Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission

Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples

after the Royal Commission

John Borrows*

The 1996 Repon of the Royal Conmzission on
Aboriginal Peoples addressed the difficulties inherent
in the domestication of Aboriginal and treaty rights in
Canada. While Aboriginal peoples can now legiti-
mately question the injustice of colonial encounters and
lay claim to pre-existing rights within the nation states
in which they live, it is also becoming increasingly
clear that these states can extensively modify, infringe,
or extinguish indigenous rights. The Report indicated
that Aboriginal peoples require the choice and the abil-
ity to pursue objectives that differ from those of the
Canadian state. Furthermore, Aboriginal peoples desire
greater control over the development of their land and
resources so that it conforms more to their values and
objectives. This article questions whether the Commis-
sion’s recommendations with respect to Aboriginal and
treaty rights to land and resources have been effectively
taken into consideration in subsequent legislative and
jurisprudential developments.

The author’s analysis demonstrates that the rec-
ommendations and proposals with respect to treaties,
treaty making, Aboriginal land base, Aboriginal title, the
Canadian government’s fiduciary obligation to Aborigi-
nal peoples, and Metis rights to land and governance have
yet to be sufficiently observed. While the Report has cer-
tainly influenced government policy, Aboriginal peoples
are nevertheless denied the recognition of Aboriginal and
treaty rights to lands and resources in the manner rec-
ommended by the Commission.

Le Rapport de la Conrussiwn roae sur les peu-
pies auaochiones de 1996 dtudiait les difficultds reli&s
a la domestication juridique des droits autochtoncs at
issus de traitds au Canada. Les piupls autochton2s
peuvent remettre en question l’injustice de la colonisa-
don et rdclamer des droits prd-cxistants ii l’intdcur des
ttats dans lesquels its vivent. mais il devient d plus en
plus dvident que ces &ats peuvent modifier cafroindre
ou andantir ces droits dans ure large msure. Le Rap-
port indiquait que ls peupls autochitones demandent
le choix et la possibilitd de viser des objactifs diffdrents
de ceux que s’est fixs Ittat canadien. Ces peuples as-
pirent dgalement h un plus grand dagr de contnrle sur
leurs terres et ressources qui refl6terait mitx leturs
propres buts ct valcurs. Cat article dtudie l’importance
accordde aux recommandations de la Commission en
cc qui coneame ls droits autochtonas et tssus de traitds
dans la 16gislation et jurisprudence sub sdquntes.

Lanalyse que fait I’auteur des deu’cloppanents qui
ont suivi Ia Rapport montre quo ls racommanlations
faites dans le cadre de ce rapport ht rgard dzs tratits d
ler conclusion. des terrs autochtones, des fires au-
tochtones, de l’obligation fiduciaire du gouvement
canadien 5 I’dgard des peuplas autodtons ains3 qt d:s
droits ii la terre et A l’autod terminaton des Mitts n’oat
pas encore did suivies de mani-e safisfaisante. Bien quz
le Rapport ait eu une influence certaine sur ls politiqu=s
gouveaementales. ls peuples autochtonas n’ont tou-
jours pas droit It ur
re-onnaissance de letrs droits. par-
ticulimment ccux issus de traitds. d’une mani~ra qui se-
rait conforme I ces reco-mmandations.

” Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I would like to thank the Delgamuukw
National Review, Indigenous Bar Association, and Law Commission of Canada for their support in
producing this article. I have also greatly benefited from the comments of Kent McNeil and Albert
Peeling on earlier drafts.

McGill Law Journal 2001

Revue de droit de McGill 2001
To be cited as: (2001) 46 McGill LJ. 615
Mode de rdfdrence: (2001) 46 R.D. McGill 615

616

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[Vol. 46

Introduction

I. Treaties

A. Peace and Friendship Treaties
B. Numbered Treaties
C. Treaty Initiatives

1. Entering, Implementing, and Renewing Treaties
2. Treaty Institutions: Getting Out of the Courts

D. Summary

II. Aboriginal Title

A. Congruence: Aboriginal Title, the Commission, and the Supreme

Court

B. Differing Views: The Incongruity between the Commission and the

Court

II. Fiduciary Duties

Inconsistencies between the Commission and the Court

A.
B. Bridging Delgamuukw and the Commission

IV. Metis Land and Resource Issues

Conclusion

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

617

Introduction

Aboriginal peoples have enjoyed some substantial gains with respect to Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights in recent years. There is a growing recognition in Canada and in-
temationally that indigenous peoples are entitled to exercise fundamental responsi-
bilities within their traditional territories. In Australia the existence of Aboriginal title
has been recognized, and a debate about its contemporary survival has reached the
legislatures, courts, and general populace.! In New Zealand the binding nature of the
Treaty of Waitangi has been aclmowledged, and steps have been taken to ensure that
the Maori have sufficient land to sustain their culture.! In Guatemala reconciliation
with the indigenous Mayan population has begun through the findings of the Com-
mission for Historical Clarification.! In Malaysia courts have accepted the principle
that indigenous peoples have rights to the use and occupation of their traditional ter-
ritories.” The courts of Norway, Sweden, and Finland have recognized certain re-
source rights of the indigenous Sami; the legislatures have granted them political rep-
resentation at the national level Columbia’s recent constitution recognizes indige-
nous rights; numerous court decisions interpreting these provisions have given a large

See Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1, 175 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.); R. Bartlett, “The
High Court of Australia Upholds Native Title and Rejects Racist State Legislation” [199512 C.NLR.
47; WIk Peoples v. Queensland (1996), 141 A.L.RL 129 (H.C.); R. Bartlett, “The Fundamental Signifi-
cance of WK v. State of Queensland’ [1997] 2 C.N.L.R. 1.

2See New ZealandMaori Council v. Attorney General, [19871 1 N.Z.L.R. 641 (CA); K. Coates et
aL, Living Relationsidps: The Treatv of liaitangi in the New Millennitmu (Wellington: Victoria Univer-
sity Press, 1998); B.D. Gilling, “The Maori Land Court in New Zealand. An Historical Overview”
(1993) 13 Can. I Native Stud. 17; J.GA Pocock, “Law, Sovereignty and History in a Divided Cul-
ture: The Case of New Zealand and the Treay of I2aitangi” (1998) 43 McGil L.J. 481.
3 Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala Meinoria del Silencio (Guatemala: CEIl
1999), online: American Association for the Advancement of Science (date accessed: 21 November 2000).
4 The Constitution of Malaysia gives the national government legislative responsibility over the
“Welfare of aborigines”(Malaysian Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule, List 1, s. 16). This clause
was interpreted inAdong bin Kmvau v. Johor (1996), [1997] 1 Malayan LJ. 418. In this case the Ja-
ktn tribe of the Orang Ali population of peninsular Asia vas awarded compensation for the loss of
fifty-three thousand acres of ancestral lands taken by the state government and used to build a darn to
supply water to Singapore.

5 See L. Sillanpaa, Political and A&inistrative Responses to Sand Self-Detennination: A Com-
parative Study of the Public Aiinistrations in Fennoscandia on the Issue of Sami Land Title as an
Aboriginal Right (Helsinki: Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters, 1994); E Kormso, “Nordic Secu-
rity and the Saami Minority: Territorial Rights in Northern Fennoscandia” (1988) 10 Hum. Rts. Q.
509; T. Svensson, ‘The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination among the Sami in Recent Years”
(1995) 8 L. & Anthropology 267.

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measure of protection to Aboriginal title and jurisdiction.’ In the United States Native
Americans have been successful in expanding jurisdiction in tribal law-making power
and economic development.7 In Canada the proprietary nature of Aboriginal title and
the liberal interpretation of ancient treaties has been recognized and affirmed by the
country’s highest court Finally, indigenous peoples from around the world met to-
gether for a decade and articulated a charter of rights and responsibilities for them-
selves and the states with which they associate in the Draft Declaration of Indigenous
Rights.

While positive in many ways, these developments have not come without a price:
Aboriginal peoples continue to sustain great losses in their relationships with settler
states, even though the maturity of the colonial relationship is somewhat less oppres-
sive than in the past. Aboriginal peoples can now legitimately question the injustice of
colonial encounters and thereby lay claim to pre-existing rights within the nation
states in which they live. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear that these
same states can extensively modify, infringe, or extinguish indigenous rights. The
domestication of Aboriginal rights represents yet another stage in colonialism’s ex-
pansion that contains both positive and negative implications for Aboriginal peoples.
In some respects the colonial relationship is less oppressive and coercive than it has
been in the past. Most Aboriginal peoples are no longer subjected to explicit policies

‘ Columbia’s constitution contains many articles dealing with the rights of its indigenous popula-
tions. See Political Constitution of Columbia, arts. 63, 72, 96, 171, 246, 286, 287, 329, 330. Colum-
bia’s Constitutional Court has been active in interpreting these judgments. See e.g. Constit. Ct. Judg-
ment T-257 (1993) (Case of Asociacion Evalgelica Nuevas Tribus) (confirming territorial rights);
Constit. Ct. Judgment T-188 (1993) (Case of Crispin Laoza) (governmental accountability for failure
to demarcate indigenous lands). For commentary on the development of indigenous provisions in
Columbia’s constitution, see National Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Columbia, “Columbia:
A Multiethnic and Pluricultural Society” in M. Lger, ed., Aboriginal Peoples: Toward Self-
Government, trans. A. Bennett (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1994) 65.
7 For an introduction to this development in law, see C.R Wilkinson, American Indians, Titne and
the Law: Native Societies in a Modem Constitutional Democracy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1987); for policy, see G.P. Castile, To Show Heart: Native American Self-Deternnation
and Federal Indian Policy, 1960-1975 (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1998); RP. Prucha,
The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians (Lincoln, Neb.: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 1984); for Native American perspectives, see A. Josephy Jr. et al., eds,, Red
Power: The American Indians’Fightfor Freedom (New York: American Heritage Press, 1971).

‘ See e.g. M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Re-

spectfor Difference (Vancouver. University of British Columbia Press, 1997).

9 See E.I.A. Diaz, “Equality of Indigenous Peoples under the Auspices of the United Nations: Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (1995) 7 St. Thomas L. Rev. 493; S.J. Anaya, In-
digenous Peoples in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) at 151-82; S.H,
Venne, Our Elders Understand Our Rights: Evolving International Law Regarding Indigenous Peo-
ples (Penticton, B.C.: Theytus Books, 1998) at 107-71.

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J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

619

of forced assimilation that attempt to completely eradicate their societies and cul-
tures.'” Instead, it is widely presumed that Aboriginal peoples will continue to exist
within their respective nations, and that indigenous land, governments, and practices
will be reconciled to fit within national settler states. For some, this represents a
chance for a better standard of living in terms of such measures as education, housing,
and per capita income. For others, however, lockstep conformity with the state and its
goals foreshadows a substantial loss of independence and separate cultural develop-
ment From this perspective, the subordination of Aboriginal rights to legal proce-
dures of modification, infringement, or extinguishment does not facilitate strong na-
tional relationships. Assimilation and the loss of Aboriginal nations and culture are
seen as a continuing threat from this standpoint, even if the context within which it
occurs is changing. Many Aboriginal peoples are therefore demanding that sur-
rounding states limit their legal and judicial intrusions into indigenous affairs.

Canada’s Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“Commission”) recognized
that Aboriginal nations should be able to pursue a different mode of living if this was
their choice, and made recommendations to limit state intrusions.” While the Com-
mission did not take a position that was against national development in Canada, most
chapters in the Report of the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples (“Report”)
draw upon indications by Aboriginal peoples of preferences for development that dif-
fer from the kind of development pursued by Canada. Indigenous people appearing
before the Commission made repeated references to pursuing their own relationships
of spirituality, culture, and tradition when relating to the land and others.’ These posi-
tions are not, by and large, against economic and social expansion in the broader na-
tion state. In fact, these aspirations can even be complementary with it.” They demon-
strate that Aboriginal peoples wish to share more of the direct benefits of develop-

” For examples of these policies in the Americas, see T. Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow (To-

ronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1991).

” The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was initiated in the months following the failure of
constitutional reform in the Meech Lake Accord and the armed confrontation between the Mohawks
and the Canadian state at Oka, Qc. The Commission vas established on 26 August 1991 and issued
its final report five years later, in November 1996. Its mandate was to “investigate the evolution of the
relationship among aboriginal peoples … the Canadian government, and Canadian society as a
whole” Furthermore, the Commission was asked to “propose specific solutions, rooted in domestic
and international experience, to the problems which have plagued those relationships:’ See Canada,
Report of the Royal Connission on Aboriginal Peoples, VOL 1: Looking Forward and Loking Back
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996) at2 [hereinafter Royal Conmission, Wol. 1].

” See eg. Canada, Report of the Royal Conunission on Aboriginal Peoples, Vol. 2: Restructuring
the Relationship (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1996) at 435-64 [hereinafter Royal Commission, VOL
2].

13 See J. Borrows, “‘Landed’ Citizenship: Narratives of Aboriginal Political Participation” in NV.
Kymlicka & NV. Norman, eds., Citizenship in Diverse Societies (New York: Oxford University Press,
2000) 326.

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ment. Aboriginal peoples also show a desire to have greater control over how devel-
opment is undertaken to ensure that the development better conforms to their values
and objectives.

Aboriginal peoples told the Commission that certain conditions were necessary to
enable them to pursue their particular goals. The Commission recognized many of
these aspirations and embodied them in its recommendations. The Report noted that
Aboriginal peoples need the Crown to implement, renew, and fulfill the terms of their
historic treaties.” The Report indicated that Aboriginal peoples require a process to
establish new treaties between the Crown and non-treaty nations in regions where no
treaties exist.'” The Commission wrote that Aboriginal peoples require a larger land
base over which they can be self-governing to secure culturally appropriate land and
resource use.’6 It declared that Aboriginal peoples need policies and principles that
would recognize Aboriginal title as a legal interest in land and that would require
Aboriginal consultation or consent prior to federal and provincial use of that land.”

Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 49. Recommendation 2.2.2 reads as follows:

The parties implement the historical treaties from the perspective of both justice and
reconciliation.

See also Recommendation 4.5.10:

The governments of Canada and of relevant provinces and territories
a) be prepared to negotiate immediately … on the manner in which Mdtis self-

government will be recognized…

See text accompanying note 239; Royal Commission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 566-6S.

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I. Treaties

Before non-indigenous peoples came to the shores of Great Turtle Island (North
America), Aboriginal peoples often made treaties between their nations to establish
relationships with one another and their lands.’ The alternatives to such measures
could be distrust, petty grievance, violence, and war. These treaties were written in the
hearts and minds of the respected record keepers and were recorded on wampum,
rock, and trees. These treaties were sacred and were often given the highest regard
and respect. The failure to abide by these agreements could bring economic hardship,
political instability, or even war to those parties failing to do so.’ This early pattern of
treaty making was already entrenched in North America when people not indigenous
to this continent arrived from distant shores. Such agreements demonstrate the ability
of peoples to pursue different paths; they also became a model to guide early relation-
ships between the peoples.’

A. Peace and Friendship Treaties

The first treaties entered into between Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal
peoples were of peace, friendship, and respect. Their terms affirmed the notion that
different peoples should be free to pursue different objectives. Such treaties were fre-
quently made according to the protocols and form that Aboriginal peoples had estab-
lished amongst themselves prior to the arrival of Europeans.2 As before, such treaties
were also kept in mind and recorded by the leaders of the Aboriginal peoples. In time,
however, a change in the old forms eventually began to occur as these treaties were
increasingly recorded in writing by the newly settling peoples as well. While these
treaties were still regarded as sacred and were to be given the highest honour and re-
spect, their interpretation could no longer be made solely according to Aboriginal per-
spectives. Interpretation had to be attentive to the ideas and attitudes of non-
Aboriginal peoples. More than ever, treaties became the product of a cross-cultural

2” For examples in the Great Lakes area, see V. Lytwyn, “A Dish with One Spoon: The Shared
Hunting Grounds Agreement in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Valley Region” in D. Pentland, ed.,
Papers of the Tiventy-Eighth Algonquian Conference (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 1997) 210.
2′ Conflict between Aboriginal nations prior to contact in the Great Lakes area is recounted in W.V.
Kinietz, The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michi-
gan Press, 1940) at 53, 60, 82-89, 196-202, 251-62.

See R.A. Williams Jr., Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Lav and Peace

1600-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

24 See e.g. W. Fenton, “Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making”
in F. Jennings et aL, eds., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy (Syracuse: Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1985) 3; W.R. Jacobs, Diplomacy and Indian Gifts: Anglo-French Rivalry along the
Ohio and Northwest Frontiers, 1748-1763 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1950).

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

dialogue.’ Nevertheless, different interpretations often arose, along with great misun-
derstandings, which sometimes led to violent conflict. : Despite these setbacks, trea-
ties remained the basis upon which the parties directed their relationships, as well as
the land and resource use. Therefore, these early treaties of peace, friendship, and re-
spect still have meaning in Canada.

Canadian courts have considered the meaning of these treaties on many occasions
in recent years. They have adopted special interpretive principles to respect the an-
cient origins and cross-cultural context in which these first treaties were negotiated.
Earlier cases such as Jones v. Meehan” in the United States, and R. v. 1White and
Bob,’ R. v. Taylor and Wlliams,’ and R. v. Nowegijicld- in Canada, had been signifi-
cant in developing principles that helped to span the cultural and temporal divide that
separated the courts from these ancient agreements. In 1985 the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed these unique canons of construction when examining a 1752 treaty
of peace and friendship in R. v. Simon.3″ These ideas were further entrenched in 1990
when the Court examined a 1752 treaty in R. v. Sioui. More recently, in 1999, the
Court gathered these principles and applied them to a 1760 peace and friendship
treaty in R. v. Marshall” The principles these cases espouse are important for under-
standing the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown because they
lead the interpreter to contemplate the possibility that the written words of a treaty
document alone may not contain the full meaning of the treaty.’ They direct the courts
to take a large, liberal, and generous approach to the issues at hand, resolving any am-
biguities in favour of Aboriginal peoples. The treaties are therefore to be construed as
the Aboriginal peoples understood them, and interpreted in a purposive, flexible man-

‘ See R. White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region,
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). White explores this thesis throughout his
book.

‘ Unfortunately, armed conflict was not uncommon between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peo-
ples east of Lake Huron when treaties broke down. See F.V. Rowe, Ertinction: The Beothucks of
Newfoundland (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977); A.G. Bailey, The Conflict of European and
Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization (Sackvifle, N.B.: Tribune
Press, 1937); OT Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A Histo-, of Founding Peoples from Earliest
Tunes (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992) at 149-62.

” 175 U.S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 1 (1899).

(1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C. CA.), aft’d, [1965] S.C.R. vi. 52 DJ_..R. (2d)

481.

” (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, [1981] 3 CN.L.R. 114 (CA.).

[1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193.
3 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387,24 D.L.R. (4th) 390.
12 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025,70 D.L.R. (4th) 427 [hereinafter Sioui cited to S.C.I].

[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 513 [hereinafterMarshall 1].
See Ll Rotman, “Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal

Rights Jurisprudence” (1997) 46 U.N.B.LJ. 11.

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ner This approach holds great promise for Aboriginal peoples who want to preserve
ancient understandings of their relationship to the land. It also enables Aboriginal
peoples to conceive of their relationship with non-Aboriginal peoples based on terms
different from those that the settlers establish amongst themselves.’

Despite the presence of principles of liberal treaty interpretation, however, many
decisions can still be found that perfunctorily recite these canons without seeming to
apply them in any genuine way. This is detrimental to the implementation of these
agreements and helps to facilitate assimilation. Each time a court stumbles over a
treaty’s meaning because it lacks information or evidence, this creates a bias in favour
of the Crown, to the detriment of Aboriginal people. This bias occurs since Aborigi-
nal peoples most often bear the burden of proof in treaty cases, while the Crown does
not have to substantiate the benefits that it receives from the agreements. The Crown’s
position is unaccountably the default position, yet this was not discussed or agreed to
by the parties during the treaty negotiations. As a result, doubt is cast on Aboriginal
peoples’ treaty claims for differential treatment, while Crown rights are automatically
assumed to be the standard by which every person’s rights and conduct are judged.
This homogenizing tilt constrains Aboriginal preferences and compels the assimila-
tion of Aboriginal peoples. For example, Crown land use within treaty areas is exer-
cised with few limits or restrictions. In contrast, Aboriginal peoples often have to
struggle against numerous constraints and obstacles to exercise treaty rights to hunt,
fish, or harvest resources on these same lands. Most treaty negotiations do not specify
that the Crown, and not Aboriginal peoples, should receive more benefits from treaty
rights.

The Commission recognized that the interpretation of treaties in court cases usu-
ally occurs “in a narrow and ultimately frustrating context”.” It lamented that the
“context does not invite a broad look at what the treaty was all about from the per-
spective of the First Nation party”‘3 Nevertheless, a narrow perspective is also taken
on the other side, as the courts do not analyze the Crown’s rights acquired under these
agreements either. The principles developed to provide for large, liberal, and generous

” For a contrary position, see R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 306-307, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 312
[hereinafter Howard cited to S.C.R.]; Eastmain Band v. Canada (Federal Administrator) (1992),
[1993] 1 EC. 501 at 518, (sub nom. Quebec (A.G.) v. Eastmain Band) 99 D.L.R. (4th) 16 (C.A.),
leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [1993] 3 S.C.R. vi, 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii (note) [hereinafter East-
main Band cited to EC.], for the court’s refusal to apply liberal interpretive principles in modem trea-
ties. For criticism of this view, see S. Grammond, “Aboriginal Treaties and Canadian Law” (1994) 20
Queen’s LJ. 57 at 74-75.

See J. (slk~j) Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev.

241 at 250-69.

” Royal Commission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 31.
38 Ibid

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

interpretations of the treaties do not seem to extend the examination that far. This
seems to occur for two reasons. First, there are often evidentiary deficiencies in cases
that make it difficult for judges to discern the understanding of the parties at the time
an agreement was reached. Second, the legal framework of treaty interpretation as-
sumes pre-eminent Crown authority over the matter in dispute in the absence of suffi-
cient evidence to prove the rights of First Nations. These limitations support the
Commission’s observation that the “courts seldom have an opportunity to address
more fundamental but controversial treaty questions such as whether the treaty na-
tion’s Aboriginal title to its traditional territories was effectively extinguished:”‘

These deficiencies are illustrated in R. v. Peter Paul,” which concerned a right to
harvest trees for commercial purposes under early peace and friendship treaties on
Canada’s east coast. Here the New Brunswick Court of Appeal held that Mr. Peter
Paul, the defendant, had not established the asserted treaty rights. As in most treaty
rights cases, the court did not take sufficient measures in implementing generous in-
terpretive principles; therefore, the burden of proof was on the Aboriginal peoples to
establish their harvesting rights in the area. As a result, the court’s approach in this
case did not resolve ambiguities in favour of the Aboriginal peoples when considering
whether Aboriginal title had been extinguished in the area so as to give the Crown
rights over the timber in dispute. The failure to apply liberal interpretive principles to
the very framework of the law stifles Aboriginal understandings of the treaty and rein-
forces the status quo.” This result is illustrated in Peter Paul: immediately after the
need to interpret treaties in a broad and liberal manner was noted, the next paragraph
declared, “In any event,” and went on to quote from the clause at issue in the treaty,
without stating how this clause would benefit from these doctrines of liberal interpre-
tation.’
3 Indeed, this case makes it appear as if the special canons of treaty construc-
tion are irrelevant in determining “fundamental but controversial questions” sur-

39 !bid.
., (1998), (Sub nor. R. v. Paul) 158 D.L.R. (4th) 231, [1998] 3 C.N.LR. 221 (N.B. CA.) [herein-
after Peter Paul cited to D.L.R.].
” For descriptions of Mi’k-maqlCrown relations in this period, see W.C. Wicken, “Re-examining
Mi’kmaq-Acadian Relations 1635-1755″ in S. Departie et al., eds., Habitants et marchands, Tvent”
Years Later: Reading the Histoiy of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth.Centur, Canada (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998) 93; W.C. Wicken, “‘Heard It from Our Grandfathers’:
Mi’kmaq Treaty Tradition and the Syliboy Case of 1928″ (1995) 44 U.N.B.L.J. 145; W.C. Wvicken,
‘The Mi’kmaq and Wuastuklviuk Treaties” (1994) 43 U.N.B.LJ. 241.

21 want to be clear that in the argument that follows I am focussing on the court’s exposition of le-
gal principles. I am not saying anything about the substantive outcome in Peter Paul: e.g. there may or
may not be a treaty right in the circumstances of this case, but that does not excuse the courts from
reasoning in a manner consistent with established treaty and constitutional presumptions in making
their case.

‘ Peter Paul, supra note 40 at 245.

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rounding the structural legal burdens faced by Aboriginal peoples in litigating their
rights.

Furthermore, when the New Brunswick Court of Appeal reviewed the lower
court’s findings concerning commercial harvesting rights, it held that there “was in-
sufficient evidence on which a consistent conclusion could be reached:” The lack of
evidence on this point led the court to write, “Even though a liberal interpretive ap-
proach is required, the result must be realistic”‘ It held that “conjecture … cannot re-
sult in the realistic interpretation of the Treaty.”‘ By such reasoning, the status quo is
preserved and the Crown is not disturbed in its use or possession of land, even though
it has not legally justified its assumed pre-eminent position. Yet that there was insuffi-
cient evidence on which to provide a realistic interpretation of the treaty surely must
also lead to the conclusion that it would be conjecture to assume that the Crown has
superordinate rights in the area under dispute. Such issues, however, are usually not
explored in treaty cases. As a result, Aboriginal peoples’ rights under treaties are do-
mesticated and placed in a subordinate position relative to the Crown.’ Such a result
reinforces the Commission’s conclusion that the law is “suffused with the values and
assumptions of imperial treaty makers”‘ The law should resist these values and em-
ploy liberal principles of treaty interpretation to question assumptions that grant re-
sidual powers to the Crown.'”

The history of Canadian federalism reveals that this path has been followed in
other constitutional cases.’ For example, the Reference Re Secession of Quebec’ indi-
cated that the federal system was only partially complete “according to the precise
terms of the Constitution Act, 1867′ because the “federal government retained
sweeping powers which threatened to undermine the autonomy of the provinces”‘ As
a result, courts have had to “control the limits of the respective sovereignties” since “a
review of the written provisions of the Constitution does not provide the entire pic-
ture” 3 of the Canadian federal structure. In this vein, the courts helped to facilitate
“democratic participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most

‘AIbid. at 246.
43 Ibid.
’46 Ibid.
, See I. Schulte-Tenckhoff, “Reassessing the Paradigm of Domestication: The Problematic of In-
digenous Treaties” (1998) 4 Rev. Const. Stud. 239.
4″Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 31.
4’ This approach has been followed in the United States where the “reserved rights” doctrine states
that those rights not expressly dealt with are reserved to the Indians. See United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 25 S. Ct. 662,49 L. Ed. 1089 (1905).

‘ See P Bobbit, “Methods of Constitutional Argument” (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 449.
5′ [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Secession Reference].
52Ibid. at para. 55.
53 ibid.

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

627

suited to achieving the particular societal objective” with regard to the diversity of the
component parts of Confederation. The Court’s historic approach has resulted in the
distribution of political power in Canada between the provinces and the central gov-
ernment. Provincial power has been significantly strengthened under this interpreta-
tion.

Applying these principles to treaty interpretation, would it not also be possible to
strengthen the position of Aboriginal peoples in the Constitution and regard the fed-
eral system as only partially complete in relation to Aboriginal peoples?” Treaties are
constitutional documents” that could be interpreted in a way that facilitates Aboriginal
autonomy in Canada. In keeping with the courts’ interpretation of provincial rights, it
could similarly be argued that the “federal government retained sweeping powers”
relative to Aboriginal peoples, contrary to most treaty relationships “which threatened
to undermine the autonomy” of Aboriginal groups. Furthermore, since the “written
provisions of the Constitution [do] not provide the entire picture” relative to Aborigi-
nal peoples, and treaties can be read to present a more balanced picture, the courts
could also “control the limits of the respective sovereignties” by distributing appropri-
ate powers to the Aboriginal governments. If the courts can strengthen provincial
powers by drawing on federalism’s unwritten principles to fill in the “gaps in the ex-
press terms of the constitutional text”,” can they not also “facilitate the pursuit of col-
lective goals”‘ of Aboriginal nations by drawing on the written and oral principles
embodied in the treaties? Federalism could be applied in this manner when interpret-
ing treaties to question assertions of Crown sovereignty that purportedly diminished
Aboriginal powers to function as an equally integral part of the federal structure in
Canada. That the courts choose not to follow this familiar course when delineating
treaty rights reveals a skewed application of constitutional law. It creates a bias in law
against treaties and in favour of other non-Aboriginal constitutional instruments.

Not all cases, however, are deficient in their recitation and application of generous
interpretive principles. For example, in the 1999 Marshall I decision, the Supreme
Court of Canada appropriately used these canons to refuse to “turn a positive
Mi’kmaq trade demand” in a 1760 treaty “into a negative Mi’kmaq covenant”. The
issue in dispute was whether a treaty clause, stating that the Mi’kmaq could only trade
in government appointed ‘Truck houses”, protected a contemporary right to trade for

/bhiL at para. 58.
55See B. Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Pro-

moting Autonomy for the Provinces and F’rst Nations” (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 308.

‘ Treaties have been described as constitutional documents in the Royal Commission, Vol 2, sripra

note 12 at 22, 36-37.

Secession Reference, supra note 51 at pam. 53.
Ibid at para. 59.

59Supra note 33 at para. 52.

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commercial purposes, given that Truck houses ceased to exist over two hundred years
ago.’ The Court held that a contemporary commercial right could be sustained. It ar-
rived at this conclusion through a flexible approach to the evidence that chose from
“among the various possible interpretations of the common intention … the one which
best reconciles the Mi’kmaq interests and those of the British Crown”62 As a result,
this case is an excellent example of the application of liberal and generous interpretive
principles. It effectively demonstrates how a court can be attentive to Aboriginal per-
spectives in the adjudication of Aboriginal rights. Nevertheless, despite this positive
treatment, the Court still managed to interpret the treaty as a whole in a way that sub-
ordinates Aboriginal peoples within Canada. The aspects of the decision that poten-
tially imperil Aboriginal difference appear when the Court subjects treaty rights to
unilateral governmental regulation and limits their scope to sustenance purposes.

The Court’s unfortunate circumspection of the right in question was prompted by
its concern that Mi’kmaq trading rights “would open the floodgates to uncontrollable
and excessive exploitation of the natural resources ” ‘2 While this potential exists in any
group’s use of a resource, there was no discussion of the legal limits imposed on Abo-
riginal fishers’ right to trade by Mi’kmaq law and custom.’ The background of Abo-
riginal law would presumably form part of the backdrop against which the treaty
should be interpreted. Furthermore, the Court did not acknowledge the Crown’s cul-
pability in facilitating the uncontrollable use and excessive exploitation of the re-
source in question over the past one hundred years. Despite the Crown’s misman-
agement of the resource and the continuing existence of Mi’kmaq law, the Court nev-
ertheless chose to grant the right to regulate the fishery to the federal government. It
did not explore the possibilities for enforceable Mi’kmaq management or co-
management regimes that solely or equally called upon Mi’kmaq law-making author-
ity in the regulation of the resource,’5 as counselled by the Commission.’ Further-
more, the Court restricted the scope of the Mi’kmaq right to “necessaries”, which
were described as “not a right to trade for economic gain” or the “accumulation of
wealth”, but “day-to-day” needs that “would not exceed a sustenance life-style.’ ‘e7

60 For the role of historians in this case, see J.G. Reid et aL, “History, Native Issues and the Courts:

A Forum” (1998) 28 Acadiensis 3.

61 Marshall I, supra note 33 at para. 13.
6’ Ibid. at para. 57.
63 For the importance of Aboriginal law and custom in Aboriginal rights litigation, see J. Borrows,

“With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)” (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629.

‘4 See D.R. Matthews, “‘Constructing’ Fisheries Management: A Values Perspective” (1995) 18

Dal. LJ. 44.

65See C. Notkzke, “A New Perspective in Aboriginal Natural Resource Management: Co-

management’ (1995) 26 Geoforum 187.

64Co-management is discussed in Royal Commission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 665-79.

Marshall I, supra note 33 at paras. 58-60.

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J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

Such an approach demonstrates the Court’s view that the Crown is the paramount
party in the treaty relationship. The characterization of Aboriginal peoples’ rights un-
der treaties as “narrow in ambit and scope”,’ while the Crown’s rights under the same
treaty are broad and plenary, illustrates the continuing colonial nature of the Crown-
Aboriginal treaty relationship. It demonstrates the problems that Aboriginal peoples
still encounter in attempting to pursue a course of life that is guided by their own
principles and objectives.

The restrictive findings in Marshall I were confirmed a few weeks later. In Mar-
shall IPr the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to rehear Marshall I by the West
Nova Fishermen’s Coalition, which was concerned about the potential lack of non-
Mi’kmaq regulatory authority over the east coast fishery. In the aftermath of violent
clashes and vociferous public criticism arising from the first decision, the Court seized
this opportunity to clarify its earlier opinion while simultaneously dismissing the ap-
plication to rehear the case.’ In doing so, the Court re-framed the context of the origi-
nal decision and placed the treaty’s limitations in very plain terms. For example, it ob-
served that the treaty did not support a general right to take resources throughout the
province.”‘ It emphasized that Marshall I could not be extended to support a right to
take resources other than eels.’ It reiterated that both the provincial and federal gov-
ernments had to regulate the rights guaranteed within the treaty.” It indicated that the
government could regulate the right to fish for “necessaries” to “produce a moderate

Ibi at paras. 57,58.
k v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Marshall 11].
0The West Nova Fishermen’s Coalition sought a rehearing of Marshall I and a further trial on the
issue ofjustification for the infringement of treaty rights. The coalition was concerned about the po-
tential application of the judgment to lobster fishing. The Court denied the rehearing, indicating that
the issue of justification was not raised in argument in the courts below, Furthermore, the Court said
the coalition’s application was based on a misconception of the scope of the earlier, Marshall I opin-
ion. The earlier decision concerned eel fishing under a particular treaty, not a general right to take re-
sources throughout the province.

?’The Court wrote that the “treaties were local and the reciprocal benefits were local. In the absence
of a fresh agreement with the Crown, the exercise of the treaty rights will be limited to the area tradi-
tionally used by the local community with which the separate but similar treaty was made” (Marshall
1, supra note 69 at para. 17).

SThe Court held, ‘The September 17, 1999 majority judgement did not rule that the appellant had
established a treaty right ‘to gather’ anything and everything physically capable of being gathered.
The issues were much narrower and the ruling was much narrower” (see ibid at para. 20).

7 On the government’s power to regulate treaty rights, the Court held that the “government’s power
to regulate the treaty right is repeatedly affirmed” and that “the government’s general regulatory
power is clearly affrmed” (see ibid at paras. 24-28). It also observed that treaty rights were “limited
by the rights of others”, and therefore “the government must ultimately be able to determine and di-
rect the way in which rights interact’ (ibid at paras. 24,25).

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[Vol. 46

livelihood” and not be found to be infringing the treaty right.” Finally, the Court ac-
centuated the notion that the government could regulate the treaty right in such a
manner as to give priority to non-Aboriginal interests in situations warranted by “re-
gional/economic dependencies”.’
In sum, the Court found that present Mi’kmaq
treaty rights are largely contingent on Canadian judicial recognition, are subject to
national and local infringement and regulation, do not extend to the accumulation of
wealth, and may give way to non-Aboriginal objectives.

The domesticating elements of colonialism that caused so much concern amongst
Aboriginal peoples testifying before the Commission are evident in Marshall I. Abo-
riginal peoples, by and large, view peace and friendship treaties as creating bilateral
relationships that are not subject to the overriding authority of any one party. They do
not interpret peace and friendship treaties as granting non-Aboriginal governments or
courts the power to determine ultimate allocations of lands and resources. They be-
lieve that power was to be shared, and decisions about the treaties’ meanings were to
be resolved through further treaty councils. Courts could take guidance from this per-
spective when faced with disputes over the meaning of these treaties and send the
parties back to peace and friendship councils to resolve their differences through ne-
gotiation and agreement. Parliament and the courts have yet to accept this interpreta-
tion of peace and friendship treaties. The lack of consensus between Aboriginal peo-
ples and Canada on this point makes peace fragile, and friendship somewhat elusive.

B. Numbered Treaties
Many of the same challenges that are apparent in the interpretation of peace and
friendship treaties are also manifest in the construction of the more recent post-
Confederation numbered treaties. Numbered treaties were signed in Canada between
1871 and 1921; geographically, they cover most of northern and western Ontario, the
three prairie provinces, and the newly realigned Northwest Territories. ‘ There are
substantial questions about the effect and meaning of these treaties. While the courts
frequently characterize these treaties as “sacred”,
it is also increasingly becoming
clear that these solemn promises can be modified, infringed, or extinguished by the
Crown as long as this course of action can be justified.” The Crown should not have
plenary power in treaty matters when it was not acquired or reserved during the nego-
tiated oral agreements. Thus, while the recognition of the sacred nature of these

Ibid. at para. 36.
“Ibid at para. 41.
“Negotiations for certain of these treaties are partially recorded in A. Morris, The Treaties of Can-
ada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories Including the Negotiations on Which
They Were Based (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1991).

R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, 133 D.L.R. (4th) 324 [hereinafter Badger].

“Ibid. See e.g. R. v. CbtS, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, 138 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter COt61.

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J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

agreements facilitates Aboriginal choice, their subjugation to wider Canadian legisla-
tive objectives simultaneously narrows the bounds within which this choice can be
exercised. The circumscription of treaty rights in this manner makes it difficult for
Aboriginal peoples to pursue objectives that may differ from those of Canada. For ex-
ample, according to current treaty law, it will be very difficult to choose to exercise an
Aboriginal right to hunt if this exercise is found to be visibly incompatible with a non-
Aboriginal right to take up the land for settlement purposes.’ Similarly, under certain
treaties it will be extremely difficult to choose to use the land for Aboriginal spiritual
purposes if the Crown occupies the land in a manner “incompatible with the exercise
of [Aboriginal religious] activities”.’

Many cases demonstrate how courts have interpreted the wording of treaties in
ways that allow pan-Canadian rights to expand at the expense of diminishing Abo-
riginal control. The Supreme Court in R. v. Horseman” expressed the Crown’s sup-
posed “pre-eminent” position in this way when speaking of the federal government’s
modification or merger of Treaty 8 under the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement
of 1930: “[T]he power of the Federal Government to unilaterally make such a modifi-
cation is unquestioned “‘ The federal government should not have power that was not
contemplated or agreed to by the parties, yet the Court simply cites earlier unreflec-
tive case law that assumes this power without indicating its basis.”

Creeping pan-Canadianism at the expense of Aboriginal choice under the courts’
interpretations of treaty rights is also evident in Badger. In this case the Supreme
Court found that land “required or taken up” for settlement, mining, lumbering, trad-
ing, and other purposes would not be available for Indians “earning a livelihood” in
the same manner as before the treaty existed.” The Court found this reduction of Abo-
riginal choice was acceptable even though a “promise that this livelihood would not
be affected was repeated to all bands who signed the treaty.”‘ Aboriginal choice is
diminished by this interpretation because visible non-Aboriginal development is suf-
ficient to defeat the treaty right. There seems to be no limit on non-Aboriginal devel-
opment that would adequately protect areas of land for Aboriginal peoples to pursue
their traditional livelihood. Yet the shrinking land base available to Aboriginal people

7C1td,

ibid

Sioui, supra note 32 at 1072.
[1990] 1 S.C.R 901,108 N.R. 1 [hereinafter Horseman cited to S.C.R.].
2 Ibkl at 934.
See the dissent of Wilson J. in Horseman, ibiL, which raises this issue.

‘Supra note 77 at para. 29.
5 /bid
For an excellent analysis of the Crown’s supposed pre-eminence in similar treaty clauses, s P.
Macklem, ‘The Impact of Treaty 9 on Natural Resource Development in Northern Ontario” in Asch,
supra note 8, 97.

632

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under the notion of “visible incompatible use” is not contemplated in the treaty.” In
Badger the Court observed that neither the Crown nor Aboriginal peoples had ever
envisioned that Aboriginal choice would become as bound as it is today when they
negotiated Treaty 8.” Given the absence of agreement on the largely unforeseen ef-
fects of subsequent settler development on treaty lands, it is not clear why treaties
should be construed in a way that decreases Aboriginal rights for the benefit of the
Crown.

These issues raise important questions regarding not only the scope of the peace
and friendship treaties and the numbered treaties, but also the adequacy of law in de-
termining answers to these questions. If, as the Commission proposed, “it is doubtful
in many cases that the First Nations participating in the numbered treaties knew that
the written texts they signed differed from the oral agreements they concluded””9 why
should Aboriginal peoples, rather than the Crown, watch their land use options de-
crease? On the whole, the courts’ liberal interpretative principles do not seem to be up
to the task of addressing this larger issue.’ The courts are institutionally limited to is-

” In fact, in one notable case concerning Treaty 11, Re Paulette and Registrar of 7itles (No. 2)
(1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8 at 33, 9 C.N.L.C. 307 (N.W.T. S.C.), rev’g (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 43
(N.W.T. S.C.), rev’d on other grounds (1975), 63 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (N.W.T. C.A.), aff’d on other grounds
(1976), [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 161 [hereinafter Re Paulette cited to D.L.R.], the court
held that

it is almost unbelievable that the Government party could have ever returned from their
efforts [to sign a treaty] with any impression but that they had given an assurance in
perpetuity to the Indians in the territories that their traditional use of land was not af-
fected.

A close examination of many of the numbered treaties raises these same doubts. See Treaty 7 Elders
and Tribal Council et al., The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
Press, 1996) at 210-12; R. Fumoleau, As Long as This Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and 11,
1870-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).

‘ See Badger “Since the Treaty No. 8 lands were not well suited to agriculture, the government
expected little settlement in the area” (supra note 77 at par. 55). Also: “No doubt the Indians be-
lieved that most of Treaty No. 8 land would remain unoccupied and so would be available to them for
hunting, fishing and trapping” (ibiL at para. 57).

89 Royal Commission, Vol. 1, supra note 11 at 173. See also the comments of Morrow J. in Re
Paulette, where he wrote, “[It is almost unbelievable that the Government party could have ever re-
turned from their efforts with any impression but that they had given an assurance in perpetuity to the
Indians in their territories that their traditional use of land was not affected” (supra note 87 at 33).

‘ In fact, in the twentieth century, there were a select number of “modem” treaties that followed the
numbered treaties and that were signed between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown (e.g. the Williams
Treaty of 1923 in Ontario; the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement in Quebec), These
courts have found that these treaties should not have benefited from the large, liberal, and generous
interpretive principles of earlier agreements. See Howard, supra note 35 at 306; Eastmain Band, su-
pra note 35 at 518.

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

633

suing opinions on a case-by-case basis that often cannot adequately assess the larger
treaty context.

If the courts cannot effectively comprehend and implement treaties, one wonders
whether they are the best organizational or administrative bodies to entrust with this
task. In keeping with this sentiment, the Commission observed that “at some point we
may have to stop looking to the courts for assistance.”‘ It recommended that other
processes and institutions should be initiated as an alternative to the courts to com-
plete the parties’ incomplete treaty agreements.’ In this spirit, the Commission out-
lined a two-pronged approach to place the resolution of treaty disputes in a broader
policy and institutional context. First, the terms of the treaties must be capable of be-
ing revisited to implement, revise, enter, and renew these agreements.” Second, insti-
tutions need to be created that take the burden of treaty matters out of the courts and
into a more responsive, broad, and flexible framework. ‘ These recommendations
from the Report and the degree to which they have been fulfilled will now be ad-
dressed.

C. Treaty Initiatives

1. Entering, Implementing, and Renewing Treaties

The Royal Commission made numerous recommendations for the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples to enter, implement, and renew treaties: While there have been
some noteworthy and high-profile initiatives in this regard, the parties’ approaches to
treaty making have largely fallen short of the proposals put forward by the Commis-
sion. The Commission recommended that the treaty process proceed through a coor-
dinated legislative effort by enacting a new Royal Proclamation and creating a de-
tailed legislative scheme to administer the treaty process. This has not occurred. In-
stead, the provincial, federal, and First Nations governments have, for the most part,
elected to proceed with treaty efforts under province-wide or regional policy initia-
tives. While this approach may allow for a greater responsiveness to local conditions,
a policy approach does not impose the same discipline and accountability on the ac-
tors as would be found in a legislatively mandated initiative. This policy paradigm
also suggests that Aboriginal peoples are mostly being “managed” by governments as
an internal municipal concern, instead of being treated as peoples with distinct and
separate rights and responsibilities. Some may describe this process as the domestica-

9’Royal Comnission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 36.
92 Ibid at 47.
‘3Recommendations 2.2.2 to 2.2.14 (ibid at 49-87).
Recommendations 2.2.15 to 2.2.17 (ibid at 87-94).
95 See Royal Conmission, VOL 1, supra note 11.

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tion of colonialism, when Aboriginal peoples are treated as entities that must ulti-
mately be subordinated by the Canadian state.’

Even more problematic than the failure to create an executive and legislative
framework for treaty making, however, is that in many instances the contemporary
treaty process reduces, rather than enhances, Aboriginal control and choice. The
Commission did not, however, envision the purpose of treaties in this way: instead, it
noted that “[t]reaty making does not require the parties to surrender their deepest be-
liefs and rights as a precondition for practical arrangements for coexistence”‘ Treaty
making should provide a means for bringing about justice and reconciliation,’ and for
recognizing and affirming the unique relationships that Aboriginal peoples have with
their lands and the newcomers.’ Therefore treaties should not require the modification
of either society to “fit” within the framework of the other, particularly in circum-
stances where this would substantially damage the fabric or values of their respective
communities. Yet such a view of the treaty relationship does not seem adequately ful-
filled at present. In fact, in many cases it seems as if the contemporary treaty relation-
ship requires Aboriginal conformity with Canadian practices, customs, traditions, and
laws.

Indeed, while there are many positive developments in the pursuit of treaty rela-
tionships (found in examples such as the Yukon and Nunavut Land Claims Agree-
ments, the Nisga’a and Sechelt treaties, and the Manitoba Framework Agreement),
these developments may contain as much cause for concern as for celebration. Even
though these agreements certainly increase the options available to Aboriginal peo-
ples, they simultaneously limit opportunities to pursue objectives that may differ in
significant ways from those of Canada. Perhaps this circumscription is to be expected
in any negotiated process where “give and take” is found on both sides of the table.
On balance, however, Aboriginal peoples are giving up much more in this process
than they are gaining. At the same time, Canada seems to be giving up much less with
respect to its governmental structure and system of landholding. The notion of recon-
ciliation that underlies and justifies treaties, according to the Commission, is more
concerned with reconciling Aboriginal peoples to Canada than it is with reconciling
Canada to the existence of different social, cultural, and political indigenous entities
within the state. For the most part, therefore, modem treaties require that Aboriginal
peoples conform to Canadian values and law, yet they do not demand that Canada si-
multaneously conform to Aboriginal ideologies and law. The imbalance that is being
replicated in contemporary treaty relationships does not bode well for the survival of

“See Schulte-Tenckhoff, supra note 47.
97Royal Conunission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 20.
“Ibid at 37-38.
“See Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Treaty Making in the Spirit of Co-

existence: An Alternative to Extinguishment (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1995).

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J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

Aboriginal social and political regimes that differ from those found in the rest of Can-
ada. The following example illustrates this point.

The Nisga’a Final Agreement is an attempt by the governments of Canada, Brit-
ish Columbia, and the Nisga’a Tribal Council to produce a “just and equitable settle-
menf’ that “will result in reconciliation and establish a new relationship among
them”” The good faith and efforts of so many Nisga’a and Canadian citizens to ar-
rive at the Final Agreement is worthy of the highest honour and praise. The agreement
is ambitious, providing for collective Nisga’a ownership of approximately two thou-
sand square kilometres of land in the Nass Valley watershed in northwest British Co-
lumbia. The proposed treaty covers such diverse issues as land titles, minerals, water,
forests, fisheries, wildlife, governance, administration of justice, fiscal relations (in-
cluding taxation), cultural property, and dispute resolution. Many of these provisions
provide significant benefits for Nisga’a people that are far greater than anything con-
templated under the Indian Act.”‘ These benefits cannot be ignored, particularly when
they appear to have the broad support of the people for whom they were negotiated.
An appropriate question to ask, however, is whether escaping the Indian Act is the
only relevant standard for judging the agreement. This is a tricky inquiry to pursue,
particularly when there are numerous criteria by which the agreement could be meas-
ured, many of which are positive. For the purposes of this article, it is relevant to ask
whether the Final Agreement should also be judged by the scope it allows to the
Nisga’a to pursue a path to development that differs from Canada’s own pervasive
economic, social, and political structures. In my judgment, while there is much that is
laudable in the Final Agreement, there is also much that foreshadows a substantial
loss for the Nisga’a in economic, social, and political terms.’

The Nisga’a may encounter the following potential losses as a result of the Final
Agreement. Approximately 1,992 square kilometres of land that the Nisga’a will hold
as a fee simple interest in the treaty can be alienated'” and thus conceivably be un-
available for Nisga’a use or possession at some time in the future.” If any future Abo-
riginal rights are found by the courts to exist, they will be held by Canada and not the

“” Nisga’a FtzalAgreement, initialled 4 August 1998, at 1 [hereinafterFinalAgreementl.
‘O R-S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
o_ For differing opinions on the Nisga’a Agreement, see (1998199) 120 BC Studies for commentary

devoted to the agreement.

3 FmalAgreenent, supra note 100 at 32, c. 3, s. 4(a).
,”‘ While it may seem unlikely that Nisga’a people wvill lose access to their land given the govern-
ment power they will retain over alienated land, its potential future loss to them should not be entirely
dismissed. The Alaska Land Claims Settlement provided that Indians lands would be held in fee sim-
ple, and while the provisions there were given in a different context, many groups lost their lands. See
T. Berger, Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Conmnission (New York. Hill and
Wang, 1985).

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Nisga’a. 5 The structure of Nisga’a governance significantly departs from, and in
most respects replaces, the traditional House (wilps) system of government.”5 Some
important Nisga’a law-making authority will be subject to certain provincial and fed-
eral laws, either through equivalency or paramountcy provisions.’ Nisga’a institu-
tions or court decisions will ultimately be subject to the discipline of the British Co-
lumbia Supreme Court.”5 Individual Nisga’a taxation will be collected under general
revenues.” Finally, disagreements in respect of the Final Agreement are supervised by
non-Nisga’a Canadian courts.”‘ Such provisions could represent a substantial chal-
lenge to Nisga’a attempts to fashion their lives in different economic, social, and po-
litical terms from those of the majority around them. Therefore, though the treaty rep-
resents some of the highest aspirations of Aboriginal peoples and Canadians in creat-
ing a relationship of mutuality and respect, it also contains a number of elements that
potentially make Canadian visions of law, politics, and development the standard by
which Nisga’a life may ultimately be judged.

2. Treaty Institutions: Getting Out of the Courts

In addition to recommending the creation, renewal, and implementation of trea-
ties, a second prong of the Commission’s approach to treaties involved recommenda-
tions that institutions be created to remove treaty disputes from the courts and place
them in a more responsive, broad, and flexible framework.”
In particular, the Com-
mission suggested that both treaty commissions and an independent lands and treaty

‘ The Nisga’a have agreed to release to Canada any other Aboriginal rights that are not dealt with

in the Final Agreement.

If, despite this Agreement and the settlement legislation, the Nisga’a Nation has an
aboriginal right, including aboriginal title, in Canada, that is other than, or different in
attributes or geographical extent from, the Nisga’a section 35 rights as set out in this
Agreement, the Nisga’a Nation releases that aboriginal right to Canada (Final Agree-
ment, supra note 100, General Provisions, s. 26).

Many of the responsibilities of wilps will be effectively replaced by the Nisga’a Lisims Govern-
ments and Nisga’a Village Governments. While this is not expressly in the agreement, a review of the
powers of these governments makes this evident. See ibid. at 159-60, c. 11, Nisga’a Government, ss.
2-8.

’07 See ibid at 25 (incidental impact provisions), 66-68 (forestry equivalency provisions), 159 (fed-

eral/provincial “paramountcy” in environmental protection).

‘0’ See ibid at 162-63 (concerning judicial review of administrative decisions by Nisga’a Institu-

tions), 193 (concerning an appeal from Nisga’a court to the B.C. S.C.).

‘0’ See ibid at 217.
“o See ibid at 239.
. See Recommendations 2.2.15 to 2.2.17 (Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 92-94).

2001]

J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

tribunal be created.’ 2 The Commission’s objective for each institution was to produce
an administrative structure and environment that would “promote and permit treaty
processes to succeed”‘ 3 Such treaty commissions were to be established by Canada or
relevant provinces as permanent, neutral, and independent bodies that would “facili-
tate and oversee negotiations in treaty processes'” They would accomplish this goal
by fact finding, monitoring and setting standards for negotiation, conducting research,
supervising cost sharing, mediating disputes, providing remedies, and engaging in
binding or non-binding arbitration to resolve certain disputes. They would be hands-
on organizations that would ensure that the day-to-day integrity of negotiations was
maintained.

A lands and treaty tribunal, in contrast, would be more circumspect in its opera-
tion and deal with the resolution of specific claims (outstanding treaty implementation
issues) and more strictly procedural matters relative to treaty creation and renewal.'”
For specific claims, the tribunal would review federal funding, monitor the good faith
of the bargaining process, adjudicate claims, and provide remedies to Aboriginal
claimants where such action would be appropriate.”‘ Such a tribunal could, inter alia,
review the adequacy of funding, supervise the negotiation of interim relief agree-
ments, and arbitrate disputes referred to it on a consensual basis.”‘ Both of these in-
stitutions (treaty commissions and the lands and treaty tribunal) are absolutely neces-
sary for Aboriginal peoples to gain greater control of their lands and resources; fur-
thermore, the Commission strongly recommended their use. The expertise, neutrality,
and independence of treaty commissions and a treaty tribunal would assist in widen-
ing the scope of the treaty relationship.

. The Royal Commission was not the first body to recommend the creation of an Indian Claims
Commission, though the institutions proposed by the Commission contemplate broader authority than
the previously recommended treaty tribunals and commissions. An Indian Claims Commission was
proposed by the Trudeau government in the White Paper of 1969 when it intended to discontinue
most Indian rights, and an Indian Claims Commission ws created in the United States in 1946. See
K. Lysyk, “The United States Indian Claims Commission”‘ in P. Cumming & N. Mickenbzrg, eds.,
Native Rights in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Assocation, 1972) 243.

“‘ Royal Coimnission, WoL 2, supra note 12 at 90-91.
114 /bid at 92.
‘”See Recommendation 2.4.32:

The tribunal be established by federal statute operative in two areas:
a) settlement of specific claims, including those removed by the Aboriginal party from

the broader treaty-making, implementation and renemal process; and
b) treaty-making, implementation and renewal processes (ibid at 602).

‘1/bid. at 603.
117bid

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These institutions were recommended to help overcome the difficulties in the ap-
plication of interpretive principles, the assumptions underlying the growth of Crown
land use, and the presumptions about the diminishing nature of Aboriginal land use. It
is likely that the courts, Crown, Parliament, and provincial legislatures will continue
to subjugate Aboriginal peoples within their structures, leaving little room for Abo-
riginal innovation and difference, unless these more neutral and independent institu-
tions are established for treaty supervision.

First Nations and Canadian governments have recently made some progress in in-
augurating treaty institutions. There have been detailed discussions and negotiations
between the federal government and Aboriginal groups to replace the Indian Claims
Commission with an independent claims body to improve the effectiveness of the
specific claims process.”‘ While the full implementation of this claims body has re-
portedly been stalled over a disagreement about the size of the fiscal envelope for the
new tribunal, there have been some positive developments. In May 2000, for example,
the federal government announced that it would agree to limited changes in the Indian
Claims Commission that would provide greater authority in mediating disputes.
While the mandate of the Indian Claims Commission needs to be made much broader,
that discussions have occurred and that some small gains have been made indicates
that there is a recognition of the desirability of an independent institution to deal with
land claims. A lands and treaty tribunal can be considered a key institution to assisting
Aboriginal peoples in overcoming the colonial nature of the management of their
lands and resources.”9

The introduction of treaty commissions to explore issues relating to historic trea-
ties or to oversee negotiations in modem agreements has seen slightly more success.
Two significant examples representing different models of how treaty commissions
may function are apparent in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. While both treaty
commissions were introduced prior to the Report, the Commission cited them each as
examples of what could be accomplished if the parties worked together.'”0 While the
British Columbia Treaty Commission has recently had success in overseeing the suc-
cessful negotiation of its first agreement in principle with the Sechelt Nation of the

“‘ Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, News Release 1-98123, “Gathering Strength

Anniversary Marks Progress” (7 January 1999).

“9 In noting the benefits of claims commissions I am not unaware of the critique of these institutions
in the United States; see e.g. H. Rosenthal, Their Day in Court: A History of the Indian Claims Coin-
mission (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990). In designing these institutions in a Canadian context,
it is important that lessons be learned from the problems encountered in the U.S.

“2 Royal Commission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 90.

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

639

sunshine coast,” it has, on the one hand, had some difficulties in persuading the par-
ties to the process to follow some of its recommendations.”- The Saskatchewan Treaty
Commission, on the other, is an excellent example of how institutions can work to
bridge the historic and future treaty relationships of the parties.

The Office of the Treaty Commissioner in Saskatchewan was established in 1989
to review issues relating to treaty land entitlement and education in that province. It
saw some success in its initial efforts, but the office was reconstituted in 1997 with
established guiding principles” and a work plan” to discuss issues of mutual interest.
This has led to some impressive results, including the collection of Saskatchewan
treaty elders’ understandings of the relationship, and the establishment of an Ex-
ploratory Treaty Table to examine issues such as child welfare, education, shelter,
health, justice, treaty annuities, and hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering. Follow-
ing an extensive review of these issues, the Office of the Treaty Commissioner of Sas-
katchewan made some sound recommendations to the parties to help them further
build upon their relationship.” A central suggestion was that a new paradigm be cre-
ated based on the treaty partnerships rather than on the outmoded and problematic In-
dian Act.'” Building on recommendations found in the Report, the treaty commission

“‘ Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, News Release 1-98130, “Progress Continues
as Canada, British Columbia and Sechelt Release Consultation Draft Agreement in Principle” (26
January 1999).

2 From 1997 to 1998 there was a period of turmoil within the British Columbia Treaty Commis-
sion as the chief commissioner, Alex Robertson, left the commission because of failures of govern-
ment parties to respond to recommendations concerning interim measures and Aboriginal title. In
spring 2000 the Sechelt people rejected the agreement in principle negotiated by their leaders and re-
vived their land claims case against the Crown.
13 Guiding principles included statements that the treaties are a fundamental part of the relationship
between Treaty F’rst Nations in Saskatchewan and the Crown; it is desirable to arrive at a common
understanding of Treaties 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 as they apply in Saskatchewan; there are differences in
views over the content and meaning of the treaties, which the parties are committed to exploring (the
Treaty F’rst Nations believe that the treaties have not been implemented according to their spirit and
intent, including oral promises, while the government of Canada relies primarily on the written texts
of the treaties as the embodiment of the Crown’s obligations); a renewed Office of the Treaty Com-
missioner will be an effective intergovernmental mechanism to assist both parties in the bilateral pro-
cess, and in the identification and discussion of treaty and jurisdictional issues. See Statement of
Treaty Issues: Treaties as a Bridge to the Future (Saskatoon: Office of the Treaty Commissioner,
1998) c. 4 [hereinafter Statement of Treaty Issues].

“24 The Work Plan included three objectives: to build on a forward-looking relationship that began
with the signing of the treaties in Saskatchewan; to reach a better understanding of each other’s views
of the treaties and of the results expected from the exploratory treaty discussions; and to explore the
requirements and implications of treaty implementation based on the views of the two parties (ibiL).

]bid- at 71-82.

‘:This paradigm shift was suggested not only for the Crown, but also for Fst Nations that “may
wish to reconsider how they are organized politically.” In so noting, the treaty commission picked up

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stated that a new paradigm in Saskatchewan could only be initiated as the general
public became more aware of the context of the treaty relationship and the benefits
that non-Aboriginal people receive as a result of these historic agreements.'” The
treaty commission’s focus affirms the notion that non-Aboriginal peoples also have
treaty rights in the province. The treaty commission hopes that the further identifica-
tion and resolution of issues of mutual concern will proceed, such as the continuance
of common, exploratory, fiscal, and governance treaty tables, as a greater appreciation
for the treaty relationship develops through public acts of renewal and general public
education.'” The actions of the Office of the Saskatchewan Treaty Table appear to be
among the most encouraging initiatives within Canada to strengthen and renew the
treaty relationship. Unlike the courts, where little can be done in a holistic way to ad-
dress the variety of issues that need attention, treaty commissions can provide the
mechanisms for people to create and rebuild a common stock of positive experiences
through official and unofficial interactions. Such actions are critically important for
Aboriginal peoples in their acquisition and maintenance of a measure of control over
the affairs of their governance and economic development.

D. Summary

As this section has shown, the treaty relationship between Aboriginal peoples and
the Crown is being simultaneously diminished and strengthened. The courts are inter-
preting historic treaties in a manner that will, over time, significantly erode the land
base that Aboriginal peoples may require for their livelihood. Furthermore, the parties
are negotiating new treaties in which Aboriginal peoples conform largely to non-
Aboriginal structures, values, and processes. Finally, other treaty initiatives are being
managed through policy forums without the benefit of the discipline and accountabil-
ity that legislative enactment can provide. Nevertheless, there are numerous other ac-
tivities currently underway that positively attempt to renew, strengthen, implement, or
create treaty relationships. The recommendations of the Commission are thereby gen-
erally followed, as the Commission had placed treaties in a central position for build-
ing the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. In fact, many other
recent and significant initiatives have taken place. Important steps have been taken in

on the Commission’s recommendation that Aboriginal peoples reconstitute themselves as nations. See
Recommendation 2.3.7, Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 234-36. In support of its position,
the treaty commission noted, “Indian Act Bands, created by the federal government during an earlier
era, may not be appropriate building blocks for First Nations in a treaty partnership” (Statement of
Treaty Issues, supra note 123 at 73).
1’2 Statement of Treaty Issues, ibid.
“2 The Office of the Treaty Commissioner of Saskatchewan suggested such acts as placing monu-
ments at treaty-making sites, holding annual treaty gatherings, delivering programs on treaties in the
schools, exploring the reissuance of treaty suits, medals, and flags, initiating essays and scholarships
on treaties, and proclaiming a treaty awareness day (ibid. at 75).

J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

2001]
the Umbrella Final Agreement,'” the Nunavut Agreement,”‘ treaty land entitlement
the Labrador Inuit land claim and Agreement-in-
agreements in Manitoba,’-”
the initiation of treaty processes in the Treaty 8 area,”‘ and the Treaty
Principle,”
Commemoration Statement signed by the Nova Scotia Mi’kanaq, Canada, and Nova
Scotia to acknowledge their long-standing treaty relationship.”‘ These actions are sig-
nificant and substantial, illustrating the parties’ commitments to treaties as an instru-
ment for building their relationships. Notwithstanding the positive aspects of these
developments, the elements that work to constrict this relationship indicate that much
more needs to be done before the treaty relationship may be considered to be mutu-
ally beneficial for both Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.

II. Aboriginal Title

Aboriginal title received its first significant review under the Constitution Act,
1982″5 subsequent to the release of the Report. The decision of R. v. DelganutkW”
was handed down a full year after the Report’s release, and its appearance stalled cer-
tain initiatives for a time while the parties reviewed the implications of the case for
the claim of the Gitksan and
policy development. Delgamuukw considered

This agreement between the Council for the Yukon Indians, the government of Canada, and the
government of the Yukon sets out substantive benefits and a process that will guide individual Yukon
First Nations in individually negotiated agreements. See online: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
(date accessed: 5 March 2001).

‘” The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 29. Nunavut became a public govern-
ment on 1 April 1999 and is a significant exercise of public government by the Inuit of the eastern
Arctic.

.The Manitoba Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement will transfer 445,452 hectares of
land to nineteen First Nations to make up for a shortfall in allocation at the time the reserves were cre-
ated, under treaties 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10. See Backgrounder attached to Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada, News Release 2-00130, “Wuskwi Sipihk Cree Nation Acquires New Reserve Land” (28
April 2000). The Manitoba Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement wvas signed by nineteen
First Nations, Canada, and Manitoba on 29 May 1997. See online: Indian and Northern Affairs Can-
ada (date accessed: 21 November 2000).

“_ This claim by the Labrador Inuit was submitted in 1977 and an agreement in principle was an-
nounced on 18 December 1998. The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement was initialled 10 May
and Labrador (date accessed. 21 November 2000).

‘ A declaration of intent was reached vith Treaty 8 Nations to begin a treaty and self-government

process.

“‘ The Ml’kmaq of Nova Scotia have also entered into an innovative legislative arrangement to
transfer administrative jurisdiction over education in an agreement called An Act Respecting Educa-
tion on Mi’lanaq Reserves in Nova Scotia, S.N.S. 1998, c. 17 [hereinafter Mi’kmaq Education Act].

‘ Section 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.KI), 1982, c. 11.
‘ [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 153 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Delgamuuk)].

642

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[Vol. 46
Wet’suwet’en’37 peoples to Aboriginal title and self-government over approximately
fifty-eight thousand square kilometres of land in (what is now called) northwest Brit-
ish Columbia.” The decision indicated that Aboriginal title was a constitutionalized
“right to the land itself’, which could be used “for a wide variety of purposes”.”‘ The
decision halted responses to the Report because both supporters and critics of Abo-
riginal rights argued that this case made “new law and changed traditional legal con-
cepts.”” This perception required that the parties ensure that their pursuit of the
Commission’s recommendations was still in accordance with the law. After careful
review, some parties largely returned to dealing with Aboriginal title issues as they
had prior to the release of Delgamuukw,” while others argued that the decision re-
quired a dramatic change.” A detailed inspection of the judgment makes it clear that
the decision aligns with many of the assumptions that reinforce the Commission’s
treatment of Aboriginal title.’3

‘ The Wet’suwet’en are an Athabaskan-speaking people, and the Gitksan are associated with the
Tsimshian language group. Their territories are located in or near village sites on the Skeena, Babine,
and Bulkley Rivers. See G. Wa & D. Uukw, The Spirit in the Land (Gabriola, B.C.: Reflections,
1992).
13’ Hereditary Chief Alice Jeffrey summarized their action: “The Gitksan people feel we have abso-
lute title and ownership to our land” (A. Jeffrey, “Remove Not the Landmark” in F. Cassidy, ed., Abo-
riginal itle in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. The Queen (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books,
1992) 58 at 61).

“9 Delgamuukw, supra note 136 at paras. 140, 117.
“4 See e.g. L. Grindlay, “Native Bands Rejoice at Top Court’s Ruling” The Vancouver Province (12
December 1997) A4. See also A. Purvis, “Our Home and Native Land”
ime Magazine 150:26 (22
December 1997) 18. Other Aboriginal people also expressed the opinion that this decision was a fun-
damental change. Chief Joe Mathias of the F’rst Nations Summit, an organization representing a ma-
jority of First Nations in British Columbia, similarly expressed his opinion that the decision is a major
change, stating it “restores the rule of law and justice for First Nations” (P Barnsley, “New Trial Or-
der in Delgamuukw v. B.C.” Windspeaker 15:9 (January 1998) 2). Furthermore, non-Aboriginal peo-
ple generally not supportive of Aboriginal rights also noted the changes brought about by Delga-
muuklv. See e.g. G. Gibson, “The Land-Claims Ruling Is a Breathtaking Mistake” The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (16 December 1997) A21. One columnist reported that the court “drastically under-
mined the Crown ownership of 94 per cent of the land mass of B.C” (T. Lautens, “How to Make In-
dian Land Claims Go Away” The Vancouver Sun (28 February 1998) A23). See also T. Morley, “A
Distant Court, An Imprudent Decision” The Vancouver Sum (20 December 1997) A21; M.H. Smith,
“What the Court Ignored in Delgamuukw” The Globe and Mail (7 January 1998) A15.
“‘ E.g. Premier Glen Clark commented that “to their credit” the Nisga’a did not change their posi-
tion on their treaty as a result of Delgamuukv (G. Clark, Address (Faculty of Law, University of To-
ronto, 15 October 1998) [unpublished]).

141 See e.g. K. McNeil, Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90’s: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got it

Right? (Toronto: Robarts Centre for Canadian Studies, 1998).

141 See J. Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia”

(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ. 537.

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J. BORROWS – ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

643

For example, both the Commission and Delganuukt’ suggested that negotiations
were more appropriate than litigation to resolve issues of Aboriginal title. The Com-
mission wrote that these negotiations should be placed in a treaty framework and re-
solved in a principled way. It observed that “[n]egotiation is the best and most appro-
priate way to address these issues, and land claims policies should be replaced by
treaty processes, primarily under the auspices of regional treaty commissions, with
Aboriginal Lands and Treaties Tribunals performing supplementary functions.”‘ ” The
Commission’s linkage of Aboriginal title and treaties, facilitated by a process of leg-
islatively enacted commissions and tribunals, draws upon its discussion concerning
the centrality of treaties. In dealing with issues of Aboriginal title, the Commission
recommended enlarging the inadequate land base of Aboriginal peoples in recogni-
tion of the historic wrongs that had been perpetrated against them,'” and providing an
economic base on which they could build their communities.'” In line with the Com-
mission’s approach to treaty issues, it envisioned that the best way to deal with Abo-
riginal land was “through legitimate processes of consultation and negotiation en-
shrined in legislation”.'” The Commission further developed its reliance on negotia-
tions and attempted to expand the scope of these negotiations by defining Aboriginal
title in a broad and generous way. Specifically, the Commission observed:

The law of Aboriginal tide provides a firm foundation for contemporary pro-
tection of Aboriginal lands and resources. It imposes extensive obligations on
the Crown to protect them. These duties of the Crown oblige Parliament to en-
act fair and effective institutional processes to facilitate negotiated solutions.
The law requires government not to rely simply on the public interest as justili-
cation for limiting the exercise of Aboriginal rights but to act in the interests of
Aboriginal peoples when negotiating arrangements concerning their lands and
resources.

148

In support of the central supposition that the law of Aboriginal tide could support a
negotiation-based regime to increase the Aboriginal land base, the Commission de-

‘” Royal Commission, oL 2, supra note 12 at 430.
‘1 The Commission noted, however, that efforts to increase the Aboriginal land base extend beyond
remedies and entitlements. It observed, ‘Expanding the Aboriginal land base is not just about hon-
ouring past obligations or paying a moral debt to Aboriginal people. It is about laying a firm consen-
sual foundation for a new relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, one of fair
sharing of Canada’s enormous land mass, of mutual reconciliation and paceful co-existence” (ibid).
‘”The Commission noted in this regard that “[w]ithout adequate lands and resources, Aboriginal

peoples will be pushed to the edge of economic, cultural and political extinction” (ibid at 574).

“‘Ibid at 570.
‘Ibi at 568.

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voted a lengthy chapter to issues of lands and resources in the second volume of its
Report.’

Delgamuukw supports the Commission’s notion that negotiation is the best way to
resolve issues of Aboriginal title. La Forest J. indicated that “the best approach in
these kinds of cases [dealing with title] is a process of negotiation and reconciliation
that properly characterizes the complex and competing interests at stake:”‘” Similarly,
Lamer C.J.C. wrote that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides a solid base
on which negotiations about Aboriginal rights can be built, observing that the “Crown
is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in
good faith””‘ The decision as a whole therefore seems to support the idea that the
parties should resolve the issue of Aboriginal title through negotiation. Indeed, the
sending of Delgamuukw back to trial due to a defect in the pleadings and the expan-
sion of the rules of evidence to incorporate Aboriginal oral history indicate the un-
certainties involved in litigation that could make negotiation more attractive for both
parties. Furthermore, the decision’s expanded scope of Aboriginal title as a “right to
exclusive use and occupation of the land ‘
in areas where the province has conven-
tionally considered itself as holding full Crown title may also create some incentives
for the province to enter into negotiations. On the other hand, that Aboriginal title can
be infringed by the provincial government through “compelling and substantial” leg-
islative objectives that can justify the infringement of Aboriginal title” may bring
Aboriginal groups to the table. Thus, negotiation of title through a meaningful process
seems to be a theme that runs through both the Commission’s and the Supreme
Court’s writings on Aboriginal title, while illustrating the importance of treaties to the
resolution of this issue.

A. Congruence: Aboriginal Title, the Commission, and the Supreme

Court

In addition to their similar emphases on negotiation, the Commission and the Su-
preme Court seem to characterize Aboriginal title similarly. First, the Commission de-
scribed Aboriginal title as a “real interest in land that contemplates a range of rights
with respect to lands and resources,” which is “recognized and affirmed by section

“‘ Supra note 12, c. 4. This chapter covered concerns such as the significance of land to Aboriginal
peoples, the loss of most of this land to settlers through misunderstanding and injustice, and the in-
adequacy of current federal claims processes to deal with the loss that Aboriginal peoples experi-
enced.

“o Delgatnuukw, supra note 136 at para. 207.
… Ibid at para. 186.
‘2Ibid. at para. 117.

“‘ Ibid. at para. 161.

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J. BORROWS-ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

35(1)” ‘” Similarly, the Court also characterized Aboriginal title under subsection
35(1) as a substantial interest in land: “the right to exclusive use and occupation of the
land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes which need not be aspects of
those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which are integral to distinctive
aboriginal cultures ” ‘ Second, the Commission stated that the “Crown has a special
fiduciary obligation to protect the interests of Aboriginal people, including Aboriginal
‘ In the same manner, the Court held that the “fiduciary relationship between
title”
the Crown and aboriginal peoples demands that aboriginal interests be placed first:””
Third, the Commission found that the “Crown has an obligation to reconcile the inter-
ests of the public with Aboriginal title””‘ In a parallel description, the Court also
noted that subsection 35(1) is directed at the “reconciliation” of Aboriginal prior oc-
cupation with the interests of other Canadians under the sovereignty of the Crown:
“Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the reconciliation of aboriginal societies
with the broader political community of which they are part.”‘ The Court then pro-
vided a test to assist the government in reconciling the interests of the public with
Aboriginal title.

The Commission’s concept of Aboriginal title was clearly influential for the Court
in Delgamuuklv: the Report was cited several times in the decision. In some respects
the Commission and the Court’s definition of Aboriginal title articulates a substan-
tially greater interest than previous cases had recognized. This creates the potential for
greater Aboriginal access to land and for stronger regimes that may allow for greater
innovation in the allocation of lands and resources. This would support the Commis-
sion’s recommendations for an increased Aboriginal land base and greater Aboriginal
control over that land. As such, the decision partially overcomes the historical bias
against Aboriginal land holdings that had been present in earlier cases.

In St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber v. R., Lord Watson wrote that the tenure of
the Indians was a personal and usufructuary rightW ‘ This narrow view of Aboriginal
tile largely prevailed through the first one hundred years of Canada’s history. While
this view of title was somewhat broadened in Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.)”‘ in
1973, and questioned in ?. v. Guerin,”‘ it was still unclear how broadly this interest
would be characterized until Delgamnuuk-w was decided. The notion of Aboriginal title

” Royal Coimnission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 573.
” Delgarnuubv, supra note 136 at para. 117.
‘5 Royal Comnzission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 573.
’57Delganuakv, supra note 136 at para. 162.
‘ Royal Coimnissio, WL 2, supra note 12 at 573.

Delgamuuhw, supra note 136 at para. 161.

‘6 (1888), 14 A.C. 46 at 54 (P.C.).
161 [1973] S.C.R. 313,34 D.L.R. (3d) 145.
‘ [1984] 2 S.C.I 335, 13 D.L.IR (4th) 321 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.].

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that largely prevailed until Delgamuukw produced a regime that discounted Aborigi-
nal title, and did not create many incentives to deal creatively with Aboriginal peo-
ples. The broader characterization of the nature of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukwv
supported the Commission’s view that Crown-Aboriginal negotiations should support
the provision of “lands that are sufficient in size and quality to foster Aboriginal eco-
nomic self-reliance and cultural and political autonomy”‘ ” Furthermore, the Court’s
view that infringements of Aboriginal title can only be seemingly justified where
governments “accommodate” the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the develop-
ment of resources, conferral of fee simples, and reduction of economic barriers to
Aboriginal peoples use of their land”4 also strengthens the Commission’s recommen-
dations. These holdings could support the regime recommended by the Commission
by which land would be selected and allocated on the basis of different categories that
provide different degrees of control to the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.'” Thus, the
way that Delgamuukw accommodates the recommendations of the Commission cre-
ates an environment that fosters the implementation of the Report, and blazes a trail
away from assimilation.

B. Differing Views: The Incongruity between the Commission and

the Court

As outlined in the Report, the Commission’s view of Aboriginal title is attractive
and feasible, yet presents potential problems for implementation in two ways. First,
the Commission’s characterization of Aboriginal title is incomplete: it fails adequately
to account for this law’s more problematic aspects that could work to undermine the
enlargement of an Aboriginal land base. Second, Delgamuukw presents other unfore-
seen challenges to the use of Aboriginal title as a vehicle for expanding the Aboriginal
land base that the Commission did not fully consider. While positive in many re-
spects, Delgamuukw has some elements that could pose significant challenges for
Aboriginal peoples as they extricate themselves from a colonial relationship while in-
creasing their land base. The qualities of incompleteness and subsequent develop-
ments can be dealt with together when exploring the current challenges in expanding
the Aboriginal land base by relying on the issues relating to Aboriginal tide.

“3Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 574.
‘6 Delganiuv, supra note 136.
” Recommendation 2.4.10:

Negotiations aim to describe the territory in question in terms of three categories of
land. Using these three categories will help to identify, as thoroughly and precisely as
possible, the rights of each of the parties with respect to lands, resources and govern-
ance (Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 581).

Aboriginal peoples would have full rights of ownership and jurisdiction of Category I lands, Category
II lands would facilitate co-management regimes, and Category III lands would be Crown lands.

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J BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

The Commission did not adequately take account of the fact that Aboriginal title
prior to Delganuukiv was described as a burden on Crown title. This concept of title
was reinforced in Delgainuukv and presents some challenges to the expansion of an
Aboriginal land base that the Commission did not address. The Court wrote that
“Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title:”‘ Since “aboriginal title
crystallized at the time sovereignty was asserted,” the Crown’s assumption of this as-
pect of the property relationship was justified “because it does not make sense to
speak of a burden on the underlying title until that title existed:”” The Crown’s tauto-
logical assumption of underlying title limits Aboriginal choice in a most profound
way because it has been interpreted to require the reconciliation of Aboriginal title
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, and therefore, Crown use of the land.” Un-
derlying Crown title diminishes Aboriginal title (and could work to prevent the Com-
mission’s recommendations for the expansion of the size and Aboriginal control of a
land base) because most Crown uses may be sufficient to displace Aboriginal use. For
example, the Court noted, since

distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a broader social,
political and economic community, over which the Crown is sovereign, there
are circumstances in which, in order to pursue objectives of compelling and
substantial importance to that community as a whole (taking into account the
fact that aboriginal societies are part of that community), some limitation of
those rights will be justifiable. Aboriginal rights are a necessary part of the rec-
onciliation of aboriginal societies with the broader political community of
which they are part; limits placed on those rights are, where the objectives fur-
thered by those limits are of suffcient importance to the broader community as
a whole, equally a necessary part of that reconciliation ‘-

This excerpt demonstrates how limits can be placed on Aboriginal title to ostensibly
reconcile this interest with the broader social, political, and economic interests of the
entire Canadian community. The Commission did not foresee the development of a
concept of Aboriginal title that was so fully and unfairly referenced to the interests of
others. Even though the Court was clear in stating that the provinces could not extin-
guish Aboriginal title through their activities, it did allow for a broad infringement of
the Aboriginal interest in land. The Commission did not have this development in
sight when writing about how the concept of Aboriginal title could support the broad-
ening of an Aboriginal land base. In fact, the Commission indicated that “[t]he law

” Delganuulv, supra note 136 at para. 145.
1671ibiL
6/bid at para. 165.
” Ibid. at para. 161, quoting R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 at para. 73, 137 D.LR. (4th) 648.

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requires government not to rely simply on the public interest as justification for lim-
iting the exercise of Aboriginal rights.”

Unfortunately, the Court did not view the issue of public interest as a justification
for limiting Aboriginal rights in the same light as the Commission. In fact, contrary to
the Commission, the Court articulated the idea that infringement of Aboriginal title
could occur for a broad range of non-Aboriginal legislative objectives:

In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the
infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad. Most of these objectives can be
traced to the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by abo-
riginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty, which entails the rec-
ognition that “distinctive aboriginal societies exist within, and are a part of, a
broader social, political and economic community”. In my opinion, the devel-
opment of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general
economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the
environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and the set-
tlement of foreign populations to support those aims, are the kinds of objectives
that are consistent with this purpose and, in principle, can justify the infringe-
ment of aboriginal title.”‘

This justificatory test for the infringement of Aboriginal title conflicts with the Com-
mission’s theory of Aboriginal title. For the Court, colonialism is a justifiable in-
fringement of Aboriginal title (as if the interference with another nation’s independent
legal rights were a minor imposition or at the fringes of the parties’ relationship). It
permits the (re)settlement of foreign populations to support the expansion of non-
indigenous societies. The Commission did not take this view. It never envisioned such
a broad view of infringement. Calling colonization “infringement” is an immense un-
derstatement. While these “infringements” must be “consistent with the special fidu-
ciary relationship between the Crown and aboriginal peoples,”‘”
the effect of the
Court’s treatment of “infringement” is to make Aboriginal land rights subject to Can-

17o Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 568.

‘. Delgamuukw, supra note 136 at para. 165. In commenting on this paragraph, it has been ob-
served that “[t]he fact that many of these objectives fall within provincial jurisdiction suggests that
‘how’ not ‘whether’ rights have been infringed, is the proper focus of future discussions between the
parties” (C. Bell, “New Directions in the Law of Aboriginal Rights” (1998) 77 Can. Bar Rev. 36 at
62). For a critique of the infringement of constitutional Aboriginal rights, see K. McNeil, “How Can
Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples Be Justified?” (1997) 8 Const. . 33.

‘ Delgamuukwv, ibid. at para. 162.

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649

ada’s objectives.'” This doctrine does not augment Aboriginal choice, and instead cre-
ates pressures towards assimilation.”

The Commission did not foresee the overarching power that the Court’s concept
of title would grant to the federal and provincial governments. In light of the current
law one may question whether the Commission’s recommendations are persuasive
and accurate enough to convince governments to expand Aboriginal lands. This ques-
tion is even more pertinent when it appears as though governments can continue to
diminish Aboriginal interests as long as they have a valid legislative objective and
pursue this activity in accordance with their fiduciary duty. The many interim steps
that the Commission states that the government could undertake to remedy the lack of
Aboriginal access to land may therefore be undercut by the Court’s concept of Abo-
riginal title in Delgamukw One may wonder, for example, whether this conception
of title subverts the government’s legal incentives to provide Aboriginal access to
natural resources and co-management regimes'” when its power may be so strong as
compared to that of Aboriginal peoples. This query leads to a discussion of the fiduci-
ary duty of the Crown when infringing Aboriginal rights. A fuller analysis and under-
standing of this obligation may explain the incentives that the government could have
for expanding Aboriginal land rights.

III. Fiduciary Duties

When the Crown infringes Aboriginal title while pursuing a valid legislative ob-
jective, it must do so “in a manner consistent with the special fiduciary relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples”.” The Court has found that the applica-
tion of this obligation requires “different articulations of the fiduciary duty” according
to the variety of ‘legal and factual context[s]” in which issues of Aboriginal rights are
framed.'” The Commission was of the view that the Crown’s fiduciary dudes towards
Aboriginal peoples “requires governments to take active steps to protect Aboriginal
lands and resources.”
It found that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and in-

‘””[B]oth the federal and provincial governments” can exercise this power (ibid at par. 160).
‘”The pressure created by the assertion of sovereignty places Aboriginal people in a dependent
feudal relationship with the Crown. The United States Supreme Court observed in Cherokee Nation v
Georgia:

They have in Europe sovereign and semi-sovereign states and states of doubtful sover-
eignty. But this states [Indian Nations], if it be a states, is still a grade below them all:
for not to be able to alienate without permission of the remainder-man or lord, places
them in a state of feudal dependence (30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 at 26-27, 8 L Ed. 25 (1831)).

‘”Royal Coimnission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 632-80.
’76Delgamuulv, supra note 136 at para. 162.
n Ibid
‘”Royal Coimnission, VL 2, supra note 12 at 565.

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temational legal norms “impose extensive positive obligations on governments to rec-
ognize and protect a wide array of rights with respect to lands and resources:”‘” The
Commission stated that these aspects of law underscored the idea that the relationship
between the parties is “nation-to-nation” and thus central to the “constitutional recog-
nition and aflirmation of Aboriginal rights”.”‘ Once again, while there are aspects of
the Commission’s articulation of the fiduciary relationship that are consistent with the
reasoning in Delgamuukw, other aspects are inconsistent with the decision. Ulti-
mately, a view of the decision can be taken that supports the position of the Commis-
sion, despite the inconsistencies that seem to exist between them.

A. Inconsistencies between the Commission and Court

As noted, the Commission seemed to define the fiduciary duty in a manner that
supported a horizontal, “nation-to-nation” relationship between the Crown and Abo-
riginal peoples. This led the Commission to suggest that the Crown had a duty to
protect Aboriginal lands and resources,”‘ which provided the justification for many
recommendations to return the land to Aboriginal control. There are, however, other
conceptions of the fiduciary relationship evident in Delgamuukw that may not be as
favourable to Aboriginal peoples, because they seem to be based on a more hierarchi-
cal notion of the parties’ relationship. The Court seems to place Aboriginal peoples in
a dependent relationship with the Crown in its description of the content of Aboriginal
title and its inherent limits.

For example, in dealing with the content of Aboriginal title, the Court described
this interest as “a right to land itself’,”‘ which was “held by Her Majesty for the use
and benefit” of the Aboriginal group itself.”‘ While the Court found that Aboriginal
people may use their title lands “for a variety of purposes”,” that this title is held by
another makes it a subordinate and dependent interest.” The Commission did not

179 Ibid
“‘Ibid
“‘ See the work of Len Rotman, who also advocates a more horizontal conception of the Crown-
Aboriginal fiduciary relationship: L.I. Rotman, Parallel Paths: Fiduciary Doctrine and the Crown-
Native Relationship in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996).

.Delgamuuklv, supra note 136 at para. 140.
‘” Ibid at para. 121.
‘”Ibid at para. 117.
‘ This position makes Aboriginal peoples analogous to serfs, dependent on their lord to hold their
land in their best interests. Feudal tenure gave important rights to the lord, vis-t-vis the tenant, that are
analogous to the Crown-Aboriginal relationship:

Rights are dependent upon a lord seen as having total control of his lordship. A tenant
is in by the lord’s allocation. He can have no more by way of title, unless it is some ob-
ligation on the lord to keep him in, or to admit his successors. He cannot by his own

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characterize the relationship in this way. There is no nation-to-nation articulation in
the Court’s description of Aboriginal tide as there had been in the Commission’s rec-
ommendations. The Court further distanced itself from the Commission and en-
trenched Aboriginal peoples’ colonial relationship to Canada when it found, quoting
that “the same legal principles governed the aboriginal interest in reserve
Guerin,
lands and lands held pursuant to aboriginal title. “‘” While the Court was careful to
note that Aboriginal title is not “restricted to those uses which are elements of a prac-
tice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group
claiming the right,”1 ‘ the analogy of title to reserves is a prescription for Aboriginal
assimilation. The idea that “the Indian interest in the lands is the same in both cases'””
does not enlarge Aboriginal title in the way that the Commission suggests. In fact, the
similarity of reserve and title land potentially restricts Aboriginal title because reserve
lands are heavily regulated interests.” The Court’s description does not even approach
the Commission’s view of the egalitarian nature of the relationship. Even though the
content of Aboriginal title encompasses “a broad notion of use and possession …
which incorporates a reference to the present-day needs of aboriginal communities,”‘
all such uses occur within the context of the Crown’s position as lord over the land.
The Court’s expansive description of the content of Aboriginal title “for the general
welfare of the band” is betrayed by the narrow construction upon which it rests. It
gives Aboriginal people broad rights over a limited, diminished interest in land. As
such, the Commission’s view of the relationship between the Crovn and Aboriginal
peoples is problematically implemented by the Court in DelganmuuLit

Furthermore, the inherent limitations that the Court finds attached to Aboriginal
lands reveal their dependent character, which is also contrary to the Commission’s
view. For example, in DelgamnuukN’ the chief justice observed that the “content of abo-
riginal title contains an inherent limit that lands held pursuant to title cannot be used

transaction confer whatever title he has upon another he can only surrender it to the
lord who may then admit another And he cannot by himself engage in dispute about
the land: in principle, the lord must decide who is to be his tenant (S.F.C. Milsom,
Historical Foundations of the Conunon Lm, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1981) at
100).

“1 Supra note 162.
“‘Delgamnuuklv, supra note 136 at para. 120, Lamer CJ.C.
‘ Ibid at para. 124. For a critique of the restriction on Aboriginal rights by reference to Aboriginal
pre-contact practices, see R. Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s lm der Peet
Trilogy: Naive Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993; B. Morse, “Permafrost
Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajevoi’ (1997) 42 McGill
L. 1011; J. Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada. Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster”
(1998) 22 Am. Indian L. Rev. 37.

‘9 Delganuutv, ibid
“/bid. at para. 121.

k’Ibid at paras. 119-21.

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in a manner that is irreconcilable with the nature of the claimants’ attachment to those
lands. “” This restriction significantly undermines Aboriginal title because it compels
Aboriginal people to surrender their lands to the Crown if they want to use them for
certain “non-Aboriginal” purposes. While the Court was anxious not to restrict Abo-
riginal land rights “to those activities which have been traditionally carried out on
it”,’
it is difficult to read the Court’s inherent limits any other way. It held that the
“special bond” that makes the land part of the group’s distinctive culture could pro-
vide a justification to prevent Aboriginal development if the group occupies the land
“in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a [special Aboriginal] use”’94 These
limits are imposed on Aboriginal title lands because proof of the occupation “is de-
termined by reference to the activities that have taken place on the land and the uses to
which the land has been put by the particular group ‘ “”‘ In such instances, if “aborigi-
nal peoples wish to use their lands in a way that aboriginal title does not permit, then
they must surrender those lands and convert them into non-title lands to do so.”‘

Under this characterization, the Crown is in the position of being able to receive
and re-designate Aboriginal lands if they are used in non-inherent ways. It is inappro-
priate for the Crown to be in such a position.”‘ The subordination of Aboriginal inter-
ests in such transactions is never effectively justified by either the Commission or the
Court. That Aboriginal peoples would have to “alienate” or “surrender” their lands to

… Ibid. at para. 125.
“‘ Ibid. at para. 132. An example of the increased powers Aboriginal people might enjoy relative to
participation and consultation in lands and resources is found in Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. v. Canada
(1997), 149 D.L.R. (4th) 519, 134 F.T.R. 246 (T.D.), where the minister of fisheries and oceans’ allo-
cation of fish was set aside because it did not conform to consultation requirements set out in the
Nunavut Agreement. While this case may be distinguished from issues of title because consultation
between the minister and the Aboriginal group was mandated by agreement, one might also find
courts taking a similar stance relative to title given Delgamuukw’s strong requirement for Aboriginal
participation where tide is found to exist. If British Columbia courts were to review ministerial deci-
sion making as the Federal Court did, resource allocation and management in the province would
eventually undergo substantial changes.

19′ “For example, if occupation is established with reference to the use of the lands as a hunting
ground” it cannot strip mine it; “Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of
its ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to destroy that rela-
tionship (e.g. by developing it in such a way that the bond is destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a
parking lot)” (Delgamuukw, ibid. at para. 128).

“‘ Ibid. These “elements of aboriginal title”, referring to the traditional activities and use of the land
by aboriginal people, “create” the “inherent limitation on the uses to which the land, over which such
title exists, may be put’ (ibid).

‘9’Ibid. at para. 131.
‘9” When did Aboriginal peoples in British Columbia ever agree to the Crown being able to receive
and redesignate their lands if they were used for “unauthorized” (as defined by non-Aboriginal courts)
purposes?

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653

the Crown to use them for these certain purposes indicates that the Court, despite its
claims otherwise, defines the content of Aboriginal title by reference to those activi-
ties that have traditionally been carried out on the lands, and by such definition makes
Aboriginal title an inferior interest. Establishing title by reference to specific practices
seems to be potentially inconsistent with the Court’s later statement that “aboriginal
title differs from other aboriginal rights … [which are] defined … in terms of activi-
ties”” If “Aboriginal title … is a right to the land itself,” the Court’s description of its
inherent limits in terms of activities may well place Aboriginal peoples in a “legal
straightjackef’ with respect to their uses, and the polity with which they deal with
these interests.'” All this is contrary to the Commission’s theory and application of the
fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, and works to di-
minish the force of its recommendations. Nevertheless, there is room in the Court’s
decision for characterizing the fiduciary relationship in a way that expands Aboriginal
control over lands to which Aboriginal peoples could claim title.

B. Bridging Delgamuukw and the Commission

Despite the inconsistencies between the Commission’s and the Court’s characteri-
zations of the relationship, there are points of similarity that might help to bridge the
problems identified in the last section. Both seem to view the fiduciary relationship as
requiring substantial protection of Aboriginal interests in land, even if they differ on
the foundation of this relationship. For example, both the Commission and the Court
indicate that the Crown’s obligation to Aboriginal peoples “requires the government
to act in the interests of Aboriginal peoples when negotiating arrangements concern-
ing their lands and resources.’

The Report indicated that governmental duties with respect to Aboriginal peoples
have been recognized as placing the Crown under a positive obligation to protect
Aboriginal lands and resources.”‘ The Court also viewed the fiduciary relationship in
this manner. It recognized that the government had a positive obligation to protect
Aboriginal title lands. In particular, the Court noted that the fiduciary duty in relation
to Aboriginal title would have to take account of three elements: “First, aboriginal title
encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of land; second, aboriginal title
encompasses the right to choose to what uses [the] land can be put …; and third, that
lands held pursuant to aboriginal title have an inescapable economic component.” –

‘”Delganuukv, supra note 136 at para. 140.
‘IbL One can anticipate numerous judicial contests concerning the “elements of aboriginal title”

that prohibit its use “in a way that aboriginal title does not permitf’ (ibid. at para. 132).

oRoyal Coimnission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 566.
I&bi at 568.
Delgamuukiv, supra note 136 at para. 166, Lamer CJ.C.

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These elements of the relationship move the Court’s and the Commission’s descrip-
tions of the fiduciary relationship much closer together than had their characteriza-
tions of the source of that fiduciary relationship.

The emphasis on the similarity between the Court’s and the Commission’s de-
scriptions of the fiduciary duty, rather than on the difference, lends greater support to
the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. For example, the Court
notes that the exclusive nature of Aboriginal title might entail the accommodation of
both the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the development of resources and the
conferral of fee simples, licences, and leases that “reflect the prior occupation of abo-
riginal title lands” and reduce “economic barriers to aboriginal uses of their landsY”
This view is consistent with the Commission’s position that lands be “purchased”‘ by
and “returned”‘
to Aboriginal peoples and that they participate in and secure access
fishing,’ hunting outfitting,’ and water.”‘ The Court’s
to forest resources,’ mining,
view of Aboriginal participation may even support the co-management and jurisdic-
tion regimes recommended by the Commission.”‘ Furthermore, the Court’s notion
that Aboriginal title includes a right to “choose to what ends a piece of land can be
put’
could support the Commission’s ideas about how consultation would require a
specific “protocol” to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are consulted with respect to de-
cisions made by governments concerning their lands. Finally, the Court’s notion that
Aboriginal title has an “inescapably economic aspect”” could lend support to the
Commission’s idea that compensation should be negotiated as “partial restitution for
past and present exploitation of the nation’s traditional territory, including removal of
resources as well as disruption of Aboriginal livelihood'”” Despite the differential
treatment of the duty’s source and their conflicting ideas about the nature of Aborigi-
nal title, the parallels between the Court’s and Commission’s descriptions of the fidu-
ciary duty’s application with respect to the protection of Aboriginal interests in land
support the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.

Therefore, when considering issues of Aboriginal title and fiduciary duties, it is
clear that an approach could be taken that would give Aboriginal peoples greater con-

Ibid at para. 167.
Royal Commission, VoL 2, supra note 12 at 627.
Ibid at 629.

6Ibid

at 641-42.

Ibid at 645.
Ibid. at 654-55.
Ibid. at 659-60.
210 Ibid. at 664-65.
2, Ibid at 679-80.
2. Delgamuuv, supra note 136 at para. 168, Lamer CJ.C.
2. Ibid at para. 169.
24 Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 575.

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655

trol over lands and resources. Exclusivity, choice, and compensation are elements of
Aboriginal title that broaden Aboriginal access, because they require that the govern-
ment protect and significantly accommodate Aboriginal interests. Both the Court and
Commission demonstrate support for these ideas. Of course, the fiduciary relationship
not only allows for greater Aboriginal control in cases of Aboriginal title, but also
extends to all aspects of the relationship of Aboriginal peoples with the Crown. The
analysis of the obligations arising out of this relationship would vary, however, ac-
cording to the specific context of the relationship!’ Nevertheless, it is clear that the fi-
duciary relationship has continuing relevance for Aboriginal lands and resources in
Canada, even if some troubling concerns remain with respect to the diminishment of
Aboriginal choice due to the potentially dependent nature of the relationship.

IV. Metis Land and Resource Issues

The Metis Nation can fairly be regarded as a founding nation of Canada. The ex-
istence of the Metis in the west prior to Confederation was central to the economic
development and expansion of the east!’ Without their presence, the fur trade would
have floundered, and political and economic development on the St. Lawrence River
and eastern Great Lakes would have been severely delayed or restricted. The Metis
Nation was also crucial to ushering western and northern Canada into Confederation
and increasing the wealth of the nation by opening the prairies to agriculture and set-
tlement. These developments could not have occurred without their intercession. The
Dominion Parliament’s unilateral attempt to survey the old northwest territories
around the Red River in 1869 ” was strongly resisted by the local Metis settlements.”‘
The Metis did not feel it was appropriate that they should become a part of the Do-
minion without their participation and consent. Therefore, after blocking the survey-
ors from their work, and thereby preventing Canada’s expansion into this region, the
Metis compelled the government of Sir John A. Macdonald to recognize their interests.

2″ E.g. issues relating to the surrender of Indian lands were also the subject of discussion in
Senialunoo Indian Band v. Canada (1997), [1998] 1 EC. 3, 148 D.LR, (4th) 523 (CA). This time,
however, the Court’s attention was focussed on the Crown’s fiduciary obligations that attached to sur-
renders of lands under the Indian Act, supra note 101, ss. 37, 38. This case is significant because it
demonstrates the flexibility that courts continue to demonstrate where there is an actionable breach of
the Crown’s fiduciary duty and where the interests of justice appear to demand it. See E. Meehan &
E. Stewart, “Developments in Aboriginal Law: The 1995-96 Term” (1997) 8 Supreme Court LRL
(2d) 1 at 4-6, commenting on Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344, 130
D.L.R_ (4th) 193.

2″6 See eg. G.EG. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A History of the Riel Rebellions (Toronto:
Longmans, Green, 1936).
217 The Dominion’s unilateral attempt to add the old northwest to Canada was legislated in the
Rupert’s LandAct, 1868 (U.K.), 31 & 32 Vict., c. 105.
2 See M. Siggins, Riel: A Life of Rerolution (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1994).

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In particular, the Red River Metis formed a provisional government that was
given authority to negotiate the terms of union with Ottawa and bring the area into
Confederation. Representatives of this government travelled to Ottawa as delegates of
the Metis people to negotiate conditions for the entry of western Canada. They
brought a locally developed Bill of Rights that expressed their demands. The negotia-
tions were challenging, but an agreement was reached and its terms were embodied in
the Manitoba Act, 18 70.”9 The democratic legitimacy of this process was sealed
through the Metis provisional government’s acceptance of the agreement before the
Dominion and Imperial Parliament’s statutory endorsement that made it part of the
constitutional law of Canada.’ The people of the Metis Nation regard the Manitoba
Act, 1870 as embodying a treaty that recognizes and affirms their nation-to-nation re-
lationship with Canada, even though they argue that its provisions concerning land
and resources have not been fulflled.”

The Commission recommended that outstanding Metis land and resource issues
be resolved through negotiation on a nation-to-nation basis.
In this respect the
Commission did not differ from the approaches outlined in the earlier sections of this
article. The Commission came to this conclusion by showing that the Metis, while
distinct from First Nations and Inuit peoples, should nevertheless have many of the
same criteria for recognition applied to their interests that are used for other Aborigi-
nal peoples in Canada. This would enable them to resist assimilative pressures and
pursue objectives appropriate to their culture that may differ from those of Canada.
The Commission made out the legal case for differential Metis land and resource use
through three arguments under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. These argu-
ments were based on the finding that the promises made to the Manitoba Metis and
embedded in the Constitution were never fulfilled, and that their land rights were se-
verely eroded through statutory provisions and administrative processes imposed on
them against their wishes.

First, the Commission noted that Metis people may have a claim to land and re-
sources because their title and rights were not extinguished by the Manitoba Act, 1870

2,9 (U.K.), 32 & 33 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. H, No. 8. The act provided for the
creation of the Province of Manitoba, French-language rights, protection for settled and common
lands, distribution of 1.4 millions acres of land to Metis children, and amnesty for those who partici-
pated in the provisional government.

The Imperial Parliament passed the Constitution Act, 1871 (U.K.), 34 & 35 Vict., c. 28, reprinted
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 11, to give effect to the provisions embodied in the Manitoba Act, 1870.
“‘ See R. v. Dumont (1988), 52 Man. R. (2d) 291, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 25 (C.A.), rev’d, [1990] 1 S.C.R.

279, 67 D.L.R. (4th) 159 [hereinafter Dumont].

= Royal Cormnission, Vol. 4, supra note 19 at 200.

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or the Dominion Lands Act, 1879.’ They wrote that that since the acts “contained
provisions that might be read as extinguishment measures, their legal efficacy is open
to doubt owing to ambiguous wording and the massive irregularities involved in their
negotiation and administration:” Clem Chartier, a Metis leader, expressed this same
conclusion even more strongly when he wrote, “[T]he government allowed gross in-
justices to be perpetrated against the half-breed people through the implementation of
a [land] grant and scrip system, leaving the half-breeds landless:” The effect of this
dispossession led the Commission to its second observation, that Metis people may
have a claim to land and resources because of the fiduciary obligation that the Crown
owes to Metis people to act in their best interests. If, as the Commission suggested,
Metis rights were extinguished due to irregularities in the negotiation and administra-
tion of their land and resource rights, this would constitute a breach of the Dominion’s
fiduciary duty. Finally, the Commission suggested that Metis people have specific le-
gal rights to lands and resources through particular provisions of these otherwise
flawed legislative acts which purported to protect their interests. For example, the
statutory terms negotiated by the Metis provisional government entitled Metis chil-
dren to receive 1.4 million acres of land; such provisions have never been effectively
implemented.’ As a result of these possibilities, the Commission concluded that
Metis people have a legal right to lands and resources.

The Commission rested the argument for Metis land and resource rights on a
broader foundation, however, than mere legal claims. It found that “it is clear … that
the Metis Nation is entitled, both morally and politically, to have access to land bases
and land use rights to fulfil its legitimate aspirations as an Aboriginal people”‘ These
findings led the Commission to make two significant recommendations for the im-
plementation of Metis land” and resource rights.’ It was recommended that appro-

tm S.C. 1879, c. 31. For further support, see PL.H. Chartmand, Manitoba’s Metis Settlement Scheme

of 1870 (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 1991).

24 Royal Commission, VbL 4, supra note 19 at 245.

See C. Chartier, “Aboriginal Rights and Land Issues: The Metis Perspective” in M. Boldt, J.
Long & L. Littlebear, eds., 77ze Questfor Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1986) 54 at 57.

For litigation on the issue of the constitutional validity of the Manitoba Act, 1870 and other stat-

utes, see Dumont, supra note 221.

2z Royal Commission, VbL 4, supra note 19 at 247-48.
22 !biL at 249:

The governments of Canada and the relevant provinces and territories be prepared to
make available, through negotiations with each recognized Nation of Metis people,
land bases sufficient in number, size, location and quality to permit the fulfillment of
the nation’s legitimate social, cultural, political and economic aspirations.

2Tbi at 251:

The governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta

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priately sized and located territories be given to Metis people in certain provinces to
hold for their own purposes, and that these provinces recognize Metis rights to hunt,
trap, and fish for food. The Commission’s recommendations therefore support the
recognition and negotiation of Metis rights to lands and resources; this is in accor-
dance with the treatment of these issues identified in the discussion of Aboriginal title
and fiduciary obligation above.

Despite these recommendations from the Commission, governments and the
courts have been slow to recognize Metis land and resource rights. There seem to be
two reasons for this failure. First, there are perennial problems with identifying who
the Metis people are that section 35 was intended to protect.’ Since there has never
been a government-controlled status and registration system for the Metis people,
there are concerns about the identification and accountability of Metis peoples if spe-
cific individuals cannot be unequivocally identified as Metis through any accredited
system. There are also concerns regarding the changing definition of the word
“Metis” over time. For example, it is not settled whether “Metis” refers to the people
descended from the Red River settlement, or whether the term can be used to refer to
any Aboriginal mixed-ancestry person who does not identify as Indian or Inuit.”
There is a further question as to whether Metis peoples are Indians for certain pur-
poses, and could thus claim analogous rights.” These problems may, however, be
overstated; recent cases have encountered fewer challenges with this than one might
expect.” For example, Powley provided a useful definition for “Metis” that could re-
solve such difficulties.”

The second, more challenging issue is that Metis rights are not yet clearly con-
ceptualized in the way that First Nations and Inuit rights have been. This problem is
illustrated by the Court’s observation in R. v. Van der Peet”‘ that “the manner in which
aboriginal rights are defined is not necessarily determinative of the manner in which
the aboriginal rights of the Metis are defined.”‘ While the potential definition of
Metis rights in a manner different from other Aboriginal rights actually holds out

a) recognize immediately that the right, of “Indians” of those provinces to hunt, trap

and fish for food … applies to all Metis persons in those provinces.

See C. Bell, “Who Are the Metis People in Section 35(2)” (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 351.

23’ SeeR. v. Blais, [1997] 3 C.N.L.R. 109 (Man. Prov. Ct.).
m SeeR. v. Grumbo (1998), 168 Sask. R. 78, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (C.A.).
‘3’ See R. v. Powley, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) [hereinafter Powley].
“‘ Ibid The case suggested that a Metis individual who claims s. 35 rights should be of Aboriginal
ancestry, self-identify as Metis, and be accepted by a Metis community. I recognize that this definition
still provides its challenges, but I suggest it is better than the legal vacuum that seems to discourage
many judges and legislators when considering Metis rights.

. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, 137 D.L.R. (4th) 289.

Ibid at para. 67.

2001]

J. BORROWS – ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

it also presents challenges because no one
great promise for all Aboriginal peoples,’
is quite sure on what foundation Metis rights will be found to rest. This presents a real
challenge for the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations, because
legislators seem to be taking a “wait and see” approach to Metds land rights. The pro-
crastination in this approach, however, is contrary to the idea that Metis peoples have
the legal, moral, and political rights that the Commission outlined in its overview of
Metis rights.

Therefore, legislators and the courts should take up this unfinished business and
place Metis rights on a more substantial conceptual ground. This would enable the
Metis to counteract historic colonial practices and repel contemporary assimilative
pressures. Governments could negotiate the issue of identity and other rights through
treaties with Metis people; courts could be more precise and forthcoming when called
upon to adjudicate Metis claims. Until there is greater clarity on this point, many
judges and legislatures will continue to define these rights in a minimal fashion and
await a filler articulation of these rights at some distant date. This is a risky path to
take, however, because it could lead to potential violations of the government’s fiduci-
ary obligations to the Metis people, or the parties may end up possessing substantially
different rights than preferable results that may arise through negotiation. Further-
more, the delay in clarifying their rights places the Metis in a vulnerable position as a
people because it prevents a fuller mobilization of their capacity to confront negative
influences. Such an approach would be contrary to the Commission’s recommenda-
tions.

Conclusion

The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples remains a relevant
and significant document for its consideration of Aboriginal land and resources is-
sues. It is unsurpassed in the breadth and depth of its coverage as a document pro-
duced under the mandate of a national government. It has already enjoyed some influ-
ence in the development of government policy, and has received numerous citations
through judicial consideration. While one may wish that its impact would have been
greater still, there is no denying that it has contributed significantly to the develop-
ment of Aboriginal rights in Canada over the past few years. Furthermore, it will con-
tinue to gain prominence, and will reach and influence audiences beyond Canada’s
borders. It contains important messages for the manner by which states can interact
with indigenous populations more respectfully to turn the tide of troubling colonial
histories.

See C. Bell, ‘Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)” (1997) 36 Ala. L Rev. 180.

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The Commission will enjoy this reputation at home and abroad because it drew its
inspiration from sources that not only found their genesis in this country, but also had
roots in the international arena. For example, the Commission cited the Draft Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to argue that “international legal principles
also specify that governments are under extensive obligations to protect Aboriginal
lands and resources.’ ‘” This draft, prepared by a sub-commission of the United Na-
tions Commission on Human Rights, contains strong statements about the obligation
of governments to recognize and reach agreements with Aboriginal peoples over land
and resources rights. For example, the Commission quotes article 26 of the draft dec-
laration, which provides that

Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands
and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal
seas, sea-ice, flora, fauna and other resources which they have traditionally
owned and otherwise occupied or used. This includes the right to the full rec-
ognition of their laws, traditions, and customs, land-tenure systems and institu-
tions for the development and management of resources, and the right to effec-
tive measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of or en-
croachment upon these rights. 9

The Commission’s willingness to draw on international sources of law and apply
them in a domestic context contributed to its wider view of Aboriginal land and re-
source rights. Parliament, legislatures, and the judiciary could take significant guid-
ance from the Commission’s approach in this respect. Instead of treating Aboriginal
peoples as municipal concerns, both governments and courts could see indigenous
peoples as nations that have a right to pursue objectives that may differ from those
states of which they are a part.

As this article has documented, however, courts and the legislatures have gener-
ally not regarded Aboriginal peoples in this more expansive light. The federal and
provincial governments have either not acknowledged or embraced Aboriginal rights,
or seen fit to subject themselves to the discipline and accountability that a legislative
process might bring in the implementation of Aboriginal rights once recognized. This
makes it difficult for Aboriginal peoples to articulate their concerns in a more com-
prehensive fashion when faced with the restrictive nature of these government initia-
tives or inaction. The subtle and scattered character of these policies presents a chal-
lenge to political mobilization when government initiatives are so diffuse. Similarly,
courts have responded to the Commission’s insights by continuing to enfold Aborigi-
nal peoples tightly within the existing federal fabric of Canada, without changing that
weave to accommodate them significantly. Courts have read Aboriginal fights to lands
and resources as requiring a reconciliation that asks much more of Aboriginal peoples

“‘ Royal Commission, Vol. 2, supra note 12 at 566.
.. IbiL at 567.

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J. BORROWS- ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AFTER RCAP

than it does of Canadians. Reconciliation should not be a front for assimilation. Rec-
onciliation should be embraced as an approach to Aboriginal-Canadian relations that
also requires Canada to accede in many areas.” Yet both legislatures and courts have
been pursuing a course that, by and large, asks change only of Aboriginal peoples.
Canadian institutions have been employing domesticating doctrines in their response
to the Commission. This approach hinders Aboriginal choice in the development of
their lands and resources, rather than enhancing it.”

Therefore, in many respects, the Commission’s incorporation of international
standards should point courts and legislatures to the fact that Aboriginal peoples have
a relationship with land in Canada that differs from that of other Canadians. Most
Aboriginal peoples want to create relationships with their land that respect and facili-
tate their values. They do not wish to abide by laws and policies that terminate or en-
croach on their rights without their consent. This article has described a few isolated
instances where the courts and legislatures have recognized these principles. While
these developments have been positive in some ways, they have not come without a
price. Canada continually uses its legislatures to modify, infringe, or extinguish Abo-
riginal and treaty rights. Courts have continued to develop, support, and implement
this framework. The domestication of Aboriginal and treaty rights in this way repre-
sents another stage in the development of colonialism for indigenous peoples. Such a
domestication of rights does not accord with the Commission’s attention to interna-
tional wisdom that would grant Aboriginal peoples a greater range of choice in land
and resource allocation and development. Until this fundamental tenet has found
broader recognition, the potential for assimilation will remain the most important is-
sue for most Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples has recognized this trajectory. Greater adherence to its recommendations wvill
allow Aboriginal nations to pursue models of development and living that ensure the
continuation of their cultures.

2 This approach is suggested in J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Di-
241 Patrick Macklein observed this process a decade earlier. See P. Macklem, “First Nations Self-

versity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 382.

Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission

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