit to its original enunciation by Lord Hanworth
in Sharp and Dohme Inc. v. Boots Pure Drug Co.2 Detail is sacrificed for the
sake of the broad context. For instance, in distinguishing between “novelty”
and “inventiveness”, Me Pichette ignores the role of the prior art, i.e.,
whether anticipation must be apparent in a single document or whether the
courts are permitted to examine the cumulative effect of the prior art. Lastly,
the two significant issues of reissue and disclaimer are not raised.
The second part, entitled “les contrats de cession et de licence” is
refreshingly well researched. The footnotes are truly a springboard for
further reference. French and American sources abound –
so much so that
the author saw fit to insert a tableau des abrdviations.3 Surely this table
I H. Fox, The Canadian Law and Practice Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions, 4th
ed. (1969), 6: “[T]he case law of Great Britain is accepted as authoritative in interpreting the
patent law of Canada, save where the statutory provisions of the two countries have
diverged, and … United States decisions are accepted only on very particular points where
the relevant statutes make similar provision.” Fox cites as authority Hunter v. Corrick
(1885) II S.C.R. 300 and Rice v. Christiani [1931] A.C. 770 (P.C. (Can.)).
2(1928) 45 R.P.C. 153, 169 (C.A.).
3 S. Pichette, Le righne canadien de la propridtd intellectuelle (excluant les marques de
commerce) (1979), 63.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
(Vol. 27
would be of greater assistance if placed at the beginning or end of the text.
Apart from this organizational flaw, the chapter is an excellent comparison
of Anglo-Canadian and European legislation. Me Pichette maintains that
Quebec lawyers should be familiar with French sources when drafting
licences and contracts of assignment.
The chapter on know-how and trade secrets is also replete with
references to civil law in a broad sense. The author has the foresight to
emphasize
the economic value of information: “elle devrait atre
suffisamment importante pour faire naitre une obligation de bonne foi tant
sur le plan pdnal que sur celui de l’quit6 et pour stimuler l’innovation
technique et les transferts technologiques.”4 This chapter includes a
discussion of computer programs. The courts have held that a program
cannot be patented since there is no inventiveness within the meaning of s. 2
of the Patent Act.5 Me Pichette recognizes the argument that an alternate
route to protection is available via the contractual relationship between the
owner of the program and its user, giving rise to an obligation of
confidentiality. 6 Various authors7 contend that the program is a “literary
work”, and as such is protected by the Copyright Act.8 It remains to be seen
whether this is an area which should entail liability for infringement
pursuant to an amendment to the Criminal Code or whether the provisions
of the Copyright Act will suffice to protect, indeed reward, the programmer.
In either case this is an issue which will not be easily resolved, as the wheels of
law reform turn slowly. In 1979 Me Pichette wrote: “la loi sur le droit
d’auteur fait 6galement l’objet d’une revision et on parle du d6but de l’ann~e
1980 comme date probable de presentation d’un projet de loi A cet effet
devant le Parlement canadien.” 9
4 Ibid., 197 [emphasis added].
5 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4. See also Schlumberger Canada Ltd v. Commissioner of Patents
(1981) 56 C.P.R. (2nd) 204 (F.C.A.); G. Orleans, The Patentability of Software Related
Inventions in Canada (1982) Series 8, vol. 13 P.T.I.C. Bulletin 855; August, Patentability of
Computers and their Programs in Canada (1982) Series 8, vol. 14 P.T.I.C. Bulletin 923.
6 For a good discussion of more current jurisprudence in Canada and the United States,
see Landry, The Protection of Trade Secrets in Canada (1982) Series 8, vol. 12 P.T.I.C.
Bulletin 712. Landry distinguishes between know-how and trade secrets.
7Pascal, Legal Protection for Computer Programs (1967) Series 7, vol. 21, P.T.I.C.
Bulletin 83; A. Campbell, Copyright Protection for Video Games in Canada (1982) Series 8,
vol. 15 P.T.I.C. Bulletin 948.
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. See A. Keyes & C. Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposalsfor a
Revision of the Law (1977).
9 Supra, note 3, 190.
1982]
BOOK REVIEWS
The book’s 275 pages provide a good overview of intellectual property
law, except for the area of trade marks. The book does not purport to
substitute for the detailed analysis undertaken by Dr Fox. Rather, it serves
as a welcome introductory student text and at the same time meets the
practitioner’s test of “utility” as a companion work.
Andrea Friedman-Rush*
* B.C.L., LL.B., McGill University.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 27
C.LP.A. Guide to the Patent Act, 1977. By The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents.
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980. Pp. xvii, 471.
On first browsing through the C.I.P.A. Guide to the Patent Act, 1977
one is struck by the fact that it only refers to seventeen cases. This seems odd
in a text written in a country whose patent law can be traced back to the
Statute qf Monopolies, 1623,1 until it is remembered that the Patents Act,
19772 was not a mere revision of the Patents and Designs Act, 1949.3 One of
the necessary conditions of the United Kingdom joining the European
Patent Convention (E. P. C.)4 was that it make its patent law compatible with
the provisions of the Convention. According to the E.P.C., any member
country5 could maintain a parallel domestic patent law and also subscribe to
the E.P.C.
Briefly, the E. P.C. permits an applicant to file a single patent application
in either English, French or German in the European Patent Office in
Munich, designating its application in some or all of the member countries.
The application is subject to a single examination and once the application is
found to be acceptable, a copy is sent to each of the countries of the
Convention designated by the applicant. Of course, the resulting patent is
then subject to interpretation in national courts according to national laws.
Prior to joining the E.P.C., the United Kingdom had developed its
patent law oblivious to changes in legal philosophy on the continent. The
Netherlands, Swedent, Germany, Norway, Finland, Denmark and even
France, had modified their laws over a period of twenty years before the
signing of the Convention with a view towards creating a uniform system.
When the Convention was being drafted, the provisions adopted were in line
with the trends which had developed on the continent.
Thus, the Patents A ct, 1977 represented a fundamental change in the
patent law of the United Kingdom, making almost obsolete as of June 1978
the centuries of jurisprudence and the rich and wonderful body of
authoritative comment 6 that had been nurtured over the years. Of course,
the old books and decisions will still be useful in interpreting the patents
which were taken out before 1978 and which may be in force until 1996.
However, any patents based on applications filed since June 1978 will be
’21 Jac. I, c. 3.
2 Chapter 37.
3 12 & 13 Geo. VI, c. 62.
4 European Patent Convention (1974). Cmnd 5656.
5The United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland,
Liechenstein, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands.
6 See T. Blanco White, Patentsfor Inventions and the Protection ofIndustrial Designs
(1974); K. Shelley, Terrell and Shelley on the Law of Patents, 10th ed. (1961).
1982]
COMPTES RENDUS
subject to the new law, and to date the only book aimed at helping the
practitioner is the C.I.P.A Guide which is the subject of this review.
The text, an annotated study of the Act, was prepared by a committee of
Fellows of the Chartered Patent Institute. The commentaries are interesting
and appear to have been well researched. In each commentary, reference is
made to other relevant sections of the A ct. Wherever possible, a comparison
is made with the Patents Act, 1949 and with the relevant provisions in the
E.P.C., and the source of each section is also identified. An appendix
includes a complete set of the Patent Rules, 1978, extracts of the Rules of the
Supreme Court, and the Register of Patent Agents.
It might have been preferable to organize the text according to subject
matter as opposed to the plan followed in this guide, which simply follows
the order of the sections in the Act. However, the plan adopted by the
C.I.P.A. may have been the only practical way of preparing a guide so soon
after the coming into force of the Act. Certainly, the C.I.P.A. must be
congratulated for publishing this very valuable guide so promptly; in
comparison, it may be noted that the last compendium of Canadian patent
law was published in 1969. 7
Much of our Canadian jurisprudence in dealing with the Canadian
Patent Act 8 is based on British decisions. However, the new Patents Act,
1977 is so different, in many respects, from the Canadian Patent Act, that
this guide can be of little use to the Canadian lawyer practising in the field,
with the possible exception of the Canadian Patent Agent.
Robert E. Mitchell*
7H. Fox, The Canadian Law’and Practice Relating the Letters Patent for hn’entions, 4th
ed. (1969).
8 R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4.
* Of the Bar of Quebec.
