First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination

First Nations Self-Government and the Borders

of the Canadian Legal Imagination

Patrick Macklem*

Self-government has become a major policy
objective for First Nations in Canada. The
common law of aboriginal title, the law relat-
ing to treaty rights and treaty interpretation,
the distribution of legislative authority over
native people, and emergent jurisprudence
under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
currently resist native aspirations for greater
control over their individual and collective
destinies by imposing Anglo-Canadian catego-
ries of legal understanding onto native reality.
The imposition of Anglo-Canadian norms is
effected in law by a rhetoric of justification
that simultaneously views native people as
similar to and different than nonnative people,
and establishes and maintains legal relation-
ships of dependence and hierarchy between
First Nations and the Canadian state. Each area
of the law, however, contains moments of
transformative possibility that could assist in
the
realization of First Nations self-
government. The author argues for specific
reconceptualizations of Anglo-Canadian con-
ceptions of property, contract, sovereignty, and
constitutional right to permit the construction
of legal spaces in which First Nations self-
government can take root and flourish and to
enable native people to participate in the for-
mation of laws that shape and govern their
lives.

L’autonomie gouvemementale est aujourd’hui
un des principaux objectifs des peuples auto-
chtones au Canada. Ce d6sir de contr6ler leurs
destins collectifs et individuels est confront6 A
l’6tat actuel du droit canadien. En effet, l’im-
position de concepts juridiques anglo-
canadiens lors de l’analyse de Ia propri6t6 des
terres ancestrales, des trait6s, du partage des
comptences l6gislatives sur les autochtones,
et dans l’interprdtation judiciaire de l’article
35(1) de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982,
d6montre une r6sistance soutenue aux aspira-
tions autochtones. Le droit se justifie par le
biais d’une rh6torique qui, selon le cas, dis-
tingue ou assimile les autochtones aux per-
sonnes non-autochtones. Ce meme syst~me
6tablit et perpdtue une relation hirarchique de
d6pendance entre les autochtones et l’Etat
canadien. Chaque domaine du droit relatif aux
autochtones contient pourtant les 616ments
d’une r6forme qui pourraient servir au d6ve-
loppement de l’autonomie gouverementale
des autochtones. L’auteur sugg~re qu’une
remise en question des notions anglo-
canadiennes de propriet6, de contrat, de souve-
rainet6 et de droits constitutionnels s’impose
afin que le droit soit en mesure de satisfaire les
demandes l6gitimes des autochtones et ainsi
leur permettre de participer activement au
d6veloppements 16gislatifs qui affectent direc-
tement leurs vies.

* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I wish to thank David Beatty, Howard Dancyger, Ron
Daniels, Karin Eisen, Allan Hutchinson, Nicholas Kasirer, Gillian Lester, Ann Macklem, Katie
McKee, Kent McNeil, Kent Roach, Bruce Ryder, Craig Scott and Bob Sharpe for their many
detailed comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank the
students in my Native Peoples Law class, who tested and helped me to clarify many of the ideas
presented in this article.
McGill Law Journal 1991
Revue de droit de McGill

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Synopsis

Introduction
I.
II. The Common Law of Aboriginal Title

The Thesis Described

A. The Marshall Legacy
B. The Canadian Framework
C. Recent Developments
D. Summary: The Myth of Crown Title
m. The Distribution of Legislative Authority

A. Federal Jurisdiction
B. Provincial Jurisdiction
C. Summary: Challenging Legislative Supremacy

IV. Treaty Rights and Treaty Interpretation

A. Treaties and Native Inferiority
B. The Contractualist Vision
C. Recent Developments
D. Summary: Revising Treaty Jurisprudence

V. Aboriginal Rights and the Constitution Act, 1982

A. R. v. Sparrow
B. Constitutional Recognition of Self-Government

Conclusion

* *

*

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Introduction

The Canadian legal system has come under increasing attack in recent
years for failing to accommodate the interests and needs of Canada’s First
Nations.’ Allegations of insensitivity, injustice, discrimination and racism have
rocked virtually all areas of the legal system affecting native people. The crim-
inal justice system, land claims, international law, and the process for constitu-
tional reform are but a few areas in which it is alleged that the concerns facing
native people are ignored by the relevant authorities. Criminal justice inquiries
dot the country, with subjects as diverse as the investigation of the wrongful
conviction of Donald Marshall for a murder he did not commit, 2 the twenty-year
silence surrounding the sexual assault and murder of Helen Betty Osborne,3 and
the shooting death of First Nations activist J.J. Harper by a Winnipeg police
officer.’ Be it by the Lubicons in Alberta,5 the Teme-Augama Anishnabai in
Ontario,6 or the Mohawks in Quebec,7 an illegal blockade protecting ancestral
lands from economic development by nonnatives is virtually a daily occurrence.
On the international front, developments are equally grim. In 1989, Canada
came under the investigative scrutiny of the United Nations as a potential vio-
lator of international law for its failure to develop appropriate policies for the
administration of treaties entered into with First Nations.’ More recently, histor-
ical inequities suffered by native people in Canada have been held to constitute
violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.’ Even in
the area of constitutional reform, where native people had been successful in
directing an about-face in federal policy away from the Trudeau government’s
proposal to abolish the Indian Act” and strip First Nations of any special status
under Canadian law” to the entrenchment of constitutional guarantees in 1982

‘I use the terms “First Nations,” “aboriginal peoples,” “indigenous population,” “native peo-
ples,” “native people,” and “Indian” interchangeably to refer to descendants of the original inhab-
itants of the North American continent, including people of Inuit and Metis descent.

2See, generally, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution (Halifax: Queen’s
Printer, 1989); see also M. Harris, Justice Denied: The Law versus Donald Marshall (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1986). For a summary of the Commission’s recommendations, see infra, note 263.
3See, generally, L. Priest, Conspiracy of Silence (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989).
4The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (I1 September 1989) A13.
5See, generally, B. Richardson, “The Lubicon of Northern Alberta” in B. Richardson, ed., Drum-
6See B. Hodgins & J. Benidickson, The Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources, and Abo-
riginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).
7The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (12 July 1990) Al.
8The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (25 July 1989) A7.
9The Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, UN HRC, 38th Sess., CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (26 March

beat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto: Summerhill, 1989) 229.

1990).

‘0R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5 [hereinafter Indian Act]; previously R.S.C. 1952, c. 149.
“The “White Paper” proposed the repeal of the Indian Act, the amendment of s. 91(24) of the
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867], the elim-
ination of the Department of Indian Affairs, the transfer of responsibilities over Indian programmes

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

protecting “existing aboriginal and treaty rights,”‘” native people have felt the
brunt of exclusion. After 1982, native people saw a string of constitutional
defeats. After four constitutional conferences addressing the possibility of
entrenching a constitutional right of self-government ended in failure, 3 the fed-
eral and provincial governments negotiated the Meech Lake Accord which rep-
resented, in one author’s words, “another nail in the coffin.”‘ 4 The Accord’s

to the provinces, the granting of fee simple title to native people with respect to reserve land, and
the temporary provision of funds for economic and cultural development. See Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Pol-
icy, 1969 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969). For an analysis of the White Paper and subsequent
developments, see R. Gibbins & J.R. Ponting, eds, Out of Irrelevance: A Socio-political Introduc-
tion to Indian Affairs in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980); and S.M. Weaver, Making Cana-
dian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
‘2Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11 [here-
inafter Constitution Act, 1982]. Even this success was a partial victory. The original proposal
would have guaranteed “aboriginal and treaty rights.” Traded away in the bargaining which
secured the consent of nine provinces to the 1982 Constitutional Accord, the guarantee was
re-inserted after public protest with the addition of the term “existing.” See, generally, D.E. San-
ders, “The Indian Lobby” in K. Banting & R. Simeon, eds, And No One Cheered: Federalism,
Democracy and the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 301.
13The 1983 First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal Affairs resulted in the Constitution Amend-
ment Proclamation, 1983, S1/84-102, which defines “treaty rights” referred to in ss. 25 and 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982 as including rights that native people may have or will acquire in the
future by way of land claims agreements, and provides that aboriginal representatives participate
in any future discussions concerning constitutional amendments that directly affect native people.
The 1984 First Ministers Conference resulted only in a federal statement of principles approving
native self-government in principle. Two other First Ministers Conferences were held in 1985 and
1987. In all four Conferences, the parties failed to obtain the consent from seven provinces rep-
resenting 50% of the population as required by s. 38 of the Constitution Act, 1982 necessary for
the entrenchment of the principle of native self-government. For accounts of the above constitu-
tional negotiations, see D.C. Hawkes, Aboriginal Peoples and Constitutional Reform: What Have
we Learned? (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1989); and
B. Schwartz, First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal Peoples, Constitutional Reform and
Canadian Statecraft (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1986).

14D.J. Purich, “Meech Lake and Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples” in J.D. Whyte & I. Peach, eds,
Re-Forming Canada? The Meaning of the Meech Lake Accord and the Free Trade Agreement for
the Canadian State (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1989)
75 at 77-79. Purich argues that the Meech Lake Accord would have disadvantaged native people
because provinces would have had a greater voice over native affairs in that they would have: (1)
been able to opt out of federal programs, subject only to the vague promise that they provide a pro-
gram “compatible with national objectives;” (2) had more of a say in the composition of the
Supreme Court of Canada; and (3) had greater control over the creation of new provinces. Others
criticize the proposed recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and the exclusion of any reference
to First Nations as fundamental to Canada’s self-definition: see G. Erasmus, “Native Rights” in R.
Gibbins, ed., Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectives From the West (Edmonton: Academic Print-
ing & Publishing, 1988) 179; J.E. Chamberlin, “Aboriginal Rights and the Meech Lake Accord”
in K. Swinton & CJ. Rogerson, eds, Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988) 12 [hereinafter Competing Constitutional Visions]; J. Bakan & D.
Pinard, “Getting to the Bottom of Meech Lake: A Discussion of Some Recent Writings on the 1987

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demise potentially signals a prolonged period of inactivity with respect to fur-
ther constitutional negotiations involving Canada’s First Nations.

And then there are the statistics. Native male life expectancy hovers
between 60 and 62 years and native female life expectancy between 63 and 69
years, compared to a life expectancy in the Canadian population for men of 72
years and for women of 79 years. 5 The major causes of death for natives are
accidents, poisoning and violence. Deaths resulting from these causes in 1983
occurred three times the rate for Canadians as a whole. 6 Incarceration rates
show a similar pattern. Native people constitute 10% of the population of fed-
eral prisons, yet they account for approximately 3% of the Canadian popula-
tion. 17 Native women account for 20% of the female inmate population of Brit-
ish Columbia.’ 8 The number of native people in federal prisons doubled between
1977 and 1987.”9 Housing standards and unemployment rates are equally dis-
turbing. According to a 1985 study by the Department of Indian and Northern
Affairs, 47% of on-reserve housing fails to meet basic standards of physical
conditions, and 38% of reserve housing lacks basic amenities such as running
water, indoor toilets and/or a bath or shower.2″ According to the 1981 census,
the official unemployment rate among natives is two and a half times the
national rate.2′ Though there have been major gains in the area, levels of edu-
cation do not fare well either. In 1981, only 19% of the native out-of-school
population had attained some form of post-secondary education, compared to
36% of the Canadian population as a whole. Two out of three status Indians use
English as their home language and numerous native languages are on the edge
of extinction.’

This article explores how the law has contributed to the current status of
First Nations in Canada. It attempts to map out the way the law has treated the
native aspiration for self-government in the past and to suggest ways that the

Constitutional Accord” (1989) 21 Ottawa L. Rev. 247 at 252-59; A.C. Cairns, “The Limited Con-
stitutional Vision of Meech Lake” in Competing Constitutional Visions, supra, 247.

15A.J. Siggner, “The Socio-Demographic Conditions of Registered Indians” in J.R. Ponting, ed.,
Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986)
57.

161bid. The annual overall death rate for native people is 9/1000, 1.5 times higher than the non-
native rate of 6.6/1000: The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (22 December 1989) A12, quoting Statistics
Canada.

‘ 7Supra, note 15.
18C. Pitcher LaPrairie, “Selected Criminal Justice and Socio-Demographic Data on Native

Women” (1984) 26 Can. J. Crim. 161 at 162.

ment Information Services, 1987).

19Correctional Services Canada, Native Population Profile Report 09130187 (Ottawa: Manage-
20Supra, note 15. These figures were unchanged as of 1988; see Canada, Basic Departmental

Data (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs, 1988).

21Census of Canada, 1981.
22Supra, note 15.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

law might facilitate its realization in the future. My starting point is fairly
uncontroversial: that the law has been stubbornly resistant of claims to self-
government by native people. Though a more precise definition is advanced in
Part I, by “self-government” I do not mean to refer to any technical legal term
but instead to a set of aspirations connected with the desire of native people to
have control over the ability to define their own individual and collective iden-
tities.’ What interests me is not so much the fact of resistance but rather the way
in which the law resists native claims of self-government. The thesis, simply
put, is that the law governing native peoples in this country resists the aspiration
to self-government by the way in which it structures and makes sense of native
reality. I address four relevant areas of legal discourse: common law aboriginal
title, the distribution of legislative power over native people, the law relating to
treaty formation and interpretation, and jurisprudence under s. 35(1) of the Con-
stitution Act, 1982. Each area serves as a frame of reference through which the
law structures and makes sense of legal disputes involving native people. Inher-
ent in each is a resistance to the idea that native people ought to have more con-
trol over their individual and collective destinies. Despite this resistance, how-
ever, each frame of reference contains moments of transformative possibility
which, if taken from the margins of legal discourse and placed at the centre of
the law governing native people, could assist in the realization of First Nations
self-government.

The article is divided into five Parts. Part I describes the thesis in more
depth, and discusses the extent to which the law can serve as a vehicle for the
realization of self-government for Canada’s First Nations. Part II addresses the
common law of aboriginal title. Part I reviews the law governing the distribu-
tion of legislative authority between Parliament and provincial legislatures as it
relates to native people. Part IV is an account of the law governing treaties
entered into by native people and the Crown. Part V assesses recent jurispru-
dence under the Constitution Act, 1982. Parts I to V share a similar organiza-
tion. Each begins with a general overview of the set of principles relevant to the
area of the law under study. Each then provides a more detailed account of those

23I choose “self-government” instead of “self-determination” to refer to the aspiration of native
people to have greater control over their destiny partly because the phrase “self-government” does
not carry with it the connotations of statehood, political separation and independence associated
with self-determination and partly because I hope for its realization through domestic, as opposed
to international, law. Yet the type of self-government envisioned in this article is one that involves
the transformation of the state structure in which the claim for self-government is made. It there-
fore straddles (1) traditional notions of self-government as a form of political autonomy within a
pre-existing state structure and (2) traditional notions of self-determination as a form of political
autonomy existing outside a pre-existing state structure. For scepticism over the right of self-
determination serving as a positive feature of statehood, see R. Emerson, “Self-Determination”
(1971) 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 459; for the view that “self-determination” can only be imbued with
meaning by reference to specific historical contexts, see E.M. Morgan, “The Imagery and Meaning
of Self-Determination” (1988) 20 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 355.

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principles and their historical development to demonstrate their resistance to the
aspiration of native self-government and to expose ways of understanding cen-
tral to the Canadian legal imagination that must be challenged if self-
government is to become a reality. Each also attempts to identify doctrinal
traces of possibility within each frame of reference that can serve to facilitate
the realization of self-government and assist in the empowerment of Canada’s
First Nations.

I. The Thesis Described

During the last several years, self-government has emerged as a major pol-
icy objective for Canada’s First Nations. Self-government, broadly speaking,
refers to the desire of native people to have control over the ability to define
their own individual and collective identities. Yet beyond this level of general-
ity, self-government is not a term that carries with it a shared, determinate
meaning. One scholar recently lamented the fact that self-government “remains
essentially at the level of a ‘value notion’.”’24 Various parties import into the
notion of self-government competing and contradictory meanings, with sharp
differences emerging the more one moves from abstract definition to concrete
proposal. Often self-government is referred to as a component of aboriginal
rights, as evidenced by the following testimony by John Amagalik,
co-chairperson of the Inuit Committee on National Issues:

Our position is that aboriginal rights, aboriginal title to land, water and sea ice
flows from aboriginal rights and all rights to practise our customs and traditions,
to retain and develop our languages and cultures, and the rights to self-
government, all these things flow from the fact that we have aboriginal rights. 25

On other occasions, self-government is seen as interchangeable with notions of
aboriginal rights, as illustrated by the following statement of Clem Chartier of
the Metis National Council:

What we feel is that aboriginal title or aboriginal right, is the right to collective
ownership of land, water, resources, both renewable and nonrenewable. It is a right
to self-government, a right to govern yourselves with your own institutions,
whichever way you want your institutions to run; the right to language, to culture,
the right to basically practice your own religion and customs, the right to hunt, trap
and fish and gather are certainly part of that, but that is not all of it.26

24S.M. Weaver, “Indian Government: A Concept in Need of Definition” in L. Little Bear, M.
Boldt & J.A. Long, eds, Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian
State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984) 65.

25Canada, First Ministers’ Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters, Unofficial and
Unverified Verbatim Transcript, 15 March 1983, vol. 1, at 130, as quoted in M. Asch, Home and
Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Methuen, 1984) at 27.
26First Minister’s Conference on Aboriginal Constitutional Matters, ibid. at 134 as quoted in

Asch, ibid. at 28.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

When one begins to reflect on the ways in which the above aspiration can
be translated into institutional arrangements carrying with them the force of law,
the potential for disagreement over the meaning of the term becomes even
greater. A number of institutionalizing techniques present themselves; each car-
ries with it a range of potential outcomes that can be characterized in loose
terms as embodying a commitment to native self-government. The aspiration of
native people to have more control over their individual or collective identities
can take the legal form of property entitlements, contractual entitlements, treaty
entitlements, statutory entitlements, delegated jurisdictional entitlements, con-
stitutional entitlements and international law entitlements.27 Within each differ-
ent type of entitlement, a spectrum of reform possibilities presents itself. The
politics of native self-government in part involves disputes over not only what
the aspiration for more individual and collective control by natives over their
destiny means, but also how it is to be translated into institutional reality.

A workable definition of self-government that avoids the emptiness of gen-
erality without descending into the politics of specifics, however, is that native
self-government at least refers to the need for a territorial base on native land,
some forms of administrative and political structures and institutions for the air-
ing of native voices and political decisionmaking, the transfer of jurisdictional
responsibilities from Parliament to native people, the ability of native people to
organize their societies and pass laws governing their lives free from federal or
provincial interference, and access to sufficient fiscal resources to meet these
responsibilities.’ Translating the loose aspiration of native people to have more
control over their individual and collective identities into the above mentioned
institutional criteria does not avoid some difficult problems associated with the
implementation of self-government, such as the extent to which institutions of

27See, e.g., Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
(1979), [1980] 1 F.C. 518, 107 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (F.C.T.D.) (common law aboriginal title includes
right to hunt and fish); Agreement between the Queen in Right of Manitoba, the Manitoba Hydro-
Electric Board, the Northern Flood Committee, and the Queen in Right of Canada as Represented
by the Minister of Indian and Northern Development (1977) (contractual agreement governing eco-
nomic development on native land and inter alia the use of labour); Saanichton Marina Ltd. v.
Claxton (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 79, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (B.C.C.A.) (treaty guarantees right to
access and control fishery); Indian Act, ss. 81, 83 (statutory grant of bylaw-making power to bands
to exercise authority over quasi-governmental matters pertaining to reserve land); Sechelt Indian
Band Self-Government Act, S.C. 1986, c. 27 (legislatively delegated powers resulting in municipal
style of government for native band); R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385
[hereinafter Sparrow cited to S.C.R.] (s. 35(1) of Constitution Act, 1982 protects right to fish); The
Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, supra, note 9 (art. 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights protects aspects of life and culture of Lubicon Lake Band).

281 borrow from J.R. Ponting & R. Gibbins, “Thorns in the Bed of Roses: A Socio-political View
of the Problems of Indian Government” in Pathways to Self-Determination, supra, note 24 at
122-23.

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[Vol. 36

self-government ought to include urban native populations.29 Nor does it address
the extent to which self-government conflicts with, in Alan Cairns’ words,
“ongoing aboriginal participation as holders of rights and bearers of duties in
Canadian society.”30 Defining self-government in the above way, however, does
have the advantage of remaining relatively abstract so as to invite little disagree-
ment, yet sufficiently specific to permit analysis of its reception in the legal
forum. Any greater degree of specificity would run counter to the aim of cre-
ating legal spaces in which native people themselves can define the contours of
the institutions which will govern their lives.3′

In this article I advance the view that the law can and ought to serve as a
vehicle for the realization of self-government for Canada’s First Nations. The
law currently exhibits a structural resistance to the aspiration of native self-

291t has been estimated that 30% of the approximately 350,000 status Indians live off-reserve,
primarily in urban centres. Estimates of the Metis and nonstatus Indian population, which does not
have an identifiable land base, run from 280,000 to 750,000 people. See W.J. Reeves, “Native
‘Societies’: The Professions as a Model of Self-Determination for Urban Natives” in Arduous Jour-
ney: Canadian Indians and Decolonization, supra, note 15, 342 at 344.
30A.C. Cairns, “Aboriginal Self-Government and Citizenship” (Address to the University of
Toronto Legal Theory Workshop, 24 April 1987) at 20 [unpublished]. The relationship between
First Nations self-government and ongoing Canadian citizenship for native people involves a com-
plex set of issues revolving around potential conflicts between the native aspiration of autonomy
and Canadian attributes of citizenship, such as adherence to norms of equality and liberty. Do
Canadian values of sexual equality, for example, “trump” the value of natives deciding among
themselves how to organize gender relations in their societies? For an excellent account of the his-
tory of legislative discrimination between native men and native women and the politics that
ensued as a result of legal action, see K. Jamieson, “Sex Discrimination and the Indian Act” in
Arduous Journey, Canadian Indians and Decolonization, ibid. See also A.G. Canada v. Lavell
(1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) (statutory provisions that discriminate on the basis of sex in
relation to band membership do not infringe Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, guarantee
of equality before the law); Lovelace v. Canada, 36 UN GOAR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XVIII, U.N.
Doc. A/36/40 (1981) (statutory provisions that discriminate on the basis of sex in relation to band
membership infringe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). Questions surrounding
the relationship between native self-government and ongoing Canadian citizenship speak to the
limits of self-government, not its desirability, and ought to be addressed in the context of specific
disputes and preferably once institutional structures of native self-government are in place. See
infra, text accompanying notes 257-58.

31See M. Boldt & J.A. Long, “Native Indian Self-Govemment: Instrument of Autonomy or
Assimilation?” in M. Boldt & J.A. Long, eds, Governments in Conflict? Provinces and Indian
Nations in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 38 at 54 [hereinafter Governments
in Conflict?] (“the challenge of the future is to transform existing institutions from Euro-Canadian
models to models compatible with Indian cultural values”); H. Cardinal, “Indian Nations and Con-
stitutional Change” in Governments in Conflict?, supra, 83 at 85 (“we have different positions, dif-
ferent perspectives; not because brown people cannot agree with one another, but because each
group traces a different historical evolution in their relationship to other peoples in this country”).
See also F. Cassidy, “Aboriginal Self-Government: Defining a Research Agenda” (Address to the
National Symposium on Aboriginal Self-Determination, Toronto, 3 October 1990) at 2 [unpub-
lished] (“[t]he study of aboriginal governments should not turn into one more effort to impose a
non-indigenous outlook on Canada’s indigenous First Nations”).

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

government, however, despite recent jurisprudence sympathetic to the needs
and interests of native peoples. My hope is that by locating the precise places
in which resistance to self-government manifests itself in the Canadian legal
imagination, it will become possible to ascertain the ways the law can transform
itself so as to become an instrument of native empowerment.

The dominant method of making sense of and resolving native claims
employed by the judiciary is to first sort out the type of dispute in question.
Does this case involve the common law of aboriginal title? Does it involve
questions relating to the interpretation of a treaty? Does this dispute raise ques-
tions about the distribution of legislative authority or involve s. 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982? Perhaps it deals with some combination of these frames
of reference. Whatever the particular configuration presented by the facts, each
doctrinal area of the law contains a particular set of legal principles that guides
judicial decisionmakers in the determination of disputes involving native peo-
ple. The law relating to common law aboriginal title, for example, contains a set
of principles governing the nature and extent of native interests in traditional
and reserve lands. Similarly, the law of federalism governing the distribution of
legislative authority over matters pertaining to native people involves a series
of principles which guide the judiciary in determining whether a legislature is
within its constitutional sphere of authority. Though each set of legal principles
is specific to the broader doctrinal area to which it belongs, they share three
attributes which contribute to and constitute the law’s resistance to First Nations
self-government.

First, each set of principles represents an extension and application of basic
Anglo-Canadian categories of legal understanding to the native context. A cen-
tral tenet of Anglo-Canadian notions of property ownership, for example, is that
the Crown has underlying title to all of Canada. Transfers of title are viewed
through contractualist lenses. Contracting parties are viewed as entities
abstracted from the particularity of circumstance. Exchanges are viewed as sol-
emn, binding agreements, enforceable in a court of law. Legislatures are viewed
as sovereign and supreme within their spheres of authority, and entitled to reg-
ulate the exercise of property ownership and contractual relationships in the
name of the common good, except insofar as such regulation infringes upon an
identifiable core of human freedom protected by constitutional guarantee. Dis-
putes involving native people invariably are resolved against the backdrop of
one or more of the above assumptions concerning the nature of property, con-
tract, sovereignty, and constitutional right. Native self-government is concep-
tually and actually excluded from the spectrum of law’s possibilities by the
unquestioned acceptance of these four cornerstones of the legal imagination.
Ultimately supporting the classificatory structure of the law brought to bear to
make sense of disputes involving native people are a series of unquestioned

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ways of conceptualizing and resolving legal disputes which work to resist aspi-
rations of native self-government.

Second, each doctrinal area effects the extension and application of the
above-mentioned categories of legal understanding to the native context by a
rhetoric of justification that appeals to a vision of native people as simultane-
ously different than and similar to nonnative people.32 Native difference is
denied where its acceptance would result in the questioning of basic premises
concerning the nature of property, contract, sovereignty or constitutional right.
Native difference is acknowledged where its denial would achieve a similar
result. The rhetoric of justification supporting the principles that govern the
nature and extent of native interests in traditional and reserve lands at common
law, for example, involves a complex interweaving of denial and acceptance of
native difference. The distribution of legislative authority between Parliament
and provincial legislatures over matters affecting native people is effected
through a process of judicial interpretation that requires determining the extent
to which native people are similar to and different than nonnative people. The
law governing the legal status and legal effect of treaties entered into by native
people with the Crown is permeated by acknowledgement and denial of native
difference. Though still in embryonic form, constitutional jurisprudence sur-
rounding s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which recognizes and affirms
“existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada,”33
implicitly rests on a vision of native people as simultaneously similar to and dif-
ferent than nonnative people. Similarity and difference constitute the currency
of justification for the invocation and application of traditional categories of
legal understanding in the resolution of legal disputes involving native people.

Third, each set of principles can be characterized as establishing and main-
taining a hierarchical relationship between native people and the Canadian state.

32In formulating this aspect of the thesis, I have benefitted from and adapted insights of recent
feminist scholarship on the way in which the law and society historically has imagined women as
both similar to and different than men. Works that I found helpful include N. Duclos, “Lessons of
Difference: Feminist Theory on Cultural Diversity” (1990) 38 Buffalo L. Rev. 325; B. Cossman,
“A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender Equality” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J.
303; C.A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989); Z. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988); M. Minow, “The Supreme Court 1986 Term –
Foreword: Justice Engendered”
(1987) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10; B. Johnson, A World of Difference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1987); N.C. Sheppard, “Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in C. Boyle et al., eds, Charterwatch: Reflections on Equal-
ity (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); J. Feral, “The Powers of Difference” in Z. Eisenstein & A. Jardine,
eds, The Future of Difference (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985) 88; G. Greene &
C. Kahn, “Feminist Scholarship and the Social Construction of Women” in G. Greene & C. Kahn,
eds, Making a Difference: Feminist Literary Criticism (London: Methuen, 1985) 1.
33The meaning accorded to these terms is discussed in Part V. See infra, text accompanying

notes 236-240.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Treaty jurisprudence, for example, establishes a legal relationship of depend-
ence by native people on the sovereign authority of the Canadian state. Jurispru-
dence under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 implicitly acknowledges a
relationship of hierarchy between native peoples and the Canadian state. The
common law of aboriginal title and the principles governing federalism disputes
evince a similar pattern. Each frame of reference brought to bear in legal dis-
putes involving native people, in other words, is constituted by a series of doc-
trinal choices that perpetuate a hierarchical relationship between native people
and the Canadian state by relying on the idea that native people are both similar
to and different than nonnative people. The doctrinal choices that constitute
each frame of reference have historically worked to exclude native self-
government as one of the law’s possibilities.

Despite the law’s historic resistance to the aspiration of self-government by
Canada’s First Nations, it would be a mistake to engage in a blanket condem-
nation of the legal system as it relates to disputes involving native people. Each
frame of reference invoked by the law to make sense of and structure native
reality contains moments of possibility for the realization of native self-
government. Although currently on the borders of the legal imagination, these
moments represent opportunities for expanding and transforming the law so that
it can serve as an instrument of native empowerment. That the legal forum is
a useful site for engaging in the politics of self-government is also borne out by
the fact that the legal forum is regarded by many to be more of an ally than an
obstacle in the quest for a greater degree of individual and collective native
autonomy. The Meech Lake Accord, for example, was seen by many native peo-
ple as detrimental to native interests for a number of reasons, including the fact
that it would have given institutions which native people fear, provincial gov-
ernments, a greater say in the constitution of an institution which native people
trust, the Supreme Court of Canada.’ The Accord’s demise will no doubt com-
plicate, if not stall, constitutional negotiations between First Nations and Cana-
dian politicians in the near future, providing even more justification for a juris-
prudence of reform.

More generally, it is fair to claim that native people have made far more
strides in their dealings with nonnative people in the legal sphere than in the
political sphere, with legal decisions often serving to initiate political and con-
stitutional change. In Guerin v. R., 5 for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
created a new form of legal accountability on the part of the Crown in its deal-
ings with native land. Guerin and cases like it have served to spur political and
legal reform, pushing federal and provincial governments to reconceive their
duties and obligations to native peoples. It may well be the case that current

34See “Meech Lake and Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples,” supra, note 14.
35[1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Guerin cited to S.C.R.]. See infra, notes

104-12 and accompanying text.

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jurisprudence is inadequate to the task of reconstructing native self-government;
indeed, I hope to demonstrate this fact in the course of this article. Yet, to reduce
the role of law to that of villain in the saga of the struggle for native self-
government has the effect of ignoring the important moments, however few, in
which the law has served to improve the lives of native people and forecloses
a powerful source of potential social transformation.

A related reason to be cautious of blanket condemnations of the legal sys-
tem as it relates to construction and reproduction of native reality is the fact that
to reduce law to a purely negative, obstructionist role paints a distorted picture
of the history and content of native peoples law and, more importantly, runs the
risk of attributing a type of essentialism to law’s possibilities, which in turn pla-
ces disabling constraints on the legal imagination. One of the great achieve-
ments of post-realist legal scholarship36 has been the ability to successfully dis-
card the view that there is an ahistorical, apolitical essence to law which in turn
preordains the correctness of legal decision-making, and instead to conceive of
law as a set of practices that constitutes economic, social and political relations
among individuals and groups in society which is itself open to transforma-
tion.37 According to this view, there is nothing preordained about the trajectory
of legal doctrine. Indeterminacy is a cause for hope, not despair. The fact that
we do not know “what will come next” means that what will come next is a
function of political and ethical commitment.” Should law fail to improve the
condition of native peoples in Canada, it will not be a function of the immanent
rationality of law, the inherent logic of the legal form, or the necessary relation
between law and the economic base, but rather a simple failure to act. Respon-
sibility for the perpetuation of current conditions of native peoples will lie on
those in power to effect legal change as well as those who advocate the view
that legal change is impossible.

The thesis, then, is that the law governing native people in Canada is resis-
tant to claims to self-government because of the unquestioned adherence to
basic categories of the Anglo-Canadian legal imagination effected by the denial
and acceptance of native difference. The result is a set of principles which work

36Classic legal realist texts include F. Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach” (1935) 35 Columbia L. Rev. 809; M. Cohen, “Property and Sovereignty” (1927) 13
Cornell L.Q. 8; and R. Hale, “Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State”
(1923) 38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470. For analysis, see J. Singer, “Legal Realism Now” (1988) 76 Cal. L.
Rev. 465.
37See, e.g., R. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories” (1984) 36 Stanford L. Rev. 57; G.E. Frug, “The
Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law” (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276; R. Unger, “The Critical
Legal Studies Movement” (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561; D. Kennedy, “The Structure of Blacksto-
ne’s Commentaries” (1979) 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205; K. Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941” (1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev.
265.3 8See J. Frug, “Argument as Character” (1988) 40 Stanford L. Rev. 869.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

to establish and maintain a hierarchical relationship between native peoples and
the Canadian state. Each frame of reference, however, contains doctrinal possi-
bilities for the realization of self-government. The purpose of this article is to
take these moments of possibility from the borders of the legal imagination and
place native self-government at the centre of the law governing Canada’s First
Nations. This is not to deny that similarities and differences exist between
native and nonnative peoples, but rather to challenge the use to which similarity
and difference has been put by the law. That is, my claim is not that the legal
assertion and denial of difference is somehow illegitimate or contradictory, but
rather to challenge the idea that similarity and difference support a relationship
of dependence between native peoples and the Canadian state. The legal asser-
tion and denial of difference in each frame of reference has operated on behalf
of domination.39 The objective is to challenge what the law has traditionally
imagined to be the implication flowing from native similarity and difference,
and to posit another, one which embraces native participation in the definition
of native difference and native consent to the laws that govern their lives.

Yet if the law is to play a facilitative role in the quest for self-government
by First Nations, basic categories of the Anglo-Canadian legal imagination must
be rethought and adapted so that the law does not perpetuate the continued
imposition of Anglo-Canadian norms and values onto native reality. The
achievement of self-government for First Nations through legal reform ulti-
mately will require legal reformation, namely, a remaking of the conceptual
map by which the law structures and makes sense of native reality. Native inter-
ests and needs cannot be accommodated within current categories of legal
understanding, as the necessary changes require more than the simple embrace
of those interests and needs into already existing and accepted ways of under-
standing the world. The law must construct spaces in which native self-
government can take root and flourish, and legal principles within each frame
of reference must be restructured so as to permit native participation in the for-
mation of rules that govern their lives. Traditional notions of property, contract,
legislative supremacy, and constitutional right must be questioned and recon-
ceptualized so as to reshape the law’s relation to native people and to permit
Canada’s First Nations to devise institutional arrangements that conform to and
celebrate native forms of life. Current ways of knowing are not so much part of
the solution as part of the problem, and reform requires the creation of new
ways of legal understanding that embrace native difference.

39See E.V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1988) at 11 (“assertion of difference and denial of difference can operate on behalf
of domination”).

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[Vol. 36

II. The Common Law of Aboriginal Title

There are several schools of thought on when the ancestors of Canada’s
native peoples began to populate North America. Anthropological estimates on
the beginning of a human presence on the continent vary from 12,000 to 30,000
years ago.’W Regardle ss of the precise date, native people in this country have
developed unique and special relationships to the land in part derived from their
descent from the continent’s original first peoples. Fred Plain of the Nishnabwe-
Aski nation, for example, states the following:

Our links with the earth are sacred links that no man can ever sever. We are one
with the earth, and the earth is one with us…. [W]e have the right to govern and
control our own people in our own land, and the right to remedy our own situa-
tions. The efforts that are made to meet our needs must come from our own peo-
ple.

4 1

Similarly, Leroy Little Bear writes of native conceptions of ownership:

Indian ownership of property, like Indians’ way of relating to the world, is holistic.
Land is communally owned; ownership rests not in any one individual, but rather
belongs to the tribe as a whole, as an entity. The members of a tribe have an undi-
vided interest in the land; everybody, as a whole, owns the whole. Furthermore,
the land belongs not only to people presently living, but also to past generations
and future generations, who are considered to be as much a part of the tribal entity
as the present generation. In addition, the land belongs not only to human beings,
but also to other living things (the plants and animals and sometimes even the
rocks); they, too, have an interest.42

Whatever the precise nature of the native relationship to land, which pre-
sumably varies from peoples to peoples, the way in which the law regulates
native interests in land is critical to the realization or frustration of self-
government. If the common law of property were to reflect the fact that native
peoples were the first nations of Canada, protect native interests in land from
nonnative interference, permit the establishment of a territorial base from which
native self-government could flourish and grow, and facilitate the meaningful
expression of the diverse ways in which native peoples relate to their land, the

4See A.D. McMillan, Native Peoples and Cultures of Canada: An Anthropological Overview
(Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988) at 19-30, and sources cited therein. For comprehensive texts
tracking the development of relations between natives and European settlers, see J.R. Miller, Sky-
scrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1989); and B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada’s “Heroic Age”
Reconsidered (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985).

4 1F. Plain, “A Treatise on the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of the Continent of North Amer-
ica” in M. Boldt & J.A. Long, eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal
Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 34.

42L. Little Bear, “Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian ‘Grundnorm”‘ in Arduous Journey: Cana-

dian Indians and Decolonization, supra, note 15, 243 at 245.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

law conceivably could assist in giving native people more control over their
ability to shape their destiny.

Current law on the nature and extent of the native interest in ancestral and
reserve lands, however, represses the fact that native people were the original
inhabitants of the continent. Jurisprudence on native proprietary interests is not
formulated with an eye to institutionalizing the special relationships native peo-
ple have with respect to ancestral and reserve land. Instead, the common law of
aboriginal title, constructed by an appeal to a vision of native people as both
similar to and different than nonnative people, assumes that the Crown pos-
sesses underlying title to all of Canada and carves out a property interest unique
to native people that places native people in a position of dependence in relation
to the Crown. The native property interest at common law in reserve lands and
lands not surrendered to the Crown has been characterized as a right of occu-
pation or possession, despite the fact that native people were the original inhab-
itants of Canadian soil. Should native authorities decide to surrender or transfer
their interest in the land, a transfer to a normative person cannot occur without
a prior surrender to the Crown. Upon surrender, the Crown is under a fiduciary
obligation to deal with the land for the benefit of those who engaged in the act
of surrender. Absent surrender, the Crown remains free to extinguish the native
interest. Thus the common law establishes and maintains a dependent relation-
ship between native people and the Crown with respect to native land. All land
transfers must occur through the Crown, and native people hold their lands at
the mercy of the Crown. As will be seen, reform efforts which do not question
the hierarchical relationship built into the structure of the native proprietary
interest are bound to reproduce native dependency in a new form.

A. The Marshall Legacy

Contemporary jurisprudence on aboriginal title at common law owes its
existence in part to the strength and power of three judgments authored by Chief
Justice Marshall in the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century.43
Culminating with Worcester v. Georgia’ in 1832, this line of cases provided
inspiration for Canadian conceptions of common law aboriginal title. The Mar-
shall legacy also provides traces of an alternative vision of the common law of

43See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) [hereinafter Worcester]; Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) [hereinafter Johnson]; Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810). For commentary, see F. Cohen, “Original Indian Title” (1947) 32 Minn. L. Rev.
28; H.R. Berman, “The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United
States” (1978) 27 Buffalo L. Rev. 637; W. Walters, “Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sover-
eignty, and Worcester v. Georgia” (1983) 62 Oregon L. Rev. 127; and C. Wilkinson, American
Indians, Time, and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

441bid.

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[Vol. 36

aboriginal title which, if embraced by the judiciary, would facilitate rather than
frustrate the realization of native self-government.

In Fletcher v. Peck,45 at issue was the validity of a Georgia statute revoking
a prior statutory land grant to the New England Mississippi Land Company.
Upon its receipt, the company’s director, John Peck, divided and resold the land
to various individuals, including Robert Fletcher. Invoking specific provisions
of the Constitution of the United States and “general principles which are com-
mon to our free institutions,” Marshall C.J. struck down the repealing statute in
the name of freedom of contract.46 Since the land had never been surrendered
by Indian bands to the United States government or the state of Georgia before
the legislature made it the subject of a grant, Marshall C.J. went on to discuss
the nature of the Indian interest in the land. Referring to what he termed “Indian
title,” Marshall C.J. held that the native interest in land was to be a title of occu-
pancy only. Though “certainly to be respected by all courts,” Marshall C.J.
added that such an interest could be “legitimately extinguished” and that it “is
not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state.”47
Justice Johnson wrote a vigourous dissent in which he argued that native peo-
ples in North America retained “absolute proprietorship of their soil” which
could be extinguished only by conquest or purchase.48

The second case of the trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh,49 provided Marshall
C.J. with an opportunity to offer justifications for his conclusion in Fletcher v.
Peck that the native interest in land is one of occupancy only with fee simple
title vesting in the state. Johnson is a useful example of how an appeal to a
vision of native people as simultaneously different than and similar to nonnative
people can work to avoid questioning the legitimacy of basic categories of the
legal imagination and maintain a hierarchical relation between native people
and the state. Johnson is also immediately relevant to Canadian jurisprudence
for it contains many of the arguments traditionally used to support common law
treatment of native people in Canada. In Johnson, international law and the con-
cept of Crown prerogative were relied upon to support the conclusion that
underlying title vests with the state, the native interest in land being one of occu-
pancy only. In his reliance on international law principles, Marshall C.J. empha-

4 5Supra, note 43.
46Ibid. Marshall C.J. stated, at 139:

[The estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration,
without notice, the state of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which
are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution
of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the prem-
ises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and
void.

4 71bid. at 142-43.
4 8 Ibid. at 146.
49Supra, note 43.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

sized difference, whereas in his reliance on the Crown prerogative, he empha-
sized similarity. Out of this interplay between similarity and difference emerged
a set of legal categories true to traditional ways of legal understanding and
resistant to the aspiration of native self-government.

In Johnson, the appellant claimed title to certain lands by virtue of a devise
from his father, who had obtained the land from the Piankeshaw and Illinois
nations. The federal government also claimed title to the land on the basis of
grants made to it by the same Indian nations after they purported to make the
grants to Johnson’s father. Marshall C.J. found for the federal authorities, hold-
ing that the federal government had the exclusive right to acquire Indian title.

In support of this conclusion, Marshall first argued that the “doctrine of
discovery” gave the British Crown, and hence the federal government, an exclu-
sive right to acquire Indian land. The doctrine of discovery was a principle of
international law developed during the period of colonial expansion to address
and reconcile competing claims over territory by European nations. The doc-
trine provided that the discoverer of unoccupied land (or terra nullius) enjoyed
territorial sovereignty”0 over such land as against subsequent arrivals.51 With
respect to occupied land, sovereignty could only be acquired by the “discover-
ing” nation by conquest or cession. 2 Since much of North America was inhab-
ited by indigenous populations prior to European settlement, one would have
thought that territorial sovereignty over the continent or parts thereof could only
be acquired by conquest or cession. Yet international law provided that land was
unoccupied and hence “discoverable,” despite the presence of an indigenous
population, if that population did not possess a certain degree of political orga-

5″Sovereignty” and “title” are used interchangeably in international law discourse to refer to the
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international law that accompanies state-
hood: see, generally, M.M. Whiteman, vol. I, Digest of International Law (Washington: Depart-
ment of State Publications, 1963) 233. “Title” in the international law sense should not be confused
with “title” in English law governing ownership of real property. As will become apparent, sov-
ereignty over a particular territory does not necessarily vest title to the land in the sovereign author-
ity. Title to land is determined not by international law principles but by reference to the relevant
domestic laws governing property ownership. To keep these concepts separate, I will use the term
“sovereignty” to denote the totality of powers that a state possesses under international law, and
“title” to refer to the ownership of real property under domestic property law.
51Some have argued that discovery alone, or discovery accompanied by symbolic acts of the
assertion of sovereignty, was sufficient to establish territorial sovereignty over unoccupied land:
see A.S. Keller, OJ. Lissitzyn & F.J. Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic
Acts, 1400-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938); others have argued that effective
occupation was also required: see R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963).

52See, generally, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1990) at 127-71.

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nization.53 In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall was of the view, widely shared at
the time,54 that discovery of North America vested territorial sovereignty over
such land in the discovering nation despite the existence of indigenous popula-
tions. He noted that from their inception American states adopted the view that
“discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy,
either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such a degree of sov-
ereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.”5
Prior to the American Revolution, those rights vested in the Crown and its rep-
resentatives in the colonies; after the American Revolution, territorial sover-
eignty vested “in that government which might constitutionally exercise it.” ’56
Marshall C.J. noted that the European justification for the assertion of ter-
ritorial sovereignty in the face of an indigenous population rested on the view
that native North Americans were “heathens.”’57 In his words,

the character and religion of [North America’s] inhabitants afforded an apology
for considering theffi as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might
claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in con-
vincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the
new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for unlimited
58
independence.

Marshall C.J. did not embrace a sectarian justification of the doctrine of
discovery, though he did attempt to support its invocation by reference to “the
character and habits of the people whose rights have been wrested from them.” 9
In his view, it was impossible to apply the laws of conquest to address propri-
etary claims of indigenous populations. Traditional principles governing the
conquest of territory provide that property entitlements in existence prior to
conquest continue to exist in the absence of legislative expropriation; if applied
to govern relations between native and nonnative people, these principles would
support the view that the “conquest” of North America did not in itself alter pre-

53Scholars disagree over the extent of political organization necessary to exclude the doctrine
of discovery. The early view appears to have required a certain degree of “civilization”; see, for
example, L. Oppenheim, ed., The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914) at 145 (requiring “a native government capable
of controlling white men or under which white civilization can exist”). Recent scholarship and
caselaw suggest that the presence of nomadic tribes with some degree of political and social orga-
nization will preclude a territory from being regarded as terra nullius. See, for example, J. Craw-
ford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) at 176-81; and
Western Sahara Case, [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 12 at 38-40.

54See R.A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Con-

quest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

55Supra, note 43 at 587.
56Ibid. at 585.
57Ibid. at 577.
8Ibid. at 573.
591bid. at 589.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

existing patterns of land holdings.’ In rejecting this line of reasoning, Marshall
C.J. stated the following:

[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupa-
tion was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave
them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to gov-
ern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and as
high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt
on their independence. 6 1

In light of this difference between native people and other conquered peoples,
“[the] law which regulates … the relations between the conqueror and con-
quered, was incapable of application.”‘
In its place, Marshall C.J. invoked the
doctrine of discovery, arguing that,

if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if
a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great mass
of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned. 63

As a result, the discovering nation was exclusively entitled to assert terri-
torial sovereignty over the indigenous population and to. acquire rights in the
land from that population in accordance with domestic laws governing land
transfers. In Marshall C.J.’s own words, “[t]he exclusion of all other Europeans,
necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring
the soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it.”‘ Thus the doc-
trine of discovery established a priority among European nations as to acquisi-
tion of native land. It was but a short leap to conclude that discovery therefore
affected the power of native people “to dispose of the soil at their own will, to
whomsoever they pleased.”’65

The interplay of native difference and similarity underpinning the assertion
of sovereignty over native people will be assessed in Part Im of this article.66
What is of present concern is the distinction between territorial sovereignty and
title to land. For it was one thing to recognize that the doctrine of discovery enti-
tles the discovering nation to assert sovereignty over native people and an
exclusive right to acquire native land from native people as against other Euro-

60English law, for example, provided that local laws, except in the case of incompatibility with
the change of sovereignty or subsequent legislative developments, remain in force: see, e.g., Blan-
kard v. Galdy (1693), Holt K.B. 341; see generally K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 110-16 and sources cited therein; and B. Slattery, “The Inde-
pendence of Canada” (1983) 5 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 369 at 384-90.

61Johnson, supra, note 43, at 590.
621bid. at 591.
631bid. at 591.
641bid. at 573.
651bid. at 574.
66See also infra, notes 118-20 and accompanying text.

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pean nations and that this right of acquisition affects the freedom of native peo-
ple to alienate their lands to third parties. It was another to conclude that dis-
covery actually vests underlying title to land in the discoverer as against the
original inhabitants of the land. Adhering to the former entails only that the sov-
ereign power is authorized to obtain ownership of the land over which sover-
eignty is asserted in accordance with its domestic laws governing title to land
and ownership of real property. Although his judgment occasionally appears to
acknowledge the difference between territorial sovereignty and title to land,67
Marshall C.J. unfortunately blurred the distinction” in his enlistment of the
royal prerogative as further support for his conclusion that the federal govern-
ment had valid title to the land in question. He referred to “the theory of the
British constitution,” which, in his words, provides that “all vacant lands are
vested in the crown, as representing the nation; and the exclusive power to grant
them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a branch of the royal prerogative.”69
English constitutional theory, according to Marshall C.J., made “no distinction
… between vacant lands and lands occupied by Indians;”‘7
title to both was
vested in the Crown. Since title to land vested in the Crown, it could not vest
with the indigenous populations: “[a]n absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the
same time, in different persons, or in different governments.”‘ In Marshall’s
view, since title to vacant land and lands occupied by native peoples vests with
the Crown, the Crown is entitled to grant such lands to third parties. Marshall
C.J. was thus able to characterize the Indian interest in land as “a right of occu-
pancy,” subject to the absolute power of the Crown to extinguish that right.7″

Johnson thus built on Marshall C.J.’s preliminary description in Fletcher v.
Peck of the native interest in land to be a right of occupancy. In Johnson, Mar-
shall C.J. held that the combined effect of the doctrine of discovery and the
Crown prerogative was to confer on the discovering nation not only territorial
sovereignty but also title to land. With respect to the doctrine of discovery,

67Marshall C.J., for example, states:

If the discovery be made, and possession of the country be taken, under the authority
of an existing government, which is acknowledged by the emigrants, it is supposed to
be equally well settled, that the discovery is made for the whole nation, that the country
becomes a part of the nation, and that the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ
of government which has the constitutional power to dispose of the national domains,
by that organ in which all vacant territory is vested by law (emphasis added, Johnson,
supra, note 43 at 595).

68Others have made this point as well. See McNeil, supra, note 60 at 228-29 & 245-46; Berman,
supra, note 43. See also Johnson J.’s dissent in Fletcher v. Peck, supra, note 43 at 147 (“All the
restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of all other compet-
itors from their markets”).
69Supra, note 43 at 595.
7 Ibid. at 596.
71lbid. at 588.
721bid.

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native difference was relied on to support the conclusion that title to land vested
with the discovering nation, insofar as native difference made the application of
the law of conquest – which would have resulted in the continuation of pre-
existing property entitlements – impossible. Yet with respect to the Crown pre-
rogative, native difference was ignored to support the same conclusion. Mar-
shall C.J. was unwilling to acknowledge any difference between native people
and nonnative people which might justify special treatment with respect to the
Crown prerogative. Invoking the royal prerogative to support the conclusion
that the Crown possesses title to native land treats native people as if they were
British subjects, and ignores the fact that native people were original inhabitants
of the land in question and that such land was not in fact vacant. Marshall C.J.,
in other words, simultaneously denied and accepted native difference to support
the assertion of Crown title to native lands.

In the third case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia,73 Marshall C.J.
retreated from his earlier view that discovery vests underlying title to native
lands in the state, preferring instead the more cautious view that discovery only
creates an exclusive right to acquire native lands as against other nations. In
Worcester, at issue was the validity of a notorious set of Georgia statutes, which
sought to assume jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation by annexing Cherokee
lands, thereby violating federal treaties entered into with the Cherokee and
annulling the Cherokee constitution and laws. One statute required white per-
sons to obtain permission of the state before entering Cherokee territory. Samuel
Worcester, a missionary from Vermont, was arrested for failing to obtain state
authorization. Worcester challenged the Georgia statute on the basis that it was
contrary to the U.S. Constitution and treaties and laws of the federal govern-
ment. In his reasons for judgment, Marshall C.J. recanted the view that discov-
ery yields title, stating that “[it is difficult to comprehend … that the discovery
… should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled
the pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.”74 Instead, discovery yields only
the exclusive right to acquire title. This restatement of the effect of discovery
led Marshall C.J. to a more subdued interpretation of the Royal Proclamation
of 1763,75 which he had interpreted in Johnson to be an assertion of title as

73Supra, note 43.
741bid. at 543.
75Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. I [hereinafter Royal Proclamation]. The Royal Proc-
lamation asserted sovereignty over territory claimed by Britain, and prohibited the granting of
unceded Indian lands by colonial governments, the settlement of unceded Indian lands by British
subjects, and the purchase of unceded Indian lands by private individuals. The Proclamation also
established a system of public purchases for the extinguishment of Indian title. For analysis and
commentary, see B. Slattery, “The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (1984) 32
Am. J. Comp. Law 361 at 368-72; G.S. Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian
Northwest Territories: A Legal Argument (D. Jur. Thesis, York University, 1981) [unpublished]; B.
Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, as Affected by the Crown’s Acquisition

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against native people rendered lawful by principles of Crown prerogative. In
Worcester, Marshall C.J. instead viewed the Royal Proclamation as asserting a
title against Europeans only and reserving the right to acquire land from native
people solely to the Crown. Speaking more generally of the protection offered
by the Crown to native nations, Marshall C.J. stated:

The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial to them-
selves –
an engagement to punish aggressions on them. It involved, practically,
no claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the nation
to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful
friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without
involving a surrender of their national character.7i

Marshall C.J. went on to hold that “Itihe Indian nations halve] always been
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their origi-
nal natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil.”” Thus, when the
Crown transferred to the colony of Georgia the rights and powers it possessed
in relation to Cherokee land, “the crown could not be understood to grant what
the crown did not affect to claim; nor was it so understood.””8 Furthermore,
jurisdiction over the Cherokee was transferred to the federal government upon
confederation of the American states. In Marshall C.J.’s view, state laws such
as the Georgia statute in question could not apply within Indian territory at all.79

Worcester represents the capstone judgment in a bold vision of aboriginal
title not only because Marshall C.J. was prepared to acknowledge the political
independence of the Cherokee nation from state law, but also because he laid
down general principles governing the jurisdiction of the federal government.
According to Marshall C.J., the relationship between the Cherokee nation and

of Their Territories (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) [hereinafter
Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples].

76Worcester, supra, note 43 at 552.
771bid. at 559.
781bid. at 545.
79In Marshall C.J.’s words, ibid. at 561:

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cher-
okees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The
whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.

The state of Georgia refused to acknowledge the validity of the judgment in Worcester v. Geor-
gia, and federal authorities did not attempt to enforce the ruling. See J. Burke, “The Cherokee
Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality” (1969) 21 Stanford L. Rev. 500. The Cherokee were
subsequently expelled from Georgia, resulting in a mass exodus of an estimated 17,000 people.
About 4,500 people died in the walk. See G. Jahoda, The Trail of Tears (New York: Holt Rinehart
& Winston, 1975).

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

the federal government was one of association, with the right of self-
government intact:

The settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
its right to self-government – by associating with
surrender its independence –
a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.80

Grounding this association in treaties entered into by the Cherokee nation with
the federal government, Marshall C.J. held that such an association engendered
a duty on the part of the federal government to act as the guardian of native
interests.”‘

Chief Justice Marshall’s vision of the nature of the native proprietary inter-
est in Worcester contains the seeds for a common law of aboriginal title that
would facilitate the development of native self-government. By acknowledging
the error of his ways in Johnson, where he concluded that the doctrine of dis-
covery and the Crown prerogative vested title to native land in the Crown, Mar-
shall C.J. in Worcester reconceptualized the native proprietary interest as an
entitlement not dependent on a prior grant from the Crown; in fact, he openly
accepted the fact that the native interest arose prior to any interest on the part
of the “discovering” nation. Discovery, properly understood, vests only the
exclusive right to acquire title from native people as against other potential
nations. This holding is critical to the development of a set of principles gov-
erning the common law of aboriginal title that would facilitate the realization of
self-government, for it challenges the assumption that the Crown holds under-
lying title to native land, and instead suggests that Crown regulation or extin-
guishment of the native proprietary interest at common law cannot occur absent
native consent. Such a formulation respects the fact that, in Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s view, “[a] weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself
under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right
of government.”82 Worcester thus represents a moment of opportunity for the
common law of aboriginal title to become an instrument of self-government. If
the common law were to borrow from Marshall C.J.’s vision of the common law
of aboriginal title implicit in Worcester and reject the assumption that the Crown
holds underlying title to native land, the result would be a set of principles that
acknowledges the fact that native people were the original inhabitants of the

80Supra, note 43 at 561.
81Compare Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) at 12, where a majority of the
Court, per Marshall C.J., held that the Cherokee people constituted a state possessing political
independence, with “their relation to the United States resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian.”

82Supra, note 43 at 561.

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continent by requiring native consent to Crown regulation or extinguishment.83
Such a formulation would result in the inclusion of native peoples in the exer-
cise of executive action that affects their lives.

B. The Canadian Framework

The Marshall vision of native proprietary rights strongly influenced Cana-
dian developments.’ Yet by adopting an extremely thin version of the Marshall
vision, English and Canadian courts have constructed a set of proprietary enti-
tlements for native people which has the effect of entrenching a hierarchical
relationship between native people and the Crown. Instead of viewing native
people as enjoying underlying title to ancestral lands with discovery vesting a
mere right to acquire native title, Canadian courts assume that underlying title
vests in the Crown and that as a result aboriginal title can be extinguished by
the Crown absent native consent and absent any compensatory obligation.
Unlike Chief Justice Marshall, who first articulated this view of native propri-
etary interests in Johnson but who soon realized its flaws in Worcester, Cana-

83Although Marshall CJ.’s judgment is strongly suggestive of a more expansive definition of
native property entitlements beyond a right to occupancy at the mercy of the federal government,
one which would include limits on the government’s authority to extinguish native title absent con-
sent, the United States Supreme Court subsequently determined that the power of Congress to
extinguish Indian title is supreme. See United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry, 314 U.S. 339 (1941)
and Buttz v. Northern Pacific Ry, 119 U.S. 55 (1886). In U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) at
323, for example, it was stated:

The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It
exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But
until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.

In the case of ambiguity, there must be a “clear and plain indication” that extinguishment was
intended; otherwise Indian title continues: see Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. CI. 487
(1967) (U.S.S.C.) at 492. Upon extinguishment, however, the native interest is not a compensable
property right unless Congress had unambiguously “recognized” a native right of permanent occu-
pancy. Absent such recognition, Congress is entitled to extinguish the native interest in reserve
lands or unsurrendered lands absent consent and without any corresponding obligation to provide
compensation for such actions. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. U.S. 348 U.S. 272 (1955). For critical
commentary, see McNeil, supra, note 60 at 259-64; I. Harvey, “Constitutional Law: Congressional
Plenary Power Over Indian Affairs – A Doctrine Rooted in Prejudice” (1982) 10 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 117; S. Bloxham, “Aboriginal Title, Alaskan Native Property Rights and the Case of the Tee-
Hit-Ton Indians” (1980) 8 Am. Indian L. Rev. 299; N. Jessup Newton, “At the Whim of the Sov-
ereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered” (1980) 31 Hastings L.J. 1215. For a general overview of
U.S. federal law over Indian affairs, see R. Ericson & D.R. Snow, “The Indian Battle for Self-
Determination” (1970) 58 Cal. L. Rev. 445 and D.G. Kelly, “Indian Title: The Rights of American
Indians in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial” (1975) 75 Columbia L. Rev. 655.
84For an overview, see J. Hurley, “Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution, and the Marshall Court”
(1982-83) 17 R.J.T. 403; see also N. H. Mickenberg, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada and the United
States” (1971) 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 119.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

dian jurisprudence has failed to acknowledge the fact that discovery ought to
establish rights as against other potential discoverers but not against the original
inhabitants of the land, save an exclusive right of acquisition.

In an early case indirectly involving native title, St. Catherines Milling and
Lumber Co. v. R.,85 the Privy Council assumed the responsibility of delineating
the nature of the native interest at common law in lands not surrendered by
treaty to the Crown. The issue arose in the context of a dispute between Ontario
and the federal government over the legality of a logging permit issued by the
federal government to St. Catherines Milling. The federal government argued
that it possessed the authority to issue a permit because it obtained title to the
land in question by virtue of a treaty it entered into with the Ojibway nation in
1873, in which the Ojibway people agreed to “cede, release, surrender, yield up,
transfer and relinquish” specified lands to the Crown forever in return for the
recognition of limited hunting and fishing rights and reserve lands, among other
benefits. The federal government also relied on s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 186786, which gives exclusive jurisdiction to Parliament over “Indians, and
Lands reserved for the Indians.” The province argued that it possessed underly-
ing title to the land in question by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
which provides that all lands belonging to the province at the time of Confed-
eration continue to belong to the province. In dismissing the federal govern-
ment’s arguments under s. 91(24), Lord Watson distinguished between the fed-
eral right to legislate with respect to native land and provincial proprietary
rights. Under s. 91(24) the federal government is entitled to enter into treaties
with respect to native land and to extinguish native title. Should native people
be divested of their proprietary interest in land, however, title to the land
remains with the provincial Crown by virtue of s. 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867.

In so holding, Lord Watson made reference to the nature and extent of the
native interest in terms similar to those articulated by Marshall C.J. in Johnson.
Lord Watson spoke of a “personal and usufructory right” attaching to native
people with respect to unsurrendered land, “dependent on the good will of the
sovereign.”87 This “usufructory right” is a right of use and possession subject to
surrender to or extinguishment by the Crown. In Lord Watson’s view, the source
of the native interest was the Royal Proclamation: “[t]heir possession, such as
it was, can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal proc-
lamation in favour of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and pro-
tection of the British Crown.”88 The text of the Royal Proclamation, according
to Lord Watson, made it clear that occupancy rights were “dependent on the

85(1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.) [hereinafter St. Catherines Milling].
86Supra, note 11.
t 7Supra, note 85 at 54.
8 Ibid.

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good will of the sovereign.” 9 Yet his judgment implies that the same result
would accrue in the absence of a proclamation: “there has been all along vested
in the Crown a substantial and paramount estate, underlying the Indian title,
which became a plenum dominium whenever that title was surrendered or oth-
erwise extinguished.”9 St. Catherines Milling thus assumes the dependent pro-
prietary relationship which Chief Justice Marshall sought to justify in Johnson:
namely, that notwithstanding the fact that native people were the original occu-
pants of the lands, the Crown has underlying title and is entitled to extinguish
the native interest without native consent. Lord Watson is unclear as to the
source of this dependency: on the one hand he implies that it is a function of
the Royal Proclamation; on the other he implies that it is embedded in the com-
mon law. In either case, the result is that property law imagines the Crown to
hold underlying title to Indian land and the native relation to land to be “depend-
ent on the good will of the sovereign.”‘”

That this is the case was bome out by the famous split decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. A.G.B.C. 2 Calder involved an action
brought by members of the Nishga tribe on the coast of British Columbia
requesting a declaration that their title to certain lands in the province had never
been lawfully extinguished. Despite the fact that the Nishga people had not sur-
rendered the lands in question by treaty, the provincial Crown had made numer-
ous grants with respect to the lands for development purposes: mining, petro-
leum exploration, tree farming, and forestry and fee simple grants. The Nishga
people claimed that they possessed aboriginal title to the land either by virtue
of the fact that they had been occupants “from time immemorial” or in the alter-
native because of the Royal Proclamation. The Court dismissed the native
claim, with Pigeon J.’s narrow holding relating to Crown fiat carrying the day.93
The other members of the Court were split on the question of extinguishment
of title. Judson J., with whom Martland and Ritchie JJ. concurred, argued that
whatever interest the Nishgas may have had at common law, it had been extin-
guished by legislation and proclamation prior to British Columbia’s joining
Confederation. Referring to U.S. cases which rely on the Marshall trilogy for
the proposition that “‘the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish’
Indian title has never been doubted,”’94 Judson J. was quick to conclude that in

89Ibid.
90Ibid. at 55.
911bid. at 54. For further discussion, see McNeil, supra, note 60 at 272-74; see also K. McNeil,
“The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Straightjacket” in M. Bray & A.
Thomson, eds, Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1990).

92 [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [hereinafter Calder cited to S.C.R.].
93Pigeon J. argued that access to the Court for the determination of the Nishga’s claim was
barred by sovereign immunity from suit without a fiat granted by the Lieutenant Governor of Brit-
ish Columbia pursuant to the Crown Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 89.

94Supra, note 92 at 334-35, quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry., supra, note 83.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

the present case “the sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion
over the lands in question, adverse to any right of occupancy which the Nishga
Tribe might have had, when, by legislation, it opened up such lands for settle-
ment, subject to the reserves of land set aside for Indian occupation.”’95 Compen-
sation, in Judson J.’s view, is owed only when there is a “statutory direction to
pay” – when, in other words, the legislature so decides.96

Justice Hall wrote a powerful dissent, concurred in by Spence and Laskin
JJ., in which he argued that Nishga title was not extinguished by colonial proc-
lamations and legislative enactments.97 Reacting against the tenor of historical
documentation which imagined native people to be “in effect a subhuman spe-
cies,””8 Justice Hall sought to expand the nature of the Indian proprietary inter-
est within the confines established by St. Catherines Milling and the Marshall
trilogy. Rather than claiming the source of the native interest to be the Royal
Proclamation, which he saw as governing Nishga land but “declaratory” of their
rights, Hall J. rooted the native interest in the common law of property and
invoked the common law principle that “[p]ossession is of itself at common law
proof of ownership.”” The evidence clearly established that the Nishga people
were prima facie “owners of the lands that have been in their possession from
time immemorial.”‘” Yet Hall J. nevertheless appeared to accept that the Crown
possesses underlying title to Indian land to the extent that he refered to, and
seemingly accepted, the fact that the Nishgas did “not deny the right of the
Crown to dispossess them.”. In his view, the native interest in land could law-
fully be extinguished by legislation absent consent and presumably absent com-
pensation, yet would require a legislative intention to extinguish Indian title to
be “clear and plain.”‘ 2 Absent a clear expression of intent, native title would
continue to exist. His acceptance of an underlying Crown title to native lands
appears to contemplate the further possibility of executive extinguishment as
well.

Unlike Lord Watson in St. Catherines Milling, both Judson and Hall JJ.
were willing to imagine native property rights as potentially rooted in the com-

951bid. at 344.
96Ibid. at 343.
97For a similar view, see W.H. McConnell, “The Calder Case in Historical Perspective” (1974)
38 Sask. L. Rev. 88. See also K. Lysyk, “The Indian Title Question in Canada: An Appraisal in
the Light of Calder” (1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. 450.

98Supra, note 92 at 346.
991bid. at 368.
“0Ibid. at 375.
‘0 1The Nishgas advanced the proposition that the native proprietary interest is “a right to occupy
the lands and to enjoy the fruits of the soil, the forest and of the rivers and streams which does not
in any way deny the Crown’s paramount title as it is recognized by the law of nations” (ibid. at
352).

‘2Quoting Davis J. in Lipan Apache v. United States, supra, note 83.

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mon law and therefore not solely dependent on the terms of the Royal Procla-
mation. Judson J. was willing to entertain the possibility that native title existed
independently of the Royal Proclamation, for he was of the view that the nature
of such title would in any event permit the sovereign to extinguish it without
compensation or consent, and that such extinguishment had occurred in the
present case.” 3 Hall J., on the other hand, reasoned that the native interest was
not limited to the reach of the Royal Proclamation and instead rested on the fact
of original possession, and that the native interest in the present case had not
been extinguished by state action. Yet despite this difference, both judgments
remain true to the relationship of dependence enshrined in the legal categories
which structure native interests in land. Judson J. is explicit that any property
rights native people may enjoy are contingent on the discretion of the Crown,
and that the Crown is entitled to extinguish native interests at any time without
consent and without compensation. Hall J. adopts a similar framework of under-
standing to the extent that he envisages that the Crown or a legislature is entitled
to extinguish absent consent and compensation as long as it expresses a clear
intent to do so. While Hall J. is sympathetic to native forms of life, neither of
them questions that executive or legislative action can extinguish what permits
these forms of life to flourish: native use and enjoyment of land.

C. Recent Developments

Hall J.’s dissenting judgment is an illustration of how judicial attempts to
ameliorate the proprietary position of native peoples that do not question the
legitimacy of the hierarchical relationship built into the structure of the propri-
etary interest simply reproduce the dependency in a new form. Another case
which powerfully illustrates this dilemma is the landmark judgment of Gue-
rin,” where the Supreme Court of Canada held the federal Crown liable for
breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to the Musqueam Indian band with
respect to the leasing of reserve land. Provisions in the Indian Act governing the
use and enjoyment of reserve land codify aspects of the native property interest
at common law, namely, that natives enjoy full use and enjoyment of reserve
land subject to regulation or extinguishment by the Crown.’ Moreover, native
people are precluded from alienating reserve land to anyone other than Crown
representatives.”l In Guerin, the band had surrendered a portion of its reserve
land to the Crown so that it could be leased to third parties as a golf club. The

103Complicating Calder was the fact that the Crown’s proclamations and ordinances at the time

had legislative force in the colony.

104Supra, note 35. For commentary, see R.H. Bartlett, Indian Reserves and Aboriginal Lands in
Canada: A Homeland (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1990) at
194-204; D.P. Emond, “Case Comment: Guerin v. R.” (1986) 20 E.T.R. 61; and J. Hurley, “The
Crown’s Fiduciary Duty and Indian Title: Guerin v. R.” (1985) 30 McGill L.J. 559.

’51ndian Act, s. 18.
161bid. s. 37.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Crown in turn leased the land to the third party on terms which were not as
attractive as those the band had been led to believe it would receive upon sur-
render. In finding for the Indian band, Dickson J. (as he then was), for a majority
of the Court held that the Crown is under a fiduciary obligation with respect to
the Musqueam band to deal with the surrendered lands for the benefit of the
band. 7 He also made more explicit the source and nature of aboriginal title. As
for the source of native tifle, Dickson J. affirmed what both Justice Hall and Jus-
tice Judson appeared to acknowledge in Calder, and held that “aboriginal title
existed in Canada (at least where it has not been extinguished by appropriate
legislative action) independently of the Royal Proclamation.”’08 As for the
nature of native title, Dickson J. referred to Chief Justice Marshall’s conclusion
in Johnson that discovery gave ultimate title to European discoverers and
reduced the native interest in land to occupancy and possession, alienable only
to the Crown. The nature of the native interest was such that it called for the rec-
ognition of a fiduciary relationship between native people and the Crown. More
specifically, the reason for the existence of a fiduciary obligation on the part of
the Crown is that “the Indian interest in the land is inalienable except upon sur-
render to the Crown.”‘” Due to the fact that “the relative legal positions are such
that one party is at the mercy of the other’s discretion,”” Dickson J. was of the
view that certain obligations attached to the Crown by virtue of its superior
position.”‘

Guerin deserves to be recognized for advancing the cause of First Nations
by its willingness to subject the exercise of Crown authority to judicial review.
The attachment of fiduciary obligations on the Crown in its dealings with native
lands ensures that native interests will be respected and protected by the Crown
in its dealings with third parties. Yet Guerin, by not questioning the hierarchical
relationship inherent in the property interest created by the common law, simply
reproduces native dependency in a new form. Justice Dickson’s judgment,
premised on the proposition generated by Marshall C.J. in Johnson that the
Crown enjoys underlying title to native land, accepts the hierarchical relation

07Wilson J. was of the view that an express trust was established upon surrender. Estey J. would

have relied on agency law to reach a similar conclusion.

10Guerin, supra, note 35 at 377. In so holding, Dickson J. concluded that the native interest in
the land would be the same if the land in question was not reserve land but rather traditional tribal
lands. For a criticism of this holding, see Bartlett, supra, note 104. See also McNeil, supra, note
60 at 286-88.

‘1Ibid. at 376.
“0Quoting E. Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 25 U.T.L.J. I at 7.
“‘For the intimation that fiduciary obligations attach to the provincial, as well as the federal,
Crown, see Dickson CJ.’s concurring judgment in Mitchell and Milton Management Ltd. v. Peguis
Indian Band et al., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85 at 109, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [hereinafter Peguis cited to
S.C.R.] (“[f]rom the aboriginal perspective, any federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has
imposed on itself are internal to itself and do not alter the basic structure of Sovereign-Indian
relations”).

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[Vol. 36

created by the recognition of underlying Crown title, and proposes to rein in the
unbridled authority that ensues to the stronger party as a result by the attach-
ment of legal duties attendant upon the exercise of such power. A fiduciary rela-
tionship by its very nature assumes a hierarchical relationship, in that “one party
is at the mercy of the other’s discretion.””‘ 2 By seeking to ameliorate some of
the adverse consequences that flow from the establishment of a legal relation-
ship of inequality, however, Guerin leaves intact the underlying hierarchical
relation between the Crown and First Nations in the context of property entitle-
ments. In so doing, and despite its intentions to the contrary, Guerin frustrates
rather than facilitates the quest for a greater degree of self-government for Cana-
da’s First Nations.

D. Summary: The Myth of Crown Title

Property law, as a frame of reference that structures the relationship
between native peoples and land, consists of a set of legal categories specific to
native people which produces a relationship of dependence by native people on
the Canadian state. Native people are restricted to use and enjoyment of unsur-
rendered or reserve land, and are precluded from personally alienating their
lands to third parties. Premised on the assumption that the Crown holds under-
lying title to native lands and thereby enjoys the right to unilaterally extinguish
native title, the common law of aboriginal title accepts the fact that one party
is at the mercy of the other’s discretion. Reformist impulses, as evidenced by
Dickson J.’s judgment in Guerin, which do not openly question the legitimacy
of an entrenched position of authority for the Crown, simply reproduce the
dependency in a new form. The attachment of a fiduciary obligation only offsets
some of the adverse side-effects of a hierarchical relationship and does not elim-
inate the fact that native peoples’ interests in land are imagined in law as
dependent on the will of the Crown. The principles that work to preserve this
relationship of dependency have been supported and sustained by a vision of
native people as both different than and similar to nonnative people. Native dif-
ference supports the extension of the doctrine of discovery to vest title in land
in the “discovering” nation. Yet native similarity supports the proposition that
native people hold property only by grant from the Crown. The result is a set
of legal categories which resist calls for self-government, permits the Crown to
extinguish native interests in land without native consent, and perpetuates a
legal state of dependence by native people on the mercy and good will of the
Canadian state.

The common law of aboriginal title represses the fact that native people
were the original inhabitants of North America. Founded on a fatal misreading
of the doctrine of discovery, the common law of aboriginal title assumes that the

” 2Supra, note 110.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Crown holds underlying title to native land. Anglo-Canadian property law
extended the “English law fiction…that all lands in the realms were originally
possessed, and accordingly owned, by the Crown,””‘ 3 to the Canadian context
by reference to and reliance on the doctrine of discovery. Yet, as originally for-
mulated, the doctrine of discovery vests in the discovering country territorial
sovereignty and a right to priority of acquisition as against subsequent arrivals.
Territorial sovereignty does not necessarily entail sovereign ownership of the
land in question. Questions surrounding land ownership are to be resolved by
reference not to international law but to domestic property law. As Kent McNeil
has persuasively argued, the English common law of property does not support
the notion of underlying Crown title; instead, in the absence of conquest, it sug-
gests that title does not lie with the Crown unless it was made the subject of a
treaty.14

Revising the common law of aboriginal title to provide that the Crown
does not possess underlying title to native lands would result in a significant
shift in the way in which the law structures and makes sense of native reality.
The assumption of Crown title is central to Anglo-Canadian ways of under-
standing property relations between individuals and the state. Borrowed from
feudal notions governing the relation between landholders and the English
Crown, the fiction of underlying Crown title has worked to legitimate the dis-
tribution of land holdings in the settlement of Canada. Yet, in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall in Worcester, “the crown could not be understood to grant what
the crown did not affect to claim.””‘ 5 Similar recognition of the myth of Crown
title can be found in Justice Wilson’s concurring judgment in Guerin. Unlike
Dickson J., who was fully comfortable with the proposition that “[a]ll our insti-
tutions recognize the absolute title of the Crown,””‘ 6 Wilson J. exhibited less
enthusiasm for the proposition that the Crown has an unfettered right of extin-
guishment. In her view,

[t]he bands do not have the fee in the lands; their interest is a limited one. But it
is an interest which cannot be derogated from or interfered with by the Crown’s
utilization of the land for urposes incompatible with the Indian title, unless, of
course, the Indians agree. g

In order to lend legitimacy to the fact that native people were the first
inhabitants and occupants of this country, the common law of aboriginal title

113McNeil, supra, note 60 at 11.
“”McNeil demonstrates that the Crown at best is lord paramount over lands subject to common
law aboriginal title. Thus the Crown is entitled to grant a lordship to a third party, but such a grant
would not affect the fee simple title native people possess by virtue of their occupation. Ibid. at
193-243. See also McNeil, “The Temagami Indian Land Claim: Loosening the Judicial Straight-
jacket”, supra, note 91 at 213-70.

“5Supra, note 43 at 545.
” 6Supra, note 35 at 380, quoting Marshall C.J. in Johnson v. M’Intosh, supra, note 43 at 588.
‘”lbid. at 349.

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[Vol. 36

ought to embrace Marshall C.J.’s vision of the relationship between native peo-
ple and the Crown in Worcester, expand upon Justice Wilson’s requirement of
native consent, and reimagine proprietary relationships between the Crown and
Canada’s First Nations. The myth that the Crown possesses underlying title to
native lands ought to be abolished. If the Crown wishes to put native lands to
nonnative use either by regulating or extinguishing native use and enjoyment,
then native consent must be obtained. The requirement of native consent would
have the effect of transforming traditional Anglo-Canadian understandings of
property ownership, which perpetuate a state of dependence by native people on
the good will of the Crown. It would also enable native people to begin to have
greater control over their individual and collective relationships to their ances-
tral land and to influence executive action that affects their needs and interests.

I. The Distribution of Legislative Authority

When the Fathers of Confederation in 1867 agreed to the principles
enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1867, there was no question among those
responsible for Confederation that the Dominion of Canada would exercise leg-
islative jurisdiction over Canada’s First Nations. The assertion of jurisdiction
over native peoples by Canada conformed to dominant understandings of inter-
national law principles governing the acquisition of territorial sovereignty in the
it was widely
face of an indigenous population. As described previously,”‘
accepted among colonial powers that territorial sovereignty over vacant lands
vested with the discoverer as against subsequent arrivals. With respect to occu-
pied lands, sovereignty could only be acquired through conquest or cession. Yet,
despite the presence of indigenous populations, international law and European
nations treated the North American continent as vacant. Territorial sovereignty
could be asserted without resort to conquest or treaty. British settlement was
sufficient to acquire sovereignty over lands not controlled by a competing colo-
nial power, and British sovereignty over lands settled by other European powers
was obtained through conquest or cession, as was the case with New France and
the Treaty of Paris in 1763.”‘ Perhaps to eliminate any doubt, the Royal Proc-
lamation of the same year asserted territorial sovereignty over lands populated
by the indigenous population of North America. 2′ Thus, when more than a hun-

“8See supra, notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
” 91n the Treaty of Paris, France ceded all its remaining territories in Canada to the British
Crown, as well as its territories east of the Mississippi River. In the same treaty, Britain also
acquired territorial sovereignty over Florida from Spain.

’20The Royal Proclamation stated the following: “And We do further declare it to be Our Royal
Will and Pleasure, for the present as aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and
Dominion, for the use of the said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Lim-
its of our said Three new Governments [Quebec, East Florida, and West Florida], or within the
Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company, as also all the Lands and Territories

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

dred years later the British Parliament passed the Constitution Act, 1867 and
carved out a sphere of legislative authority for a newly-created federal govern-
ment for its Canadian colonies, Crown sovereignty over Canada’s First Nations
was never in question.

As is evident from Chief Justice Marshall’s judgment in Johnson, the
assertion of territorial sovereignty over lands populated by native peoples of
North America was supported by a rhetoric of justification which imagined
native people as different than, and inferior to, European settlers. North Amer-
ica was deemed vacant despite the presence of an indigenous population on the
basis that its native inhabitants were either heathens or insufficiently civilized
to be worthy of the benefit of international law principles governing the acqui-
sition of sovereignty over occupied territories. Native difference was seen as the
justification for the assertion of territorial sovereignty without resort to conquest
or cession. Native difference, in other words, provided the justification for treat-
ing native people the same as nonnative people, namely, as subjects of the
Crown.

Nowhere in the jurisprudence devoted to the distribution of legislative
authority between Parliament and provincial legislatures over aspects of native
life is there any sustained examination of the legitimacy of the assertion of
Canadian sovereignty over First Nations beyond the reasons alluded to by Chief
Justice Marshall in Johnson. Working well within the boundaries of the Anglo-
Canadian legal imagination, courts have never seriously questioned Canadian
sovereignty over native people.’ 2′ Much like jurisprudence under the common
law of aboriginal title, which vests in the Crown an underlying proprietary inter-
est in native lands and which permits the Crown to regulate and extinguish
native interests absent native consent, the law governing the distribution of leg-
islative authority permits Parliament and provincial legislatures to pass laws
regulating the life and culture of native people without native consent.” Native
consent is either assumed or deemed irrelevant in the law governing the distri-
bution of authority over native people. The issue underlying every dispute relat-
ing to jurisdiction over matters pertaining to native people is not whether the

lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the [Atlantic Ocean] from the
West and North West….

12tLogan v. A.G. Canada (1960), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 416, O.W.N. 361 (Ont. C.A.), is the only case
to my knowledge which directly addresses this issue. In Logan, a member of the Six Nations Con-
federacy, composed of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca and Tuscarora nations,
argued unsuccessfully that members of the Six Nations were not subjects of the Crown and there-
fore outside the reach of the Indian Act. In dismissing the argument, King J., at 442, argued that
the Six Nations were once “faithful allies of the Crown” but became “loyal subjects of the Crown”
by virtue of accepting reserve land from the Crown.

122With the passage of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the exercise of legislative authority
must not interfere with “existing aboriginal or treaty rights;” see infra, notes 232-56 and accom-
panying text.

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[Vol. 36

state has authority to regulate incidents of native title, but rather which level of
government is entitled to regulate the matter in dispute. The underlying assump-
tion is that native title is subject to legislative regulation and extinguishment.
Principles governing relations between levels of government accept without
question a relationship of sovereign and subject between the Canadian state and
native peoples. The law governing the division of power over native people is
thus premised on a hierarchical relationship between the state and native people,
with the former enjoying sovereign power over the latter.

Acceptance and denial of native difference legitimate not only the assertion
of legislative authority over native people but also the distribution of that
authority between Parliament and provincial legislatures by the Canadian judi-
ciary. The distribution of legislative authority is effected through a process of
judicial interpretation that vacillates between a vision of native people as differ-
ent than nonnative people and one which sees native people as similar to non-
native people. The boundary between federal and provincial jurisdiction over
native people is identified by reference to native difference. The acceptance and
denial of native difference work to determine the scope of federal and provincial
sovereignty over native people and to maintain a hierarchical relationship
between native people and the Canadian state.

A. Federal Jurisdiction

The starting point of the law relating to the distribution of power is s.
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which confers on Parliament jurisdiction
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians.” Section 91(24) has been
interpreted to authorize Parliament to single out native people, including Inuit
peoples,”2 and treat them differently than nonnative people, and provides the
constitutional authority for the Indian Act and other federal statutes which sin-
gle out native people for special treatment. The Indian Act provides for the
establishment of band councils and the management and protection of Indian
lands and moneys, and defines certain Indian rights such as exemption from tax-
ation in certain circumstances and entitlements to band membership and Indian
status.

Parliament is also entitled to pass laws pursuant to other federal heads of
power listed in the Constitution Act, 1867 and treat native people the same as
normative people. That federal legislation passed pursuant to a head of power
other than s. 91(24) applies to native people is poignantly illustrated by R. v.

123The judiciary has interpreted s. 91(24) to include Inuit peoples. See Reference re Term “Indi-
ans”, [1939] S.C.R. 104, 2 D.L.R. 417. It has yet to be determined whether s. 91(24) also refers
to Metis people. See J. Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 6. See also C. Chartier,
“‘Indian’: An Analysis of the Term as Used in Section 91(24) of the British North America Act,
1867″ (1977-79) 43 Sask. L. Rev. 37.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Derriksan,24 which involved a dispute between a native person and fisheries
officials. Derriksan was apprehended fishing in a certain area without a license,
contrary to provincial regulations passed pursuant to the federal Fisheries Act.”
Derriksan argued that he was exercising his common law aboriginal right to fish
in the area. The Supreme Court of Canada had little time for the argument, dis-
missing it orally on the basis that even if Derriksan was correct in asserting an
aboriginal right to fish in the waters in question, Parliament has jurisdiction to
regulate aboriginal rights not only by virtue of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867 but also by virtue of its other heads of power in s. 91. The Court held the
Fisheries Act, enacted pursuant to s. 91(12), to be applicable to native people
despite the fact that it is not in relation to “Indians, and Lands reserved for the
Indians.” Thus Parliament is entitled to have its laws, passed under heads of
power other than s. 91(24), applied to native people as well as nonnative people.
Parliament, in other words, is entitled to ignore native difference and treat
native people the same as nonnative people. It is also entitled, by virtue of s.
91(24), to pass laws which single out native people and treat native people dif-
ferently than nonnative people.

As evidenced by the Court’s cursory dismissal of Derriksan’s claim that his
right to fish could not be interfered with by federal legislation, principles
designed to effect the distribution of authority between Parliament and provin-
cial legislatures are founded on an unquestioned belief in the authority of Par-
liament, pursuant to either s. 91(24) or another source of federal power, to pass
laws that affect First Nations without their consent. Judicial acceptance of fed-
eral authority over native people is based on the view that the Constitution Act,
1867 authorizes Parliament to pass laws affecting native people and that, by
implication, native people surrendered their sovereignty to the overarching
authority of European monarchs upon the settlement of the continent. Yet the
legitimacy of this assumption is never seriously questioned by those entrusted
with distributing the legislative power entailed by the assertion of territorial sov-
ereignty. Ultimately grounded on notions of native inferiority, the assertion of
territorial sovereignty had the effect of subjecting native forms of self-
government to the legislative authority of the colonies.

Continued reliance on the doctrine of discovery to ground the legitimacy
of traditional understandings of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, however, is
deeply problematic. 6 As illustrated by Chief Justice Marshall’s reasons in
Johnson, historical justifications for the assertion of territorial sovereignty are

124(1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 159, 31 C.C.C. (2d) 575 (S.C.C.).
125R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14 [hereinafter Fisheries Act], now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
26See B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims: Reconstructing North Amer-
1
ican History” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming) for the view that “the premise that Amer-
ica was legally vacant when Europeans arrived cannot be justified either by reference to systems
of conventional law or to natural law” (supra at 15 of manuscript).

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

based on unacceptable notions of native inferiority. The judiciary must begin to
construct principles that accept the fact that native people did not surrender their
sovereignty or pre-existing forms of government by the mere fact of European
settlement. The law governing the distribution of legislative authority over
native people ought to eliminate the interpretive obstacles currently in place that
permit extensive federal regulation of native people absent native consent, and
construct principles governing the distribution of authority to allow for the abil-
ity of native people themselves to pass laws governing their individual and col-
lective lives. In Part V of this article, I argue that s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 authorizes and indeed requires such judicial action. 7 The remainder
of this Part is devoted to describing how such a result can be achieved. Although
it will be no easy task, it is not a wholly unfamiliar one for the judiciary. Prin-
ciples constructed by the judiciary to police the boundaries of provincial juris-
diction over native people offer a useful doctrinal approach which, if deepened
and extended to the federal sphere, could provide a model for judicial protection
against the assertion of legislative authority over Canada’s First Nations.

B. Provincial Jurisdiction

Embedded in the principles constructed by the judiciary to determine the
scope of provincial jurisdiction over native people are the seeds of an approach
which could facilitate the realization of First Nations self-government. Yet cur-
rent efforts to carve out a space free from provincial legislative regulation are
not justified by the need to preserve and promote native autonomy; instead, pro-
vincial laws of general application are read down solely to protect federal leg-
islative authority over First Nations.”z To this end, a province is not entitled to
single out native people and treat them differently than nonnative people. Leg-
islation to this effect would be in pith and substance legislation in relation to
“Indians” and therefore ultra vires the province. This is illustrated by R. v. Suth-
erland, 9 in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 49 of Manitoba’s
Wildlife Act 3′ was ultra vires the province because it singled out and thus was
a law in relation to native people. Lurking in the background of the case was
a memorandum of agreement between the federal and provincial government
designed to transfer from the federal government to the province all ungranted
lands within the province.’ 3′ The memorandum of agreement stated that provin-
cial fish and game laws would not apply to native people seeking to hunt and
fish on unoccupied Crown lands or on lands on which native people had a right

’27See infra, text accompanying notes 232-57.
128See B. Ryder, “The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Pro-

moting Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308.
129[1980] 2 S.C.R. 451, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 374.
130R.S.M. 1970, c. W-140 [hereinafter Wildlife Act], now R.S.M. 1987, c. W-130.
13’para. 13 of the Memorandum ofAgreement Under the Manitoba Natural Resources Act, S.M.

1930, c. 30, S.C. 1930, c. 29, 1930 (U.K.) 20-21 Geo. V, c. 26.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

of access. Section 49 of Manitoba’s Wildlife Act deemed a huge amount of
Crown land to be occupied, thereby eliminating the authority which the mem-
orandum of agreement gave to native people to hunt and fish on the land in
question. In the Court’s view, provincial jurisdiction over property and civil
rights does not entitle a province to single out native people and treat them dif-
ferently than nonnative people; since s. 49 was aimed at native people, it was
therefore ultra vires the province.132

Despite the fact that a province cannot seek to regulate native people by
singling them out and treating them differently than nonnative people, a prov-
ince, generally speaking, is entitled to treat native people the same as normative
people and regulate their affairs by laws of “general application.” This is illus-
trated in Kruger and Manuel v. R.,’33 where at issue was whether a provincial
game law applied to non-treaty natives hunting off a reserve on unoccupied
Crown land. Before concluding that the relevant statute was applicable to native
people, the Court offered some guidance on what constitutes a law of general
application. Rejecting the view that a law which has a disparate impact on
native people is not a law of general application, the Court held that “the fact
that a law may have graver consequence to one person than to another does not,
on that account alone, make the law other than one of general application.”‘ 3
Since the legislation had a uniform territorial operation and a valid provincial
purpose, it was held to be a law of general application.

Though a province is entitled to treat native people the same as nonnative
people and regulate native affairs by laws of “general application,” the Court
noted in Kruger and Manuel that provincial authority in this regard is not unlim-
ited. In the words of Dickson C.J., “[t]he line is crossed … when an enactment,
though in relation to another matter, by its effect, impairs the status or capacity”
of native people.’35 A similar test was articulated by Justice Beetz in Four B

S.C.R.].

132The Court went on to accept the trial judge’s finding that, in fact, the land in question was
“occupied” within the meaning of the memorandum of agreement because it was being used as a
wildlife management reserve pursuant to valid provincial legislation, but that since the public had
a limited right of access to the land, native people possessed an unlimited right to hunt and fish
for food pursuant to the memorandum of agreement.

131(1977), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 434 [hereinafter Kruger and Manuel cited to
1341bid. at 110.
1351bid. In Kruger and Manuel, the Court concluded that the legislation in question did not have
such an effect. Whether a province can extinguish, as opposed to regulate, aboriginal title is a com-
plicated question. If the law in question singles out native people in the act of extinguishment then,
according to traditional principles such a law would be ultra vires the province. If, however, the
law is one of general application, it could be argued that it nonetheless touches on matters that are
“inherently Indian” and therefore inapplicable. See R. v. Dennis and Dennis (1974), [1975] 2
W.W.R. 630, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 379 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), for the view that a provincial law that extin-
guishes aboriginal rights is legislation in relation to Indians and therefore ultra vires, and that
exclusive federal authority over extinguishment of aboriginal title is a “most desirable social objec-

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[Vol. 36

Manufacturing v. United Garment Workers of America,1 36 where he spoke of
provincial laws of general application which touch on matters which are “inher-
ently Indian” or “regulate Indians qua Indians.”’37 In such cases, the law, despite
its general applicability, will be held to be inapplicable to native people. In Der-
rickson v. Derrickson,”3 ‘ for example, the Court was of the view that provincial
legislation of general application did go to the essence of federal jurisdiction
over native people. At issue was whether provisions of British Columbia’s Fam-
ily Relations Act 39 dealing with division of family assets apply to lands located
in a reserve held by a native. The Indian Act provides that possession of lands
in a reserve is to be allotted to individual band members by the band council
with the approval of the Minister of Indian and Northern Development who
issues a certificate of possession. 4′ The appellant wife brought a petition for
divorce and sought a declaration pursuant to the Family Relations Act that she
was entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the properties for which her
husband held certificates of possession. For a unanimous Court, Chouinard J.
held that “[t]he right to possession of lands on an [I]ndian reserve is manifestly
of the very essence of the federal exclusive legislative power under s. 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1867,” noting that to hold otherwise “would significantly
impact on the ability of the Band and the federal Crown to ensure that reserve
lands are used for the benefit of the Band.”” Thus the Court imagined posses-
sion of reserve lands as going to the core of federal jurisdiction.’42

to S.C.R.].

tive” (at 390). But see A.G. Ontario v. Bear lsland Foundation (1984), 49 O.R. (2d) 353, 15 D.L.R.
(4th) 321 (Ont. H.C.), aff’d [1989] 68 O.R. (2d) 394, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 117 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to
appeal to the S.C.C. granted, 19 October 1989). See W. Pentney, “The Rights of the Aboriginal
Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982: Part II: Section 35: The Substantive Guarantee”
(1987) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207, for an argument in support of exclusive federal power to extinguish
aboriginal title.

136(1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 385 [hereinafter Four B Manufacturing cited
1371bid. at 1048.
118[1986] I S.C.R. 285, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 175 [cited to S.C.R.].
’39R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121 [hereinafter Family Relations Act].
140Supra, note 10, s. 20.
141Supra, note 138 at 296.
142For other cases involving claims that provincial laws go to the core of federal jurisdiction
under s. 91(24), see Re Stony Plain Indian Reserve No. 135 (1981), 130 D.L.R. (3d) 636, 35 A.R.
412 (Alta. C.A.); R. v. Smith (1980), [1981] 1 F.C. 346, 113 D.L.R. (3d) 522 (Fed. C.A.); Western
Industrial Contractors Ltd. v. Sarcee Developments Ltd., [ 1979] 3 W.W.R. 631, 98 D.L.R. (3d) 424
(Alta. S.C.A.D.); Milbrook Indian Band v. Northern Counties Residential Tenancies Board (1978),
28 N.S.R. (2d) 268, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 174 (N.S.S.C.); Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child
Welfare, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, 60 D.L.R. (3d) 148; Cardinal v. A.G. Alberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695,
40 D.L.R. (3d) 553 [hereinafter Cardinal cited to S.C.R.]; Corporation of Surrey v. Peace Arch
Enterprises (1970), 74 W.W.R. 380 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Rodgers (1923), 33 Man. L.R. 139, 3 D.L.R.
414 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Jim (1915), 22 B.C.R. 106, 26 C.C.C. 236 (B.C.S.C.). Judicial protection
of the “core of Indianness” from provincial regulation is more notional than real, due to judicial
interpretation of s. 88 of the Indian Act which has consistently been held to nonetheless incorporate

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Thus a province is not entitled to single out native people and treat them
differently than nonnative people, nor is a province, under the guise of similar
treatment, entitled to regulate native peoples’ essential difference. Yet difficul-
ties arise when the judiciary is asked to provide a precise location for this dif-
ference. Should it refer to attributes which are associated with the legal defmi-
tion of “Indian” or should difference be located elsewhere, for example, in
native culture or history? The former leaves the provinces free to subject native
people to norms and values which are alien to native culture so long as they are
embodied in laws of general application and do not affect the legal status of
native people. In Kruger and Manuel, for example, the Court not only held that
the provincial game law was a law of general application but also that it did not
“impair the status or capacity” of native people. In Four B Manufacturing, a
similar conclusion was reached with respect to provincial labour legislation. In
both cases, few reasons were offered for the conclusion, though few are needed
if by “status and capacity” the Court means to refer to those attributes which
make native people native in the eyes of the law. Provincial game laws, like pro-
vincial labour legislation, does not threaten “Indian status … [or] rights so
closely connected with Indian status that they should be regarded as necessary
incidents of status such for instance as registrability, membership in a band, the
right to participate in the election of chiefs and band councils, reserve privi-
leges, etc.”’43 Yet if by status and capacity one means to refer to the ability of
native people to engage in the cultural practices which help to constitute their
individual and collective self-definition, provincial game laws do threaten the
status and capacity of native people for whom hunting and fishing is a central
aspect of their native identity. To reduce the meaning of status and capacity to
its legal attributes leaves the provinces free to eliminate all that constitutes
native difference apart from the formal shell of legal status, so long as this proc-
ess of elimination occurs through laws of general application.

The spectre of provincial legislation riding roughshod over native differ-
ence through the guise of laws of general application has prompted some judges
to move beyond a legal definition of status and capacity and embrace a richer
definition of “Indianness.” In R. v. Dick,’ for example, at issue was the familiar
fact-situation of a native person caught hunting out-of-season off his reserve but
on the traditional hunting grounds of his people. Lambert J.A. in dissent noted

by reference provincial laws of general application which impair the status and capacity of native
people so long as such laws do not conflict with treaty fights or federal legislation, or address a
subject matter dealt with by the Indian Act. See, for example, Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, 23
D.L.R. (4th) 33 (S.C.C.); Jack and Charlie v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 641 [here-
inafter Jack and Charlie cited to S.C.R.]. For an overview, see L. Little Bear, “Section 88 of the
Indian Act and the Application of Provincial Laws to Indians” in Governments in Conflict?, supra,
note 31 at 175.

143Four B Manufacturing, supra, note 136 at 1047-48.
144(1982), 41 B.C.L.R. 173, 3 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (B.C.C.A.), aff’d supra, note 142.

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the close connection between the rituals of hunting and the self-definition of the
Alkali Lake Band to which the respondent belonged and argued that “it is
impossible to read the evidence without realizing killing fish and animals for
food and other uses gives shape and meaning to the lives and members of the
Alkali Lake Band,” and therefore that provincial game laws strike at “the central
core of Indianness.”’45 The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed with the
lower court’s holding that the case was indistinguishable from Kruger and
Manuel.

14 6

Contained in Lambert J.A.’s attempt to move beyond a strictly legal def-
inition of status and capacity are the beginnings of an approach to the distribu-
tion of legislative authority which, if extended beyond the provincial sphere to
govern federal authority, would facilitate the realization of First Nations self-
government. By shielding native people from the application of federal or pro-
vincial laws that strike at the core of their self-identity, the law governing the
distribution of authority could acknowledge the illegitimacy of continuing to
assume that native people surrendered their sovereignty by the mere fact of
European settlement, and provide a doctrinal basis for reimagining Canada’s
relations with its indigenous population. The judiciary could police the bound-
ary between Canada and First Nations simply by extending the Lambert J.A.
approach to protect native self-identity from provincial and federal intrusion. 47

That such an approach is not without risks is illustrated by Jack and Char-
lie v. R. 48 In Jack and Charlie, two native people were apprehended hunting
without a license out-of-season. The activity was done in conjunction with a
religious ceremony in which the Salish people of the west coast cook meat to
satisfy the needs and desires of their ancestors, whom they believe to have the
same needs and desires as living people. Counsel for the Salish argued among
other things that the law struck at the core of Indianness and regulated native
people qua native people by virtue of the fact that it interfered with the religious
practices of the Salish people. Justice Beetz, writing for a unanimous Court,
drew a distinction between the killing of the deer and the religious ceremony

s. 88 of the Indian Act. See supra, note 133 and accompanying text.

1451bid. at 183 & 187.
146The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial law was incorporated by reference by
147For a similar view, see Ryder, supra, note 128. Ryder argues that the judiciary should prevent
provincial laws from applying to “matters that touch the heart of First Nations peoples’ identities”
or to areas in which federal or First Nations laws have “covered the field,” and that Parliament
ought to be prevented from delegating federal legislative authority over “Indians, and Lands
Reserved For Indians” without the consent of parties involved (at 363). Compare Laskin’s dissent
in Cardinal, supra, note 142 at 716, where he stated:

Indian Reserves are enclaves which, so long as they exist as Reserves, are withdrawn
from provincial regulatory power. If provincial legislation is applicable at all, it is only
by referential incorporation through adoption by the Parliament of Canada.

148Supra, note 142.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

and held that “there was no evidence that the killing of the deer was part of the
religious ceremony.”‘ 49 Though evidence was given at trial that raw deer meat
was required for the ceremony, Justice Beetz held that this did not entail that the
killing of the deer itself was a ceremonious act in the absence of evidence to
suggest that “the use of defrosted deer meat was sacrilegious.”’50 What is prob-
lematic about Justice Beetz’ reasons for judgment is not so much the cavalier
“buy-a-freezer” character to it, but rather the risks associated with the simple
possibility that he might be wrong.’

The risks associated with the judiciary assuming the task of engaging in
acts of cultural definition, however, can be ameliorated by enhancing the ability
of native people to participate in the litigation process and sensitizing the judi-
ciary to native difference. Lambert J.A.’s approach to the delineation of the
scope of provincial power remains a useful means by which the judiciary can
attempt to facilitate the realization of native self-government. Native people
would be free from federal or provincial legislation that threatens their self-
identity. Such a result is the logical implication of rejecting the legitimacy of the
doctrine of discovery in the Canadian context.

C. Summary: Challenging Legislative Supremacy

The law governing the distribution of legislative authority as it relates to
Canada’s First Nations is a thicket of doctrinal manoeuvres that accepts without
question legislative sovereignty over native peoples. Federal jurisdiction is
derived from s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which has been read to
permit Parliament to single out native people and treat them differently than
nonnative people. Parliament is also entitled to treat native people the same as
nonnative people under laws passed pursuant to other heads of federal power.
Provincial legislatures are not entitled to treat native people differently than
nonnative people, but can pass laws regulating native forms of life so long as
such laws are of general application and do not touch on matters which are
inherently Indian. By not questioning the legitimacy of the assumption of leg-
islative jurisdiction by either level of government over Canada’s First Nations,
however, the law relating to the distribution of authority perpetuates a legal rela-
tionship of dependence between native peoples and the Canadian state.

149Ibid. at 345.
150Ibid. at 344.
‘5’Although proposed by counsel for the Salish, this part of Justice Beetz’ reasons was not
devoted to rebutting the argument that regulating the hunt interfered with the core of Indianness,
as Justice Beetz opted for the narrower, legalistic definition of federal authority articulated in Dick
v. R, supra, note 142. He drew a distinction between the hunt and ceremony to refute the argument
that federal incorporation under s. 88 of the Indian Act of provincial regulation of the hunt would
infringe the religious freedom of the Salish people protected by the Canadian Bill of Rights, supra,
note 30. Yet the risk of error would be the same had he opted for Lambert J.A.’s approach.

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With respect to federal jurisdiction, s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867
has been interpreted by the judiciary as conferring on Parliament the authority
to pass laws specifically in relation to native forms of life absent native consent.
With respect to provincial jurisdiction, s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 has
been interpreted as authorizing provincial legislatures to engage in legislative
intervention which has a similar effect. Jurisprudence governing the distribution
of legislative authority, premised on the Anglo-Canadian notion of legislative
supremacy, imagines native people to be subjects of the Crown and in this
respect essentially the same as normative people. This assimilationist vision
forms the conceptual backdrop to the assertion of legislative authority absent
native consent.

Yet the automatic acceptance of legislative supremacy by the judiciary in
the context of the distribution of power between Parliament and the provinces
must be challenged if the law is to facilitate the realization of self-government.
Although the notion that there is a sphere of activity immune from the reach of
the legislature is antithetical to Canadian understandings of the law of federal-
ism, vesting authority in Canadian legislatures to pass laws that regulate native
forms of life is equally antithetical to the aspiration of native self-government,
to the extent that self-government requires that native people possess control
over their individual and collective destinies. One component of such control is
the ability to pass laws and organize social relations free from federal or provin-
cial interference. Although translating such an aspiration into the discourse of
the law governing the distribution of power will necessarily proceed on a case-
by-case basis, the distribution of legislative power against the backdrop of mul-
tiple communities in Canadian political life is not a wholly unfamiliar task for
the judiciary. As Richard Simeon has argued, “the essential message of feder-
alism is that it is a regime of multiple loyalties.”” 2 Moreover, jurisprudence
addressing the extent to which provinces are entitled to regulate native forms of
life by laws of general application already contains a doctrinal technique suit-
able for the task of reconciling overlapping allegiances in the context of First
Nations self-government. Current jurisprudence engages in such an inquiry for
the purposes of determining whether a province as opposed to Parliament can
engage in cultural interference. The judiciary ought to extend its current
approach with respect to provincial laws of general application to apply to all
laws, be they federal or provincial, that touch on matters central to native iden-
tity. Federal laws and provincial laws of general application that do not bear on
matters relating to cultural self-definition could continue to apply to native peo-
ple without threatening forms of self-government. If a federal or provincial law
is held to govern matters central to native identity, they ought to be declared

152R. Simeon, “Aboriginal Self-Government and Canadian Political Values” (Address to the
National Symposium on Aboriginal Self-Determination, Toronto, 2 October 1990) at 53
[unpublished].

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

ultra vires absent native consent and participation in their formulation. Section
91(24) ought to be re-interpreted as authorizing Parliament to pass laws specif-
ically in relation to native people only if native people participate in and consent
to the formation of those laws.’53 The potential for cultural insensitivity by the
judiciary when engaging in the task of delineating matters central to native iden-
tity, as evidenced by Justice Beetz’ reasons in Jack and Charlie, can be allevi-
ated by native participation in the litigation process and an increased awareness
of native difference on the part of the judiciary.

The concept of legislative sovereignty, so central to the Canadian legal
imagination that it structures the very way the law conceives of legal problems
involving legislative jurisdiction over Canada’s First Nations, is intimately con-
nected to the law’s inability to embrace native forms of self-government. As
stated by Bruce Ryder, “valid claims of First Nations people to autonomy have
been ignored by the doctrinal structure of Canadian federalism.”’54 Built into the
premises of the law governing the distribution of legislative authority is a form
of legal understanding that conceptually excludes serious consideration of
native self-government. The task facing decisionmakers is not to devise ways in
which self-government can be accommodated within the current rubric of leg-
islative supremacy, but rather to acknowledge that legislative supremacy, as a
way of understanding and structuring native reality in law, must itself be accom-
modated and adapted so as to create constitutional spaces in which First Nations
self-government can flourish.

IV. Treaty Rights and Treaty Interpretation

Since 1700, close to 500 treaties have been negotiated between represent-
atives of the Crown and native people in Canada.’55 The year 1850 is often used
to distinguish two different types of treaties. Most treaties signed prior to 1850
involved a one-time payment by the Crown for the surrender of relatively small
tracts of land. Under the 1781 Treaty between the Crown and the Chippewa and
Mississagua nations, for example, Indian land was surrendered to the Crown in
return for three hundred suits of clothing. Occasionally annual payments were
provided for, as was the case in another treaty negotiated between the Chippewa
nation and the Crown in 1827, where the Chippewas agreed to surrender over
2 million acres of land in return for a paltry 18 thousand acres of reserve land
and an annual payment of eleven hundred pounds.’56 Some pre-1850 treaties did

153Compare M. Krasnick, “Remarks before the National Symposium on Aboriginal Self-
Determination” (Address to the Symposium, Toronto, 1 October 1990) at 5 [unpublished] (section
91(24) authorizes federal regulation of “some aspects of Indian life, but cannot displace those
aspects of Indian life that are essential to continuing Indian culture”).

‘-“Ryder, supra, note 128 at 322.
155D.J. Purich, Our Land: Native Rights in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer and Co., 1986) at
156Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders From 1680 to 1902, reprinted ed. (Toronto: Coles

95.

Publishing, 1971).

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[Vol. 36

not refer to land surrenders but were simply peace and friendship treaties
whereby natives would agree to lay down their arms and support the Crown in
the war against the French by England. Peace and friendship treaties often were
negotiated without any reciprocal obligations attaching to the Crown. One
exception was the Treaty of 1752, where the Micmac nation in Nova Scotia was
guaranteed the right to hunt and fish in return for its agreement to “submit to
the King” and “forbear all acts of hostility towards English subjects.” ’57 Another
exception was an agreement signed in 1760 by General Murray and the Huron
nation, in which the Hurons agreed to make peace with British forces in return
for a guarantee of “the free exercise of their Religion, their Customs, and their
Liberty of trading with the English.”’58

Treaties negotiated during and after 1850 covered much more land and
provided for annual payments. The Robinson-Huron Treaty, for example, one of
two treaties negotiated in 1850 by William Benjamin Robinson, provincial com-
missioner of Upper Canada,’59 involved the surrender of all land held by the par-
ties north of Lake Huron to the border between Canada and what was then
known as Rupert’s Land. In exchange, the native signatories were guaranteed a
lump sum payment of 2000 pounds, an annuity of 500 pounds, three areas of
reserve lands, and the right to hunt and fish on unoccupied lands.”f Eleven
numbered treaties, negotiated between 1871 and 1921, cover land from Que-
bec’s border with Ontario to the northwest edge of the country. Treaty Number
Six, for example, involved the surrender of approximately 120,000 square miles
of territory in what is now central Saskatchewan and Alberta in return for one
square mile of reserve land per family of five; continued hunting and fishing
rights; a one-time payment of $12.00 per Indian, farm stock and equipment,
seed, a flag, a medal, and a horse, harness and wagon for each chief; $1500.00
annual payments, as well as an additional $1000.00 a year for three years for
provisions; a promise to maintain a school on reserve land; and an undertaking
to provide for a medicine chest for the benefit of Indians and assistance in the
case of pestilence or famine. 16 1

209-15.

157Ibid. See also infra, text accompanying notes 165-75 and 199-208.
15Slndian Treaties and Surrenders, supra, note 156; see also infra, text accompanying notes
159The other was known as the Robinson-Superior Treaty, which extinguished the rights of
native signatories to all land north and east of Lake Superior to the boundary between Canada and
Rupert’s Land, and contained terms similar to those of the Robinson-Huron Treaty. Both are found
in Indian Treaties and Surrenders, ibid. at 147-49.

16Ibid. See also infra, text accompanying notes 185-98.
161The complete texts of the numbered Treaties are available in A. Morris, The Treaties of Can-
ada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories, reprinted ed. (Toronto: Coles
Publishing, 1971) [hereinafter The Treaties of Canada]; see also infra, text accompanying notes
176-83. For an analysis of events leading up to the negotiation of Treaties Number Six and Seven,
see J.L. Taylor, “Two Views on the Meaning of Treaties Six and Seven” in R. Price, ed., The Spirit
of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Edmonton: Pica Pica Press, 1987) 9.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Though each is unique in its terms and scope of application, and apart from
a few early peace and friendship treaties, virtually every treaty entered into by
the Crown and native people involves the surrender of ancestral lands in return
for certain benefits to be provided by state authorities. Treaties thus simultane-
ously frustrate and facilitate the aspiration of native peoples to have more con-
trol over their individual and collective destinies. On the one hand, the fact that
the Crown has entered into agreements that have been held to deprive native
people of their historic connection to their ancestral lands and involve the relo-
cation of native people to reserves is a source of profound disempowerment.
However much it may vary from context to context, the aspiration to self-
government is inextricably tied to native peoples’ relationship to ancestral
lands. The severing of such a relationship through surrender and the relocation
of native peoples to reserves has had a devastating effect on native peoples’
ability to maintain native forms of life. On the other hand, treaties contain pos-
itive elements and entitlements for native people which, if read sympathetically,
could facilitate the realization of self-government. The act of surrender, for
example, need not be interpreted by reference to traditional Anglo-Canadian
understandings of title transfers. A surrender need not be read as conveying an
absolute right of exclusion and as automatically stripping native people of con-
tinued use and enjoyment of the land in question. Instead, a surrender could be
viewed as the granting of consent to a system of priority of use, whereby native
people, in return for benefits provided by the Crown, agree either that nonnative
use or native use will have priority in the event of conflict between uses. When
there is no conflict in use, namely, where one party can engage in activity that
does not threaten the use put to the land by the other party enjoying priority, the
act of surrender need not foreclose native use and enjoyment. The content of
treaties also provides moments of possibility for the realization of aspects of
self-government. The promise to maintain a school and a medicine chest on
reserve lands in Treaty Six, for example, potentially binds the Crown to provide
complete funding for educational and medical services to those covered by its
terms. Judicial interpretation of treaties between the Crown and native peoples
in Canada thus is critical to the success or failure of treaties to serve as instru-
ments of self-government.

Jurisprudence surrounding treaties, however, historically has been unsym-
pathetic to viewing treaties in a way which would minimize their potential for
disempowerment and maximize the opportunities they present for realizing the
aspiration of self-government. Judicial resistance to the aspiration of self-
government in the context of treaty jurisprudence is reflected in two areas: the
legal status accorded to treaties by law, and the way in which substantive treaty
rights are interpreted by the courts. The former refers to the legal force accorded
to treaties. The latter refers to the way in which the judiciary has given substan-
tive content to vague treaty guarantees. Although each area has seen a historical
shift toward the development of principles which are more accommodating of

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[Vol. 36

native concerns, contemporary treaty jurisprudence in both spheres continues to
reflect and perpetuate a hierarchical relationship between native people and the
Canadian state.

‘With respect to the legal status of treaties, treaty rights have been imagined
in law in such a’ way as to render them either unenforceable or enforceable only
against state inaction. More specifically, judicial attitudes toward the legal status
of treaties entered into by native peoples and the Crown historically has
involved a shift from an approach that imagines native people as different than,
and inferior to, nonnative people, toward an approach that imagines native peo-
ple as the same as normative people and therefore not worthy of special consid-
eration. The earlier approach viewed agreements between the Crown and native
peoples as essentially political agreements not enforceable in a court of law.
Traditional international law principles provide that an agreement between two
“independent powers” constitutes a treaty binding on the parties to the agree-
ment.’ 62 Courts viewed native people as “uncivilized” and as belonging to an
inferior race and thus agreements between native peoples and the Crown were
not binding on the Crown in law. Contemporary jurisprudence has rejected the
view that native people are different than, and inferior to, normative people,
with the result being that treaties are elevated from the level of nonbinding
political agreement to that of contractual right. Native people are imagined
under this approach as possessing legal personality similar to that possessed by
normative people in Canada and therefore capable of entering into binding
agreements with the Crown. Because such agreements are not viewed as any-
thing more than contractual agreements with the Crown, despite exhortations by
the courts that treaties are “unique,” 63 they are seen as subject to legislative
authority. Prior to 1982,'” this had the effect of permitting Parliament to regu-
late or extinguish existing treaty rights.

‘With respect to judicial interpretation of the content of treaty guarantees,
there has been a shift in the opposite direction, namely, toward the embrace of

162See e.g. Principles of Public International Law, supra, note 52 at 58-70. It should be noted
that, even if treaties between the Crown and First Nations were accorded “international treaty” sta-
tus, this fact alone would not render them enforceable in domestic courts; implementing legislation
would be required. See A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] A.C. 326, 1
D.L.R. 673 (P.C.).

163The uniqueness of treaties is emphasized to dampen the application of international law prin-
ciples to the treaty context. In Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 at 404, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 390 [here-
inafter Simon cited to S.C.R.], for example, Dickson C.J. stated that “[ain Indian treaty is unique;
it is an agreement sui generis which is neither created nor terminated according to the rules of inter-
national law.” See also R. v. White and Bob (1964), 52 W.W.R. 193, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 at 617-18
(B.C.C.A.), aff’d [19651 S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481n (S.C.C.); and Francis v. R., [1956] S.C.R.
618 at 631, 3 D.L.R. (2d) 641; R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427 [hereinafter
Sioui cited to S.C.R.].

164See infra, text accompanying notes 187-98.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

native difference. More specifically, early judicial pronouncements on the con-
tent of treaty guarantees were blind to native cultural difference. Treaty rights
historically were rendered concrete and given determinate meaning by reference
to Anglo-Canadian public and private law norms and values. The “plain mean-
ing” of a treaty guarantee was determined by a process that accepted without
question the legitimacy of basic categories of Anglo-Canadian legal conscious-
ness. This resulted in expansive definitions of the meaning of land surrenders
and narrow interpretations of treaty benefits flowing to native people. Recent
jurisprudence is more sensitive to native expectations about treaty negotiation
and thus is more accommodating of native difference. This shift has resulted in
more expansive definitions of treaty benefits to native people, though the mean-
ing of land surrenders effected by treaty continues to be steeped in Anglo-
Canadian notions concerning title and transfer.

A. Treaties and Native Inferiority

The case of R. v. Syliboy”65 is illustrative of the tendency of early jurispru-
dence to view treaties as little more than political arrangements between native
people and the Crown through a rhetoric of justification that imagined native
people as different than, and inferior to, nonnative people. Patterson J.’s judg-
ment also illustrates the judicial tendency to accept as unquestioned the legiti-
macy of Anglo-Canadian public and private law categories and values in the
adjudication of threshold legal issues surrounding treaty disputes.

In Syliboy, the grand chief of the Micmac nation was convicted of illegal
hunting on Cape Breton Island, contrary to Nova Scotia’s Lands and Forests
Act, 1926.”s Syliboy admitted to the acts complained of, but asserted a right to
hunt and trap under a treaty entered into in 1752 by the then-Governor of the
Province of Nova Scotia and various delegates of the Micmac lation. Article 4
of the treaty provided that “the said Tribe of Indians shall not be hindered from
but have free liberty to hunt and fish as usual.” 67 Despite the relative clarity of
the terms of the treaty, Patterson J. dismissed Syliboy’s appeal. Bombarding the
reader with a fusillade of arguments supporting the Crown’s case, the judgment
illustrates many of the difficulties associated with the assertion of native treaty
rights. Articulating the view that native people are different than, and inferior
to, nonnative people, Patterson J. held that the Micmac nation was an “unciv-
ilized people” and as a result could not be said to be an “independent power,”
which would confer on it the status to enter into a treaty with another nation. 6
Referring to a version of the doctrine of discovery which Marshall C.J. recanted

165[1929], 1 D.L.R. 307, 50 C.C.C. 389 (N.S. Co. Ct.) [hereinafter Syliboy cited to D.L.R.].
166S.N.S. 1926, c. 4, now Crown Lands Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 114.
167Syliboy, supra, note 165 at 308.
161bid. at 313.

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in Worcester,16 9 Patterson J. stated that “[a] civilized nation first discovering a
country of uncivilized people or savages held such country as its own until such
time as by treaty it was transferred to some other civilized nation,” and that as
a result “[t]he savages’ rights of sovereignty were never recognized.”‘ 70 With
Kafkaesque flair, Patterson J. found support for his conclusion that the Micmac
did not claim to be an independent power in “the very fact” that they sought
from the Governor the right to hunt in Nova Scotia.’
In his words, “if they
were [an independent power], why go to another nation asking this privilege or
right and giving promise of good behaviour that they might obtain it?”‘ 72 Pat-
terson J. concluded this part of his reasons with the statement that “the Treaty
of 1752 is not a treaty at all; … it is at best a mere agreement made by the Gov-
ernor and a handful of Indians.”’73 Patterson J. further held in the alternative that
even if the Treaty of 1752 was in fact a treaty, it did not extend to Cape Breton
Island due to the fact that Cape Breton Island was not part of the Province of
Nova Scotia when the treaty was negotiated and because the signatories, in his
view, did not represent the precise tribe of Micmac to which Syliboy belonged.
He was also of the view that if the Treaty of 1752 was a treaty, it had expired
due to the outbreak of hostilities, but in any case contemplated provincial reg-
ulation of hunting. Patterson J. concluded by viewing the agreement as a form
of political agreement unenforceable in the courts under contractual principles,
characterizing the benefits that flowed to the Micmac not in terms of contractual
or treaty right but rather as a manifestation of the good will of the state as
expressed in statutory form.74

Patterson J.’s judgment is an example, albeit extreme, of some of the
threshold difficulties native people face in attempting to assert treaty rights in
the context of a jurisprudence that imagines natives as different than and inferior
to nonnative people. In Syliboy, native difference is cast in terms of native infe-
riority and then relied upon to deny the ability of native people to enter into
agreements having the force of law. Since native peoples are not imagined as
similar to “independent powers,” agreements made between native representa-
tives and the Crown do not constitute international treaties. Patterson J.’s argu-
ment that the agreement is not a treaty because the Micmac nation was “unciv-

169See supra, notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
170Supra, note 165 at 313.
17’bid.
172Ibid.
173Ibid. Patterson J. was also of the view that the Governor did not have treaty-making authority
as there was no evidence that the Governor was not specially deputed by the constituted authorities
of Great Britain for this purpose (supra at 314).

174For discussion of the lack of any definition of the status of a native treaty in Canadian law,
see D.E. Sanders, “Aboriginal Peoples and the Constitution” (1981) 19 Alta. L. Rev. 410 at 417-18.
For a contrary holding, see R. v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337,4 D.L.R. 774 (Alta C.A.). For anal-
ysis, see K. McNeil, Indian Hunting, Trapping and Fishing Rights in the Prairie Provinces of Can-
ada (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983).

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

ilized” and “savage” is rooted in racist assumptions about native difference. He
referred to the native negotiators as “a handful of Indians”‘ 75 and resisted con-
ceptualizing those involved as acting on behalf of a legal entity, namely, the
Micmac nation, capable of entering into binding agreements with the Crown.
Syliboy also is an illustration of an early tendency to accept without question the
legitimacy of Anglo-Canadian public and private law norms in the determina-
tion of threshold legal issues surrounding treaty litigation. In his rejection of the
possibility that the Treaty of 1725 extends to Cape Breton Island, Patterson J.
determined the scope of the treaty by reference to legal boundaries which have
little or no meaning to the Micmac people. Thus Patterson J.’s resistance to the
proposition that the agreement constitutes a treaty is rooted in a view of native
people as different than and inferior to nonnative people, whereas his view that
the agreement does not extend in any event to Cape Breton Island is premised
on the unquestioned acceptance of Anglo-Canadian legal boundaries.

B. The Contractualist Vision

Although contemporary jurisprudence no longer is explicitly grounded in
the view that native people are an inferior race, threshold questions of status,
applicability, and expiry similar to those raised in Syliboy continue to haunt and
infuse contemporary litigation surrounding treaty rights. As well, judicial inter-
pretation of vague treaty guarantees, at least until recently, has been marked by
a tendency to import Anglo-Canadian norms into the interpretive process, and
has resulted in narrow constructions of treaty provisions which exclude native
interests in land use and self-government. The tendency to interpret treaty guar-
antees narrowly is exemplified in the case of Johnston v. R.,’76 where the appel-
lant was appealing a conviction of a failure to pay hospital tax as’ required by
Saskatchewan legislation. The Saskatchewan Hospitalization Act’77 created a
general obligation to pay hospital tax but exempted Indians living on reserves
as well as Indians living off reserves for less than 12 months. A further exemp-
tion existed for those who were entitled to obtain general hospital services from
the federal government. Johnston had been living off his reserve for more than
12 months but he argued that Treaty Number Six entered into in 1876 between
the Wood Cree and the Crown entitled him to obtain general hospital services
from the federal government. More specifically, Treaty Number Six provided
the following:

That a medicine chest shall be kept at the house of each Indian Agent for the use
and benefit of the Indians at the direction of such agent.

175Supra, note 165 at 313.
176(1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 749, 56 W.W.R. 565 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter Johnston cited to

D.L.R.].

177R.S.S. 1953, c. 232, now R.S.S. 1978, c. S-23.

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That in the event hereafter of the Indians comprised within the treaty being over-
taken by any pestilence, or by a general famine, the Queen, on being satisfied and
certified thereof by her Indian Agent or Agents, will grant to the Indians assistance
of such character and to such extent as her Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs
shall deem necessary and sufficient to relieve the Indians from the calamity that
shall have befallen them. 178

In the court below, the Magistrate held that the provision for a medical
chest required that the federal government provide “all medical services, includ-
ing medicines, drugs, medical supplies and hospital care free of charge.”‘ 79 In
allowing the appeal, Culliton C.J.S. was faced with a choice between a broad
interpretation and a narrow interpretation of the clause, with very little interpre-
tive aids to assist him. He opted for the latter. Referring to the meaning “con-
veyed by the words themselves in the context in which they are used,” Culliton
C.J.S. interpreted the clause to provide for an undertaking by the Crown to keep
at the house of the Indian agent a medicine chest for the use and benefit of the
Indians at the direction of the agent, adding that he could “find nothing histor-
ically, or in any dictionary definition, or in any legal pronouncement, that would
justify the conclusion that the Indians, in seeking and accepting the Crown’s
obligation to provide a ‘medicine chest’ had in contemplation provision of all
medical services, including hospital care.” ‘

In refusing to read the medicine chest provision as requiring the Crown to
provide medical care free of charge, Culliton C.J.S. adopted an interpretive
strategy of giving meaning to treaty rights by reference to the meaning of the
terms used in existence at the time of negotiation. This “frozen rights” approach
to treaty interpretation is the result of a narrow stress on the intent of those
involved in treaty negotiations. In examining the record for evidence of such
intent, Culliton C.J.S. goes no further than the official record of the Honourable
Alexander Morris, P.C. 8′ This is not to suggest that determining the understand-
ing of the native negotiators would have been an easy task,’ s but rather to chal-
lenge an interpretive process which determines the meaning of treaty rights by
reference to the state of medicine as it existed in 1876. Culliton C.J.S.’s reading
of Treaty Number Six is indicative of a tendency to imagine treaty rights at best
as contractual guarantees, and a reluctance to accord them the kind of status
worthy of constitutional documents. When contrasted to the interpretive style
adopted by the judiciary in relation to the Constitution Act, 1867, viewed as a

178The Treaties of Canada, supra, note 161 at 354-55.
179Supra, note 176 at 751.
’80Ibid. at 753. For an opposite conclusion, see Dreaver v. The King, an unreported judgment

of the Exchequer Court of Canada, referred to in Johnston, ibid. at 754.

8’8 The Treaties of Canada, supra, note 161.
182For the view that “[t]he intent was that Indians should receive from the Federal Government
whatever medical care could be made available,” see Indian Chiefs of Canada, “Citizens Plus” in
Wanbageshig, ed., The Only Good Indian (Toronto: New Press, 1970) 5 at 35.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

“living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits,”‘8 3 the
historically impoverished nature of treaty jurisprudence could not be starker.

A further illustration of the tendency to inject Anglo-Canadian norms and
values into the process by which meaning is given to abstract treaty rights is
found in Pawis v. R.,’84 where four members of the Ojibway nation were
charged with violating federal fishery regulations. All four had been fishing in
a traditional manner for food for themselves and other band members in places
where they had fished regularly in the past. In their defence, they appealed to
a treaty right to hunt and fish pursuant to the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850,
which provided that in consideration of the surrender of lands covered by the
treaty, the chiefs and tribes covered were granted “the full and free privilege to
hunt over the territory now ceded by them, and to fish in the waters thereof, as
they have theretofore been in the habit of doing.”‘ 185 The accuseds argued that
the Crown was in breach of its treaty obligations and in breach of trust by the
enactment of fishery regulations.8 6

Dismissing the above arguments, Marceau J. first held that the Robinson-
Huron Treaty was “tantamount to a contract.” ’87 Viewing the treaty through con-
tractualist lenses had the effect of triggering several threshold concerns detri-
mental to the success of the appeal. According to Marceau J., any breach of
contract occurred not at the date of the apprehension of the four accuseds, but
rather when fisheries regulations were first passed by federal authorities. As a
result, “[t]he breach of contract they allege, and the damage they say was
thereby caused to the Ojibways, occurred long before they were born.”’88 The
limitation period for maintaining an action in breach of contract long expired
prior to their apprehension.’89 Thus, conceptualizing a treaty as a type of con-
tract renders it subject to limitation periods; as a result, treaty rights which have
been systematically ignored by the authorities cannot be invoked in aid of an
action in breach of contract.

Viewing the treaty as if it were a contract also enabled Marceau J. to resort
to the technique of implication. More specifically, Marceau J. held that he
would infer into the agreement, “in like manner that clauses that are customary
or necessary are supplied in ordinary contracts between individuals,” that the

’83Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124 at 136, 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.), Lord Sankey.
114[1980] 2 F.C. 18 at 18, 102 D.L.R. (3d) 602 (F.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Pawis cited to F.C.].
185Ibid. at 22.
1861bid. at 23. It was also argued that the Crown was guilty of negligent representation due to
statements by former Ministers of Indian Affairs to the effect that the policy of the Government
was to “recognize the lawful obligations imposed on the Crown by treaties entered into with the
Indian people.”
‘ 871bid. at 25.
“’88Ibid. at 31.
‘Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 246, now R.S.O. 1980, c. 240.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

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right to hunt and fish is subject to state regulation.’90 Guiding this part of his rea-
sons is the underlying view that the Crown could not contractually bind itself
to not enact legislation regulating methods of fishing. Analogizing to property
ownership, Marceau J. concluded that

[t]he right acquired by the Indians in those treaties was…necessarily subject in its
exercise to restriction through acts of the legislature, just as the person who
acquires from the Crown a grant of land is subject in its enjoyment to such leg-
islative restrictions as may later be passed as to the use which may be made of
it. T
it191
The enactment of fishery regulations, in Marceau J.’s view, stemming from
valid exercises of legislative authority, could not constitute breach of contract.
In his words, “[h]ow can a legal act be at the same time an act to be sanctioned
as an illegal breach of contract?”‘”

In any event, Marceau J. was of the view that the treaty did not contain a
promise that the Crown would not regulate the right to fish. More specifically,
he held that the reference to “full and free privilege to fish” did not exclude state
regulation. Marceau J. reached this conclusion by interpreting the treaty right to
hunt and fish by reference to Anglo-Canadian private law categories of under-
standing. More specifically, the reference to a “free privilege to fish” was given
meaning by the invocation of contractualist values. Marceau J. stated that “it
simply means that no consideration is to be exacted from those entitled to hunt
and fish in exercise of the right.”’93 The reference to “full … privilege to fish”
was interpreted through the prism of property ownership, and seen as “connot-
[ing] a plenary quality, a completeness of the right … strictly as regards the right
of the owner or possessor of the land.”’94 Thus in Marceau J.’s view, the “full
and free privilege to hunt and fish” accorded to the Ojibway nation by the terms
of the Robinson-Huron Treaty does not refer to the methods used but to the pur-
pose for which the activity was carried on, “It]he words have nothing to do with
the manner of fishing.”’95 He therefore concluded that “the wording does not
import any intention that there be unrestricted rights in perpetuity to fish regard-
less of the general laws regulating the means of hunting and fishing.”’96

Pawis is an example of how treaty jurisprudence simultaneously devalues
the status of treaty rights to at best the level of contractual rights as against the
Crown, and involves an interpretive process that views those guarantees through
the lenses of Anglo-Canadian private law categories of understanding. By

190Supra, note 184 at 27.
‘9 ‘Ibid. at 28.
192Ibid.
’93Ibid. at 26-27.
’94Ibid. at 26.
195Ibid., emphasis added.
96Ibid. at 27.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

reducing the status of treaties to the category of contract, the law is able to main-
tain the supremacy of legislative initiatives that infringe upon treaty guaran-
tees.’97 Treaty rights become enforceable only in the context of Crown inaction,
in circumstances where the Crown has failed to live up to the promises set out
in the treaty. Even in cases of state inaction, maintaining a cause for breach of
contract will be possible only where a plaintiff can point to recent Crown inac-
tion; otherwise limitation periods will govem. In any event, no relief is available
in circumstances where legislative initiatives regulate the exercise of treaty
rights, as in the case of regulations passed pursuant to federal jurisdiction over
fisheries. 9 ‘ Moreover, by interpreting the nature and extent of treaty guarantees
by reference to Anglo-Canadian private categories of understanding, as evi-
denced by Marceau J.’s reliance on market freedom and private property to
infuse the right in question with determinate content, the law governing treaty
interpretation excludes from its interpretive horizons native interests in land use
and self-government.

C. Recent Developments

The Supreme Court of Canada has since repudiated many of the arguments
put forward by Patterson J. in Syliboy, and indicated that the judiciary should
not engage in the type of interpretation offered by Culliton C.J.S. in Johnston
and Marceau J. in Pawis. In Simon,’99 for example, the appellant was convicted
of an offence under Nova Scotia’s Lands and Forests Act.” The issue before
the Court was whether the Treaty of 1752 created a right to hunt so as to pre-
clude the application of the provincial law. Dickson C.J. for the Court stated that
Patterson J.’s judgment in Syliboy “reflects the biases and prejudices of another
era in our history.”‘” He went on to hold that the Treaty of 1752 was validly
created by competent parties, that it contained a right to hunt which applied to
the appellant’s activities in question, and that the treaty had not been terminated
by hostilities between the Micmacs and the British in 1753 or by extinguish-
ment through occupancy by nonnatives under Crown grant or lease. He held fur-
ther that the appellant was an Indian covered by the treaty and that, as a result
of s. 88 of the Indian Act, the hunting rights contained in the treaty exempted
the appellant from prosecution under the Nova Scotia legislation. Dickson C.J.
also affirmed a principle of interpretation which calls for construing treaties
“not according to the technical meaning of their words, but in the sense that they

197For an illustration of this principle, see Sikyea v. R., [1964] S.C.R. 642, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 80.
198in Pawis, supra, note 184 at 29, Marceau J. hints that compensation may be due in cases
where “property is actually taken possession of, or used by, the government” quoting Wright J. in
France Fenwick and Company Limited v. R., [1927] 1 K.B. 458 at 467.

199Supra, note 163.
20 R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 163 [hereinafter Lands and Forests Act], now Crown Lands Act, supra, note
166.201Snpra, note 163 at 399.

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would naturally be understood by the Indians.”2′ This led him to interpret the
Treaty of 1752 as “an effective source of protection of hunting rights,” and “sen-
sitive to the evolution of changes in normal hunting practices.”2 3

Simon represents a shift in judicial understanding concerning the meaning
of treaty guarantees. Dickson C.J.’s judgment challenges the blind acceptance
of the legitimacy of Anglo-Canadian public and private law values in the proc-
ess of determining the meaning of vague treaty rights, and calls for heightened
sensitivity to native expectations surrounding the negotiation of a treaty. Simon,
however, is ambivalent on the critical question of the extinguishment or regu-
lation of treaty rights. It should be emphasized that the reason offered by Dick-
son C.J. as to why Nova Scotia’s Lands and Forests Act did not apply to the
appellant’s activities was not because the treaty rights shielded the appellant
from provincial regulation, but rather because s. 88 of the federal Indian Act
shielded the treaty right from provincial regulation.2” While stating that he does
“not wish to be taken as expressing any view on whether, as a matter of law,
treaty rights may be extinguished,”2 5 Dickson C.J. stated that it “seems appro-
priate to demand strict proof of the fact of extinguishment in each case where
the issue arises.”2’ Retaining the possibility of the extinguishment or regulation
of treaty rights implies that treaty rights have no more force than contractual
guarantees against the Crown, and that legislatures are entitled, within their
respective spheres of jurisdiction and subject to paramountcy principles, to pass
laws that regulate or extinguish treaty rights should they so desire. Absent the
protective shield of s. 88 of the Indian Act, treaty rights would not bind provin-
cial legislatures from passing laws which effected their regulation or extinguish-
ment. Treaty rights can be asserted against valid provincial laws not because
they conctrict the exercise of legislative authority but because Parliament has
stated in s. 88 of the Indian Act that provincial laws of general application shall
not infringe treaty guarantees. The legal force of a treaty in the context of a pro-
vincial law that threatens its regulation or extinguishment is conditional on the
existence of federal legislation. Moreover, there is nothing in s. 88 that provides
that treaty rights are paramount over federal legislation. 2” Viewing legislative
initiatives as paramount over treaty guarantees has the effect of envisioning
treaties as a form of protection against failures by the Crown to provide benefits

2021bid. at 402, quoting Nowegijick v. R., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, 144 D.L.R. (3d) 193, and Jones
v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899). See also R. v. Bartleman (1984), 55 B.C.L.R. 78, 12 D.L.R. (4th)
73 (B.C.C.A.) and R. v. Taylor (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.), leave
to appeal refused [1981] 2 S.C.R. xi. For a discussion of the “Nowegijick principle” as it relates
to the interpretation of statutes, see Peguis, supra, note 111 at 98-100.

203Supra, note 163 at 402.
24See supra, note 142.
205Supra, note 163 at 407.
2061bid. at 406.
2TSee R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 386.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

stipulated in the treaty, and not as a form of protection against valid exercises
of legislative authority. Except in the context of a simple failure to act by the
Crown, the legal force of a treaty is dependent on the good will of Parliament.”‘

A similar judicial orientation to the legal status and interpretation of trea-
ties is evident in the recent case of Sioui.2 9 In Sioui, the respondents were mem-
bers of the Huron band on the Lorette Indian reserve in Quebec. They were con-
victed of cutting down trees, camping and making fires in a provincial park,
contrary to provincial legislation.”‘ They alleged that they were engaged in
ancestral customs and religious rites protected by a treaty entered into by the
Hurons and the Crown in 1760. Justice Lamer (as he then was) held for the
respondents, ruling that the agreement between the Hurons and the Crown con-
stituted a treaty, that the parties thereto were competent to enter into it, that it
had not been extinguished, and that the respondents were exempt from the rel-
evant provincial regulations by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act. In his analysis
of the scope of the right asserted, Lamer J. gave a broad and liberal interpreta-
tion of the treaty’s provision for “the free Exercise of [the Hurons’] religion,
[and] their Customs.”‘.. Given that there is no mention made in the treaty of the
territory over which the treaty rights may be exercised, it was argued that the
treaty right did not extend to activities performed in park territory. Lamer J. held
that the issue had to be resolved “by determining the intention of the parties …
at the time it was concluded.”2 2 Sensitive to native expectations as well as those
of the English, Lamer J. was of the view that “the rights guaranteed by the treaty
could be exercised over the entire territory frequented by the Hurons at the time,
so long as the carrying on of the customs and rites is not incompatible with the
particular use made by the Crown of this territory. ‘213 Yet, like Dickson C.J.’s

20SThis is now subject to s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982; see infra, text accompanying

notes 232-57.

2gSupra, note 163.
21 Parks Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. 9.
21’Supra, note 163 at 1031.
2 12Ibid. at 1068.
213Ibid. at 1070. It should be noted that Lamer J. excluded the free exercise of religion on private
property from the scope of the treaty right. He did this by claiming that the intent of the parties
conformed to nonnative legal categories, namely, the distinction between public and private own-
ership, while at the same time acknowledging that the Hurons were probably unaware of the con-
sequences of private ownership. He stated the following:

I readily accept that the Hurons were probably not aware of the legal consequences,
and in particular of the right to occupy to the exclusion of others, which the main Euro-
pean legal systems attached to the concept of private ownership. Nonetheless I cannot
believe that the Hurons ever believed that the treaty gave them the right to cut down
trees in the garden of a house as part of their right to carry on their customs (supra at
1072).

Relying on the intent of the parties to support the invocation of the public/private distinction in
the context of an agreement where one party is unaware of the legal consequences of the concept
of private ownership is, to say the least, highly problematic.

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reasons in Simon, and subject to the Court’s view on s. 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982,”14 Justice Lamer’s judgment presumes that a legislature possesses the
legislative authority to regulate or extinguish treaty rights. The provincial leg-
islation making it an offence to cut down trees in the park was held inapplicable
to the respondents not by virtue of the existence of the treaty right in and of
itself but by virtue of its combined effect with s. 88 of the Indian Act. Section
88 was held to protect the treaty from extinguishment by provincial legislation,
and Justice Lamer further held that the appellant’s arguments that a number of
actions by the British Crown constituted extinguishment did not meet the strict
burden of proof governing extinguishment as stipulated in Simon.

Both Simon and Sioui indicate a shift in the nature of treaty jurisprudence
away from an approach marked by a multiplicity of procedural hurdles and nar-
row readings of treaty rights as evidenced by the judgments in Pawis and Syli-
boy. In its place is a set of principles more sensitive to native interests, which
call for broad and liberal readings of treaty rights and a relaxation of procedural
requirements usually associated with actions in breach of contract. Both judg-
ments heed the expectations of native negotiators at the time the treaty was
entered into, and neither relies unduly on Anglo-Canadian values detrimental to
native interests when giving meaning to abstract treaty rights. Yet despite a
statement by Justice Lamer in Sioui that “[t]he very definition of a treaty …
makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty cannot be extinguished
without the consent of the Indians concerned,”‘ 5 both judgments ultimately rest
on the existence of s. 88 of the Indian Act, which legislatively provides that
treaty rights will be paramount over conflicting provincial legislation. Parlia-
ment has jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” by vir-
tue of s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which enables it to shield treaty
rights from provincial regulation. Federal legislation renders treaty rights para-
mount over conflicting provincial law; a treaty standing alone is still conceived
of as subordinate to legislative authority. It is an open question whether a treaty
right would be paramount over conflicting provincial legislation in the absence
of s. 88. More importantly, apart from the obiter by Justice Lamer in Sioui,
treaty rights are not paramount over federal legislation. Still conceived in con-
tractual terms, treaties are not imagined as binding the legislative authority of
Parliament. Subject to the Court’s view of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982,16 Parliament remains supreme, and rights stemming from treaties with
the Crown are subject to federal legislative interference.

Although Sioui and Simon indicate a significant movement away from tra-
ditional judicial methods of treaty interpretation, the shift has not been com-

214See infra, text accompanying notes 232-57.
215Supra, note 163 at 1063.
216See infra, text accompanying notes 232-57.

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

plete. In Horse v. R.,'” a case decided before Sioui but after Simon, the appel-
lants were charged and convicted of violating provincial game laws for hunting
on private farm property. The appellants alleged that they were entitled to
engage in the activity in question by virtue of Treaty Six. Though the text of the
Treaty supported the Crown’s case, in that it provided that the “said Indians
shall have the right to pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout
the tract surrendered … saving and excepting such tracts as may from time to
time be required or taken up for settlement,” ‘
the appellants pointed to oral
evidence suggesting that they were entitled to hunt on private land subject to the
interests of the property holder and with regard to the safety of others.21 9 The
appellants argued that oral evidence suggested that Treaty Six contemplated that
Indians were entitled to hunt over land taken up for settlement under a joint use
concept, namely, upon the settlement of these lands, the Indian right to hunt was
not extinguished but rather the lands came to be used jointly by the Indian and
the settler.

In dismissing the appeal, Estey J. for a unanimous Court had “reservations”
about referring to oral evidence given the parole evidence rule that “extrinsic
evidence is not to be used in the absence of ambiguity.”2 0 Paying lip service to
Dickson C.J.’s exhortation in Simon that treaties “should be liberally construed
and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indian,”2”
though not con-
ceding that the text of Treaty Six is ambiguous on the point, Estey J. went on
to consider the Morris text, which he claimed “reinforces the conclusion that the
argument of the appellant for joint use of lands taken up by settlement must be
rejected.”” 2 Yet when he examined the Morris text, Estey studiously ignored the
evidence supportive of the appellant’s case, and concentrated instead on parole
evidence in relation to three other treaties: Treaties One, Three and Four. Estey
J. then argued that during the negotiation of the treaty at issue, Treaty Six, fed-
eral negotiators stated that the agreement was analogous to Treaties One, Three
and Four. In his view, since in the records of these other negotiations there was
no statement made by the Indians expressly requesting the right to hunt on occu-
pied lands, and since federal negotiators indicated that the terms of Treaty Six
“were analogous to those of the previous treaties,” the conclusion that Treaty

217[1988] 1 S.C.R. 187, 47 D.L.R. (4th) 526 [hereinafter Horse cited to S.C.R].
21SThe Treaties of Canada, supra, note 161 at 353.
2 19More specifically, the appellants relied on the following extract from The Treaties of Canada,

ibid. at 215-18:

[Chief Tee-Tee-Quay-Say:] We want to be at liberty to hunt on any place as usual …
[Lieutenant Governor Morris:] You want to be at liberty to hunt as before. I told you
we did not want to take that means of living from you, you have it the same as before,
only this, if a man, whether Indian or Half-breed, had a good field of grain, you would
not destroy it with your hunt…

20See Cross on Evidence, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1985) at 615-16.
22’Supra, note 217 at 202.
2221bid. at 203.

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Six did not contemplate hunting on occupied lands was “inescapable.”2” He
added that the evidence relied on by the appellant “can be read in a manner con-
sistent with the written provision, ‘
though he offered no reasons as to why
one ought to read the extrinsic evidence in such a manner.

Estey J.’s judgment in Horse is an indication that the shift in interpretive
technique advocated by Dickson C.J. in Simon and subsequently adopted by
Lamer J. in Sioui has not been complete. Estey J.’s reluctance to consider oral
evidence in Horse may have been overcome by Dickson C.J.’s statement in
Simon that treaties are to be liberally construed, but his understanding of the text
of Treaty Six and his treatment of oral evidence surrounding the treaty’s nego-
tiation evoke the interpretive blindness of another era. His refusal to concede
that the text of the Treaty does not foreclose hunting on settled lands is a man-
ifestation of an unwillingness to accept the possibility that a surrender of Indian
lands can be viewed in nonexclusive terms, namely, as involving an invitation
by natives to nonnative people to use the land in question and to assert priority
when such use conflicts with Indian interests. Estey J.’s judgment assumes with-
out question the legitimacy of applying traditional Anglo-Canadian assumptions
concerning the meaning of surrender in a context where joint use by natives and
nonnative people is possible. His stubborn focus on oral evidence surrounding
the negotiation of three other treaties and his claim that such evidence supports
the view that Treaty Six did not contain the right to hunt on occupied territories,
are at best disingenuous arguments and at worst constitute a profoundly disturb-
ing exercise of judicial power. Simply stating that the oral evidence surrounding
the negotiation of Treaty Six can be read in a manner consistent with the written
guarantee, i.e., in a manner consistent with the conclusion that the Treaty does
not include the right to hunt on occupied lands, begs the question whether the
written guarantee in fact ought to exclude such activity. It also begs the question
whether the oral evidence ought to be read in a manner consistent with such a
conclusion. The alternative conclusion, that the oral evidence does support a
right to hunt on occupied Crown lands, is not ruled out by the language of the
Treaty and can be supported by the oral evidence presented by the appellant.
Given that the evidence and the text of the Treaty are ambiguous on the point,
why reach the conclusion that the Treaty does not authorize the activity in ques-
tion? No reasons are offered in this regard, and the failure by Estey J. to offer
such reasons indicates a stubborn unwillingness to seriously entertain treaty
claims in the face of legislative regulation.

Another case decided after Simon but before Sioui indicates that treaty
jurisprudence is caught between two interpretive approaches: the expansive, lib-
eral vision of Simon and Sioui and the narrow, conservative vision of early juris-

2231bid. at 205 & 208.
2241bid.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

prudence and Justice Estey in Horse. In Horseman v. R., 25 a member of the
Horse Lakes Indian Band shot and killed a grizzly bear in self-defence while
lawfully hunting moose under the terms of Treaty Eight and the Alberta Natural
Resources Transfer Agreement of 1930. A year later, in need of money to sup-
port his family, he obtained a grizzly bear hunting license and sold the hide.
When read in conjunction with the Transfer Agreement, the treaty entitled the
appellant to hunt for food only, namely, for sustenance for himself or his family,
and not for commercial purposes. At the time he shot the grizzly, he was not in
possession of a grizzly hunting license. He was subsequently charged with
unlawfully trafficking in wildlife, contrary to s. 42 of the Alberta Wildlife Act.226
The issue facing the Supreme Court of Canada on appeal was whether Horse-
man could properly be said to have been hunting for food pursuant to Treaty
Eight when he killed the bear in self-defence. If so, s. 88 of the Indian Act
would shield the appellant from prosecution under s. 42 of the Wildlife Act.

In dismissing Horseman’s appeal, Cory J. held that the fact that the bear
was killed in self-defence is no defence to the charge of illegally trafficking in
bear hides. Reading the treaty right to hunt “for food” as meaning only the right
to hunt for direct consumption of the product of the hunt, Cory J. refused to con-
sider a more liberal interpretation of the right to hunt for food, one which would
include the right to hunt for support and subsistence and exclude sport or com-
mercial hunting.’ Cory J. attempted to justify his conclusion by arguing that
“if it were permissible to traffic in hides of grizzly bears that were killed in self-
defence, then the numbers of bears slain in self-defence could be expected to
increase dramatically.””22 If the permission to traffic in bear hides came from a
treaty right to engage in commercial hunting, then this might in fact be the case.
Yet if the permission to traffic came from a treaty right to hunt for support and
sustenance, the number of bears slain in “self-defence” could not be expected
to rise dramatically. Justice Cory himself noted the low chances of success on
planned bear hunts, a success rate between two and four per cent for a license
holder. 9 In any case, there was no question but that the bear was slain in self-
defence in the present case. Indeed, as Justice Wilson pointed out in dissent, “it
is difficult … to describe Mr. Horseman’s act as ‘hunting’ at all.””0 Justice
Cory’s steadfast refusal to interpret the appellant’s treaty right to hunt for food
as including slightly more than the right to hunt for direct consumption of the
product of the hunt indicates a reluctance to embrace the trend begun in Simon

=[1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 353 [hereinafter Horseman cited to S.C.R.].
226R.S.A. 1980, c. W-9, s. 42 [hereinafter Wildlife Act], now S.A. 1984, c. W-9.1.
227A distinction drawn by Wilson J. in dissent. See also Dickson J. (as he then was) in Moose-
228Supra, note 225 at 937.
259Ibid.
23Ibid, at 922.

hunter v. R., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 95.

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and continued in Sioui toward liberal interpretations of treaty guarantees, geared
toward native understandings of permissible practice.

D. Summary: Revising Treaty Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence surrounding treaties negotiated between the Crown and
native peoples is marked by a well-defined set of principles that speak to the
legal status of treaties and the substantive rights established by the treaty-
making process. With respect to the former, jurisprudence was originally based
on the view that natives were different than, and inferior to, nonnative people.
Native people were imagined as not possessing the authority to enter into bind-
ing reciprocal arrangements with the Crown. Treaties were imagined as not hav-
ing the force of law, and amounted to little more than nonbinding political
arrangements entered into by the Crown with native people. Eventually, the law
came to recognize the legal status of native people to enter into agreements
which could be enforced in a court of law, by abandoning the view that native
people are different than and inferior to nonnative people. Grounded in conno-
tations of similarity, the enforceability of treaties is currently seen in contractual
terms. Native people are imagined as similar to other subjects of the realm, enti-
tled to enter into contractual arrangements with the Crown and sue for noncom-
pliance. Yet, if treaties are imagined as little more than contractual arrange-
ments, their contents will be subject to legislative regulation and
extinguishment. At least prior to the passage of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, legislative initiatives were seen as paramount to the terms and conditions
of treaties. Under this view, the fact that provincial legislation is rendered inop-
erative in the context of the successful assertion of a treaty right is not because
treaties occupy a higher plane of entitlement than statutory initiatives but rather
because federal legislation declares treaty rights to be paramount over provin-
cial legislation. Absent s. 88 of the Indian Act, treaty rights would be subject to
the valid exercise of legislative authority by either level of government. Their
status with respect to provincial legislation is a function of the good will of Par-
liament as expressed in s. 88 of the Indian Act, and not because they occupy a
special place in Canadian law.

With respect to the way in which the judiciary has interpreted the content
of treaty guarantees, the interpretive enterprise was initially characterized by a
refusal to treat native expectations differently than nonnative expectations. That
is, vague treaty guarantees were infused with substantive meaning by unques-
tioned reference to a reliance on Anglo-Canadian categories of legal under-
standing. Notions of private property and freedom of contract guided the judi-
ciary in interpretive movements from abstract treaty rights to concrete
applications. The “plain meaning” of vague treaty guarantees was determined
by a process which accepted without question the legitimacy of Anglo-Canadian
legal categories of understanding. Recently, treaty jurisprudence has come to

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

embrace native difference, with the acknowledgement that native expectations
concerning the meaning of treaty entitlements may well have been markedly
different than those entertained by the agents of the Crown. The interpretive
process still places a high premium on the intent of the parties to the agreement,
expanded to incorporate the original expectations of native negotiators. Yet
Anglo-Canadian understandings concerning the meaning of land surrenders still
permeate jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of treaties with native
people, legitimated by a vision of native people as the same as nonnative peo-
ple. Treaties that involve the surrender of land in return for certain specified
benefits from the Crown are imagined as vesting in the Crown an absolute right
to exclude native use and enjoyment of ceded land. Thus a set of assumptions
steeped in Anglo-Canadian understandings concerning the ownership and the
right of exclusion unquestionably informs treaty jurisprudence, to the detriment
of alternative understandings of land surrenders which would acknowledge the
possibility of joint use except in the case of actual conflict.

The above jurisprudential traits have the effect of maintaining and perpet-
uating a hierarchical relationship between native peoples and the Canadian state
through the medium of treaty guarantees. Though the extremes of traditional
acts of judicial interpretation have been eliminated by the new approach called
for by Chief Justice Dickson in Simon, Anglo-Canadian conceptions are still
imported into the process of interpreting treaty guarantees in the context of
determining the meaning of land surrenders. Moreover, unless the Court holds
to the contrary under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Parliament remains
free to regulate or extinguish rights guaranteed by treaties, and in the absence
of specific federal legislation to the contrary, provincial legislatures are simi-
larly empowered to regulate and even extinguish treaty rights. The end result is
a set of principles that perpetuates a state of legal dependence by native peoples
on the legislative good will of the Canadian state and frustrates rather than facil-
itates the realization of self-government.

If the law governing treaty rights is to further the cause of native self-
government, treaties ought to be interpreted as binding on Parliament and pro-
vincial legislatures. Justice Lamer’s statement in Sioui that “It]he very defini-
tion of a treaty … makes it impossible to avoid the conclusion that a treaty
cannot be extinguished without the consent of the Indians involved”‘” ought to
be taken seriously as precedential support for the proposition that federal and
provincial legislation is not paramount over conflicting treaty guarantees; prom-
ises made to natives by the Crown ought to be imagined as setting the bound-
aries of permissible legislative activity in the future. Imagining treaties in this
way forces reconsideration of traditional understandings of the nature of legis-
lative authority; its end result would be to view treaties entered into by the

231Supra, note 163 at 1063.

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Crown with native peoples as constitutional documents demarcating permissible
and impermissible spheres of legislative authority as it intersects with native
interests. Yet treaties ought to be imagined as constitutional documents; they
represent historic agreements between Canada’s First Nations and settling peo-
ple as to the use and enjoyment of land and played a critical role in the consti-
tution of Canada.

Moreover, despite their particular differences, treaties share the overarch-
ing purpose of protecting forms of native self-government from nonnative inter-
ference. Jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation of the substance of treaties
ought to accord treaties the type of interpretive respect befitting a constitutional
document that has as its purpose the protection of fragile forms of self-
government. Although Simon and Sioui do much to reorient the interpretive
understanding of treaties in this manner by their acceptance of “liberal and pur-
posive” interpretations of treaty guarantees, treaty jurisprudence should
acknowledge that the purpose toward which purposive interpretations of treaty
rights ought to be geared is the protection of nascent forms of native self-
government. This redefinition of the purposes of treaties ought to redirect the
interpretation of the content of treaty guarantees away from the tendency to
infuse substantive content by reference to Anglo-Canadian categories of under-
standing. Again, Simon and Sioui represent bold efforts in this regard, though
their success must be tempered in light of Horse and Horseman.

The approaches taken in Simon and Sioui, however, need to be extended
to govern understandings of land surrenders. Still viewed through Anglo-
Canadian lenses of understanding, provisions governing surrenders are concep-
tualized as vesting in the Crown an absolute right to dictate the use to which sur-
rendered lands can be put and a corresponding right to exclude native use and
enjoyment regardless of the lack of any potential conflict in use engendered by
native enjoyment. Justice Lamer’s theory of compatibility of use, articulated in
Sioui where the treaty at issue did not contemplate land surrender, ought to be
extended to govern the meaning of land surrender treaties. That is, a treaty
involving the surrender of land by native people should not be viewed as auto-
matically stripping native people of continued use and enjoyment of the land in
question. Instead of viewing a surrender as a relinquishment of all native rights
to the land, a surrender should be treated as the granting of consent to a system
whereby land could be shared by native and nonnative people, with priority of
use attaching to one party by virtue of the surrender. Where native people can
continue to use the land in a manner that does not threaten the use put to the
land by the Crown, then surrender need not foreclose native use and enjoyment.
Such an interpretation of land surrender agreements challenges traditional
Anglo-Canadian ways of understanding title transfers, yet is critical to the abil-
ity of native people to use and enjoy ancestral lands surrendered by treaty to the

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Crown, which use and enjoyment is intimately connected to the aspiration of
native self-government.

V. Aboriginal Rights and the Constitution

Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that “[t]he existing
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby rec-
ognized and affirmed.” Depending on the meaning given to s. 35(1), the consti-
tutional sphere could serve as a powerful source for the realization of the aspi-
ration of native self-government. Unlike the other areas of law analyzed earlier,
the constitutional sphere is one which could facilitate self-government without
the need to rearrange basic Anglo-Canadian categories of legal understanding.
For years, the judiciary has policed the boundary between federal and provin-
cial jurisdiction. With the advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, 32 the judiciary is relatively comfortable with the task of striking down
legislation that interferes with constitutional rights and freedoms. The idea that
laws must conform to basic constitutional principles is no longer alien to the
Canadian constitutional imagination. To the extent that self-government
requires immunity from legislative action, much of the interpretive work neces-
sary to realize self-government could proceed in the constitutional sphere with-
out upsetting traditional categories of legal understanding.

A. R. v. Sparrow

Although it is too early to define with certainty the traits that characterize
constitutional jurisprudence under s. 35(1), there are indications that s. 35(1)
may well involve the entrenchment of aspects of a legal relationship of depend-
ence between First Nations and the Canadian state through the medium of con-
stitutional right. In R. v. Sparrow 3 the Supreme Court of Canada recently had
occasion to interpret the scope and meaning of s. 35(1) with respect to its rela-
tion to aboriginal rights existing at common law. At issue in Sparrow was the
validity of a fishing permit issued under the federal Fisheries Act’ 4 to the Mus-
queam Indian band which required members of the band to use a drift net with
a maximum length of 25 fathoms. The appellant was apprehended fishing with
a net which was 45 fathoms in length. He admitted violating the terms and con-
ditions of the permit but asserted an aboriginal right to fish and that the length
restriction in the permit was inconsistent with s. 35(1) and therefore invalid.
Prior to the passage of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the case would
have been decided in accordance with the principle articulated in R. v. Derrik-

232Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,

c. 11.

233Supra, note 27.
23

4Supra, note 125, ss. 34, 61(1).

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san, where the Court held that any aboriginal right to fish is subject to the valid
exercise of federal legislative authority 35 Legislation passed pursuant to a valid
head of power, in this case Parliament’s authority to pass laws in relation to
inland fisheries pursuant to s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867, can apply
so as to regulate common law aboriginal rights. The appellant argued that s.
35(1) “recognized and affirmed” his aboriginal right to fish and as a result
shielded him from the application of otherwise valid federal legislation.

In finding for the appellant, Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. set out in broad
strokes an approach which no doubt will structure future claims involving
s. 35(1). Calling for a “generous, liberal” and “purposive” interpretation of
s. 35(1),6 the two judges analogized to recent jurisprudence surrounding trea-
ties and argued that the content of s. 35 must be sensitive to the interests of
native people. They also stated that 35(1) must be interpreted in light of Gue-
rin’s requirement that the government “act in a fiduciary capacity with respect
to aboriginal peoples.” 7 These two guiding principles respectively informed
the way in which meaning was given to the scope of s. 35 and the assessment
of state initiatives which infringe s. 35 interests. With respect to the former,
Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. first ruled that s. 35(1) applies to rights which
were in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 came into effect. Following
lower courts on the issue,”5 they held that any aboriginal rights extinguished
either by treaty or by legislation cannot be revived by s. 35(1). Secondly, they
held that an existing aboriginal right cannot be read so as to incorporate or
include the specific manner in which it was regulated before 1982. This holding
put to rest a division of opinion between lower courts on the matter. Some
courts had held that s. 35(1) protects only the residue of native freedom which
remained after accounting for state regulation; 9 such an approach would have
the effect of delineating the scope of s. 35(1) by reference to the nature and

235See also supra, text accompanying notes 124-25.
2 6Supra, note 27 at 1106.
237See supra, text accompanying notes 104-12.
238See R. v. Eninew (1984), 1 D.L.R. (4th) 595, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 443 (Sask. Q.B.), aff’d (1984),
10 D.L.R. (4th) 137, 12 C.C.C. (3d) 365 (Sask. C.A.); A.G. Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation,
supra, note 135; R. v. Hare and Debassige (1985), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.N.L.R. 139 (Ont. C.A.);
Steinhauer v. R. (1985), 63 A.R. 381, 15 C.R.R. 175 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. Agawa (1988), 28 O.A.C.
201, (1989) 53 D.L.R. (4th) 101. But see R. v. Martin (1985), 65 N.B.R. (2d) 21, 17 C.R.R. 375
(N.B.Q.B.). See also D.E. Sanders, “The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1983) 61
Can. Bar Rev. 314 at 331; K. Lysyk, “The Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples of Can-
ada” in W.S. Tarnopolsky & G.A. Beaudoin, eds, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) 478; B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of Aborig-
inal and Treaty Rights” (1982-83) 8 Queen’s L.J. 232 at 262-65; K. McNeil, “The Constitutional
Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1982) 4 Sup. Ct L. Rev. 255 at 257-58; Pentney,
supra, note 135.

239R. v. Martin, ibid.; R. v. Eninew, ibid.; Horse v. R., [1985] 1 W.W.R. 1 (Sask. C.A.), aff’d

supra, note 217; R. v. Netmaker, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 181 (Sask. Prov. Ct.).

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extent of state regulation of native activity in existence in 1982. Others argued
that the right recognized by s. 35(1) is that which is protected by the common
law prior to taking into account the existence of state regulation.24 In siding
with the latter approach, Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. made it clear that state
regulation of common law aboriginal rights are now subject to constitutional
review.

The two judges also found that the Musqueam Indian Band had an aborig-
inal right to fish, referring to evidence which established that the Musqueam
lived on the north shore of the Fraser River as an organized society long before
European settlement of surrounding area. Evidence also disclosed that the tak-
ing of salmon was an integral part of their lives, being an important source of
food and central to the system of ceremony and beliefs of the Salish people, of
which the Musqueam were one of several tribes. The appellant was appre-
hended fishing in ancient tribal territory where his ancestors had fished since
“time immemorial.” ’24 The Court thus eliminated any lingering doubt as to the
existence of aboriginal rights at common law, indicating by implication that
Calder no longer ought to be interpreted as providing that the common law does
not recognize the concept of aboriginal right.242 In further holding that the abo-
riginal right to fish had not been extinguished prior to 1982 by state action, the
Court reiterated that “the Sovereign’s intention [to extinguish] must be clear and
plain.”243 Permits issued pursuant to the Fisheries Act “were simply a manner
of controlling the fisheries, not defining underlying rights.”2′ The Court
avoided discussion of whether the Musqueam aboriginal right to fish included
a right to fish for commercial purposes, arguing that the case was not presented
on the footing of an aboriginal right to fish for commercial or livelihood
purposes.

The notion that federal authorities are to act in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to native peoples informed the Court’s approach with respect to deter-
mining whether a particular law or state action infringed s. 35(1) and whether
such infringements are constitutionally justifiable. With respect to the question
whether s. 35(1) rights had been infringed, the Court was of the view that the
presence of a fiduciary relationship entailed asking whether the limitation in
question was unreasonable, whether it imposed undue hardship, and whether it
denied aboriginal people of the “preferred means” of exercising their right, in
sum, “whether either the purpose or the effect of the restriction on net length

240R. v. Sparrow (1986), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 246 (B.C.C.A.), aff’d, supra, note 27. See also Pentney,
supra, note 135 at 210-15; Slattery, supra, note 238 at 254-57; McNeil, supra, note 238 at 256-57;
B. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 781-82.

241Supra, note 27 at 1084.
242See supra, text accompanying notes 92-102.
243Supra, note 27 at 1099.
2441bid.

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unnecessarily infringes the interests protected by the fishing right.” ’45 The fidu-
ciary relationship between the Crown and native people also informed Dickson
C.J.’s and La Forest J.’s analysis of the constitutionality of laws which infringed
s. 35(1) interests. In their view, such a relationship required that “federal power
must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve that reconcil-
iation is to demand the justification of any governmental regulation that
infringes upon or denies aboriginal rights. 246 Thus even though the Constitution
Act, 1982 does not state that s. 35(1) rights are subject to s. 1 of the Charter,
the Court was willing to embrace a mode of analysis which required the gov-
ernment to “bear the burden of justifying any legislation that has some negative
effect on any aboriginal right protected under s. 35(1). “247 In the event of a
s. 35(1) violation, the government would have to demonstrate a valid legislative
objective, such as conservation or the prevention of harm to the general popu-
lace or aboriginal peoples. Secondly, the government would have to show that
“any allocation of priorities after valid conservation measures have been imple-
mented must give top priority” to Indian interests, in this case, fishing inter-
ests.2′ The Court also indicated that other cases may require determining
whether there has been as little infringement as possible in order to effect the
desired result; whether fair compensation has been made available in the event
of expropriation; and whether there has been adequate consultation with
affected native peoples with respect to the implementation of conservation mea-
sures. The Court ordered a retrial to allow for findings of fact to determine
whether the net length restriction constituted an infringement of the Musqueam
right to fish and, if so, whether such regulation was justifiable according to the
above-mentioned tests.

Sparrow represents an ambitious and far-reaching attempt to include the
needs and interests of First Nations in the constitutional sphere. The Court inter-
preted s. 35(1) so as to constitutionalize the protection previously accorded to
native peoples under the common law of aboriginal title and as a result subject
legislative initiatives which regulate or extinguish common law rights to consti-
tutional scrutiny. By calling for a liberal and purposive interpretation of the
scope of s. 35(1) rights, the Court was sensitive to native perspectives on the
content of aboriginal rights. By interpreting the phrase “existing aboriginal
rights” to refer not to the residue of freedom left over after state regulation is
taken into account, the Court ensured that laws which engage in regulation of
common law rights are tested against a justificatory standard akin to the tests
developed in R. v. Oakes249 under s. 1 of the Charter.

2451bid. at 1112.
2461bid. at 1109.
2471bid. at 1110.
2481bid. at 1116.
249[19861 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R (4th) 200.

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FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

Though Sparrow strictly speaking was not a case which involved the asser-
tion of treaty rights, there is no reason why a similar approach might not be
taken with respect to laws which regulate or extinguish treaty rights.” Moreo-
ver, by including within the calculus of tests that comprise the justificatory stage
of review the need to consult native people affected by state regulation which
impairs their interests, the Court in Sparrow offset some of the concerns asso-
ciated with the proposition that aboriginal rights are not shielded from some
forms of state intervention. If the requirement of consultation is deepened and
extended in future cases, it could result in a constitutional requirement of an
equal partnership between governments and First Nations in the drafting of laws
which affect s. 35(1) rights; native consent to laws that affect their interests
could become a precondition of constitutionality. Though it is too early to judge
the extent to which the judiciary will facilitate the realization of self-
government by the invocation of constitutional rights, the Court in Sparrow laid
down a framework for the constitutional protection of First Nations interests
which is strongly supportive of the active involvement of native people in the
formation of laws which govern their lives.

Yet, although the Court ought to be applauded for its display of sensitivity
to the interests and needs of First Nations in its emergent constitutional jurispru-
dence on aboriginal rights, the principles laid down in Sparrow maintain a rela-
tionship of legal dependence between native peoples and the Canadian state
analogous to that which exists in the other areas of the law canvassed earlier in
this article. Underpinning the Court’s interpretive understanding of s. 35(1) is
the proposition that native people are in a hierarchical relationship with the
Crown, albeit tempered by the attachment of fiduciary obligations to the Crown
upon the exercise of its discretion. The way in which the Court invoked the
proposition that the Crown is under a fiduciary obligation toward native peoples
permitted the Court to take a deferential stance with respect to laws that poten-
tially infringe s. 35(1) interests. That is, in order to show an infringement of s.
35(1) interests, a plaintiff will have to demonstrate that state regulation of those
interests is “unreasonable” and constitutes “undue hardship.””1 The application
of a reasonableness standard to the initial stage of determining whether a vio-
lation of s. 35(1) has occurred injects considerations which ought to be extra-
neous to this aspect of the constitutional inquiry. Whether a particular infringe-
ment is unreasonable has little to do with the fact that it infringes on s. 35(1)
interests. Applying a reasonableness standard to the determination whether a
particular law infringes aboriginal rights inevitably leads the judiciary into an
assessment of the reasons for the legislative initiative. The content of s. 35(1)

251n Simon, supra, note 163, the Supreme Court of Canada avoided this issue, holding that in
light of s. 88 of the Indian Act it was not necessary to consider s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982.

25’Supra, note 27 at 1112.

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rights becomes dependent in part on the legislative purpose and effect of laws
which affect the interests that the right is designed to protect. The inclusion of
a reasonableness standard at this stage of the inquiry indicates that the Court is
willing to defer to a certain extent to the state’s assessment of what is or is not
in the interests of First Nations. The scope of aboriginal rights remains depend-
ent upon the actions of those institutions against which First Nations ought to
receive constitutional protection. The Court’s reliance on the idea that the
Crown bears fiduciary responsibilities toward native peoples to support a rea-
sonableness standard indicates that the Court is not willing to move away from
a hierarchical vision of the relationship between First Nations and the Canadian
state in the realm of constitutional jurisprudence.

Moreover, underlying the Court’s reasons in Sparrow is the assumption
that Canada enjoys sovereign authority over its indigenous population. Laws
limiting the exercise of rights protected by s. 35(1) will undergo judicial scru-
tiny to ensure that they further a valid legislative objective and accord priority
to whatever native interests remain after the implementation of means necessary
to achieve such an objective. Yet the Court does not question Parliament’s ulti-
mate jurisdiction over Canada’s First Nations; it only requires that the exercise
of legislative authority meet constitutional standards of justification. As stated
by Chief Justice Dickson and Justice La Forest, “[i]t is worth recalling that
while British policy towards the native population was based on respect for their
right to occupy their traditional lands, … there was from the outset never any
doubt that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to
such lands vested in the Crown.” 2 This reiteration of legislative supremacy
indicates that the judiciary is content to assume the legitimacy of the assertion
of sovereignty by the discovering nations over the indigenous population at the
time of settlement. The hierarchical relationship between First Nations and
Canadian legislatures that emerged as a result of the assertion of sovereignty,
ultimately underpinning jurisprudence on the distribution of legislative author-
ity, has been tempered, but not displaced, by the interpretation given to s. 35(1).
Parliament continues to possess the authority to pass laws regulating native life,
so long as it meets the justificatory standards articulated in Sparrow. Absent is
any consideration of the possibility that the doctrine of discovery, steeped as it
is in notions of native inferiority, is an illegitimate basis for the continued asser-
tion of Canadian sovereignty over the lives of native peoples. Native difference
continues to be the justification for treating native people the same as nonnative
people, namely, ultimately as subjects of the Crown.

B. Constitutional Recognition of Self-Government

Subsequent jurisprudence under s. 35(1) ought to extend the principles
articulated by Dickson C.J. and LaForest J. in Sparrow to provide for more

2521bid. at 1103.

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powerful protection of native interests. Section 35(1) ought to be viewed as con-
stitutional recognition of the aspiration of native self-government. Securing
self-government through the medium of constitutional right entails the rejection
of an approach which includes reasons for state regulation in the definition of
the content of s. 35(1). It also entails rejecting the automatic assumption that
Parliament has the authority to regulate native life so long as it conforms to
acceptable regulatory techniques. Instead, it requires reading s. 35(1) as affirm-
ing a sphere of autonomy for native people over those matters that are central
to their individual and collective self-definition. Section 35(1), in other words,
ought to be viewed as authorizing and indeed requiring the judiciary to assess
the legitimacy of the assertion of Canadian sovereignty over Canada’s First
Nations. Unless and until the law can generate justifications more acceptable
than those relied on by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh for the
continued assertion of territorial sovereignty over Canada’s indigenous popula-
tion, the judiciary ought to police the borders of Canadian and First Nation sov-
ereignty. Section 35(1) ought to be the vehicle through which matters central to
the individual and collective self-definition of native peoples are shielded from
legislative intrusion.

It may well have been the case that, prior to 1982, it would have been inap-
propriate for the judiciary to second-guess the legitimacy of the assertion of
Canadian sovereignty over Canada’s native peoples. Although there is nothing
in the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 dictating the conclusion that Canada
possesses jurisdiction to pass laws affecting its indigenous population absent
consent, and ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 could have been inter-
preted in the manner proposed in Part Im of this article, 3 courts have been loath
to assess the legitimacy of claims of sovereignty made by their parent states.
Known in law as the “act of state” doctrine, courts have traditionally imagined
executive and legislative action in relation to the acquisition of new territory to
fall outside the purview of domestic courts.’ Whatever may have been the case
prior to 1982, however, the passage of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 dra-
matically changes the role of the judiciary as it relates to the legal and consti-
tutional position of Canada’s First Nations. Section 35(1) expressly “recog-
nize[s] and affirm[s]” aboriginal and treaty rights of Canada’s indigenous
population. The content of those rights is directly dependent upon a judicial
assessment of the legitimacy of the assertion of territorial sovereignty by Euro-
pean nations at the time of European settlement; Canadian sovereignty over its
indigenous population is now a question for domestic constitutional law.
Whether or not s. 35(1) shields native forms of life from federal or provincial

253See supra, text accompanying notes 146-54.
2″See e.g. Cook v. Sprigg, [1899] A.C. 572; Vajesingii Joravarsingfi v. Sec. of State for India
(1924), L.R. 51; Coe v. Commonwealth of Australia (1979), 53 A.LJ.R. 403. For discussion, see
McNeil, supra, note 60 at 131 n. 104 and Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples,
supra, note 75 at 45-59.

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intrusion depends on the legitimacy of the claim that territorial sovereignty can
be asserted by the settling nation without resort to conquest or cession as against
an indigenous population. Section 35(1) thus requires the judiciary to assess the
legitimacy of this claim; it subjects “acts of state” against Canada’s indigenous
population to constitutional scrutiny. Section 35(1), in other words, recognizes
and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights; Parliament and provincial leg-
islatures cannot assume that they are entitled to regulate those rights absent con-
sent if the claim of sovereignty underlying legislative action is suspect. Given
that s. 35(1) requires the judiciary to give meaning to aboriginal and treaty
rights, the judiciary can no longer shirk the task of assessing the legitimacy of
the claim. For courts to invoke the “act of state” doctrine in such a context
would be, in Brian Slattery’s words, to “conced[e] their status as passive instru-
ments of colonial rule.” 55

Questioning the legitimacy of the claim of territorial sovereignty need not
be an “all-or-nothing” affair. It may well be that Canada ought to be able to
claim sovereign authority over its indigenous population in relation to some
matters but not in relation to others, just as traditional constitutional principles
governing the distribution of legislative power recognize that Parliament and
provincial legislatures possess legislative authority in relation to different
subject-matters. At this stage in s. 35(1) jurisprudence, the issue is not so much
where the judiciary ought to draw the line but simply that s. 35(1) requires one
to be drawn. As stated in Part III of this article, the judiciary already possesses
a technique capable of performing this task: current jurisprudence on the limits
of provincial jurisdiction over native people can be deepened to protect native
self-identity from federal or provincial intrusion. 6 No doubt conflict will arise
from the constitutional embrace of the fact that native peoples possess “multiple
loyalties;” 7 multiple loyalties often collide. Yet the threat of possible collision
in some cases should not stand as a reason against the establishment of institu-
tional spaces that would permit greater control by native people over their indi-
vidual and collective destinies. By taking on the twin tasks of assessing the cir-
cumstances in which Canadian sovereignty is justified and assisting in the
formation of self-governing institutions for native peoples, the judiciary could
begin to redress the individual and collective damage caused to Canada’s First
Nations by the continued invocation of Anglo-Canadian legal categories to
resolve relations between native people and the Canadian state.

Conclusion

Despite moments of accommodation, the law governing native peoples has
been resistant to the aspiration of native peoples to have more control of their

25SIattery, supra, note 126 at 9.
6See supra, text accompanying notes 146-54.
2
257Simeon, supra, note 152 at 53.

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individual and collective destinies. The common law of aboriginal title recog-
nizes a limited property interest in ancestral lands. Treaty jurisprudence reduces
treaties entered into by native people and the Crown to little more than contrac-
tual arrangements. The law governing the distribution of authority and jurispru-
dence under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 assume without question leg-
islative supremacy over First Nations. Each frame of reference utilized by the
law to structure and make sense of native disputes involves the imposition of
Anglo-Canadian legal categories of understanding onto native reality. The com-
mon law of aboriginal title unquestionably accepts the myth of underlying
Crown title. The law governing the distribution of authority over native people
assumes that there is no sphere of activity immune from state regulation. Treaty
jurisprudence assumes the legitimacy of legislative supremacy over treaty guar-
antees. Jurisprudence under s. 35(1) equally rests on fundamental assumptions
concerning the nature of constitutional right. These ways of legal knowing are
projected onto the native context by a rhetoric that denies and embraces native
difference. Native difference is denied where its embrace would render prob-
lematic current ways of knowing. Native difference is embraced where its
denial would achieve similar results. As a consequence, each frame of reference
utilized by the law to structure and make sense of native disputes perpetuates
a legal relationship of dependence by native people on the Canadian state.

Despite the law’s historic resistance to the aspiration of self-government by
Canada’s First Nations, it would be a mistake to suggest that the legal system
is solely responsible for the appalling socio-economic conditions into which
native people are born in Canada, as indicated by the statistics listed in the intro-
duction to this article. The relationship between law and the socio-economic
conditions of native people is far too complex to be reduced to a simple relation
of cause and effect. In addition to legal practices, provincial and federal inac-
tion, economic imperatives, ideological factors, as well as the inertia of history,
all conspire among themselves to thwart the desire to pin responsibility for the
lack of control which native people have over their lives on any one single fac-
tor. Law is but one factor among many which participates in the construction
and maintenance of native reality. Yet even if law is but partially responsible for
the current status of native people, this fact alone ought to be sufficient justifi-
cation for re-imagining law’s relation to Canada’s First Nations.

The complexity of causality with respect to the conditions of native life,
however, has certain implications for the design of a legal reform agenda aimed
at vesting Canada’s First Nations with more control over their individual and
collective destinies. On the one hand, the fact that legal relations are but one of
many factors working to maintain native socio-economic reality adds a dash of
realism to the possibility that legal change alone can ameliorate the lives of
native people. In fact, a sole emphasis on legal reform may frustrate attempts
to improve the concrete lives of native people, in so far as it may serve to

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

obscure equally fundamental forces that maintain native inequality. What is
needed is an all-encompassing set of parallel reforms at a variety of levels in
Canadian society, including changes in relatively specific institutional arrange-
ments such as fiscal policy,”5 education policy,s health care,260 child welfare,2 6′
policing,” criminal justice,26 resource management, 264 and economic develop-

258For an excellent analysis of various fiscal arrangements and transfer programmes which could
serve as models for a system of fiscal arrangements between the federal and provincial government
and native peoples, see D.C. Hawkes and A.M. Maslove, “Fiscal Arrangements for Aboriginal
Self-Government” in D.C. Hawkes, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and Government Responsibility:
Exploring Federal and Provincial Roles (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1989) 93. See also M.
Malone, Financing Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, Background Paper No. 9 (Kingston:
Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1986) and R. Aniol, “Fiscal Arrange-
ments: Creating Unique Financial Transfers for Indian Governments” (Address to the National
Indian Government Conference, Toronto, 4 October 1990) [unpublished].

259For an overview of current education policy and analysis of reform options, see J. Paquette,
Aboriginal Self-Government and Education in Canada, Background Paper No. 10 (Kingston: Insti-
tute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, 1986). See also J. Barman, Y. H1bert &
D. McCaskill, eds, Indian Education in Canada, vols. 1 & 2 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1986).

26For a general account of issues surrounding health care delivery, see E. Cassidy & R.L. Bish,
Indian Government: Its Meaning in Practice (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan & The Institute for
Research on Public Policy, 1989) at 104-105; see also D.C. Speck, An Error in Judgment: The Pol-
itics of Medical Care in an IndianlWhite Community (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 1987), for a case
study of delivery failure.
261For an analysis of child welfare policy, see M.G. Kline, Child Welfare Law, Ideology and the
First Nations (LLM Thesis, York University, 1990) [unpublished]; see also P. Johnston, Native
Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto: Canadian Council on Social Development &
Lorimar, 1983); E.F Carasco, “Canadian Native Children: Have Child Welfare Laws Broken the
Circle?” (1986) 5 Can. J. Fam. L. 111; and S. Bull, “The Special Case of the Native Child” (1989)
47 Advocate 525.
262See Report of the Osnaburgh Windigo Tribal Council Justice Review Committee, 31 July 1990
(recommending native administration of justice and policing). For a description of current policing
mechanisms, see R.H. Bartlett, “The Power and Jurisdiction of An Indian Act Band Police Force”
(1985) 2 C.N.L.R. 1.
263See Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, Summary of Findings, vol
8, Digest of Findings and Recommendations, supra, note 2. The Marshall Report found that the
treatment accorded to native people by the justice system is affected by several factors, including
marginalized social status, absence of an economic land base, unemployment, poverty and social
dysfunction, lack of adequate representation within the legal system, and racist assumptions about
native difference. The Report recommended the establishment of a 5 year pilot project creating a
community-controlled native criminal court, and the establishment of an Institute of Native Justice
empowered to assess the incorporation of traditional law and to monitor potential discriminatory
treatment in the legal system. See also M. Jackson, “Locking Up Natives in Canada” (1984) 23
U.B.C. L. Rev. 215 (proposing the implementation of programmes vesting native people with more
control over incarceration and rehabilitation).

264For a scenario-based analysis of resource management in the wake of comprehensive land
claims settlements in British Columbia, see F Cassidy & N. Dale, After Native Claims?: The Impli-
cations of Comprehensive Claims Settlements for Natural Resources in British Columbia
(Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan & The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1988).

1991]

FIRST NATIONS SELF-GOVERNMENT

ment on native land,265 as well as transformations of more amorphous phenom-
ena such as political responsibilities toward native people and the way in which
nonnative people view their relationship to, and responsibility for, the present
conditions of native life. 266

On the other hand, the fact that law is not solely responsible for the current
conditions of native life makes the task of legal reform less daunting than it
might otherwise appear. It is possible for the law to reform itself so as to become
an instrument of native empowerment and at the same time avoid fears typically
triggered by more radical clarion calls for fundamental transformation. Despite
its structural resistance to self-government for Canada’s First Nations, the legal
imagination contains moments of possibility that could facilitate the realization
of native self-government. The Marshall legacy in the common law of aborig-
inal title contains the seeds of a doctrinal approach to the nature and scope of
native proprietary interests in ancestral and reserve lands which respects the fact
of original occupation. The law governing. the distribution of authority contains
an interpretive approach with respect to the applicability of provincial laws of
general application that could be extended to all forms of state regulation so as
to carve out a sphere of activity immune from legislative intervention in which
forms of native self-government could take root and flourish. Treaty jurispru-
dence ought to be refashioned so as to reconceptualize the purpose of treaties
to be the protection of particular forms of self-government, and the broad and
purposive method of interpretation currently accepted by the judiciary ought to
be redirected so as to conform to such a purpose. Constitutional jurisprudence
ought to deepen the requirement that native people be consulted in the forma-
tion of laws that affect their individual and collective identities so that native
consultation and consent become preconditions of the constitutionality of laws
that regulate native forms of life.

Reshaping the law’s relation to native people requires questioning tradi-
tional Anglo-Canadian ways of understanding the world in which we live. Prop-
erty law, resting on the assumption of underlying Crown title, thwarts the aspi-
ration of native self-government from the outset by the unquestioned acceptance
of a category of understanding antithetical to the desire of native people to have

265See The Economic Foundation of Indian Self-Government, A Report for the House of Com-
mons Special Committee on Indian Self-Government (Thalassa Research Associates, 1983) (linking
native economic development to settlement of land claims). See also The Canadian Aboriginal
Economic Development Strategy (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1989), for a statement of federal
economic development objectives. See R. Francis, “The Development of an Economic Basis for
Kingsclear Indian Nation” (Address to the National Indian Government Conference, Toronto, 3
October 1990) [unpublished], for a case study of economic development issues on the Kingsclear
Indian Reserve in New Brunswick.

266See J.E. Chamberlin, The Harrowing of Eden: White Attitudes Toward American Natives
(New York: Seabury Press, 1975), for a historical account of the imposition of European values
onto native reality.

456

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 36

more control over their individual and collective destinies as those destinies
relate to the lands upon which they live. The law governing the distribution of
authority assumes rather than justifies the assertion of sovereignty over Cana-
da’s First Nations. Treaty jurisprudence rests on contractualist notions and
severely limits the possibility of treaties entered into by native people and the
Crown to serve as instruments of native self-government. Constitutional juris-
prudence entrenches a relationship of hierarchy between native people and the
Canadian state by its reliance on the proposition that native people are subject
to the discretion of the Crown’s authority, albeit tempered by the attachment of
a fiduciary obligation. Yet these ways of legal understanding must be challenged
and reshaped if the law is to assist in the empowerment of Canada’s First
Nations. The borders of the Canadian legal imagination must be redrawn so as
to include the aspiration of native people to have greater control over their indi-
vidual and collective destinies. Our home and native land deserves no less.

Les Enfants, Les Incapables et la G~ntique

Th6r~se Leroux*, Bartha M. Knoppers**

et Jean-Christophe Galloux-*t

Les auteurs examinent la protection juridique
que le droit canadien accorde actuellement aux
enfants et aux incapables, dans Ia mesure oi
l’intrgrit6 physique de ces personnes peut 8tre
mise en cause par l’exprrimentation ou le trai-
tement medical. Plus prrcis~ment, ils tentent
de drterminer si certaines therapies gdniques
peuvent atre assimil~es A l’une ou l’autre de
ces formes d’intervention. Au plan du droit
international, les auteurs constatent que le
principe de l’inviolabilit6 de la personne est
mis en oeuvre par de nombreux documents,
dont la D6claration d’Helsinki et la D~clara-
tion Universelle des droits de l’homme. Par ail-
leurs, la Charte canadienne des droits et liber-
t~s consacre diverses formes de protection que
pourrait invoquer un enfant ou un incapable
qui serait soumis h une intervention m~dicale
sans son consentement. Les auteurs se livrent
dgalement h une 6tude des dispositions conte-
nues au Code criminel pour terminer par un
examen minutieux des textes l6gislatifs pro-
vinciaux qui r~glementent l’exprrimentation,
la transplantation et le traitement medical. Les
auteurs en arrivent ht la conclusion que le droit
doit continuer de refl~ter l’6quilibre que notre
socidt6 cherche A atteindre entre l’avancement
des connaissances scientifiques et une protec-
tion efficace de ses membres les plus vuln6-
rabies.

The authors analyze the legal protection avail-
able in Canada to children and incapables
where their physical integrity is affected by
medical experiments or treatment. The authors
are particularly interested in exploring the
extent to which genetic techniques may be
incorporated into the established categories of
medical treatment and experimentation. On an
international level, the authors note that the
notion of the inviolability of the person is cen-
tral to the protection of the person in the med-
ical context, and explore this notion in the Hel-
sinki Declaration, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, as well as other documents.
At the domestic level, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms provides various forms
of protection which could be invoked by a
child or an incapable who is subjected to a
medical treatment without his or her consent.
The authors also examine the relevant Crimi-
nal Code provisions, and undertake a detailed
study of provincial legislation dealing with
medical experiments, transplants, and treat-
ment. In their conclusion, the authors discuss
the need for Canadian society to face the chal-
lenge of balancing the promotion of scientific
progress with the need to protect the rights of
some of its most vulnerable members.

* Chercheur, Centre de recherche en droit public, Universit6 de Montreal.
** Professeur, Facult6 de droit et Chercheur associ6, Centre de recherche en droit public, Univer-

sit6 de Montreal.

*** Chercheur invit6, Centre de recherche en droit public, Universit6 de Montreal.
tCette recherche a 6t6 rdalis~e grace a une subvention accord~e par le minist~re f~d~ral de la
Justice A m~me le Fonds des droits de la personne. Les auteurs remercient les personnes qui ont
collabor6 h cette recherche: Claire Bernard, Marie Dansereau, Nathalie Girard, Magali Lewis, Lori
Luther, Brigitte Morneault et Carole Tremblay. Les auteurs expriment 6galement leur recon-
naissance au docteur Claude Laberge pour ses judicieux commentaires. Ce document est h jour
au 30 septembre 1990.
Revue de droit de McGill
McGill Law Journal 1991

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

Introduction

Sommaire

A. Concepts scientifiques

1. Notions g6n6rales de g6n6tique humaine
2. Maladies et anomalies g6n6tiques

a. Le concept de pathologie g~n~tique
b. Les expressions de la pathologie g~n~tique

3. Moyens de lutte contre les anomalies et les maladies

g6n6tiques

B. Concepts juridiques

Principe de l’inviolabilit6 de la personne

1.
2. Notion de consentement

La protection juridique accord~e aux enfants et aux incapables

A. Le droit international

1. L’exp6rimentation et la transplantation chez l’enfant et chez

l’incapable
Le traitement m6dical de l’enfant et de l’incapable

2.

B. Le droit constitutionnel

1. La libert6 de conscience et de religion
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

La libert6 d’association
Le droit h la vie, h la libert6 et h la s6curit6
Les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les saisies abusives
Les traitements ou peines cruels et inusit6s
Le droit A l’6galit6
L’article 1 de la Charte

C. Le droit criminel

1. La protection de 1’int6grit6 physique de la personne et

2.

1’exp6rimentation
La protection de l’int6grit6 physique de la personne et le trai-
tement m6dical
D. Le droit provincial

1. L’exp6rimentation
2.
3.

Le don de tissus entre vivants et la transplantation
Le traitement m6dical

E. Les lignes directrices canadiennes

Conclusion

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GENETIQUE

459

Introduction

Le ddveloppement consid6rable que connait la g6ndtique depuis la r~vdla-
tion par Watson et Crick de la structure fine de I’ADN’ (acide d6soxyribonu-
cl6ique) a ouvert A la mddecine d’immenses horizons. Les techniques de l’ing&
nierie g6ndtique, qui d6sormais autorisent l’homme h intervenir au niveau des
structures g6niques de l’individu, permettent tout Ai la fois d’61aborer de nou-
velles mol6cules th6rapeutiques2 et de mieux comprendre, d’identifier et de
d6pister les alt6rations g6n6tiques dont les patients peuvent ou pourront souffrir.
Dans un avenir proche, les m6decins pr6voient la possibilit6 de remplacer les
g~nes d6l6t~res par des g~nes sains dans le g6nome m~me du patient: la th6ra-
pie g6n6tique en est A ses premiers essais3. Les praticiens 6voquent enfin la pos-
sibilit6 de d6terminer les susceptibilit6s d’un individu en raison de ses caract6-
ristiques g6n6tiques : la g6n6tique devient pr6dictive.

Les anomalies et les maladies g6n6tiques apparaissent dos lors comme l’un
des objets majeurs de la recherche m6dicale contemporaine. Les possibilit6s
techniques dont nous avons fait mention viennent apporter leur concours, au
surplus, h une politique de sant6 qui tend vers une plus grande suj6tion 6cono-
mique, et assurent aux procr6ateurs la s6curit6 qu’ils recherchent de plus en plus
dans la procr6ation. En effet, les maladies et anomalies g6n6tiques, h cause des
handicaps souvent graves par lesquels elles s’expriment, repr6sentent un poids
consid6rable dans les d6penses de sant6. Que l’on songe que cinq h sept pour
cent des nouveaux-n6s en sont atteints, et que ces anomalies ou maladies g6n6-
tiques sont responsables d’une grande partie des avortements spontan6s. La
r6duction du nombre de tels handicaps devient donc un objectif de politique
sanitaire. En outre, les parents, du moins dans les pays les plus industrialis6s oi
le taux de natalit6 est bas, acceptent plus difficilement que jadis la naissance
d’enfants souffrant de maladies g6n6tiques incurables. De ce fait, ils sont en
g6n6ral prts A utiliser une politique de choix de reproduction qui se traduit par
le recours aux d6pistages pr6natals et aux avortements th6rapeutiques.

Les enfants et les incapables sont au coeur de cette probl6matique. La plu-
part des maladies ou des anomalies g6n6tiques vont etre d6pist6es et se d6velop-
per dans les premieres semaines ou les premieres ann6es de l’existence. Si l’en-
fant survit, les d6ficiences dont il pourra rester atteint feront de lui un incapable

tiquement modifi6s.

de I’ADN, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1969.

‘Voir J.D. Watson, La double hdlice ; compte rendit personnel de la dicouverte de la structure
2Comme les interf6rons, les hormones de croissance, etc., synth6tis6s par des organismes g6n6-
3La premiere exp6rience autorisde de transfert g6ndtique chez un patient (premiere 6tape vers la
rdalisation de la th6rapie g6n6tique) a 6t6 pratiqu6e le 22 mai 1989 par les professeurs Rosenberg
et Anderson
l’Institut am6ricain de Washington. Voir D. Gershon, < Transfer Study Expands >
(1990) 344 Nature 483 ; J.L. Marx, Gene Transfer is Coming on Target
(1988) 242 Science
191.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 36

de fait ou de droit. Les interventions th6rapeutiques seront tentdes sur eux, pour
les m~mes raisons, par prioritO4. Par ailleurs, l’6tude des maladies et des anoma-
lies g6n6tiques, tant h l’6chelon individuel que dans le cadre d’une politique 6pi-
d6miologique, exige le recours h des enquetes familiales et le recueil de donn6es
m6dicales ou d’6chantillons biologiques aupr6s de tous les individus concem6s.
La conduite de ces enqu~tes aupr~s d’enfants ou d’incapables suscite des pro-
blames sp6cifiques en raison de l’6tat de vuln6rabilit6 dans lequel ils se
trouvent. Plut6t que d’examiner le seul cas des incapables au sens juridique du
terme, c’est-a-dire les personnes ne jouissant pas de la pleine capacit6 juridique,
tels les mineurs et les majeurs prot6g6s, nous nous sommes attach6s au sort plus
g6n6ral des individus pr6sentant des faiblesses qui sont constitutionnelles ou
psychologiques, passag~res ou permanentes, dues a l’age ou d’origine patholo-
gique et qui les placent dans un 6tat de d6pendance, d’infdriorit et de vuln6ra-
bilit6 tel qu’on puisse craindre que leurs droits soient trop ais6ment violds’ ou
qu’ils ne donnent un consentement parfaitement 6clair6 et libre aux actes dont
ils peuvent 8tre l’objet. Nous examinerons la situation de tous les enfants, quels
que soient leur niveau de discemement ou leur aptitude A consentir A un traite-
ment m6dical et ce, de la naissance a l’age de la majorit6. Les incapables dont
nous parlerons, sont ceux que des r6gimes juridiques protgent sp6cialement
(incapables de droit) comme ceux qui n’en b6n6ficient pas, mais qui se trouvent,
au moment des faits, dans un 6tat d’incapacit6 tel qu’ils doivent b6n6ficier d’une
protection adapt6e (incapables de fait).

La pr6sente 6tude va s’attacher A examiner le droit applicable a ces per-
sonnes plus particuli~rement dignes de protection dans le cadre de programmes
de pr6vention et de traitement des maladies et des anomalies g6n6tiques. Les
r~gles juridiques contemporaines sont-elles appropri6es et suffisantes pour leur
conf6rer une protection idoine dans toutes les hypothnses ?

Les textes 16gislatifs ne font pas express6ment r6fdrence a la g6ndtique
humaine et A ses retomb6es au sein de la population. Ainsi, nous devons, tout
au long de cette 6tude, proc6der par analogie et extrapolation h partir de ce qui
est pr6vu pour l’exp6rimentation, la transplantation et les soins. En effet, la th6-
rapie g6nique peut 8tre assimil6e tour a tour A ces actes mddicaux. Compte tenu
des connaissances scientifiques actuelles, certaines de ces th6rapies sont quali-
fi6es d’exp6rimentales et visent A mettre en oeuvre des manipulations compa-
rabies t des transplantations. Ces nouvelles techniques pourront 6ventuellement
faire partie de l’arsenal offert A la pratique m6dicale et alors, elles seront sans

4Conseil De Recherches Mddicales Du Canada, Lignes directrices concernant la recherche sur
la thrapie ginique somatique chez I’humain, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada,
1990.5Cette definition large de l’incapacit6 pernet au demeurant de s’affranchir des difficult6s rela-
tives aux cat~gorisations juridiques diffdrentes donndes par les divers ordres juridiques examines.

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNITIQUE

461

doute assimil6es it des soins6. Par cons6quent, il est essentiel d’examiner la pro-
tection juridique dont jouissent les enfants et les incapables en regard de ces
divers actes m6dicaux, et de d6terminer dans chaque cas si le traitement gen6-
tique envisag6 est assimilable
l’une on l’autre de ces formes d’intervention.
Ainsi, notre 6tude se concentre essentiellement sur les actes m6dicaux qui
englobent h la fois 1’exp6rimentation, la transplantation de meme que les trai-
tements et soins usuels. Malgr6 l’int6r~t et l’importance ind6niables que revet
la probl6matique de l’acc~s aux dossiers et A l’information g6n6tique, nous
n’abordons pas ce sujet qui m6rite une 6tude particuli~re. De plus, l’analyse du
statut juridique du mat6riel g6n6tique est exclue A cause de l’ampleur de cette
question et parce qu’elle n’est pas sp6cifique aux enfants et aux incapables.
Toutefois, en vue de mieux circonscrire la probl6matique de cette 6tude, nous
pr6sentons succinctement certains concepts scientifiques (A) et juridiques (B)
d6terminants pour notre analyse.

A. Concepts scientifiques

Avant de proc6der h l’examen de la protection juridique accord6e aux inca-
pables, un bref rappel des donn6es scientifiques s’impose. Le discours juridique,
en l’occurrence, repose sur la trame des possibilit6s techniques. Ces possibilit6s
techniques guideront nos d6veloppements. Apr~s avoir donn6 un aperqu som-
maire de la g6n6tique humaine (1), nous cemerons les concepts d’anomalie et
de maladie g6n6tique (2), pour terminer avec un panorama des moyens actuels
de pr6vention de ces anomalies et de ces maladies g6n6tiques (3). La mise en
oeuvre de ces moyens h l’6gard de la cat6gorie de personnes que nous avons
d6finie, sera analys6e dans le corps de cette 6tude sous un angle juridique.

1.

Notions g6n6rales de g6n6tique humaine

Tous les caract6res h6r6ditaires sont d6termin6s par le mat6riel g6n6tique
que les 6tres vivants convoient dans chacune des cellules qui les composent, et
plus particuli~rement leurs g~nes. Les g~nes sont des portions, des s6quences
plus on moins longues figur6es de fagon lin6aire sur les chromosomes. Chez
l’homme, ces demiers sont dispos6s par paires de chromosomes identiques, au
nombre de 23 paires. Elles se composent de 22 paires d’autosomes et d’une
paire de chromosomes sexuels : XX chez la femme et XY chez l’homme. Du
fait m8me de cet appariement, les genes sont A l’6tat de paires et chaque carac-
t~re h6r~ditaire est sous la d6pendance de deux g~nes. La garniture chromoso-
mique d’un individu forme son caryotype. L’ensemble des g~nes constitue le
g6notype et leur expression visible, le ph6notype.

6 Pour un expos6 de la probl6matique voir, par exemple, les actes du colloque multidisciplinaire
tenu
l’Universit6 du Quebec hL Montr6al le 18 mai 1989 au 57e Congr~s de I’ACFAS : Conseil
de Recherches M6dicales du Canada, Ginitique et ithique : Identification et thdrapie des maladies
gindtiques, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1990 [ci-apris Ggngtique et 9thique].

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

Chaque g~ne est constitu6 d’un segment plus ou moins long d’ADN dont
la structure est celle d’une spirale form6e de deux chalnes lat6rales li6es entre
elles par des structures transversales. Les premieres sont constitutes par l’alter-
nance r6gulire d’un sucre et d’un groupe phosphatique. Les secondes, liant les
sucres deux a deux, sont form~es par des paires de bases au nombre invariable
de quatre (guanine, adenine, cytosine et thymine) s’appariant toujours de la
meme mani~re, en G-C (C-G) ou T-A (A-T). L’ensemble, compos6 du sucre, du
phosphate et d’une base, s’appelle un nucl6otide. La longueur d’un g~ne est de
l’ordre de plusieurs milliers de nucl6otides.

L’information g6n6tique est inscrite dans l’enchalnement rigoureux des
paires de bases..Elle sp6cifie la s6quence des acides amin6s qui constituent les
prot6ines, les prot6ines 6tant elles-m~mes le constituant fondamental des 6tres
vivants. En d’autres termes, le code g6n6tique s’6crit avec quatres signes diff6-
rents : A-T, T-A, G-C et C-G. Chacun des vingt acides amin6s existants est cod6
par un triplet de ces signes. Une erreur survenant dans l’enchainement de ces
bases vicie la transcription du g~ne en acide amin6 et peut par cons6quent inter-
dire ou vicier la production d’une prot6ine, ce qui peut bloquer, en fim de r6ac-
tion, la r6alisation d’une fonction vitale. Cette erreur est aussi d6nomm6e muta-
tion. C’est un 6v~nement rare dont la fr6quence est d’environ 1 pour 100 000
genes et qui apparait r6guli6rement de fagon spontan6e au cours de l’6volution
des esp~ces vivantes. La mutation peut 6galement 8tre provoqu6e par des causes
exog~nes, m6caniques7 ou chimiques s. Toutes les anomalies et les maladies
h6r6ditaires r6sultent de mutations plus ou moins r6centes.

On estime que l’homme poss~de entre 50 000 et 100 000 g~nes codants et
ayant un r6le fonctionnel : le reste de I’ADN n’est que redondances, mais oi les
mutations continuent a s’accumuler. La plupart des caract~res en cause dans les
anomalies ou maladies g6n6tiques d6pendent de l’action d’un seul couple de
genes. Si les deux g~nes d’un couple (un sur chacun des deux chromosomes de
la paire portant’le gene) sont identiques, l’individu est dit homozygote. Si ces
g~nes sont diff6rents, l’individu est h6t6rozygote. Les variantes d’un meme gene
sont appel6es alleles et il peut y en avoir plusieurs au m6me site g~nique. Une
variante peut etre dominante ou r6cessive, suivant qu’un allele t l’6tat h6t6ro-
zygote dirige ou non l’expression du caract~re. Ces alleles r6sultent des muta-
tions pr6c6demment d6crites. La distribution de ces alleles, transmis pour cha-
cun d’eux par chacun des parents, suit les lois de l’h6r6dit6 mend~lienne. Ces

7Par le fait des radiations ionisantes, provenant de sources nuclaires par exemple : voir K. San-
karanarayanan, Prevalence of Genetic and Partially Genetic Diseases in Man and the Estimation
of Genetic Risks of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation >> (1988) 42 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 651 aux pp.
651-62.

8Voir, par exemple, sur l’ensemble de cette question, les actes du colloque < tvaluation du pou- voir mutag~ne des produits chimiques >> tenu A Paris, le 19 janvier 1989 par I’Association Chimie
et tcologie (1989) 9 Toxicologie clinique et exp6rimentale, no 2 bis, numdro supplement.

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lois math6matiques simples ont inaugur6 le premier chapitre de la g6n6tique, la
g6n6tique statistique. Ce d6veloppement a 6t6 suivi par celui de la g6n6tique
humaine et m6dicale; enfin, r6cemment encore, nous avons assist6 h la nais-
sance de la g~n6tique mol6culaire et de la cartographie g6n6tique, cette derni~re
s’attachant t la localisation des s6quences g6niques sur les chromosomes. Ces
lois de distribution sont A la base du conseil g6n6tique dispens6 aux couples et
aux individus procr~ateurs. Une affection peut 6galement se trouver sous l’ac-
tion de plusieurs gnes, voire, d6pendre de facteurs g6n6tiques et de facteurs
environnementaux. On parlera alors de la pr6disposition de tel individu it telle
maladie, en raison de la complexit6 et de l’incertitude des param~tres pr6sidant
h son 6mergence.

2.

Maladies et anomalies g6n6tiques

Le concept de pathologie g6n6tique est au coeur des discussions relatives
aux maladies g~n6tiques et h leur &adication. En effet, il vaut mieux savoir
avant d’intervenir sur le corps humain si l’intervention projet6e poursuit un but
th6rapeutique, car c’est ce crit~re qui sert, dans une large mesure , a quantifier
la lic6it6 d’une atteinte t l’int6grit6 d’une personne. La d6finition de la patho-
logie g6n~fique, en fixant les bomes de l’intervention m6dicale, permet 6gale-
ment d’exclure les comportements strictement eug6niques dont l’attrait est
important dans le domaine de la th6rapie g6n6tique n . Son examen pr6c~de donc
la description des formes que revt cette pathologie.

a. Le concept de pathologie gingtique

Par le pass6, la naissance d’un enfant afflig6 d’une anomalie ou d’une dif-
formit6 quelconque 6tait consid6r6e comme le signe d’une intervention sumatu-
relle”2. Aujourd’hui, la meme difformit6 ou la meme anomalie est vue en termes
informationnels, soit comme une erreur de transcription de l’information g6n6-
tique, soit comme une erreur qui se serait gliss6e dans le code h6r6ditaire ou
encore comme une erreur de chronologie due au hasard dans l’ouverture et la
fermeture des g~nes lors de l’embryogn6se, qui est un processus extr~mement

9Voir, par exemple, l’art6riosc1lrose prcoce des coronaires dont les facteurs gdn6fiques ont 6t6
bien mis en 6vidence dans leur interaction avec le milieu: D.J. Galton, < A Genetic Analysis of Premature Coronary Disease dans T. Sasazuki, 6d., New Approach to Genetic Diseases, Academ- ic Press, 1988, 3. 1Puisque certaines atteintes 4 l'int~grit6 corporelle peuvent d~sormais etre justifi~es par des rai- sons non m~dicales : le transsexualisme, la chirurgie esth6tique, la collaboration t un programme de recherche en qualit6 de volontalre sain. (1986-1987) 27 Jurimetrics J. 200 a la p. 215 et s. I'Voir, par exemple, J.L. Gage, ( Government Regulation of Human Gene Therapy>>
12Sur l’ensemble de cette question, voir J. Warkany, < Congenital Malformations in the Past (1959) 10 J. Chronic Diseases 84. REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL [Vol. 36 complexe. Cette constatation biochimique suffit-elle pour qualifier l'anomalie de pathologique ? Les diff6rentes appellations de < maladie cong6nitale >>, < maladie hdr6di- taire >> et < maladie g6n6tique >> recouvrent une r6alit6 similaire qui s’oppose
aux maladies d’origine 6cologique comme les intoxications, les carences ou les
infections 3. La maladie se d6finit comme une d6viation par rapport A la norma-
lit6 biologique telle que ddfmie par le corpus medicus >>”. Du point de vue
g6n6tique, la sant6 s’6value d’apr~s la capacit6 d’adaptation de l’individu. Cet
6tat 6nonce la, seule vraie normativit6, individuelle, h laquelle on peut opposer
l’6tat pathologique. Or, en quoi l’anomalie que constitue 1’erreur relev6e dans
le code hd6rditaire de l’individu, repr6sente-t-elle une infraction h sa propre nor-
mativit6 ? L’erreur inn6e ne donne pas la possibilit6 de se r6fdrer h un 6tat ant6-
rieur de sant6 ; la normativit6 biologique de l’individu est ainsi fauss6e d~s le
d6part. Elle sera n6anmoins consid6re comme pathologique si elle exprime des
normes sp6cifiques inf6rieures qui affectent l’individu dans son m6tabolisme
nutritif (par exemple, le fait de ne pas pouvoir m6taboliser le galactose dans le
cas d’une galactos6mie cong6nitale), ou surtout si elle est la cause de handicaps
apparents et s6v~res (comme la spina bifida). En revanche, le syndrome de Kli-
nefelter (caryotype XXY), qui affecte les mAles, bien qu’il constitue une anoma-
lie g6n6tique, ne serait pas une pathologie v6ritable en ce qu’il permet aux indi-
vidus qui en sont atteints de vivre de maniere quasi-normale (outre la st6rilit6
qui les frappe, l’apparence physique longiligne et la gyn6comastie).

Ainsi, la pathologie g6n6tique se distingue de la pathologie g6n6rale en ce
sens qu’elle n’est pas seulement diagnosticable objectivement, mais aussi sub-
jectivement, par rapport h l’individu atteint et en comparaison avec la norme.
Cette diffdrence avec la pathologie g6ndrale est surtout marqu6e du fait que la
cause de la maladie est maintenant reconnue comme 6tant endog~ne, inn6e et
non acquise.

En tout 6tat de cause, la normalit6 g6n6tique ne doit pas se mesurer selon
des 616ments tir6s de statistiques ou de moyennes, sous peine de contraindre la
vie entre des bomes qui nieraient son sens meme et le fondement scientifique
de l’individualit6. La vie est variation et adaptation et les bomes au fonctionne-
ment des 8tres vivants sont fix6es par leur capacit6 d’adaptation. Ici la m6decine
g6n6tique temp~re et amenuise la force sdlective de la vie naturelle et permet
une plus grande adaptation (sant6) aux individus atteints de maladies g6n6-
tiques. On ne dicte pas scientifiquement des normes h la vie. Mais la vie est
cette activit6 polaris6e avec le milieu qui se sent ou non normale, selon qu’elle

13Voir J.-M. Robert, < Histoire naturelle des maladies d'origine g6nftique > (1974) 24 R. du Pra-
4Sur l’ensemble de cette question, voir
1

‘ouvrage fondamental de G. Canguilhem, Le normal

ticien 3421.

et le pathologique, 5e 6d., Paris, P.U.F., 1984.

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se sent ou non normative >>. D’un point de vue 6cologique, on pourrait donc
s’interroger sur cette pr6tention de l’homme b. vouloir limiter la variabilit6 du
vivant 6.

Ii est donc essentiel que le d6bat sur les maladies g6n6tiques porte sur une
conception coh6rente de la pathologie g6n6tique, faute de quoi le terme th6ra-
peutique sera d6voy6 et restera vuln6rable A toutes les tentationg d’eug6nisme
social.

b. Les expressions de la pathologie gdnitique

La pathologie g6n6tique se pr6sente sous des formes et a des degr6s divers.
La pathologie g6n6tique, selon ce qui vient d’6tre dit et de fagon courante,
s’entend des expressions les plus graves, en termes de handicap, d’une anomalie
g6n6tique. Ce sont les variations g6niques qui engendrent des malformations
organiques, tissulaires ou mol6culaires. L’apparition de la maladie dans le temps
est tr~s variable d’une affection A l’autre.

Les malformations organiques affectent le nombre, la forme ou la structure
d’un ou de plusieurs organes internes. Elles sont g6n6ralement s~v~res et
r6sultent essentiellement d’aberrations chromosomiques, la plupart du temps
non h6r6ditaires. Ces aberrations consistent en des accidents m6caniques surve-
nus lors d’une division cellulaire, soit au cours de la m6iose paternelle ou mater-
nelle, durant laquelle les gametes parentales sont constitutes, soit au cours des
premieres divisions de l’oeuf f6cond6. Les aberrations chromosomiques
impliquent une modification substantielle de l’information g6n6tique port6e par
l’individu puisque des parties de chromosomes, voire des chromosomes entiers
sont perdus (d6l6tion), multipli6s ou fix6s a d’autres fragments chromosomiques
(translocation). Ces maladies ne sont g6n6ralement pas d6celables dans la
parent6, hormis le cas tr~s exceptionnel ofi une personne atteinte a procr66. Elles
surviennent A un stade qui laisse peu de place a un d6pistage p6rinatal. Plus
g6n6ralement, les aberrations chromosomiques seront d6cel6es chez le foetus (le
cas de la trisomie 21 est bien connu) ; plus rarement chez les g6niteurs directe-
ment, dans la mesure oti la qualit6 du mat6riel g6n6tique qu’ils transmettent a
leur prog6niture peut 8tre mise en cause en raison de leur age ou d’expositions
particuli~res A des agents mutag~nes. Ainsi, les 6tudes ont montr6 que les effets
de l’Age sur les ovules de mme que sur les spermatozofdes augmentaient la fr6-

15lbid. a la p. 153. Voir aussi J.-C. Galloux, Essai de ddfinition d’ un statut juridique pour le
16M.-A. Hermitte, << Le concept de diversit6 biologique et la cr6ation d'un statut de la nature matiriel gdndtique, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 1991 [A paraltre]. dans M.-A. Hermitte et B. Edelman, 6d., Lhomme, la nature et le droit, Paris, C. Bourgeois, 1988, 238. McGILL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36 quence des aberrations chromosomiques 17. La plupart des aberrations chromo- somiques seront donc d6pist6es a la naissance ; le diagnostic est souvent ais6 compte tenu des handicaps majeurs qui apparaissent alors (comme dans les tri- somies 13, 15 on 18). Quand les chromosomes sexuels sont affect6s, les malfor- mations observ6es causent l'infertilit:. Dans toutes ces hypotheses, aucune th6- rapie n'est au point, encore que dans certains cas, la chirurgie puisse pallier hi des anomalies de constitution. Le secours, m~me futur, d'une th6rapie g6n6tique parait exclu. Ces personnes voient leur esp6rance de vie r6duite et sont g6n6ra- lement st~riles. Les malformations tissulaires s'opposent aux pr6c6dentes en ce qu'elles sont rarement d6cel6es h la naissance, elles pr6sentent souvent un potentiel 6vo- lutif et r6sultent toujours de mutations g6niques. Leur gravit6 d6pend de la p6riode de l'embryog6n~se pendant laquelle le g~ne mut6 a produit son action et du type de tissu concern6. Ainsi l'achondroplasie (forme de nanisme) est une affection frappant les chondroblastes des cartilages de conjugaison emp~chant un d6veloppement normal des membres. La maladie de Recklinghausen (d6bi- lit6 et comitialit6 notamment) semble due des troubles affectant la formation de l'enc6phale. Ces maladies sont 6videmment incurables et la seule lutte pos- sible r6side en un d6pistage des porteurs du g~ne d6l6t6re, identifies grace t des 6tudes familiales. Les malformations mol6culaires atteignent l'organisme dans son fonction- nement m6tabolique. Les prot6ines issues de la synth~se dirigde par les g~nes mut6s vont perturber le m6tabolisme en raison de leur d~faut ou de leur non- conformit6. On retrouve parmi ces maladies du m6tabolisme : la mucoviscidose, la thalass6mie, la ph6nylc6tonurie, etc. Toute th6rapie leur 6gard n'est pas illu- soire en d6pit de la gravit6 de ces malformations mol~culaires. Ainsi, le d6pis- tage pr6coce de la galactos6mie, grace son diagnostic dans la fratrie, d~s la naissance, permet de sauver l'individu par la suppression du galactose dans l'insuffisance ou A l'absence de synth~se l'alimentation. Le nanisme vrai, dfi de l'hormone de croissance, peut 6tre combattu par l'injection de cette hormone. Les travaux les plus r6cents ont permis d'isoler les s6quences g6niques respon- sables de certaines de ces maladies. A l'avenir, la th6rapie g~n6tique pourrait permettre leur remplacement par des s6quences saines ou leur inactivation. Parmi ces maladies g~n6tiques, identifi~es comme telles et pour la plupart monofactorielles (dont le nombre ne d6passe pas quelques milliers), on a parfois tendance A ranger les variations g~niques dont l'interaction avec certains fac- teurs environnementaux donne lieu h des d6veloppements pathologiques. C'est notamment le cas des affections cardiovasculaires, de la schizophr6nie et de cer- 17Voir, par exemple, R.H. Martin et A.W. Rademaker, The Effect of Age on the Frequency of Sperm Chromosomal Abnormalities in Normal Men >> (1987) 41 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 484.

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taines formes de cancers”8 . I1 s’agit soit de maladies h facteur gdndtique, soit de
simples predispositions pour lesquelles la politique sanitaire se rdsumera, A la
rigueur, h un dfpistage et au suivi d’une hygiene adaptfe. Cette hygiene impo-
sera A l’individu l’adoption d’un mode de vie diminuant les risques induits par
les facteurs environnementaux identifids.

Le mode d’expression des maladies ou des anomalies gfnftiques peut 8tre
tr~s variable. Ceci peut rendre plus difficile leur d6pistage, et surtout, peut poser
des probl~mes 6thiques lorsqu’il s’agira de ddbattre, si << la vie de la personne atteinte m~rite d'6tre v~cue >> ou si une intervention thdrapeutique est ndces-
saire. Les trisomies 13 et 18 sont 16tales au cours des premiers mois ; les homo-
zygotes pour la maladie de Tay-Sachs manifestent les premiers signes de l’af-
fection vers quatre ou six mois et survivent rarement h leur deuxi~me
anniversaire. Par ailleurs, dans sa forme tardive, cette maladie peut d6buter
entre 25 et 40 ans. La chorfe de Huntington peut se manifester par des troubles
psychiques dfmentiels entre 30 et 50 ans.

La principale difficult6 h laquelle se heurtent les thfrapeutes est de mettre
en 6vidence le mode de transmission des maladies ou des anomalies gfnftiques.
A dffaut, le conseil gdn6tique demeurera tr~s imprfcis. Cette difficult6 culmine
pour les affections multifactorielles. La question pr6sente un int6rat moindre
pour les anomalies chromosomiques car elles rendent souvent leur porteur st6-
rile. Pour les autres, qui suivent les lois de l’h6rfdit6 mendflienne, on distin-
guera les maladies dominantes autosomiques, les maladies rfcessives autosomi-
ques et les maladies rfcessives lifes au sexe.

Dans le cas d’une maladie dominante autosomique, les sujets atteints
appartiennent aux deux sexes; ils naissent toujours d’un parent atteint et le
risque pour une personne atteinte d’avoir un enfant malade est de 50 pour cent.
Dans les familles, les malades naissent malades ou porteurs du g6ne mut6 et les
germains non-porteurs n’ont eux-memes que des enfants sains. Dans certaines
hypotheses, l’all~le dominant ne s’exprimera pas chez celui qui le porte, de
sorte que dans l’analyse familiale on constatera des << sauts de gfnfration >> par
inexpression du phrnotype (apparence clinique) ; on dira alors que la pfnftrance
du g~ne n’est pas absolue. Les exemples de maladies dominantes autosomiques
sont nombreux, et comprennent la chor6e d’Huntington et la dystrophie myota-
nique.

Les maladies rfcessives autosomiques se manifestent chez les sujets homo-
zygotes pour le g~ne pathologique. Les personnes atteintes appartiennent aux
deux sexes et elles naissent g~nfralement de parents apparemment sains mais
hft~rozygotes pour l’all~le concern6. Dans les fratries des malades on trouve en
moyenne un sujet atteint pour deux sujets h6tdrozygotes (apparemment sains) et

I8Supra, note 4.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 36

un sujet homozygote normal. La consanguinit6 peut augmenter de fagon impor-
tante la probabilit6 de survenue d’un enfant atteint si le g~ne est tr~s rare dans
la population. En pratique, le risque pour un couple ayant eu un enfant atteint
d’en avoir un autre est de 25 pour cent t chaque naissance. Quant aux germains
sains d’un malade, ils ont peu de chance d’avoir un enfant atteint moins qu’ils
n’6pousent un h6t6rozygote. La d6tection des h6t6rozygotes pr6sente done un
int6r~t tr~s important. Comme nous le verrons, elle devient possible pour un
nombre important de maladies r6cessives. Parmi elles, on citera la galactos6mie,
la thalassdmie et r6cemment la fibrose kystique du pancrdas.

Lorsque le g~ne pathologique est port6 par un chromosome sexuel, il ob6it
aux lois de l’h6r6dit6 li6e an sexe. C’est le cas des maladies li6es h I’X comme
la myopathie de Duchesne (dystrophie musculaire). La maladie se voit le plus
souvent chez les gargons, les malades naissant de femmes h6t6rozygotes (por-
teuses) et d’un homme sain. Le fr~re sain d’un malade ne risque pas d’avoir
d’enfant malade, mais la soeur du malade a une chance sur deux d’8tre
h6t6rozygote.

Certaines maladies g6n6tiques connaissent plusieurs modes de transmis-
sion : la maladie de Charcot-Marie en poss~de ainsi trois. Ceci est dfi au fait que
la m6decine pose des diagnostics sur des apparences (ph6notypes) et non sur des
s6quences d’ADN.

3.

Moyens de lutte contre les anomalies et les maladies gdndtiques

Comme pour tout probl~me m6dical et dans la mesure oii l’anomalie g6n6-
tique est qualifi6e de pathologique, l’intervention th6rapeutique est, en principe,
justifi6e, en tant que reconqu~te de la sant6. C’est au niveau de la mise en
oeuvre de la th6rapeutique et de tout ce qui la pr6pare que l’analyse juridique
pourra se greffer. En effet, la th6rapeutique et les actes qui la prdparent, cons-
tituent les modalit6s de l’intervention d’un tiers sur le corps de la personne dont
le droit a charg6 de prot6ger l’int6grit en toutes ses composantes physiques et
morales.

La lutte contre les maladies ou les anomalies g6n6tiques se caract6risait,
jusqu’ pr6sent, par une grande pauvret6 th6rapeutique en d6pit des progr~s
accomplis en pharmacologie et en chirurgie. L’action sanitaire 6tait dirig6e vers
la pr6vention de la transmission des affections h6r6ditaires. D6sormais, une th6-
rapeutique pourrait 8tre envisageable avec le d6veloppement de la th6rapie
g6nique, oia le g~ne < anormal >> pourrait 8tre remplac6, corrigeant ainsi son
expression pathologique (du moins en th6orie).

La pr6vention repose essentiellement sur l’identification des g~nes d616-
t~res et sur le conseil g6n6tique dispens6 aux futurs procr6ateurs. Cette identi-
fication implique toute une s6rie d’op6rations techniques qui vont de l’isole-
ment du gene responsable grace aux m6thodes du g6nie g6n6tique, h la

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469

fabrication de sondes mol6culaires permettant de diagnostiquer la pr6sence du
gene d6l6t~re dans le g6nome du patient’9, en passant par la r6alisation d’6tudes
statistiques et familiales visant h d6terminer la fr6quence de distribution du g~ne
dans la population de r6f6rence et son mode de transmission. Ces op6rations
impliquent A l’6gard des personnes concem6es le pr6lvement d’6chantillons
biologiques ou g6n6tiques, leur analyse, leur conservation dans des banques de
g~nes, voire, l’accomplissement d’exp6rimentations sur ces tissus”. Pr6sente-
ment, ces operations ont pris une importance plus grande du fait de la produc-
tion, par la biologie mol6culaire, d’un grand nombre de sondes g6n6tiques.

La pr6vention des maladies g6n6tiques existe d6jt depuis plusieurs ann6es
dans des programmes de d6pistage chez les nouveaux-n6s (par exemple, ph6nyl-
c6tonurie, galactos6mie). Dans ces cas, le diagnostic se fait h partir de mesures
biochimiques sur du sang s6ch6 pr6lev6 quelques jours apr~s la naissance. La
plupart des pays d6velopp6s ont de tels programmes.

Certaines programmes de pr6vention d6finissent l’6tat de porteurs chez les
adolescents d’age scolaire (par exemple, Tay-Sachs et thalass6mies) ou chez les
adultes de certains groupes A risque, par exemple la maladie de Tay-Sachs chez
les personnes d’origine juive ashk6naze. Ces programmes se servent de sondes
mol6culaires r6cemment disponibles pour caract6riser les mutations pr6sentes
dans ces populations et les fr6quences de leurs variations.

I1 n’existe pas encore de d6pistage syst6matique de population par utilisa-
tion de sondes g6niques, mais tant la technologie (amplification par PCR) que
‘6pid6miologie g6n~tique laissent entrevoir cette capacit6 au cours des pro-
chaines ann6es (par exemple, hypercholest6rol6mie familiale). Des d6bats sont
d’ailleurs amorc6s sur le transfert de la technologie de I’ADN aux programmes
de d6pistage biochimique classique aux fins d’6tudes-pilotes sur l’utilisation
2des pr6l vements de sang s6ch6 pour typage d’ADN1 .

Mame si le consel g6n6tique ne fait pas partie de la pr6sente discussion,
il faut rappeler cependant que la nature familiale des 6tudes g6n6tiques, sp6cia-
lement en ce qui conceme l’utilisation de sondes g6niques pour le diagnostic ou
pour la pr6diction du risque de maladies g6n6tiques, devra utiliser des pr6l ve-
ments sanguins de plusieurs membres des families. Ce pr6lvement pour ana-

19Voir, par exemple, B. Merz, << DNA Probes Demonstrate Utility in Diagnosis, Treatment Moni- toring >> (1988) 259 J.A.M.A. 2645.

20Par exemple, on peut verifier Ta qualit6 chromosomique du sperme humain, afin d’y d6celer
d’6ventuelles aberrations, en f6condant des ovocytes de hamster; voir Martin et Rademaker, supra,
note 17.

21 B.M. Knoppers, < Genetic Heritage: The International Debate >> dans B.M. Knoppers et C.M.
Laberge, dd., Genetic screening: From Newborns to DNA Typing, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science
Publishers, 1990, 257.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

lyse d’ADN est un acte m6dical et comporte des obligations professionnelles
ainsi que des pr6rogatives de confidentialit6 2.

L’limination des g~nes drlrt~res se pratiquait jusqu’ present grace

l’avortement thdrapeutique, solution consistant h interrompre la grossesse
lorsque les foetus sont porteurs d’anomalies ou de maladies grn~tiques graves.
Cependant, cette approche pr6ventive ne peut nous concemer dans la prdsente
6tude puisque la ddcision d’avortement fait suite A un drpistage men6 in utero,
et l’enfant A naitre n’est point assimil6, dans le cadre de notre 6tude, i l’enfant
n6. La srgrrgation reprdsente une solution plus nuancre, 6cartant de la procr6a-
tion les porteurs de g~nes d6l6t~res. Elle peut prendre la forme d’une st6rilisa-
tion forcde ou consentie, ou d’une prohibition de procrder prenant la forme
notamment d’une prohibition au mariage 3.

La thrrapie grnique reprrsente la r~ponse thrrapeutique la mieux adaptre
aux maladies et aux anomalies grnrtiques : elle permettrait de restituer un ordre
au stade cellulaire en adjoignant au g6nome les sequences saines qui font drfaut,
ou en inhibant les sequences d6lrt~res dont l’expression est
l’origine de la
maladie. Elle pourrait etre somatique ou germinale: si les nouvelles sdquences
6taient ins~res dans le grnome A un stade prrcoce du d6veloppement cellulaire
(lors des premieres divisions de l’oeuf), elles pourraient alors se retrouver dans
les futures gametes de l’individu qui pourrait h son tour transmettre le nouveau
caract~re. Si les srquences grn6tiques 6taient insdres dans les cellules d’un
tissu particulier (le tissu atteint, g~n~ralement), elles ne pourraient pas se trans-
mettre aux grn~rations suivantes. La thrrapie somatique sera soigneusement
rrglementre lorsqu’elle sera rralisable24. Elle ne semble possible que pour les
maladies et les anomalies sous la drpendance d’un seul g~ne. Les premieres
experimentations ont ddbut6 il y a A peine une annrez et il y a peu de raisons
de croire que cette thrapeutique sera courante avant la fin de la drcennie26 .

22B.M. Knoppers et C.M. Laberge, <> (1989) 140
C.M.A.J. 1023 ; voir aussi H. Guay et B.M. Knoppers, << Information grnrtique : qualification et communication en droit qu~b~cois >> (1990) 21 R.G.D. [sous presse].

23Dans le passe, plusieurs 6tats amdricains avaient une legislation de ce type, voir J.M. Shaman,
Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children >> (1978) 12 Fam.
L.Q. 61. Voir aussi L.B. Andrews, Medical Genetics: A Legal Frontier, Chicago, American Bar
Foundation, 1987. Deux provinces canadiennes, l’Alberta et la Colombie-Britannique, ont d~jh eu
des lois prrvoyant la strrilisation des drficients mentaux: The Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.A.
1970, c. 341, abrog~e par S.A. 1972, c. 87 ; Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 353, abroge
par S.B.C. 1973, c. 79.

24 Voir, par exemple, < Gene Therapy in Man - Recommendations of European Medical Research Councils >> (1988) 8597 The Lancet 1271 ; pour les ttats-Unis d’Amrrique, voir J.L. Fox,
Gene Transfer Test, Global Rules Approved >> (1988) Bio-technology 1279 ; pour le Canada,
Conseil de Recherches M~dicales du Canada, supra, note 4.

25Supra, note 3.
26Supra, note 4.

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Toutefois, comme le pr6voit 1’6tude r6cente du Conseil de recherche m6di-
cale du Canada, les premieres maladies qui seront candidates pour les essais de
th6rapie g6nique seront des maladies habituellement 16tales ou causant une
arri6ration mentale h un age pr6coce. De plus, certaines de ces maladies sont
sp6cifiques aux enfants. Les premiers sujets seront donc n~cessairement des
enfants27. La th6rapie germinale demeure tr~s controvers6e et est meme con-
damn6e au niveau international’8 .

Ayant vu tr~s sommairement les concepts scientifiques qui sous-tendent
notre 6tude, nous consid6rerons dans la seconde partie de l’introduction deux
concepts juridiques au coeur de notre probl6matique. En effet, pour v6rifier si
les 16gislations actuelles peuvent r~pondre ad6quatement au d6veloppement de
la g~n6tique humaine, il est essentiel d’examiner le droit applicable A l’exp6ri-
mentation humaine, aux transplantations et aux soins m6dicaux. Or, au travers
de ces 16gislations transparaissent deux principes fondamentaux : l’inviolabilit6
de la personne humaine et le consentement.

B. Concepts juridiques

Le droit se veut le mode d’expression privil6gi6 par la soci6t6 occidentale
pour s~parer, s6lectionner et 6tablir une hirarchie entre les valeurs humaines.
Or, parmi ces derni~res, deux retiendront notre attention: l’inviolabilit6 de la
personne (1) et le consentement (2). Toutes deux furent consacr6es par le droit
et seront 6tudi6es h travers chacune des sections de cette recherche. Cependant,
il importe d’ores et d6jt de d6crire bri~vement les concepts juridiques associ6s
h ces termes.

1.

Principe de l’inviolabilit6 de la personne

La personne humaine est inviolable, nul ne peut y porter atteinte sans son
consentement29 . La notion de personne humaine comprend 6galement l’enfant et
l’incapable. L’ttat ainsi que l’individu doivent respecter cette inviolabilit6. Le
traitement medical, l’exp6rimentation ou la transplantation pratiqu~e sur une
personne mineure ou sur celle d’un incapable peuvent constituer une violation
ou une atteinte h l’int6grit6 physique ou mentale de la personne. Mme un acte
aussi simple qu’un pr6lvement sanguin pour des fins d’analyse ou d’entrepo-

2 Voir par exemple, E.J. Rosenkranz, Custom Kids and the Moral Duty to Genetically Engi-
(1987) 2 High Technology L.J. 3 h la p. 23 ; J.C. Fletcher, < Moral Problems neer our Children (1983) 69 Virginia L. Rev. 515 ; Ginj- and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene Therapy tique et 9thique, supra, note 6. Soulignons qu'en septembre 1990, le gouvemement am6ricain a autoris6 une premiere greffe de g~nes chez une fillette de quatre ans. 28 Knoppers, supra, note 21. 29A. Mayrand, ULinviolabilitj de la personne humaine, Montreal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1975. Pour les provinces de common law, voir la decision r6cente: Malette c. Shulman (1990) 2 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 (C.A. Ont.), inf. (1987) 65 O.R. (2d) 243, 46 D.L.R. (4th) 18 (H.C.). REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL [Vol. 36 sage d'ADN est consid6r6 comme un acte m6dical compte tenu de la qualit6 personnelle de l'information qui y est cod6e3". Un tel acte m6dical sera qualifi6 en tenant compte du consentement et des qualit6s essentielles de celui-ci. ttant donn6 l'importance capitale du consentement dans le cadre de notre 6tude, il nous apparait essentiel de pr6senter succinctement ce concept juridique. 2. Notion de consentement Le principe de l'inviolabilit6 de la personne a pour corollaire la n~cessit6 d'obtenir un consentement libre et 6clair6 avant de poser un acte susceptible de porter atteinte t cette personne31. Or, la notion de consentement tant pour le mineur que pour la personne majeure renvoie A << l'acquiescement de la volont6 >>32 qui ne peut provenir que de la personne vis6e par les soins. L’action
de tout autre intervenant, que ce soient les parents, les tuteurs, les curateurs ou
le tribunal, se limitera h autoriser ou h permettre que certains soins soient pro-
digu~s h leurs prot6g6s33. L’expression couramment utilis6e de << consentement substitu6 ou par procuration >> semble d~s lors inappropri6e.

Apr~s avoir diff6renci6 le consentement de l’autorisation en fonction de
l’identit6 de la personne qui exprime l’acquiescement, consid6rons maintenant
la distinction qu’on doit 6tablir entre le consentement et l’assentiment. Cette
distinction r6side dans la capacit6 de comprendre les enjeux associ6s t l’acte
m6dical envisag6.

Ainsi, un enfant d’un certain fge ou un incapable peut etre en mesure de
comprendre ce qu’on lui propose et pourra alors consentir. Cependant, compte
tenu de son incapacit6 de droit, l’autorisation des parents, des curateurs, ou du
tribunal, selon les circonstances, sera requise.

Dans le cas d’un enfant plus jeune ou d’une incapacit6 plus marqu6e, la
personne ne pourra comprendre que certains aspects de la d6marche propos6e.
Dans ces circonstances, cette personne ne pourra pas donner un consentement
libre et 6clair6 mais elle pourra A tout le moins manifester son assentiment.
Etvidemment, dans ce cas, l’autorisation des parents ou des tuteurs est de
rigueur 5 .

3 0Knoppers et Laberge, supra, note 22.
3 1Voir par exemple, les arts. 19 et 19.1 C.c.B.-C. et Mayrand, supra, note 29.
3 2D. Pag6, Petit dictionnaire de droit quibicois et canadien, Montr6al, Fides, 1975.
3 3B.M. Knoppers, <
34 M.A. Somerville, Le consentement di l’acte midical (Document d’6tude) Commission de
3 5D.M. Maloney, Protection of Human Research Subjects, New York, Plenum Press, 1984 A la
p. 315 et s. ; A.R. Holder, Legal Issues in Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine, 2e dd., New Haven,

r6forme du droit du Canada, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1980.

(1978) 19 C. de D. 893.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNtTIQUE

473

On ne doit pas faire fi de l’enfant ou de l’incapable et l’ignorer lors de la
d6marche en vue d’obtenir un consentement libre et 6clair6. M~me s’il ne peut
pas consentir 16galement, il faut tenir compte de son accord ou de son refus3 6.

Si elle se congoit facilement comme indispensable, la participation d’un
enfant ou d’un incapable h un acte m6dical fait depuis longtemps l’objet d’une
profonde pr6occupation. On reconnait la n6cessit6 de prot6ger ceux-ci d’une
fagon particuli~re mais on s’interroge37 sur l’ampleur que devrait prendre cette
6ventuelle protection. On discute d’une fagon de plus en plus pressante de la
possibilit6 de reconnaitre la capacit6 de fait des mineurs et des incapables A con-
sentir h l’acte m6dical. Par le fait meme, on est en quelque sorte forc6 d’6valuer
le bien-fond6 du << consentement substitu6 > qui 16gitimise l’acte m6dical prati-
qu6 sur un patient ou un sujet incapable de donner un consentement valide. On
cherche h contr6ler ou h surveiller l’exercice de cette autorit6 a consentir pour
autrui et, h cet 6gard, la difficult6 est double. I1 faut tenir compte des besoins
et du meilleur int6r~t de l’enfant ou de l’incapable et concilier ces imp6ratifs et
le bien-6tre de la soci&6t qui passe n6cessairement par le d6veloppement des
connaissances m6dicales et scientifiques.

Les probl~mes juridiques pos6s par l’exp6rimentation, le don et la trans-
plantation d’organes et de tissus et le traitement m6dical sont multiples et d’au-
tant plus complexes lorsque le patient ou le sujet est un enfant ou un incapable.
Les r~gles juridiques qui r6gissent la recherche, la transplantation d’organe et le
traitement m6dical ne sont pas les memes. Ainsi les conditions impos6es h la
validit6 du consentement different selon la nature de l’acte m6dical envisag6 et
selon qu’il s’agit d’un enfant ou d’un incapable. I1 en va de m~me de l’obliga-
tion d’informer ou de r6v6ler les risques encourus.

Ces r~gles mettent en jeu diff6rents principes fondamentaux reconnus tant
par le droit international que par les r~gles de droit interne. En nous attardant
sp6cifiquement aux mineurs et aux incapables, nous 6tudierons les r~gles juri-
diques qui r6gissent la recherche, la transplantation et le traitement m6dical h la
lumi~re du droit international (A), du droit constitutionnel (B), du droit criminel
(C) et enfin du droit provincial canadien (D). Nous examinerons 6galement les
normes 6thiques propos6es aux chercheurs canadiens pour prot6ger la personne
humaine (E).

Yale University Press, 1985 A lap. 155 ; D.H. Schethy et E.P. Benedek, Emerging Issues in Child
Psychiatry and the Law, New York, Brunner/Mazel, 1985 aux pp. 24 et 54-55.

36Voir par exemple, P.L. 20, Loi portant rdforme au Code civil du Quebec du droit des per-
sonnes, des successions et des biens, ire sess., 33e Leg. Qua., 1987, c. 18 [ci apr~s P.L. 20] et Com-
mission de r~forme du droit du Canada, L’expirimentation biomddicale sur l’6tre humain (Docu-
ment de travail no 61) Ottawa, Approvisionnement et Services, 1989 aux pp. 44-50.

37Voir ci-dessous, partie E. Les lignes directrices canadiennes.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

La protection juridique accord~e aux enfants et aux incapables

A. Le droit international

L’implication grandissante de la communaut6 intemationale en ce qui a
trait aux droits et libert6s fondamentales de la personne constitue un premier
t6moignage de ce type de pr6occupations. Au cours des derni~res d6cennies, dif-
fdrents documents intemationaux et r6gionaux ont permis de constater l’immix-
tion des droits de la personne en droit international. Plus r6cemment, les droits
des enfants ont fait l’objet d’une convention intemationale3 . C’est d’abord
partir de cette reconnaissance des droits de la personne en droit international
que nous aborderons notre r6flexion sur les enfants, les incapables et l’acte
m6dical. Plus pr~cis6ment, nous tenterons de d6gager A travers l’6volution du
droit international quels sont les droits de l’enfant et de l’incapable les plus sus-
ceptibles d’8tre mis en cause par l’acte m6dical dans le domaine de la g6n6tique.
En consid~rant le r6le des r6gles de droit international et la force pr6pond6rante
de celles-ci, nous d6limiterons par la suite la nature et l’6tendue de la protection
offerte par le droit international.

La r6glementation de l’acte m6dical en ce qui a trait au consentement doit
s’envisager sous l’angle des droits et libert6s fondamentaux tels que reconnus
par les r~gles de droit international. Parmi les droits inh6rents a la personne
humaine, le droit A la vie, le droit t la sant6, h l’int6grit6 physique de la per-
sonne, le droit h la dignit6 humaine, le droit h la protection contre toute forme
de discrimination, le droit it la protection contre tout traitement cruel ou inusit6
et le droit de l’enfant h la protection particuli~re qu’exige son 6tat, sont les
droits les plus suceptibles d’6tre mis en cause par l’acte mddical.

Dans un premier temps, nous examinerons la protection que peuvent accor-
der ces droits lors de l’exp6rimentation et de la transplantation (1). Par la suite,
nous consid6rerons le traitement m6dical (2).

1.

L’exp6rimentation et la transplantation chez l’enfant et chez l’incapable

Les buts de l’exp6rimentation dans le domaine m6dical sont de deux
ordres : la recherche d’une part et le traitement ou la th6rapie d’autre part39. Cer-

Doc. NiL A/C. 3/44/L.44 (1989).

38Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, 20 novembre 1989, Doc. off. AG NU C.3, 44e sess.,
39Selon la Commission de r~forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 36 A la p. 4, on peut d6finir

l’exp~rimentation de Ta fagon suivante:

L’exp6rimentation est donc une technique, un processus permettant de vdrifier certains
faits en cr6ant des conditions propices t leur r~alisation. Les buts de 1’exp6rimentation
peuvent varier; dans le domaine m~dical, ils se divisent en deux grandes cat6gories:
la recherche d’une part, le traitement ou la th6rapie d’autre part.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNtTIQUE

475

taines maladies n’affectent que des enfants, de sorte que la th6rapie et la
recherche doivent se faire aupr~s de personnes appartenant t ce groupe (par
exemple, transplantation de myoblastes chez un enfant atteint de dystrophie
musculaire). De meme, pour certains groupes d’Wage comme pour la maladie
d’Alzheimer qui, tout en affectant des adultes, les rend sujet d’exprrimentation
A titre d’incapables de fait, compte tenu de la d6trrioration de leur sant6 men-
tale. Finalement, les modules animaux des maladies humaines sont rarement uti-
lisables car s’il y a analogie, il n’y a pas nrcessairement similitude (par
exemple: la dystrophie musculaire chez les souris et chez l’homme. Les deux
manquent de dystrophine, mais la souris ne ddveloppe pas les signes majeurs de
faiblesse et d’atrophie musculaire qu’on constate chez l’homme, m~me si un
g~ne identique sur le chromosome X est impliqu6).

Le pr6l~vement d’organe et la transplantation sont executds a des fins th6-
rapeutiques. En tenant compte de l’un ou l’autre de ces objectifs, on congoit
facilement la n~cessit6 de procrder A l’exp6rimentation sur l’enfant ou sur l’in-
capable et on peut aussi justifier la participation de ceux-ci i une transplanta-
tion. Cependant, comme pour tout acte mddical, la 16galit6 de la procedure exp6-
rimentale ou de la transplantation est conditionnelle h l’obtention du
consentement libre et 6clair6 du sujet.

Par souci de voir respecter la dignit6 humaine et l’inviolabilit6 de la per-
sonne, plusieurs documents intemationaux rdglementent l’exp6rimentation sur
les sujets humains. II aura cependant fallu franchir certaines 6tapes avant d’en
arriver a la rdglementation actuelle. S’il est dordnavant admis que dans certaines
circonstances un consentement substitu6 est acceptable i des fins d’exp~rimen-
tation sur un enfant ou un incapable, la situation 6tait fort diffdrente il y a
quelques drcennies.

Dans l’ordre chronologique, le Code de Nuremberg4″ est le premier docu-
ment a caract~re intemational a traiter de la question de l’exp6rimentation. La
contribution du Code de Nuremberg a 6t6 de reconnaitre, du moins implicite-
ment, la ldgitimit6 de l’exp6rimentation sur l’8tre humain et de soumettre la
16galit6 de celle-ci au respect de certains param~tres fondamentaux. Sans distin-
guer entre les diffdrents types d’exp6rimentation, les dispositions du Code
6noncent un ensemble de crit~res visant h assurer la protection de la personne

Voir aussi Conseil de recherches m~dicales du Canada, Lignes directrices concernant la recherche
sur des sujets humains, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1987. Voir ci-dessous,
partie E. Les lignes directrices canadiennes.
40Avant de rendre son jugement concemant les crimes commis pendant la Deuxi~me Guerre
mondiale, le Tribunal militaire amrricain, sirgeant A Nuremberg, a drtermin6 dix principes
d’6thique mrdicale auxquels on rrfre comme 6tant le Code de Nuremberg. Le texte de ces prin-
cipes est reproduit dans Conseil de recherches mrdicales du Canada, La ddontologie de l’expiri-
mentation chez l’6tre humain, rapport no. 6, Ottawa, Approvisionnement et Services Canada, 1978
aux pp. 59-60 [ci-apr~s Code de Nuremberg].

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 36

humaine. A cette fin, ce document 6num~re dix conditions qui font du consen-
tement volontaire du sujet une condition essentielle A la 16galit6 de la proc6-
dure4″. Cependant, comme le Code pr6cise que le consentement volontaire d’un
sujet est celui obtenu d’une personne ayant la capacit6 16gale de consentir, l’ex-
p6rimentation sur un enfant ou sur une personne incapable semble interdite et
ce, meme en pr6sence du consentement donn6 par un repr6sentant 16gal.

La Diclaration d’Helsinki42 a 6t6 le premier document international h
admettre l’exp6rimentation sur l’incapable43 et h faire une distinction entre l’ex-
p6rimentation th6rapeutique et l’exp6rimentation non th6rapeutique. Conform6-
ment a l’esprit de la Diclaration, une personne mineure est considr6e comme
une personne incapable. Dans le cas d’un incapable comme dans celui d’un
enfant, le consentement substitu6 est acceptable et devra 8tre obtenu soit du
repr6sentant 16gal, soit des plus proches parents. Il est int6ressant de noter que
la D&laration d’Helsinki tient implicitement compte de la capacit6 de fait d’une
personne mineure a consentir. Toutefois, la seule approbation des parents ne
saurait 8tre suffisante pour 16galiser 1’exp6rimentation sur un enfant en mesure
de consentir puisqu’il faut 6galement obtenir l’approbation de celui-ci. L’exp6-
rimentation sur une personne souffrant d’une d6ficience mentale ou physique
qui la rend en principe incapable de donner un consentement valable est permise
pour autant que le repr6sentant 16gal y consente et ce, dans les formes pr6vues
par le droit interne.

41L’art. 1 du Code de Nuremberg se lit comme suit:

Le consentement volontaire du sujet humain est absolument essentiel. Cela signifie que
la personne en cause doit avoir la capacit6 lgale de donner un consentement ; doit etre
en mesure d’exercer un libre choix exempt de fraude, de fourberie, de contraine, de
duperie, ou de toute forme ult6rieure de contrainte ou de coercition et doit, en plus,
avoir une connaissance suffisante des
l6ments et de l’objet de 1’exp6rimentation de
mani~re A 8tre en mesure de prendre une d6cision juste et 6clairde. Ce demier 616ment
requiert que pr~alablement 4 l’acceptation d’une decision affirmative par le sujet de
l’expdrimentation celui-ci ait 6t6 inform6 de la nature, de la durde et du but de l’exp6-
rimentation, la m6thode et les moyens par lesquels elle sera conduite, tous les incon-
v6nients et alias susceptibles de se presenter; de meme que les repercussions que cette
exp6rimentation pourrait avoir sur sa sant6 et sa personne […].

42The World Medical Association Handbook of Declarations, Femey-Voltaire, France, The
World Medical Association, 1985 aux pp. 38-40 [ci-apres Dclaration d’Helsinki]. Le texte de la
Dclaration a 6t6 adopt6e en 1964 par l’Association m~dicale mondiale puis revis6 une premiere
fois en 1975, une seconde fois en 1983 et une troisi~me fois en 1989. Le texte r6vis6 de 1975 est
reproduit dans Conseil de recherches m6dicales du Canada, supra, note 40 aux pp. 61-64.

43Le libell de son art. 11 se lit comme suit:

En cas d’incapacit6 lgale et notamment s’il s’agit d’un mineur, le consentement devra
etre sollicit6 aupr~s du repr6sentant 16gal, compte tenu des 1dgislations nationales. Au
cas oii une incapacit6 physique ou mentale rend impossible l’obtention d’un consente-
ment 6clair6, l’autorisation des proches parents responsables remplace, sous ]a meme
r6serve celle du sujet.

44La meme r6serve s’applique A l’exp~rimentation chez l’enfant.

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Quant aux types d’exp6rimentation qui devraient 8tre permis sur les per-
sonnes incapables en raison d’une d6ficience mentale, la Declaration de
Hawaii45 adopt6e par l’Association mondiale de la psychiatrie pr6cise que
seules les exp6riences permettant d’accroitre le savoir psychiatrique doivent
6tre effectu6es et permises.

La position adopt~e par l’Organisation des Nations Unies en mati~re d’ex-
p6rimentation est elle aussi sans 6quivoque. I1 est interdit de soumettre une per-
sonne A une exp6rience m6dicale ou scientifique sans son consentement46.

Du cot6 de l’Association m6dicale mondiale, deux documents retiennent
l’attention. Adopt6e en 1987, la Declaration de Madrid de l’Association m~di-
cale mondiale sur les transplantations d’organes humains47 recommande aux
m6decins qui effectuent les transplantations un certain nombre de lignes direc-
trices. Quoiqu’il n’y soit faite aucune mention expresse de l’enfant ou de Fin-
capable donneur, on y pr6cise qu’un m6decin ne doit assumer aucune responsa-
bilit6 dans une proc6dure de transplantation h moins que les droits du donneur
et du r6cipiendaire ne soient prot~g6s. Les droits auxquels on fait allusion ne
sont pas pr6cis6s mais il est A tout le moins permis de croire qu’il s’agit du droit
A la vie, A la dignit6 et a l’inviolabilit6 de la personne humaine. A cet 6gard le
consentement du donneur et du r6cipiendaire ou le consentement de leurs repre-
sentants l6gaux devra 6tre obtenu. S’il s’agit d’une proc6dure de transplantation
exp6rimentale, le m6decin doit se conformer aux recommandations contenues
dans la D~claration d’Helsinki.

Adopt6es en 1988, les Declarations de principe sur la bioithique et autres
matieres” sont le reflet de la position de l’Association en mati~re de recherches
biom~dicales sur des sujets humains et en mati~re de technologies de reproduc-
la Diclaration d’Helsinki mais ajoute
tion. Ce texte renvoie directement
qu’une discussion compl~te de la proc6dure avec le patient devrait 8tre exigde
et que le consentement du patient ou de son repr6sentant l6gal devrait 8tre
6clair6, libre, volontaire et donn6 par dcrit.

4 5Voir Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 36 hL la p.4 8 n. 104.
46Pacte international relatif aux droits civils etpolitiques, 19 dcembre 1976,999 R.T.N.U. 171.
L’art. 7 se lit comme suit: << Nul ne sera soumis A la torture ni A des peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou d~gradants. En particulier, il est interdit de soumettre une personne sans son consen- tement libre une expdrience m6dicale on scientifique >. Quant aux modalit6s d’obtention d’un
consentement libre et 6clair6 de Ta part du sujet d’exp~rimentation, deux documents retiennent l’at-
tention. Le premier est un rapport publi6 en 1976 A la demande de I’ONU par la Association m~di-
cale mondiale sous le titre V ‘liment santj dans la protection des droits de ‘Homme face au pro-
gras de la biologie et de la mdecine. En second lieu, l’Organisation Mondiale de ]a Sant6 et le
Conseil des organisations internationales des sciences m6dicales ont adopt6 les Directives interna-
tionales proposdes pour la recherche biomdicale impliquant des sujets humains, Gen~ve, 1982.
47Voir World Medical Association, World Medical Association adopts declarations and state-

ments on bioethical and other matters >> (1988) 39 Intl. Dig. Hlth Leg. 267 aux pp. 269-74.

481bid.

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Certains projets de conventions r6gionales de portde plus restreinte, pr6-
sentent 6galement un int6rt particulier en mati~re de consentement A l’acte
m6dical, h l’exp6rimentation ou
la transplantation. En Europe, la Rgsohution
sur une Charte europienne des droits de l”enfant”9 insiste pour que soient recon
nus A l’enfant le droit de recevoir une information adapt6e A son age, A son dave-
loppement mental, et son 6tat affectif et psychologique quant
l’ensemble du
traitement envisag6e de m~me que le droit de ne pas faire l’objet d’exp6riences
pharmacologiques ou th6rapeutiques. Seuls les parents ou les tuteurs dfment
avertis des risques et des avantages de l’exp6rimentation auront la possibilit6
d’accorder leur consentement et aussi de le retirer.

En mati~re de g6nie g6n6tique, une recommandation adopt~e en 1982 a
permis h l’Assembl6e parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe de r6it6rer son
adh6sion au principe selon lequel le consentement du sujet est essentiel. On ne
peut exp6rimenter une th6rapie g6n6tique sans obtenir au pr6alable le consente-
ment libre et 6clair6 de la personne conceme ou, s’il s’agit d’un mineur, sans
le consentement libre et 6clair6 du ou des parents ou de la personne qui en a la
garde l~gale50 .

Quant aux types d’exp6rimentation m~dicale qui devraient etre permis sur
les personnes atteintes de d6ficience mentale, le Conseil des ministres de l’Eu-
rope souhaitait en 1983 que l’exp6rimentation non th6rapeutique soit tout sim-
plement interdite1 .

Dans l’intention d’uniformiser les r~gles applicables en mati~re de
recherche m6dicale sur la personne humaine, le Conseil des ministres du Con-
seil de l’Europe a adopt6 en 1990 la Recommandation portant sur la recherche
m~dicale sur les itres humains2. Consid6rant le droit de toute personne d’ac-

49Conseil de l’Europe, Comit6 des Ministres, Risolution sur une Charte europienne des enfants
hospitalisgs, Doc. A2 25/86, cit6 dans P. Boucaud, Le Conseil de l’Europe et la protection de I’en-
fant – L’ opportunitj d’une convention europ~enne des droits de l’enfant, Dossiers sur les droits
de l’homme no. 10, Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1989 A ]a p. 43.

5Conseil de l’Europe, A.C., 33e sess., Jlle partie, Textes adoptis, Rec. 934 (1982) a ]a p. 1
reproduite dans < Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopts Recommendation on Genetic Engineering >> (1982) 33 Intl. Dig. Hith Leg. 382. L’Assemblde parlementaire a recom-
mand6 A ‘art. 7(c) de fournir les moyens n6cessaires pour proc6der h ]a redaction d’une liste de
maladies s~rieuses qui peuvent 6tre trait~es par th6rapie g6n6tique avec le consentement de la per-
sonne conceme. Elle demande 6galement que certains usages de la th6rapie pouvant se faire sans
le consentement conform6ment aux pratiques observ6es pour d’autres formes de traitement m6di-
cal soient reconnus comme compatibles avec les droits de la personne dans l’6ventualitd ob une
maladie trhs s6rieuse serait transmise aux descendants.
51Conseil de l’Europe, Comit6 des Ministres, Rec. no R(83)2 (1983) dans Collection des recon-
mandations, r~solutions et diclarations du Comitj des ministres portant sur les droits de l honime
1949-1987, Strasbourg, Conseil de l’Europe, 1989 aux pp. 100-102 (recommandation sur la pro-
tection juridique des personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux et plac6es comme patients
involontaires).
52Conseil de l’Europe, Comit6 des Ministres, Rec. no R(90)3 (1990) (portant sur ]a recherche

m6dicale sur l’tre humain).

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GENETIQUE

479

une recherche m6dicale et consid6rant
cepter ou de refuser de participer
qu’une protection particuli~re devrait 8tre accord6e h certains groupes, la
recommandation 6nonce des principes et des modalit6s propres t assurer un
6quilibre entre le respect de la personne et les b~n6fices h tirer de l’experi-
mentation.

L’ensemble de ces principes s’appliquent aux enfants et aux incapables,
mais certaines dispositions leur sont exclusivement consacr6es. On y pr6cise
que l’int6rt et le bien-6tre du sujet devraient toujours avoir pr6s6ance sur l’in-
t6r&t de la science et de la soci6t6 et que les risques auxquels une personne s’ex-
pose en participant h une recherche ne devraient jamais 6tre disproportionn6s
aux avantages qu’elle pourra en retirer et h l’importance des objectifs poursuivis
par les chercheurs53. En mati~re de consentement, il est stipul6 qu’aucune
recherche m6dicale ne devrait 6tre entreprise sans le consentement libre, 6clair6,
expr~s et sp6cifique de la personne sujet de la recherche. A cet 6gard, la per-
sonne qui participe h une recherche m6dicale devrait 6tre inform6e des objectifs
et de la m6thodologie de l’exp6rimentation. Elle devrait 6galement etre infor-
m6e des risques et des inconv6nients pr6visibles, et l’information fournie
devrait etre suffisamment claire de fagon h lui permettre de consentir ou de refu-
ser en pleine connaissance des faits pertinents. De plus, le consentement devrait
pouvoir 6tre retir6 en tout temps et le sujet de l’exp6rimentation devrait etre
inform6 avant le d6but de la recherche de son droit de retirer son consentement
sans pr6judice54.

D’autre part, la participation d’une personne 16galement incapable h une
experimentation est possible en vertu des principes applicables sp6cifiquement

53Ibid., le principe 2 qui se lit comme suit:

1. Dans la recherche mdicale l’int~r& et le bien-6tre de la personne qui se prate t la
recherche doivent toujours pr~valoir sur l’int&rt de la science et de la soci6t6 […].
2. Les risques encourus par la personne qui se prate une recherche mrdicale doivent
8tre limit~s au minimum. Les risques ne doivent pas 6tre disproportionnfs par rapport
l’importance de l’objectif de cette recherche.
aux bdn6fices pour cette personne et

54Ibid, le principe 3 qui se lit comme suit:

1. Aucune recherche m6dicale ne peut 8tre effectu6e sans le consentement 6clair6, libre,
expr~s et spdcifique de la personne qui s’y prate. Ce consentement peut etre librement
retir6 h n’importe quelle phase de la recherche; la personne qui se prate A la recherche
doit, avant sa participation A celle-ci, etre avertie de son droit de retirer son
consentement.
2. La personne qui se prate A la recherche m6dicale doit atre informde de l’objectif de
cette recherche et de la m~thodologie de l’exp~rimentation. Elle doit aussi etre infor-
m~e des risques pr~visibles et des inconv6nients qu’elle encourt du fait de la recherche
propos~e. Cette information doit etre suffisamment claire et etre adapt6e, de fagon A
permettre de donner ou de refuser le consentement en pleine connaissance de cause.
3. Les dispositions de ce principe s’appliqueront 6galement au repr6sentant 16gal et a
l’incapable juridique capable de discemement dans les cas mentionn~s aux principes
4 et 5.

Le texte des principes 4 et 5 du projet de recommandation est reproduit infra, notes 56-57.

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ces personnes. Cependant elle demeure tributaire de l’obtention du consente-
ment substitu6 A savoir, celui du repr6sentant 16ga 55 ou de la personne d6sign6e
conform6ment aux r~gles de droit interne56. De fagon it assurer la protection de
la personne incapable, la recommandation pr6voit 6galement que seules les
exp6rimentations devant s’avdrer b6n6fiques pour la sant6 du sujet pourront etre
conduites sur la personne d’un incapable57.

En mati~re de transplantation d’organes provenant de donneurs vivants, les
travaux de la Troisi~me conf6rence des Minist~res de la sant6 europ6ens” ont
trait6 des probl~mes soulev6s par le cas du donneur incapable. De l’ensemble
des lignes directrices adopt6es it cette occasion, il se d6gage qu’un pr6lvement
ne devrait atre effectu6 que sur un adulte capable de donner librement son con-
sentement. Quoiqu’il en soit, dans certains cas exceptionnels, des substances
susceptibles de se reg6n&er pourraient 8tre pr6lev6es sur une personne 16gale-
ment incapable et ce, pour des raisons thrapeutiques. En pareil cas il semble
que le consentement du repr6sentant 16gal constitue de l’avis des Minist~res,
une garantie du respect des droits de la personne. Rejoignant en quelque sorte
la Dgclaration d’Helsinki, le consentement du donneur incapable dou6 de dis-
cernement devrait 8tre exig6. Dans le cas particulier d’un don de rein, une per-
sonne 16galement incapable pourrait etre donneur si celle-ci et le r6cipiendaire
ont un lien g6n6tique 6troit et en autant que son reprdsentant 16gal ainsi que les
autorit6s comp6tentes ont autoris6 le pr6l vement. Lorsque le donneur incapable
a la capacit6 de fait de consentir, son autorisation devrait 6galement etre obte-
nue. De plus, le donneur et, lorsqu’il s’agit d’une personne 16galement inca-
pable, son repr6sentant 16gal devraient recevoir une information appropri6e

55 Soulignons qu’en vertu du principe 13.2 de la Rec. no R(90)3 supra, note 52, le reprsentant
16gal appel6 hL consentir ne devrait recevoir aucune r6mun~ration sous quelque forme que ce soit
en 6change de Ta participation de Ia personne incapable i l’exp6rimentation. Seules les d6penses
effectu6es devraient 8tre rembours~es.

56Rec. no R(90)3, ibid. Le principe 4 se lit comme suit:

Un incapable juridique ne peut faire l’objet d’une recherche m6dicale que lorsqu’elle
est autoris6e selon le Principe 5 et a condition que son repr~sentant 16gal ou l’autorit6
ou l’individu autoris6 ou d~sign6 selon les dispositions de son droit national y consente.
Si l’incapable juridique est capable de discemement, son consentement est 6galement
requis et aucune recherche ne peut 8tre entreprise s’il ne donne pas son consentement.

57Ibid., principe 5 qui se lit comme suit:

1. Un incapable juridique ne peut faire l’objet d’une recherche m~dicale sauf s’il peut
en attendre un bfn6fice direct significatif pour sa sant6.
2. Cependant, A titre exceptionnel, le droit national peut autoriser des recherches sur un
incapable juridique dont la sant6 n’en b6n6ficiera pas directement t condition que cette
personne ne s’y oppose pas et pour autant que ces recherches soient effectu~es au b~nd-
fice de personnes faisant partie de la meme cat6gorie que lui et que des r6sultats scien-
tifiques analogues ne puissent 8tre obtenus si elles sont faites sur des personnes qui
n’appartiennent pas A cette catdgorie.

58Tenue t Paris les 16 et 17 novembre 1987, les travaux de la Conference ont fait l’objet d’un
article intitul6 < 3rd Conference of European Health Ministers >> (1988) 39 Intl. Dig. Hlth Leg. 274.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNETIQUE

481

quant aux consequences du pr6l vement et en particulier quant aux effets m6di-
caux, sociaux et psychologiques de la proc6dure pour le donneur et pour le
r6cipiendaire.

En somme, la communaut6 internationale a admis la 16galit6 et la 16gitimit6
de 1’exp6rimentation sur les enfants et les incapables mais a 6tabli certains para-
m~tres destin6s it assurer la protection de ces personnes.

Ainsi, depuis la Dkclaration d’Helsinki, il est clairement 6tabli qu’une
exp6rimentation peut etre effectu6e sur la personne d’un mineur ou d’un inca-
pable pour autant que le consentement libre et 6clair6 de son repr6sentant l6gal
ait 6t6 obtenu. Le consentement substitu6 apparait donc comme le moyen privi-
16gi6 par le droit international pour garantir le respect des droits fondamentaux
de l’enfant et de l’incapable.

Destin6 h sauvegarder les droits de la personne humaine, le consentement
subsfitu6 est g6n6ralement une mesure efficace. I n’en demeure pas moins que
les int6r~ts de l’enfant, les int6rts de l’incapable, ceux de ses parents ou de ses
repr~sentants l6gaux et ceux de l’Etat peuvent s’av6rer conflictuels. Devant
cette possibilit6, certaines conventions r6gionales ont consenti aux enfants et
aux incapables des garanties additionnelles fort int6ressantes. Ainsi, la Conven-
tion europienne des droits de l’Homme59 a la particularit6 d’accorder aux per-
sonnes mineures le droit de s’adresser
la Commission europ6enne des droits
de l’Homme en cas de non respect de leurs droits et ce, ind6pendamnent de leur
incapacit6 et sans l’autorisation de leurs repr6sentants 16gaux. Selon certains, la
capacit6 16gale n’est pas une condition au droit d’action6 , ce qui permet de
croire que les personnes l6galement incapables peuvent elles aussi s’adresser ‘
la Commission. Adopt6e dans le but d’offrir aux enfants et aux adolescents une
protection sp~ciale contre les dangers physiques et moraux 1 , le comit6 d’ex-
perts ind6pendants de la Charte sociale europeenne prevoit quant A lui l’insti-
tution d’un commissaire aux enfants62. Charg6 essentiellement de d6fendre les
int6r~ts des enfants dans toute question priv6e ou publique les concernant, ce
commissaire peut intervenir de sa propre initiative ou h la demande des int6res-
s6s dans tous les cas oi l’int6r& de l’enfant est en cause. Cette derni~re appro-
che qui 6vite la < judiciarisation >> de la recherche m6dicale constitue une appro-
che innovatrice.

59Adoptde 4 Rome le 4 novembre 1950, (1955) 213 R.T.N.U. 223.
601 s’agit l de l’interpr~tation donn~e hL l’art. 14 de la Convention europienne des droits de
l’homme par M. Buquicchio-De Boer, Children and the European Convention on Human
, dans F. Matcher et H. Petzhold, 6d., Protection des droits de l’homme : la dimension
Rights
europ~ene, K61n, Carl Heyman Verlag KG, 1988, 73 4 la p. 74.
61Voir Ia Charte sociale europienne, 18 octobre 1961, 529 R.T.N.U. 89, art. 7(10), cit6e dans
62Conclusions IX et IX-2 du Comit6 d’experts ind~pendants de la Charte sociale europienne,

Boucaud, supra, note 49 A la p. 34 [ci-apr s Charte sociale europ~enne].

Strasbourg, 1985 et 1986.

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[Vol. 36

Cela dit, deux tendances se d6gagent des textes intemationaux et r6gionaux
adopt6s apr~s 1965. Dans un premier temps, la communaut6 intemationale
semble prte A accorder une certaine importance h la capacit6 de fait des
mineurs et des incapables A consentir. Dans un second temps, on amorce un tra-
vail de d6finition de ce que constitue un consentement libre et 6clair6. On cons-
tate donc A la lecture de certains documents r6cents63 l’6mergence d’un double
consentement comme condition h la 16galit6 de l’exp6rimentation : l’assenti-
ment du sujet incapable et l’autorisation de ses parents ou repr6sentants 16gaux.
Dans le meme ordre d’id6es, d’autres documents exigeront qu’une information
appropri6e h l’dge ou au d6veloppement mental de l’enfant ou de l’incapable
soit fournie A ce dernier et h son repr6sentant 16gal64. Le caract~re libre et 6clair6
du consentement et du consentement substitu6 d6pend essentiellement de Fin-
formation transmise aux personnes concern6es. A cet 6gard, certains documents
internationaux vont jusqu’h pr6ciser le contenu de l’information65. La personne
appel6e a consentir ou h refuser l’exp6rimentation ou la transplantation doit A
tout le moins etre inform6e des avantages, des risques et des inconv6nients pr6-
visibles que pr6sente la proc6dure.

Apr~s ce survol des dispositions internationales applicables A 1’exp~rimen-
tation et A la transplantation, examinons maintenant la r~glementation applica-
ble au traitement m6dical.

2.

Le traitement m6dical de l’enfant et de l’incapable

Contrairement

l’exp6rimentation et A la transplantation, ce n’est qu’A titre
exceptionnel que des dispositions contenues dans des documents internationaux
ont 6t6 consacr6es au traitement m~dica 66. Par cons6quent, la question du con-
sentement au traitement m6dical doit s’envisager h partir des principes intema-
tionaux relatifs aux droits fondamentaux de la personne.

Le traitement m6dical est orient6 vers l’am6lioration du bien-6tre de la per-
sonne. Visant h gu6rir la maladie ou l’affection dont souffre l’individu, il est

6 3Voir notamment les travaux de ]a 3e Conference des Minist~res de la sant6 europdens, supra,
note 58. Voir dgalement les principes 4 et 5 de la Rec. no R(90)3 concemant la recherche m~dicale
sur l’etre humain, supra, notes 56 et 57 ; de meme que le texte de la Declaration d’Helsinki dans
sa version de 1975, supra, note 42.

64Voir par exemple la R6solution sur une Charte europienne des enfants hospitaliss, supra,
note 49; en mati~re de transplantation, voir les travaux de Ta 3e Confdrence des Ministres de la
sant6 europ6ens, ibid.

65Les D6eclarations de principe sur la bio6thique et autres mati~res, supra, note 47 ; la Resolution
sur utne Charte europienne des enfants hospitalisis, ibid., Rec. no R(90)3 concemant la recherche
m6dicale sur l’etre humain, supra, note 52.

66La Rgsolution sur une Charte europienne des enfants hospitalisgs, ibid. traite du traitement
m6dical en ce qu’elle insiste pour que soit reconnu h l’enfant le droit de recevoir quant au traite-
ment envisag6 une information adapt6e A son fige, a son d~veloppement mental et h son dtat affectif
et psychologique.

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483

administr6 en fonction des besoins individuels. Divers instruments intematio-
naux reconnaissent l’importance du bien-etre physique, mental et social de la
personne humaine en ce qu’ils consacrent express6ment le droit
la sant6 ou au
meilleur 6tat de sant6 possible67. Parmi ces documents, certains contiennent des
garanties destin6es sp6cifiquement aux personnes mineures. La Charte consti-
tutive de l’Organisation mondiale de la Sante6′ par exemple, pr6cise dans son
pr6ambule que le d6veloppement sain de l’enfant est d’une importance fonda-
mentale. La Charte sociale europ~enne reconnait h chacun le droit
la sant6.
Par cons6quent, l’Ittat a l’obligation de prendre les mesures n6cessaires
la pro-
tection de la sant6 des enfants puisque l’enfant doit 8tre particuli~rement pro-
t6g6 contre les dangers moraux et physiques auxquels il est expos 6 9. L’adoption
r6cente par l’Assembl6e g6n6rale de l’Organisation des Nations Unies de la
Convention relative aux droits de l”enfant” est venue confirmer le droit de l’en-
fant de jouir du meilleur 6tat de sant6 possible’.

Ce droit h la sant6 ou au meilleur 6tat de sant6 qu’il soit possible d’attein-
dre aura pour corollaire certaines obligations. Une premire obligation consiste
A s’abstenir de porter atteinte A la sant6 d’autrui. Une seconde obligation impose
par exemple aux ttats de proc6der h la mise en place d’institutions vou6es au
traitement m6dical, de pr6voir les mesures necessaires pour 6viter la prolif6ra-

67A titre d’exemple, la Charte constitutive de l’Organisation mondiale de la Sant6, 22 juillet
1946, 14 R.T.N.U., 185 (adopt6e par la Conf&ence intemationale de la sant6 tenue A New-York
en 1946 et entree en vigueur le 7 avril 1948) est un des premiers documents a avoir reconnu comme
fondamental le droit au meilleur 6tat de sant6 que l’homme puisse atteindre. Le pr6ambule du
document constitutif de rOrganisation Mondiale de Ta Sant contient les extraits suivants:
La sant6 est un 6tat de complet bien-etre physique, mental et social et ne consiste pas
seulement en une absence de maladie ou d’inflrmit6 […].
La possession du meilleur 6tat de sant6 qu’il soit capable d’atteindre constitue l’un des
droits fondamentaux de tout etre humain, quelles que soient sa race, sa religion, ses opi-
nions politiques, sa condition 6conomique ou sociale […].
Les gouvemements ont la responsabilit6 de la sant6 de leurs peuples ; ils ne peuvent
y faire face qu’en prenant les mesures sanitaires et sociales appropri6es.

La D~claration universelle des droits de ‘homme adopt~e par L’Assembl6e g~n~rale des Nations-
Unies Doc. off. AG NU Doc. NU A/810 (1948) garantit h toute personne un droit aux moyens
n6cessaires pour atteindre et conserver un 6tat de sant6 satisfaisant (art. 25) :

Toute personne a droit h un niveau de vie suffisant pour assurer sa sant6, son bien-etre
et ceux de sa famille, notamment pour l’alimentation, l’habillement, le logement, les
soins m6dicaux ainsi que pour les services sociaux n6cessaires […].

Le premier principe de la Ddclaration d’Alma-Alta, Organisation mondiale de ]a Sant6, Gen~ve,
1978, reconnaeit express6ment que la sant6 est un droit fondamental de l’tre humain. Voir 6gale-
ment : Fart. 11 de ]a Charte sociale europienne ; ‘art. 12.1 du Pacte international relatif aux droits
iconomiques, sociaux et culturels, 16 d6cembre 1976, 993 R.T.N.U. 3.

61bid.
69Supra, note 61 art. 1(11), 11(1)-(3).
7 0Supra, note 38.
71Ibid. art. 24(1).

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tion de maladies ou pour protdger la sant6 des enfants72. Cette obligation de faire
pourra 6galement, comme le prdcise la Convention relative aux droits de l’ en-
fant avoir pour objet de garantir A tout enfant un acc~s aux services mddicaux
qui lui sont ndcessaires 73. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, le droit it la sant6
tel que conqu par les r~gles de droit international ne peut s’exercer sans la par-
ticipation de l’Etat. La Convention prdcise aussi que l’enfant a droit aux soins
avant comme apr~s la naissance74.

La possibilit6 d’utiliser ce << droit >> au traitement << avant >> comme
<< apr~s >> la naissance ne devrait pas crder de probl~mes additionnels si les trai-
tements envisagds sont d’ordre gdndtique. Le traitement d’une incompatibilit6
Rh par transfusion sanguine intra-utdrine, ou une chirurgie pour rdparation du
diaphragme existent d6jh. Si une maladie gdndtique devait 8tre traitde avec une
semblable urgence durant la grossesse, il n’y aurait pas en thdorie de diffdrence
quant h la philosophie de l’acte mddical thdrapeutique. Cependant dans l’6tat
actuel de nos connaissances, il n’y a pas de maladies gdndtiques qui prdsentent
une telle urgence et qui ne pourraient attendre la naissance pour 6tre traitdes.

Mais d’une fagon plus gdndrale, le droit aux soins << avant >> la naissance
tel qu’accept6 par la Convention peut soulever une poldmique quant au droit de
<< l'enfant >> au diagnostic prdnatal systdmatique, au d6pistage mol6culaire de
maladies frdquentes selon l’ethnie ou la gdndalogie de ses parents ou encore au
criblage gdn6tique avant d’8tre implant6 dans l’utdrus de sa mere. Est-il impor-
tant de rappeler ici que plus de cinquante pour cent des interruptions spontandes
et naturelles de grossesse sont caus6es par des problmes gdndtiques et qu’en-
viron sept pour cent des enfants nds vivants souffrent de handicaps majeurs, la
plupart de composante essentiellement gdndtique75. Enfin, le ddveloppement
embryonnaire 6tant un processus tr~s complexe s’6tendant sur une courte
pdriode de temps (premier trimestre de la grossesse surtout) les risques d’erreurs
dans ces diagnostics demeurent importants et emp~chent de garantir un
nouveau-n6 << parfait >>.

La participation de l’Etat doit se faire en tenant compte des droits fonda-
mentaux que confere le droit international A la personne humaine. S’il est con-
forme au droit A la sant6 de prodiguer A un enfant ou h un incapable les traite-
ments m6dicaux dont il pourrait avoir besoin, l’Ittat qui honore ses engagements
envers la communaut6 internationale doit s’assurer du respect des autres droits
et libertds fondamentales de la personne humaine. Le bien-atre physique, mental
et social de la personne humaine est en partie tributaire du respect du droit h la

7 21bid. art. 24(1)-(2).
7 31bid. art. 24(1).
74Ibid. prtambule et art. 24(2)d).
75Conseil De Recherches Mtdicales du Canada, supra, note 4.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNIfTIQUE

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vie, A la libert6 et a la s~curit6 de la personne, du droit de l’enfant A la protection
particuli~re qu’exige son 6tat de meme que des libert6s d’expression et de reli-
gion reconnues a chacun. Ces droits et libert6s sont susceptibles d’etre mis en
cause par le traitement m6dical et ce sont eux qui justifient l’exigence du con-
sentement et du consentement substitu6.

Le droit h la vie, A la libert6 et a la s6curit6 de la personne tel que reconnu
par les r~gles de droit international suppose l’autonomie et l’inviolabilit6 de la
personne76 . Ce droit comprend la libert6 du patient de prendre les d6cisions sur
des sujets qui le concernent personnellement, le droit de consentir ou de refuser
son consentement a un traitement m6dical de m~me que l’obligation pour le
m6decin traitant d’obtenir le consentement du patient. Contrairement a d’autres
droits, le droit a la vie, a la libert6 et h la s6curit6 de sa personne n’est pas un
droit absolu. Ce droit poss~de ses propres limites et peut etre restreint dans le
but notamment de prot6ger la sant6 collective et individuelle. L’incapacit6 des
enfants ou des incapables a r6agir par eux-mgme en raison de leur age ou de
leurs capacit6s mentales rend n6cessaire une surveillance pour assurer l’6pa-
nouissement du droit h la vie a l’intdrieur de ses limites. Les enfants et les inca-
pables sont sujets de droit mais ne peuvent avoir le plein exercice de leurs droits
avant d’avoir atteint un certain age ou une certaine capacit6. Ni l’un ni l’autre
ne peut consentir ou refuser de consentir (stricto sensu) a un traitement m6dical.

En droit international, le droit de l’enfant A une protection particuli~re est
ind6niable. La Diclaration universelle des droits de l’homme octroie quant h
elle une garantie h la mere et h l’enfant en accordant a ceux-ci le droit h une aide
et A une assistance sp6ciales77. Consacr6e exclusivement aux enfants, la Dgcla-
ration des droits de l’enfant75 est d6jh plus pr6cise que les documents qui l’ont
pr6c6d6e. Elle reconnait express6ment que l’enfant, en raison de son manque de
maturit6 physique et intellectuelle, a besoin d’une protection particuli~re et de
soins sp6ciaux, notamment d’une protection juridique appropri6e, avant comme
apr~s la naissance79 . L’id6e voulant que l’enfant ait droit h une protection par-
ticuli~re en raison de son age a 6t6 6galement reprise dans le Pacte international

76Djclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, supra, note 67, art. 3 ; American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopt6 par ]a 9e International Conference of American States,
Bogota, Colombia, 1948) art. I ; Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, supra,
note 46, art. 6(1) ; Convention europienne des droits de l’homme, supra, note 59, art. 2(1). La con-
s6cration de la libert6 individuelle presume que chacun a le droit de disposer librement de son
corps, de se soigner comme il l’entend ce qui revient A reconnaitre un certain degr6 d’autonomie
au patient.

771bid. art. 25.2 qui se lit comme suit: < La matemit6 et l'enfance ont droit h une aide et une assistance sp~ciales. [...] >>.

78Doc. N.U., 20 novembre 1959 [R6solution 1386 (XIV)]. I est A noter que cette d~claration n’a

cependant aucune force contraignante pour les ttats qui y ont souscrit.

79Voir A cet effet le considdrant de la D~claration, supra, note 76.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

relatifaux droits civils et politiques et plus r6cemment comme nous l’avons vu
dans la Convention internationale”.

Dans cette section de l’6tude, nous avons d6gag6 les grands principes
reconnus 1’6chelle intemationale et applicables aux enfants et aux incapables
dans le cadre de 1’exp6rimentation, la transplantation et les soins m6dicaux. I1
importe maintenant d’examiner de quelle fagon ces principes sont ou seront
transpos6s dans notre droit interne. Pour ce faire, nous proc6derons selon la hi6-
rarchie des textes 16gislatifs. Ds lors, une analyse de la Charte canadienne des
droits et liberts82 s’impose d’embl6e.

B. Le droit constitutionnel

La Charte s’applique h l’action l6gislative, ex6cutive et administrative du
gouvemement en vertu de son article 32″. Une loi f6d6rale ou provinciale ou
un acte gouvernemental portant sur l’exp6rimentation, la transplantation, les
traitements m6dicaux ou la g6n6tique est ainsi soumis aux exigences de la
Charte.

L’exp6rimentation, la transplantation et le traitement m6dical mettent en
jeu des libert6s et droits fondamentaux prot6g6s par la Charte, tels la libert6 de
conscience et de religion 4 (1), la libert6 d’association85 (2), le droit A la vie, t
la s6curit 6 6 (3), le droit h la protection contre les fouilles, les per-
la libert6 et
quisitions et les saisies abusives 7 (4), le droit h la protection contre tout traite-
ment ou peine cruel et inusit688 (5) et le droit h 1’6galit689 (6).

Jusqu’ici seul le traitement m6dical a fait l’objet de d6cisions judiciaires
dans le contexte du droit constitutionnel. I ne fait pas de doute que les droits

8Supra, note 46, art. 24(1) qui se lit comme suit :

Tout enfant, sans discrimination aucune fondde sur la race, la couleur, le sexe, la
langue, la religion, l’origine nationale ou sociale, ]a fortune ou la naissance, a droit, de
Ia part de sa famille, de ]a soci6t6 et de I’ttat, aux mesures de protection qu’exige sa
condition de mineur.

81Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant, supra, note 38.
82Charte canadienne des droits et libertis, Partie I de ia Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, consti-

tuant

‘annexe B de la Loi de 1982 sur le Canada (R.-U.), 1982, c. 11 [ci-apr~s Charte].

83VoirS.D.G.M.R. c. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 R.C.S. 573,33 D.L.R. (4th) 174. La Charte
s’applique lorsqu’iI y a d616gation de pouvoirs, c’est–dire aux rfglements et aux d~crets et peut-
8tre meme aux r~glements municipaux et aux r~glements adopt6s par d’autres organes cr66s par
le Parlement et les 16gislatures. Quand une partie privde invoque un tel acte gouvernemental et que
celui-ci viole un des droits garantis une autre personne par la Charte, celle-ci va s’appliquer.

84Charte, art. 2(a).
851bid. art. 2(d).
86Ibid. art. 7.
871bid. art. 8.
“Ibid. art. 12.
“9Ibid. art. 15.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNITIQUE

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et libert6s mentionn6s pourraient aussi 8tre invoqu6s dans le cadre de l’experi-
mentation et de la transplantation sur les enfants et les incapables. 1 est donc
utile d’examiner l’interpr6tation donn6e par les tribunaux i chacun de ces droits
et de consid6rer leur application en g6n6tique. Les droits et libert6s n’6tant
cependant pas absolus, nous allons voir qu’ils peuvent 6tre limit6s par une r~gle
de droit si ces limites sont raisonnables et qu’elles se justifient dans le cadre
d’une soci6t6 libre et d6mocratique 0 (7).

1.

La libert6 de conscience et de religion

La libert6 de conscience et de religion pent d’une part 8tre invoqu6e par
l’individu lui-m~me. Les enfants ayant l’Age de faire un choix 6clair6 ont un
droit fondamental de faire leur propre choix religieux 1 . Le fait d’avoir donn6
une transfusion de sang it une enfant Tmoin de J6hovah ag6e de 12 ans sans
son consentement transgresse sa libert6 religieuse92. L’enfant dou6 de disceme-
ment ou l’incapable pouvant comprendre la port6e de son geste pourrait consen-
tir a une exp6rimentation on h une transplantation si l’on admet qu’il exerce
ainsi sa libert6 de conscience.

La libert6 de conscience et de religion peut d’autre part 8tre invoqu6e par
les parents d’un enfant93. Elle ne justifie toutefois pas le refus de donner leur
consentement au traitement m6dical de leur enfant si d’autres droits fondamen-
taux, comme le droit a la vie de l’enfant, sont en jeu94 .

2.

La libert6 d’association

La libert6 d’association pourrait etre invoquee pour prot6ger l’institution
du mariage et le droit de fonder une famille5 . Si le droit de se marier ou de fon-

9 0Ibid. art. 1.
9 1Droit de la Famille 260, [1986] R.J.Q. 315 (C.S.).
92Re L.D.K.(1985), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 164 a la p. 171 (C.P. Ont.).
93Jones c. R., [1986] 2 R.C.S. 284, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569 [ci-apr~s Jones cit6 aux R.C.S.].
94Re C.P.L. (1988), 70 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 287 t lap. 302, 215 A.P.R. 287 (Nfld. U.F.C.) [ci-apr~s
cit6 aux Nfld. & P.E.I.R.] ; M. (R.E.D.) c. Dir. of Child Welfare (1987), 47 Alta L.R. (2d) 380, 1
W.W.R. 327 aux pp. 343-44 (Alta. Q.B.) [ci-apr~s cit6 aux W.W.R.] ; R. c. Tutton (1985), 18 C.C.C.
(3d) 328, 14 C.R.R. 314, confirn6 sur une autre base par [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1392, 48 C.C.C. (3d)
129 [ci-apr~s Tutton].

95M. le juge McIntyre affirmait dans le Renvoi relatif dt la Public Service Employee Relations

Act, [1987] 1 R.C.S. 313 A la p. 406, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161 :

Meme certaines institutions comme le mariage et la famille, qui de par leur nature sont
collectives, ne tombent pas facilement ou enti~rement sous ]a rubrique libert6 d’asso-
ciation. […] Cela ne veut pas dire que des institutions fondamentales, comme le
mariage, ne b6n6ficierontjamais de la protection de la Charte. L’institution du mariage,
par exemple, pourrait fort bien atre prot6g6e par la combinaison de ]a libert6 d’asso-
ciation et d’autres droits et libert6s.

REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL

[Vol. 36

der une famille est effectivement prot6g6, cela pourrait remettre en cause la 16gi-
timit6 des programmes de d6pistage chez les adolescents comme pour le Tay-
Sachs et la thalass6mie. Selon cette interprdtation restrictive, la transmission de
1’information concemant l’6tat de porteur de l’adolescent pourrait constituer une
atteinte au droit de se marier ou de fonder une famille en ce que cette informa-
tion limiterait le choix de partenaires.

3.

Le droit A la vie, h la libert6 et A la s6curit6

L’article 7 protege la personne contre une atteinte h la vie, A la libert6 et
A la s6curit6. Cette atteinte est ill6gale uniquement si elle est contraire aux prin-
cipes de justice fondamentale %. L’atteinte h un des trois 616ments de l’article 7
est suffisante pour qu’il y ait violation de l’article97. Une activit6 exp6rimentale,
une transplantation ou un traitement m6dical qui porterait atteinte h la vie, A la
libert6 ou h la s6curit: d’une personne serait ainsi ill6gal.

Le droit h la libert6 garantit h l’individu un certain degr6 d’autonomie per-
sonnelle dans la prise de d6cision affectant sa vie prive 98, qui comprend les
d6cisions relatives aux soins m6dicaux. Ce droit d6coule du principe fondamen-
tal de la dignit6 de la personne qui est prot6g6, entre autres 99, par l’article 7′”.
Le droit a la s6curit6 protege son int6grit6 physique et psychologique”‘0 et son
contr6le sur celle-ci. Un traitement m6dical ou chirurgical impos6 par l’Etat
constitue une atteinte A l’int6grit6 physique de la personne02 . L’article 7 prot6
gerait ainsi le droit d’un individu de consentir au pr6lvement d’une substance
de son corps, le droit de l’enfant de consentir au traitement m6dical, ainsi que
celui de ses parents d’autoriser le traitement.

En vertu des principes 6nonc6s plus haut, le pr6l vement d’une substance
corporelle contre la volont6 de la personne ou sans son consentement, constitue

Voir aussi R. c. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 R.C.S. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [ci-apr~s Morgentaler cit6
aux R.C.S.] et B.M. Knoppers, << Reproductive Technology and International Mechanisms of Pro- tection of the Human Person >> (1987) 32 R.D. McGill 336.

96Pour d~terminer si un principe est un principe de justice fondamentale, il faut examiner > (Renvoi relatif a la Motor Vehicle Act
(C.B.), [1985] 2 R.C.S. 486 a la p. 513, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 [ci-apr~s Motor Vehicle cit6 aux
R.C.S.I, M. lejuge Lamer). Les principes de justice fondamentale portent non seulement sur la pro-
c6dure mais aussi sur ]a substance (supra aux pp. 498-99, M. le juge Lamer).

97Singh c. Ministire de l’Emploi et de l’Immigration, [1985] 1 R.C.S. 177, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422.
9SMorgentaler, supra, note 95 A ]a p. 170, Mme le juge Wilson. Voir aussi Knoppers, infra, note

153.

99<< La notion de dignit6 humaine trouve son expression dans presque tous les droits et libertds garantis par ]a Charte >> (ibid.

a p. 166, Mme le juge Wilson).

1Ibid. aux pp. 164-65, Mme le juge Wilson.
1011bid. aux pp. 55-56, M. le juge en chef Dickson et A ]a p. 173, Mme le juge Wilson.
12Ibid. A la p. 173, Mme le juge Wilson.

1991] LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNITIQUE

489

une violation de l’article 7 de la Charte13 . La constitutionnalit6 de l’utilisation
des tests sanguins en mati~re de filiation a 6t6 mise en doute sur cette base. Cer-
taines lois provinciales, comme par exemple la Children’s Law Reform Act” ,
prfvoient qu’une partie peut demander au tribunal la permission de faire proc6-
der un test sanguin dans le but de ddterminer la filiation d’un enfant1 5. Si un
individu refuse de subir le test, le tribunal peut tirer les conclusions qu’il juge
approprides. La loi ne contraint pas une personne
se soumettre au test; le test
ne peut 8tre pratiqu6 qu’avec le consentement de la personne concerne. Sans
ce consentement, il y aurait voies de fait et atteinte A la vie privfe de la per-
sonne. S’il n’y a pas de coercition, il ne peut y avoir d’atteinte aux droits garan-
tis par l’article 7.6

Le droit de l’enfant de donner son consentement h des soins mfdicaux est
protfg6 par ‘article 7.7 . Nous avons dfjh mentionn6 que le fait d’avoir donn6
une transfusion de sang h une enfant Tmoin de Jehovah Agfe de 12 ans sans
son consentement transgresse son droit h la s~curit&1. L’article 7 pourrait 6ga-
lement servir comme fondement an droit de l’enfant de consentir h une exp6ri-
mentation ou h une transplantation.

Le droit d’autoriser 1’exp6rimentation, une transplantation ou un traitement
medical sur des enfants appartient aux parents en vertu de l’autorit6 parentale.
L’autorit6 parentale relive de l’autonomie familiale qui est protfgfe par ‘article
7 de la Charte'”. La question de savoir si le droit A la libert6 comprend le droit

’03Dans R. c. Ligare (1988), 89 N.B.R. (2d) 361, 43 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (C.A. N.B.), on ajug6 que
le prdlvement de cheveux contre la volontd de la personne violait l’art. 7. Dans Dyment c. R.
(1984), 47 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 350, 9 D.L.R. (4th) 614 (P.E.I. S.C.), inf. par (1986), 57 Nfld. &
P.E.I.R. 210,26 D.L.R. (4th) 399 (P.E.I. S.C.A.D.), conf. par [1988] 2 R.C.S. 417,55 D.L.R. (4th)
503 [ci-apr~s Dyment cit6 aux R.C.S.], la remise d’un dchantillon de sang A un tiers sans le con-
sentement de Ta personne viole son droit A la sfcurit6. Cette conclusion a cependant 6t6 rejetfe en
appel. La dcision de Ta Cour supreme porte uniquement sur l’art. 8 de Ta Charte.

’06R.S.O. 1980, c. 68.
105Ibid., art. 10; contra, Droit de lafamille 206, [1986] R.J.Q. 2038 (C.A.).
11p.(K.) c. N.(P.) (1988), 15 R.F.L. (3d) 110 (C.S. Ont.) ; Re N andD (1985), 49 O.R. (2d) 490

h ]a p. 498, 13 C.R.R. 26 (C.P.).
“”Re C.P.L., supra, note 94

la p. 171.

Ta p. 308 : << The child was still denied his right to be informed through his parents. I find the apprehension and detention of C.P.L.was not in accordance with fundamental principles of justice > .

’08Re LD.K., supra, note 92
109< [S]ecurity of the person includes the right to individual privacy or family autonomy and [...] one of the liberty interests to be protected is the parental right to be free from State intervention [...] > (Re T and Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 347
a p. 358, 39 R.F.L. (2d) 297 (C.P.) [cit6 aux O.R.]) Voir aussi, M. (R.E.D.) c. Dir. of Child Wel-
fare, supra, note 94. Voir en ce sens, N. Bala et J.D. Redfeam, < Family Law and the 'Liberty Inte- (1983) 15 Ottawa L. Rev. 243. Contra : < With rest' : Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights respect to family autonomy, [...] I am not sure that any such right exists (Re C.P.L., supra, note 94 A la p. 303). McGILL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36 d'un parent d'61ever et d'6duquer son enfant a 6t6 soulevde devant la Cour supreme, mais la majorit6 de la Cour a jug6 inutile de se prononcer dans le con- texte de la cause"O. Selon l'opinion d'un juge minoritaire, la libert6 prot6g6e par l'article 7 comprend << le droit des parents d'6duquer leurs enfants conform6- ment leurs croyances >>”‘.

leur conscience et

L’enfant est aussi prot6g6 par l’article 7″2 . Sur cette base, les tribunaux
donnent l’autorisation judiciaire de soumettre l’enfant A des traitements m6di-
caux contre la volont6 du titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale qui sont g6n6ralement
les parents de l’enfant. Bien que le droit
la libert6 comprend le droit de
prendre les decisions concemant leur enfant, le droit A la vie de l’enfant dont
l’6tat de sant6 requiert une transfusion sanguine limite la libert6 des parents de
choisir les traitements m6dicaux qui lui seront prodigu~s”3.

Les incapables b6n6ficient 6galement des droits 6num6r6s t l’article 7.
Dans l’arrt Re Eve, la Cour supreme affirme que la st~rilisation non th6rapeu-
tique ne devrait jamais 8tre autoris6e en vertu de la comp6tence parens
patriae”4 . L’intervention constitue une << atteinte irr6versible et grave des droits fondamentaux d'une personne [qui] est simplement trop grande pour permettre un tribunal d'agir sur le fondement d'avantages possibles qui, du point de vue de la personne, sont extr~mement contestables >>”‘. Un des motifs de la Cour
6tait que la st6rilisation, en l’occurrence la ligature tubaire, est normalement
irr6versible et contreviendrait au droit de procr6er de l’individu”6. On pourrait
appliquer ce meme raisonnement restrictif A l’exp6rimentation sur les enfants et
les incapables, h la transplantation ou
certains traitements m~dicaux dans la
mesure ohi ces interventions peuvent etre dites non thrapeutiques.

10 Jones, supra, note 93 h Ia p. 302, M. le juge LaForest.
.Ibid. h la p. 320, Mme le juge Wilson.
112<< The child as well may have individual rights which are safeguarded by the section >> (Re T
and Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, supra, note 109 aux pp. 357-58).
” 3Re K.(R.) (1987), 79 A.R. 140, 50 Alta L.R. 422 (Alta. Prov. Ct) ; M. (R.E.D.) c. Dir. of Child

Welfare, supra, note 94.

” 4E. (Mme) c. Eve, [1986] 2 R.C.S. 388 A lap. 431, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [ci-apr~s Re Eve cit6 aux
R.C.S.]. Les auteurs s’interrogent quant
l’applicabilit6 de ]a doctrineparenspatriae au droit priv6
qu6bdcois. Pour une analyse de ]a question, les auteurs r6frent les lecteurs A M. Morin, << La com- p6tence parens patriae et le droit priv6 qudb~cois : un emprunt inutile, un affront A l'histoire >
(1990) 50 R. du B. 827.

“5 Re Eve, ibid. 4 Ia p. 432.
” 6Cette conclusion a 6t6 critiqu6e par une d6cision de ]a Chambre des Lords en Angleterre:

To talk of the << basic right >> to reproduce of an individual who is not capable of kno-
wing the causal connection between intercourse and childbirth, the nature of pre-
gnancy, what is involved in delivery, unable to form maternal instincts or to care for
a child appears to me wholly to part company with reality (Re B, [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1213,
2 All E.R. 206 A lap. 213).

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNIETIQUE

491

4.

Les fouilles, les perquisitions et les saisies abusives

L’article 8 interdit non seulement les fouilles, les perquisitions ou les sai-
sies abusives” T, mais garantit le droit h la protection contre celles-ci”‘. Ces trois
termes doivent s’interpr6ter de fagon disjonctive” 9 .

Un des objets de la protection constitutionnelle contre les fouilles, les per-
quisitions et les saisies abusives est la protection de la vie priv6e des indivi-
dus”20 . Alors que dans le pass6, le droit t la vie privee visait la protection du
domicile, aujourd’hui il protege plut6t les personnes que les lieux’2 . Le droit i
la vie priv6e comprend 6galement la protection des renseignements person-
nels”2 .

La saisie dans le contexte de l’article 8 se d6finit comme la prise par les
autorit6s de quelque chose appartenant A un individu sans son consentement’13.
Le pr6l6vement d’une substance corporelle, comme le sang, sur une personne
inconsciente, et donc sans son consentement, constitue une fouille abusive 24. Si
le pr6lvement est effectu6 pour des fits m6dicales sur un individu inconscient,
la prise de possession par un repr6sentant de l’ttat de l’6chantillon de sang
constitue une saisie au sens de l’article 8′”. I1 en est de m~me pour toute autre
substance corporelle 26. Si la saisie n’est pas faite en raison d’une urgence, elle
est abusive 27.

L’utilisation d’une partie du corps d’une personne afin d’obtenir des ren-
seignements sur elle sans son consentement porte atteinte A sa vie priv6e 12 et
son autonomie personnelle 29. De plus, si la personne consent au pr6lvement

” 7Voir Y. de Montigny, < La protection contre les fouilles, les perquisitions et les saisies abu- sives: un premier bilan >> (1989) 49 R. du B. 53.

“5M.N.R. c. Kruger Inc., [1984] 2 C.F. 535, 13 D.L.R. (4th) 706 (C.A.); Dyment, supra, note

103 4 ]a p. 427.

“9Dyment, ibid. h Ta p. 431.
120Hunter c. Southam, [1984] 2 R.C.S. 145 A lap. 159, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 [ci-apr~s Hunter cit6

aux R.C.S.].

129Dyment, supra, note 103 a la p. 436.

12 lbid.
’22Dyment, supra, note 103 aux pp. 429-30.
1231bid. h ]a p. 431.
124R. c. Poheretsky, [1987] 1 R.C.S. 945 A Ta p. 948, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 699. Le pr61vement avait
6t6 effectu6 t Ta demande d’un policier et non pour des raisons m6dicales. Comme le minist~re
public reconnaissait que le pr61Tvement 6tait une fouille abusive, ]a Cour n’a pas eu A d6cider si
le pr61Tvement dtait une fouille ou une saisie.

125Dyment, supra, note 103 A la p. 435.
1261bid. h la p. 439.
1271bid. aux pp. 436-37. Le policier aurait dfi obtenir au pr6alable un mandat l’autorisant A la
1281bid. aux pp. 431-32. Dans R. c. Katsigiorgis (1988), 62 O.R. (2d) 441, 39 C.C.C. (3d) 256
A lap. 261, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a consid6r6 que la saisie d’un 6chantillon d’urine ne n6ces-
site aucune intrusion du corps humain et ne constitue qu’une invasion minime de la vie priv6e.

saisie.

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d’un dchantillon d’une partie corporelle A des fins m~dicales, celui-ci doit servir
ces fins 3′. Cette interpr6tation de l’article 8 a 6galement un
uniquement
impact sur le droit d’acc~s et le droit d’utilisation de l’information issue du
mat6riel g6n6tique en ce qui conceme les membres de la famille, les chercheurs
et les tiers. Le consentement du patient ou du sujet t une telle utilisation devrait
6tre explicite.

5.

Les traitements ou peines cruels et inusit6s

L’article 12 de la Charte canadienne protege chacun contre tout traitement
ou peine cruel et inusit6. Le terme traitement n’est pas limit6 au traitement
p6nal”3 . I y a violation du droit si le traitement est soit cruel, soit inusit6, soit
les deux’32. Un traitement est cruel et inusit6 s’il n’est pas conforme aux normes
publiques de d6cence et de biens6ance’33, s’il n’est pas n6cessaire car il existe
des alternatives acceptables et s’il ne peut pas atre appliqu6 selon une base
rationnelle en conformit6 avec des normes v~rifi6es ou v6rifiables'”.

L’article 12 a 6t6 invoqu6 dans une cause portant sur le traitement m6dical.
Des parents avaient r6tract6 l’autorisation qu’ils avaient initialement donn6e t
ce qu’un drain pos6 dans le cerveau de leur enfant de 7 ans soit remplac6. L’en-
fant souffrait de multiples probl~mes qui affectaient gravement sa qualit6 de vie
et sans drain, il allait mourir dans les jours suivants. Le Superintendent of
Family and Child Services s’opposa A leur d6cision et saisit la Cour provinciale
pour que la garde de l’enfant lui soit remise. Les parents soutenaient que le rem-
placement du drain constituerait un traitement cruel et inusit6 contraire A l’ar-
ticle 12. La Cour provinciale leur donna raison et leur confia la garde de l’en-
fant 35. Le Superintendent interjeta appel de la d6cision sur la base de l’article
7 de la Charte.

La Cour supreme de la Colombie-Britannique renversa la decision car
selon elle, les parents ne pouvaient pr6sumer de la qualit6 de vie de l’enfant’36.
Ce tribunal note que la Cour provinciale s’6tait fond6e sur l’article 12, mais ni
l’un ni l’autre des tribunaux n’a interpr6t6 les termes de l’article 12. La Cour
suprme de la Colombie-Britannique ne dit pas si l’intervention chirurgicale
6tait prohib6e par l’article 12, auquel cas cette disposition serait secondaire par

L.R. (2d) 63 (Alta. Q.B.) [ci-apr~s cit6 aux C.R.R.].

drogues dans l’emploi >> (1988) 48 R. du B. 315. Voir Knoppers et Laberge, supra, note 22.

la p. 432. Voir K. Benyekhlef, << R6flexions sur Ia 16galit6 des tests de d6pistage de 131Soenen c. Director of Edmonton Remand Centre (1984), 6 C.R.R. 368 a la p. 372, 28 Alta 1321bid. 133, Public standards of decency and propriety >>, ibid.
’34Ibid. 4 Ta p. 380.
135Re S.D. (1983), 42 B.C.L.R. 153, 3 W.W.R. 597 (B.C. P.C.), inf. par (1983), 42 B.C.L.R. 173,

]a p. 380.

130Ibid.

la p. 376.

34 R.FL. (2d) 34 (S.C.).

1361bid.

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rapport A l’article 7, ou si l’intervention ne constituait tout simplement pas un
traitement cruel et inusit6 au sens de l’article 12.

Dans une ddcision qui posait le meme genre de dilemme, un tribunal qu6-

brcois rdfere ainsi h l’article 12 :

L’tat doit prdserver la vie humaine, mais si, malgr6 ses soins, la vie devient inhu-
maine, c’est la dignit6 de Ia personne qui doit I’emporter sur l’intdrt de l’ttat.
L’article 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits permet alors
la personne de dire
que tout traitement qu’on veut lui administrer est << cruel >>, et elle peut le refuser.
Mais le test de la disparition de la dignit6 de la vie doit etre objectif’ 37.

Par contre, selon des ddcisions plus rdcentes, l’article 12 ne s’applique pas
aux traitements mddicaux3 s. Reste h savoir si cette interprdtation limitative
rdcente sera suivie par des instances supdrieures.

L’expdrimentation pourrait constituer un traitement cruel et inusit6′ 39 . Le
terme << traitement >> aurait une portde suffisamment large pour inclure une acti-
vit6 exp~rimentale 4 ‘. Une expdrimentation, de par sa nature meme semble 6tre
un acte inusit6. La ddfinition que l’on choisit de donner h << inusit6 >> prend d~s
lors toute son importance. Si on ddfmit ce terme comme voulant dire << extraor- dinaire >>, toutes les experimentations ne peuvent pas etre considdres comme
inusites”‘. L’interprdtation peut aussi porter sur le caract~re cruel de l’expdri-
mentation 42 .

6.

Le droit h l’6galit6

Un courant jurisprudentiel interprdtait la notion de discrimination contenue

A l’article 15 comme une distinction injuste et ddraisonnable:

La Cour est d’avis d’adopter une ddfinition dynamique du terme << discrimina- tion >> au sens de l’article 15. Celle-ci supposera une distinction fondre ou non sur
l’un des motifs 6num~rs, mais, en tout 6tat de cause, qui soit injuste, ddraison-

137Re Goyette : Centre de services sociaux du Montreal Mitropolitain, [1983] C.S. 429 A la p.

436.

271 A lap. 285.

13SM. (R.E.D.) c. Dir. of Child Welfare, supra, note 94 h la p. 344.
139M. Ouellette, << La Charte canadienne et certains probl~mes de biorthique >> (1984) 18 R.J.T.
140Commission de r~forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 36 A la p. 13.
141Voir la redaction de l’art. 7 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils etpolitiques, supra,
note 46: .

142M. Ouellette, supra, note 139 A la p. 285:

[U]ne exprimentation […] prrsente un caract re inusit6 […] mais pas n~cessairement
cruel. Pourtant, pour paraphraser l’art. 20 (1) C.c., le risque couru par le sujet peut fort
bien 8tre hors de proportion avec le bienfait qu’on peut en esp~rer. A moins que ce ne
soit 14 une definition du traitement cruel !

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nable et injustifi6e en regard des buts poursuivis par la l6gislation attaqu6e et de
l’tendue des cons6quences sur les droits et libert6s qui se trouvent entrav6s 143.
Selon une autre interpr6tation, est discriminatoire la distinction 6tablie
entre des individus qui sont dans une m~me cat6gorie, dans une situation ana-
logue'”.

La Cour supreme a rejet6 les deux interpr6tations 41. La discrimination dont
i est question an paragraphe 15(1) se limite h celle qui d6coule de l’application
de la loi. Le test de la situation analogue exclut << toute consid6ration de la nature de la loi >146 La discrimination au sens de l’article 15 est une distinction,
intentionnelle ou non, mais fond~e sur des motifs relatifs h des caract6ristiques
personnelles d’un individu ou d’un groupe d’individus qui a pour effet d’impo-
ser h la personne des d6savantages non impos6s h d’autres ou d’empecher ou de
restreindre l’acc~s aux avantages offerts h d’autres membres de la soci6t6. II faut
done 6tudier l’effet de la distinction 147 . Toute distinction n’est pas
discriminatoire.

Les motifs 6num6r6s h l’article 15 ont essentiellement trait des caract6-
ristiques inh6rentes h l’individu qui sont fond6es sur des caract6ristiques per-
sonnelles par opposition aux distinctions fond6es sur les m6rites ou les capacit6s
de l’individu. Les premieres seraient presque toujours tax6es de discriminatoires
alors que les secondes le seraient rarement 1′. L’age et les d6ficiences mentales
ou physiques sont des motifs 6num6r6s.

Pour certains tribunaux, la discrimination fond6e sur l’Age apparalt moins

s6rieuse que celle fond6e sur d’autres crit~res :

[I n’est gu~re de loi ou r6glementation qui ne contraigne, restreigne ou impose
en fonction de l’Age ; cette classification ou cat6gorie est reconnue et largement
utilis6e par tous les 16gislateurs. C’est pourquoi, parmi tous les cas possibles, il ne
s’agit pas 14 de la discrimination la plus grave et la plus pemicieuse 49 .

On doit donc exiger pour les distinctions sur la base de l’Age une justification
l’6galit6. Une cer-
moins rigoureuse que celle pour d’autres violations du droit
taine jurisprudence soutient la position inverse h savoir que tous les motifs 6nu-
m6r6s doivent 8tre soumis au m~me degr6 de protection”‘

.

143Bande d’Eastmain c. Gilpin, [1988] R.J.Q. 1987 A ]a p. 1992 (C.P.).
144Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. c. P.G. du Canada, [1987] 2 C.F. 359 A ]a p. 368,

34 D.L.R. (4th) 584 (C.F.A.).

145Andrews c. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 143 aux pp. 178-182, 56

D.L.R. (4th) 1, M. le juge McIntyre [ci-apr s Andrews cit6 aux R.C.S.].

1461bid. 4 Ta p. 166, M. le juge McIntyre.
147Ibid. aux pp. 174 et 182, M. le juge McIntyre.
1481bid. aux pp. 174-75, M. le juge McIntyre.
149Bande d’Eastmain c. Gilpin, supra, note 143 A lap. 1994 ; Silano c. A.G. of British Columbia

(1987), 16 B.C.L.R. (2d) 113, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 407 (B.C.S.C.).

’50McKinney c. University of Guelph (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 1, 46 D.L.R. (4th) 193 a la p. 234
(C.A. Ont.). Voir au meme effet le jugement de ]a Cour supreme, McKinney c. University of Guelph
(6 d6cembre 1990) (20747) (C.S.C.).

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On a jug6 que le fait d’avoir donn6 une transfusion de sang A une enfant
T~moin de J6hovah Ag6e de 12 ans sans son consentement constitue de la dis-
crimination fond6e sur l’age’51.

Cependant tout traitement diff6rent ne constitue pas de la discrimination.
Le traitement diff6rent r6serv6 aux jeunes contrevenants ne viole pas les droits
garantis par ‘article 15 car i s’agit d’un programme ayant pour but d’am6liorer
les conditions d’un groupe de personnes d6favoris6es 52.

I

II reste maintenant h savoir si les personnes atteintes de maladies g6n6-
tiques sont prot6g6es par l’article 15 qui interdit la discrimination fond6e sur les
conditions de d6ficiences mentales ou physiques. M~me si toute personne est
porteuse de g~nes d6l6t1res, la variabilit6 individuelle dans l’expression clinique
de ces g~nes fait que ‘6valuation du niveau de m6sadaptation qu’ils engendrent
se fera sur une base individuelle et m6dicale. La discrimination ne s’appliquera
donc pas h partir du nom de la maladie mais plut6t sur la mesure de m6sadap-
tation qu’elle entraime pour la personne atteinte compte tenu du contexte
social’53.

Par ailleurs, la Cour supr~me a laiss6 ouverte la possibilit6 d’ajouter d’au-

tres cat6gories pour lesquelles la discrimination sera prohib6e’ 5 .

7.

L’article 1 de la Charte

Les droits et libert6s prot6g6s ne sont pas absolus et peuvent 8tre restreints

par l’Etat.

La partie qui invoque le maintien de la restriction doit 6tablir que celle-ci
est raisonnable et que sa justification peut se d6montrer dans le cadre d’une
soci6t6 libre et d6mocratique’55. Elle doit pouvoir convaincre le tribunal que
l’objectif de la restriction A un droit ou une libert6 garanti par la Charte, est suf-
fisamment important pour en justifier la suppression 56. Un objectif est consi-
d6r6 suffisamment important s’il se rapporte des < pr6occupations urgentes et r6elles dans une soci6t6 libre et d6mocratique >> 17. I1 va sans dire que la d6tec-

151o Given the intelligence, state of mind and position taken by L., all of which were known to
(Re L.D.K., supra, note

this hospital, she ought to have been consulted before being transfused
92 4 la p. 171).

effet, R. c. W. (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 269 (B.C.S.C.).

152R. c. M.(R.C.) (1986), 36 Man. R. (2d) 252, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 116 (Man. Q.B.). Voir au m~me
I53B.M. Knoppers, Digniti humaine et patrimoine gingtique (Document d’dtude) Commission

de r6forme du droit du Canada, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1991.

154Andrews, supra, note 23.

c5R. C. Oakes, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103 aux pp. 136-37, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 [ci-apr~s Oakes cit6

aux R.C.S.].

1

Big M citd aux R.C.S.] ; Oakes, ibid. 4 la p. 138.

56R. c. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 R.C.S. 295 a la p. 352, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [ci-apr~s
‘570akes, ibid. 4 la p. 139.

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tion des maladies g6n6tiques traitables chez le nouveau-n6 constitue une
urgence compte tenu du fait que tout retard peut entramner des cons6quences
irr6versibles dans le d6veloppement d’un enfant.

En second lieu, les moyens choisis pour r6aliser ces objectifs doivent 6tre
proportionnels ou appropri6s aux fms poursuivies5 s. Un moyen est appropri6
s’il a un lien rationnel avec cet objectif, s’il est de nature A porter le moins pos-
sible atteinte au droit en question et si 1’effet de la restriction est proportionnel
A l’objectif recherchP5 9.

Cette notion de limites raisonnables se retrouve 6galement dans le Code
criminel”6. Elle se justifie par les objectifs sociaux poursuivis par le lgislateur.
Ainsi, on trouve plusieurs exemples de discrimination l6gitime en droit p6nal.
Une disposition du Code criminel pr6voyant que le consentement de la victime
de moins de 14 ans n’est pas une excuse A une accusation d’agression sexuelle
si l’accus6 est de 3 ans ou plus l’aim6 de la victime 6’ viole les droits garantis
par l’article 15. Mais le but de cette disposition est de prot~ger les jeunes per-
sonnes de l’exploitation sexuelle par des personnes plus ag6es qui peuvent exer-
cer sur elles une plus grande influence que celle exerc6e par des personnes d’h
peu pr~s le m~me age. I1 s’agit donc d’un objectif l6gitime et important qui jus-
tifie la discrimination 6 .

Le rapport entre une atteinte aux droits garantis par l’article 7, les principes
de justice fondamentale et l’article premier de la Charte a 6t6 interpr6t6 de deux
fagons 63. Selon la premiere interpr6tation, les droits garantis h l’article 7 sont
viol6s prima facie par la transgression des principes de justice fondamentale,
mais urie telle atteinte peut n~anmoins se justifier si elle respecte les exigences
de l’article premier de la Charte”‘6 . Selon la deuxi~me interpr6tation, il est inu-
tile d’avoir recours A l’article premier s’il est d6montr6 que la limite aux droits
garantis h l’article 7 viole les principes de justice fondamentale 65.

Le rapport entre l’article 8 et l’article premier n’a pas encore fait l’objet
d’une interpr6tation. II n’est pas clair qu’une fouille, une perquisition ou une
saisie abusive soit automatiquement d6raisonnable'”.

158Big M, supra, note 156 t la p. 352.
1590akes, supra, note 155 A la p. 139.
160S.R.C. 1985, c. C-46 [ci-apris Code criminel].
161Code criminel, art. 246.1(2).
162R. c. Bearhead (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 546, 22 C.R.R. 211 (Alta. Q.B.).
163Motor Vehicle, supra, note 96.
1641bid. A lap. 520, M. lejuge Lamer; Morgentaler, supra, note 95 h la p. 73, M. lejuge en chef

Dickson;

la p. 123, M. le juge Beetz; A la p. 180, Mme le juge Wilson.

165Motor Vehicle, supra, note 96 A la p. 523, Mme le juge Wilson; Guerrera c. St-Sauveur-des-
Monts (3 juin 1988), Terrebonne 700-36-000006-88 1, J.E. 88-948 (C.S.). Notons que le juge Wil-
son s’est ralli~e A la premiere interpretation dans l’arr& Morgentaler.

166Hunter, supra, note 120 aux pp. 169-70, Mme le juge Wilson.

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Ainsi, si le l6gislateur intervient en matire d’exp6rimentation, de trans-
plantation ou de traitement m6dical par rapport aux enfants ou aux incapables,
il devra tenter de concilier les droits fondamentaux des parties impliqu6es. Si
son action porte atteinte A un des droits enchass6s dans la Charte, il devra jus-
tifier cette intervention. Le principe demeure vrai meme dans le cas ott cette
atteinte prend la forme d’une < protection > et cela d’autant plus qu’elle
implique des personnes vuln6rables. A d6faut d’une justification convaincante,
les tribunaux n’h6siteront pas prot6ger les droits et libert6s de ces personnes.

C. Le droit criminel

Les lois p6nales s’appliquent h l’acte m6dical en ce qu’elles visent i pro-
t6ger la soci6t6 et t sauvegarder la vie et la sant6 de l’individu 67. Dans sa fonc-
tion de sauvegarde de la sant6 et de la vie, le Code criminel tient compte et res-
pecte certaines valeurs fondamentales dont le caract~re sacr6 de la vie, la
s6curit6 et la libert6 de la personne humaine, le droit h l’autod6termination, la
libert6 de religion et le droit de chacun au respect de sa vie priv6e.

Pour prot6ger le droit fondamental de chaque individu A la s6curit6 et h
l’inviolabilit6 de sa personne, le Code criminel pr6voit un certain nombre d’in-
fractions appel6es infractions contre la personne’68. Afm d’assurer h chacun le
respect de l’int6grit physique h laquelle il a droit, le l6gislateur a choisi d’as-
similer l’acte m6dical aux infractions comportant l’usage de la force contre la
personne d’autrui et de ce fait, h moins d’une justification l6gale expresse 169,
l’acte m6dical pourrait constituer un acte criminel. Selon les circonstances,
l’acte m6dical pourrait 6quivaloir h des voies de faits 170, t un manquement h
l’obligation de fournir les choses n6cessaires h la vie’, h des l6sions corporelles
de la n6gligence criminelle 173 ou enfm h un
caus6es intentionnellement”‘,
homicide”. Ces dispositions s’appliqueront aussi bien h l’exp6rimentation, au
pr6lvement et h la transplantation (1) qu’au traitement m6dical (2).

1.

La protection de l’int6grit physique de la personne et l’exp6rimentation

Le fait pour une personne d’appliquer intentionnellement ou par insou-
ciance t6m6raire une force sur la personne d’autrui sans le consentement de

167Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada, Le traitement midical et le droit criminel, (Docu-

ment de travail no 26) Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1980.

Code criminel, art. 45.

16SCode criminel, partie VIII.
6 9
1
170Ibid. art. 265 et 268; Malette c. Shulman (Ont. H.C.), supra, note 29.
17 1Code criminel, art. 215-216.
1721bid. art. 267.
1731bid. art. 219.
1741bid. art. 222.

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[Vol. 36

cette derni~re constitue des voies de fait”75. L’acte m6dical comporte cette inten-
tion de violence physique contre la personne d’autrui 7 6 et toute intervention
m6dicale, y compris un pr6l vement sanguin, une analyse d’urine ou l’adminis-
tration d’une substance A titre exp6rimental n6cessite l’application de la force.
En ce sens, certains actes pos6s dans le cadre d’une exp6rimentation m6dicale
constitueront, sauf justification, des voies de fait.

L’application intentionnelle de la force dans le cadre d’une exp6rimenta-
tion m6dicale ne peut constituer des voies de faits s’il y a consentement valable
de la part du sujet. De plus, en droit p6nal, un consentement est valable s’il est
soit impos6, c’est le cas par exemple lorsqu’un tribunal autorise A proc6der h
l’acte m6dical et ce, contre le gr6 du patient”7 , soit autoris6 par la loi

.

Le consentement autoris6 est essentiellement un consentement que peuvent
donner certaines personnes en vertu des pouvoirs que leur conferent des textes
de loi. Ainsi en vertu des diffrentes lois provinciales, les parents sont investis
de l’autorit6 suffisante pour consentir ou refuser que certains actes soient pos6s
sur la personne de leur enfant 79 . Cela dit, pour atre valable, le consentement
autoris6 par la loi doit r6pondre a trois conditions. Un consentement sera valable
s’il est librement donn6, s’il se rapporte a la nature de l’acte et s’il est donn6
par une personne ayant la capacit6 de consentir.

Un consentement librement donn6 est un consentement obtenu sans con-
trainte et sans fraude quant t la nature et la qualit6 de l’acte”‘8 . La fraude con-
sisterait par exemple a pr6senter l’exp6rimentation non th6rapeutique comme
une d6marche b6n6fique et n~cessaire A la gurison”‘. La contrainte pourrait
quant h elle vicier le consentement si le sujet ou la personne autoris6e A consen-
tir pour autrui est soumis ‘a une pression indue qui compromet le libre exercice
de sa volont6. En ce sens, la contrainte susceptible de vicier un consentement
peut provenir d’une personne en situation d’autorit6. L’autorit
implique un
pouvoir de contr6le, souvent disciplinaire, sur une personne dont quelqu’un a la
charge. Le Code criminel actuel reconnalt une telle autorit6 aux parents’82 et A
celui qui pratique une intervention chirurgicale”83. La question de savoir si, aux

175En mati~re de transplantation voir par exemple, D. O’Connors, <(Transplant Surgery and the Criminal Law > (1970) 3 Aust. & N.Z. J. Crim. 223, cit6 dans Commission de r6forme du droit
du Canada, supra, note 167 A la p. 120 n. 57.

relvent de la comp6tence provinciale.

’76Code criminel, art. 265.
1771nstitut Philippe Pinel de Montrial c. Dion, [1983] C.S. 438.
78Le Code criminel est muet quant au consentement impos6 ou autoris6. La plupart de ces cas
179Ci-dessous, partie D. Le droit provincial.
80Code criminel, art. 265(3).
’81 Par analogie avec l’affaire R. c. William Case (1850), 4 Cox C.C. 220, oa il s’agissait d’une
infraction sexuelle commise sous pr6texte d’un traitement m6dical. La fraude consistait alors hi
avoir pr~sent6 A la patiente l’acte comme une mesure n~cessaire et b6n6fique lt sa gudrison.

1

1

’82Code criminel, art. 43.
‘ 3 bid. art. 45.

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fins du droit criminel, le chercheur qui procde une exp6rimentation sur une
personne humaine est ce qu’il convient d’appeler une personne en situation
d’autorit6 reste A l’heure actuelle sans r6ponse’84.

Pour atre valable, le consentement h 1’exprimentation doit 6galement se
rapporter h la nature de l’acte et l’objet de celui-ci dolt 8tre connu du sujet.
Comme l’a sugg&6 une auteure, celui qui proc~de a une exp6rimentation sur
une personne humaine devrait r6v61er au sujet tous les risques possibles ratta-
ch~s a l’exp~rimentation afm d’6viter d’engager sa responsabilit6 criminelle”‘8 .
La m~me prudence s’impose h notre avis quant h l’information que le chercheur
la personne qui consent h ce qu’une exp6rimentation soit pra-
devrait foumir
tiqu6e sur 1’enfant.

Enfm, seul le consentement donn6 par une personne capable constitue un
consentement valable A l’application de la force. Le Code criminel ne traite pas
du consentement des personnes mineures aux voies de fait’86 , mais il se d6gage
de la jurisprudence qu’un consentement ne peut 6tre valable si celui qui donne
son autorisation n’est pas h m~me de comprendre la nature de l’acte’87 .

Dans l’6tat actuel du droit p6nal canadien, le consentement a donc g6n6ra-
lement pour effet de 16galiser une atteinte h l’int6grit6 corporelle de 1’enfant. II
semble donc qu’il ne puisse y avoir voles de fait si l’enfant est capable de com-
prendre la nature de l’acte ou, dans le cas oa il est incapable d’en comprendre
la nature, si son repr6sentant 16gal consent librement a ce que la force lui soit
administr6e”‘8 . Le consentement d’une personne capable de comprendre est
valable en droit criminel et constitue une premiere ligne de protection pour la
personne mineure. Par contre, le Code criminel est muet quant aux types d’at-

I’4Voir Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 167 A lap. 10. 11 faut n6anmoins
constater que le droit ne consid~re pas h l’heure actuelle le personnel m6dical comme des per-
sonnes exergant une autorit6 et malgr6 la d6pendance qui peut caractdriser la relation m6decin
patient, il est impossible d’imputer au m6decin une position d’autorit6 16gale. I1 nous apparait donc
douteux qu’un chercheur puisse 8tre consid6r6 comme une personne en situation d’autorit6 par rap-
port au sujet participant A 1’exp6rimentation et, de ce fait, puisse exercer la contrainte susceptible
de vicier un consentement.

85C.L. Levy, The Human Body and the Law: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Human
Experimentation, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1983 h ]a p. 23. Cette auteure pr6ecise
cependant que la possibilit6 de poursuite au criminel en rapport avec une experimentation est illu-
soire puisque l’ttat exerce un contrile de plus en plus important sur les modalit6s de l’exp6rimen-
tation sur l’tre humain.

18611 est int&essant de noter qu’en Angleterre, la capacit6 de comprendre la nature de l’acte envi-
sag6 est express6ment exig6e. Si 1’enfant n’est pas en mesure de comprendre la nature de l’acte,
son consentement ne peut 8tre consid6r6 comme valable. Voir h cet effetBurrell c. Harmer (1966),
[1967] Crim. L.R. 169, 116 New L.J. 1658 cit6 dans Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada,
supra, note 167 A la p. 23 n. 79.

187Bolduc and Bird c. R. [1967] R.C.S. 677, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 82.
ISSSi l’on suppose que le consentement d’une personne dou6e de compr6hension est valable aux
fins du droit criminel, le fait de proc6der h une exp6rimentation en d6pit du refus du sujet capable
de comprendre devrait normalement engager ]a responsabilit6 criminelle du chercheur.

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teintes h l’int6grit6 corporelle pour lesquelles un consentement constitue une
d6fense valable. En mati~re d’exp6rimentation certaines difficult6s peuvent de
ce fait survenir. Doit-on accepter le consentement comme une d6fense valable
lorsque le but poursuivi est lui-m~me ill6gal ou immoral ? I1 est certains usages
de la force auxquels la common law britannique interdit de consentir’89. Ainsi,
le consentement h l’acte n’a aucun effet si des lesions corporelles sont la con-
s6quence probable des voies de fait. << L6sion corporelle >> s’entend alors de tout
ce qui porte atteinte i la sant6 ou au bien-etre physique de la victime et qui n’est
pas simplement passager. Comment concilier cette position avec la r6alisation
de protocoles de recherche ? En effet, le but poursuivi par l’exp6rimentation
n’est pas toujours de procurer au sujet un bienfait ou un b6n6fice qui lui soit
propre puisque certaines recherches sont men6es afm d’augmenter le champ des
connaissances scientifiques. La doctrine canadienne a pris position et 6carte
cette r~gle de droit anglais”90 . De l’avis de la Commission de r6forme du droit
du Canada, la soci6t6, par l’intermdiaire des tribunaux, doit garder un certain
contr6le sur ce qu’elle peut juger humainement acceptable et A cette fin elle pro-
pose deux solutions. Une premiere solution consiste A cr6er des moyens de
d6fense sp6cifiques A l’administration d’un traitement de fagon A faire contre-
poids h l’inclusion de cette administration dans la cat6gorie g6n6rale des infrac-
tions contre la personne. La seconde solution avanc~e par la Commission serait
la cr6ation d’une infraction sp6cifique portant sur l’administration fautive du
traitement m6dical’ 91.

Par ailleurs, il y a consentement impos6 lorsqu’une loi ou une d6cision
judiciaire autorise l’acte m6dical en l’absence d’un consentement de la part du
sujet ou malgr6 le refus de celui-ci ou de ses repr6sentants 16gaux. La principale
question qui se pose alors est de savoir s’il est possible d’obtenir l’autorisation
judiciaire de procgder h une exp6rimentation m6dicale sur un sujet humain et
plus pr6cisdment, sur la personne d’un mineur ou d’un incapable.

Dans le cas d’un mineur, il est clairement 6tabli que le consentement du
titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale doit 8tre obtenu pour foumir h l’enfant les soins
m6dicaux qu’exige son 6tat g2. Toutefois, le tribunal peut substituer son opinion
h celle des parents lorsqu’un texte de loi le lui permet 93 ou, en l’absence d’un
tel texte, par l’application de la doctrine du parens patriae. Soulignons cepen-
dant que les textes de loi qui autorisent le tribunal
substituer son opinion I
celle des parents ne s’appliquent qu’en mati~re de traitement m6dical et non en
mati~re d’exp6rimentation.

189Commission de r~forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 167 A Ta p. 23.
’90Ibid. a ]a p. 24.
991Ibid. aux pp. 106-107.
’92Voir ci-dessous, partie D. Le droit provincial.
193Par exemple, Loi stir la protection de la santa publique, L.R.Q. c. P-35, art. 42.

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501

Quant

la porte de la notion de parens patriae, elle fut examinee dans
l’affaire Re Eve. En rendant son jugement, la Cour supreme du Canada 6nonce
que la competence de parens patriae n’autorise pas le tribunal A permettre un
acte m6dical h des fins non th6rapeutiques. De plus, l’honorable juge LaForest
rappelle que la comp6tence parens patriae ne peut etre utilis6e qu’h l’avantage
des personnes atteintes de d6ficiences et ce, pour les prot6ger. Par cons6quent,
il semble peu probable que le tribunal, en vertu de sa comp6tence parens
patriae, autorise une exp6rimentation chez un enfant ou un incapable 94 .

Cela 6tant 6tabli, il nous faut v6rifier si, en regard du droit criminel, le trai-

tement m6dical est r6gi de la meme fagon que l’exp6rimentation.

2.

La protection de l’int~grit6 physique de la personne et le traitement
m6dical

Le Code criminel impose aux parents et aux tuteurs en mesure de le faire,
l’obligation de fournir aux enfants ag6s de moins de seize ans les choses n6ces-
sakes h l’existence 95. Les parents ou tuteurs qui manquent A cette obligation
sans excuse 16gitime, engagent leur responsabilit6 criminelle si, par suite de ce
manquement, l’enfant se trouve dans le d6nuement ou le besoin ou encore si
l’omission met en danger la vie de l’enfant ou compromet sa sant6 de fa9on per-
manente. La meme obligation incombe h toute personne qui a t sa charge une
personne incapable 9 6. L’h6pita’ 97 , le m~decin 19 s et le personnel infirmier sont
donc tenus de founir les choses n6cessaires h l’existence h une personne inapte
h se les procurer elle-m~me. Ceux-ci engagent leur responsabilit6 criminelle si,
conscients de la n6cessit6 d’agir, ils omettent de le faire sans excuse 16gitime 99
et mettent de ce fait en danger la vie ou compromettent de fagon permanente la
sant6 de la personne h leur charge2 .

Le Code criminel ne d6finit pas l’expression << les choses n6cessaires t l'existence >>20. La jurisprudence par contre offre plusieurs exemples de choses
n6cessaires h l’existence ; elles comprennent notamment les traitements et les

194Supra, note 114 A la p. 431.
19 5Code criminel, art. 215(1)a) Voir Tutton, supra, note 94; R. c. Brown et Urbanovich (1985),
31 M.R. (2d) 268 (C.A. Man.) [ci-apr~s Brown] ; R. c. Cyrenne, Cyrenne et Cramb (1981), 62
C.C.C. (2d) 238 (Dist. Ct Ont.) [ci-apr~s Cyrenne].

19 6Code criminel, art. 215(1)c).
19 7Voir H6pital Notre-Dame c. Patry, [1972] C.A. 579.
19SVoir Brown, supra, note 195.
19911 y a excuse 16gitime si l’accus6 nest pas en mesure de foumir les choses essentielles. Voir

Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada, supra, note 167 A la p. 26 n.105.

2Code criminel, art. 215(1)c). Un manquement A l’obligation de foumir A t’enfant les choses
essentielles h I’existence peut donner lieu A diverses condamnations en vertu du Code criminel.
Ainsi les parents, le tuteur ou encore le m6decin peuvent en th6orie 8tre reconnus coupables
d’homicide.

201Code criminel, art. 215(1).

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

soins mddicaux2 2. Toutefois, il faut s’interroger sur la possibilit6 que cette
notion de secours m6dical soit suffisamment large pour englober les th6rapies
g6niques. On pourrait ainsi exiger, entre autres des parents, qu’ils aient recours
h ces mesures exceptionnelles pour assurer la qualit6 du mat6riel g6n6tique
transmis ii leur prog6niture2 3.

Etant donn6 que les lois r6gissant la pratique m6dicale sont de juridiction
provinciale, il est essentiel de poursuivre notre analyse du droit canadien en exa-
minant le droit en vigueur dans chaque province ou territoire.

D. Le droit provincial

Dans cette section de l’6tude d6volue aux lois provinciales ou territoriales,
nous d6butons notre survol en consid6rant le droit applicable h l’exp6rimenta-
tion (1) pour nous attarder ensuite aux dons de tissus et A la transplantation entre
vivants (2). Nous compl6terons notre analyse en traitant des contr6les propres
aux soins de sant6 prodigu6s aux enfants et aux incapables (3).

1.

L’exp6rimentation

En mati~re d’exp6rimentation, seul le l6gislateur qu6b6cois a adopt6 des
dispositions particuli~res applicables aux enfants2″. Ce texte 16gislatif205 ne dis-
tingue pas entre 1’exp6rimentation i vis~e th6rapeutique et celle de nature non
th6rapeutique.

Dans un premier temps, le l6gislateur 6nonce le principe de l’inviolabilit6
de la personne et prescrit l’obligation d’obtenir le consentement de la personne
son int6grit6 physique’ 6. Par la suite, le l6gislateur 6tablit
pour porter atteinte
l’exp6rimentation2″. Soucieux
les r~gles permettant au majeur de participer

20 2R. c. Brooks (1902), 9 B.C.R. 13,5 C.C.C. 372 (B.C.S.C.) ; Cyrenne, supra, note 195 ; Tutton,

supra, note 94.

traitement m~dical de l’enfant et de l’incapable.

203Pour une discussion de cette hypoth~se, voir ci-dessus, patie A.2. Le droit international-Le
204J.-L. Baudouin, < L'exp6rimentation sur les humains : un conflit de valeurs 205C.c.B.-C., art. 20 qui se lit comme suit: R.D. McGill 809. (1980-81) 26 Le majeur peut consentir par 6crit h l'ali~nation entre vifs d'une partie de son corps ou A se soumettre A une exp6rimentation, pourvu que le risque couru ne soit pas hors de proportion avec le bienfait qu'on peut en esp~rer. Le mineur dou6 de discemement le peut 6galement avec l'autorisation d'un juge de 'autorit6 parentale a condition Ia Cour sup6rieure et le consentement du titulaire de qu'il n'en r~sulte pas un risque s6rieux pour sa sant6. L'ali6nation doit atre gratuite h moins que son objet ne soit une partie du corps sus- Le consentement doit etre donnd par dcrit; il peut &re pareillement r~voqu6. ceptible de r6g6ndration. 2061bid. art. 19. 20 71bid. art. 20(1). 1991] LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNITIQUE 503 d'accorder une protection particuli~re aux enfants dou6s de discernement, il ins- taure un contr6le plus rigoureux pour eux. Ainsi, en plus de la permission des parents, l'autorisation du tribunal est requise0 s. Compte tenu du libelI6 de l'article 20 Code civil du Bas Canada, l'enfant non dou6 de discemement2 9 tel celui en tr~s bas Age ou le nourisson, ne peut participer t un protocole de recherche et ce, m~me si l'autorisation des parents peut 8tre obtenue. Les incapables sont 6galement exclus de la r6alisation d'ex- p6rimentations car ils sont priv6s de la capacit6 de consentir et ne peuvent vala- blement adh6rer h un contrat2 . Or, l'enr6lement h un protocole de recherche est un contrat. Le l6gislateur n'a pr6vu aucun m6canisme, comme assimilable cette situation. c'est le cas pour l'enfant dou6 de discernement, pour pallier L'entrde en vigueur du projet de loi 20 portant r6forme au Code civil du Bas-Canada' modifiera cette situation"'. L'incapable et l'enfant pourront alors l'exp6rimentation sans que r6f6rence ne soit faite h leur capacit6 de participer consentement. L'autorisation du repr6sentant 16gal et du tribunal est requise 3. Soulignons que le refus du mineur de quatorze ans fait obstacle h l'exp6rimen- tation 14. De plus, le tribunal dans son appreciation de la situation doit recueillir l'avis de la personne concem6e, A savoir l'6ventuel sujet, et respecter, sauf motif grave, son refus" 5. Par la mise en place de ce m6canisme de contr6le, le 16gis- notion de < dou6 de discemement >> laisse beaucoup de latitude au tribunal.

201t bid. art. 20.
2gComme nous le verrons en examinant l’application de cet article au cas du don d’organes, Ia
210Art. 986 C.c.B.-C.
2HP.L. 20, supra, note 36.
212R.P. Kouri, Le consentement aux soins m6dicaux

la lumi~re du projet de loi 20 >> (1988)

18 R.D.U.S. 27 A lap. 37 ; E. Deleury, << La protection des incapables et la r6forme du Code civil >>
(1988) 18 R.D.U.S. 57.

2 13 .L. 20, supra, note 36, art. 18 qui se lit comme suit:

Le majeur peut ali6ner entre vifs une partie de son corps ou se soumettre une exp6-
rimentation, pourvu que le risque couru ne soit pas hors de proportion avec le bienfait
esp~r6.

Le titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale, le tuteur ou le curateur peut, sous la meme con-
dition et s’il est autoris6par le tribunal, consentir une alienation ou 4 une exp6rimen-
tation qui concerne un mineur ou un majeur inapte consentir. Cependant, le refus du
mineur de quatorze ans fait obstacle A toute alienation ou exp6rimentation (nos
soulignements).

2 14 1bid.
2 15 1bid. art. 19 qui se lit comme suit:

Le tribunal qui doit statuer sur une demande d’autorisation relative h l’ali6nation
‘avis d’experts, du
d’une partie du corps, h des soins ou A une exp6rimentation, prend
titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale, du tuteur ou du curateur et du conseil de tutelle ; il peut
aussi prendre l’avis de toute personne qui manifeste un int6r& particulier pour la per-
sonne conceme par Ia demande.

II doit aussi, sauf impossibilitd, recueillir l’avis de la personne concem6e et, t moins

d’un motif grave, respecter son refus.

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[Vol. 36

lateur qu6b6cois veut permettre l’avancement des recherches m6dicales, ce qui
inclut vraisemblablement les th6rapies g6niques, tout en assurant une protection
ad6quate aux plus vuln6rables tels les enfants et les incapables, de meme que
le respect de leur dignit6.

Dans les provinces de common law, seule la Saskatchewan a express6ment
prdvu une interdiction de soumettre les patients involontaires h l’exp6rimenta-
tion 1
216

En absence de dispositions l6gislatives, c’est grace i sa comp6tence de
parens patriae que le tribunal pourrait intervenir. En se r6f6rant i la d6cision de
la Cour supreme du Canada dans l’affaire Re Eve, il est possible de croire que
le tribunal n’autorisera pas l’exp6rimentation ? vis6e non th6rapeutique. En
effet, l’honorable juge LaForest a d6clar6 que la comp6tence parens patriae ne
peut 6tre utilis6e qu’ l’avantage des personnes atteintes de d6ficiences et non
pas des autres2 17. Par cons6quent, la participation d’un incapable A un protocole
de recherche qui ne lui rapporte rien personnellement mais qui pourrait 6ven-
tuellement aider le traitement de personnes atteintes de la meme maladie ne
serait pas autoris6e. C’est l’effet direct et imm6diat qui est consid6r6 par le
tribunal.

Ainsi, dans l’6tat actuel du droit provincial, la participation des enfants et
des incapables h l’exp6rimentation est relativement r6duite meme si, a certains
6gards, elle peut &re profitable quand les maladies vis6es par les protocoles de
recherche ne se rencontrent que dans ces segments de la population.

2.

Le don de tissus entre vivants et la transplantation

Contrairement i la situation pr6valant pour l’exp6rimentation, les pro-
vinces de common law ont jug6 bon de 16gif6rer en ce qui a trait aux dons d’or-
la transplantation218. Cette prise de position est sans aucun doute
ganes et
reli6e au nombre croissant de transplantations r6alis6es, de greffes r6nales
notamment’t 9.

216 Mental Health Services Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. M-13.1, art. 25(5).
2 17Supra, note 114

la p. 427:

Bien que ]a port6e ou le cadre d’utilisation de ]a comp6tenceparenspatriae puisse etre
illimitd, il n’en dfeoule absolument pas que le pouvoir discr6tionnaire de 1’exercer soit
illimit6. […] Le pouvoir discr6tionnaire doit 8tre exerc6 A l’avantage de cette personne
mais pas pour celui des autres.

218B. Sneiderman, < Organ and Tissue Donation" dans B. Sneiderman, J.C. Irvine et P. H. Osborne, 6d., Canadian Medical Law, Toronto, Carswell, 1989, 209. Soulignons que lors de la Confdrence sur l'uniformisation des lois au Canada le texte d'une l6gislation commune en regard des dons de tissus fut adopt6 (Loi uniforme sur le don de tissus, Confdrence sur l'uniformisation des lois du Canada, actes de la 71e r6union annuelle, Yellowknife, aoflt 1989, 22-9). 219Transplantations effectu~es au Canada en 1985/projetdes en 1990: rein : 737/1248 ; coeur et coeur poumons respectivement, rein: 15/1 ; coeur et coeur poumons: 20/1 ; moelle osseuse: 1991] LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNtTIQUE 505 La majorit6 des provinces canadiennes22 excluent la participation des mineurs et des incapables aux dons entre vifs de tissus autres que le sang, la peau, les os et les tissus susceptibles de r6g6n6ration grace it un processus natu- rel". Un facteur qui distingue ces diff6rentes l6gislations est la limite d'age fixe pour consentir a un tel don. Par exemple, l'Ontario permet A un adolescent de 16 ans de consentir un don de tissu en vue d'une transplantation222 alors que la Colombie-Britannique requiert que la personne ait atteint l'age de 19 ans2 3. Soulignons que ces lois relatives a la transplantation furent promulgu6es en vue des transplantations de reins. Ainsi, compte tenu des exclusions faites dans le cadre de la d6f'mition du terme tissu 24, ces textes 16gislatifs semblent peu sus- ceptibles d'application a la th6rapie g6nique ou encore h d'autres types de trans- plantation. Par ailleurs, grace aux techniques de laboratoire disponibles, il peut s'av6rer possible d'effectuer le d6pistage g6n6tique a partir de ces 616ments exclus. Or, en ce qui a trait aux dons de tissus susceptibles de r6g6n6ration grace un processus naturel, 616ment exclu de la d6finition de tissu, les principes de common law retrouvent leur application. II est int6ressant de noter que le 16gislateur du Nouveau-Brunswick ne fait aucune r6f~rence au consentement du donneur dans sa l6gislation relative a la transplantation entre vifs'. Par contre, la province du Manitoba a adopt6, en 1987, une loi qui 6tablit un contr6le de plus en plus rigoureux en fonction de l'age du donneur et de la finalit6 du don226. Ainsi, la personne de 18 ans et plus ne peut donner, pour des fins de recherches m6dicales, que des tissus suscep- tibles de r6g6n6ration227. Quant A la personne ag6e entre 16 et 18 ans, elle ne peut consentir a donner un tissu en vue d'une transplantation que si la r6alisa- 1.5/1 ; foie: 5/1 (Sant6 et Bien-ttre Social Canada, Centre de transplantation d'organes vitaux Guide, Ottawa, Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1988 4 la p. 6). 22Alberta, Colombie-Britannique, le du Prince-Edouard, Nouvelle-Ecosse, Ontario, Saskatche- 221Par exemple, Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, art. 3(1) qui se lit comme suit: wan, Terre-Neuve. Any adult person who is mentally competent to consent and is able to make a free and informed decision may in a writing signed by him consent to the removal forthwith from his body of the tissue specified in the consent and its implantation in the body of another living person (nos italiques). De meme que l'art. 2 qui prescrit: < A transplantation from one living human body to another living human body may be done in accordance with this Act, but not otherwise >> (nos itali-
ques).

2″Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 210 mod. par Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment

Act, S.O. 1986, c. 64, art. 19.

2 23Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 187, art. 3.
224 A titre d’exemple, Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. H-12, art. 1(b) qui se lit comme
suit: < (b) 'tissue' includes an organ, but does not include any skin, bone, blood, blood constituent or other tissue that is replaceable by natural processes of repair [...] . 2-'Loi sur les tissus humains, L.R.N.-B. 1973, c. H-12. 226Loi sur les tissus humains, L.M. 1987-88, c. 39. 227 1bid. art. 9. McGILL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36 tion de l'intervention satisfait aux trois conditions suivantes : un m~decin doit certifier la capacit6 de l'adolescent A comprendre la nature et les effets de l'op6- ration autoris6e par le consentement, le b6n6ficiaire de la transplantation doit 8tre un membre de la famille imm6diate du donneur et enf'm, le pore, la m~re ou le tuteur du donneur doit consentir A la transplantation 8. Dans le cas d'un enfant de moins de 16 ans, les exigences sont encore plus consid6rables et cer- taines conditions s'ajoutent A celles d6jh pos6es pour l'adolescent. Le tissu donn6 doit 8tre susceptible de r6g6n6ration, le receveur doit 8tre dans un 6tat pr6caire, le risque Ai la vie et h la sant6 du donneur doit 8tre relativement faible et enfm, la Cour du Banc de la Reine doit approuver la transplantation 29. Cette intervention du pouvoir judiciaire dans le domaine de l'ali6nation entre vifs est aussi pr6sente dans la province de Qu6bec "0 . Le Code civil diu Bas-Canada, en son article 20, exige que le consentement du mineur dou6 de discemement et celui des parents soient bonifi6s par l'autorisation d'un juge de la Cour sup6rieure. L'affaire Cayouette~' illustre bien la mise en oeuvre de cette obligation. I1 s'agit d'un jeune enfant de 5 ans chez qui l'on d6sire pr6lever de la moelle osseuse pour transplanter chez son jeune fr~re atteint de leuc~mie. Apr~s avoir 6tabli que l'enfant est dou6 de discemement et qu'il consent, le juge conclut que les risques inh6rents i l'intervention sont largement contrebalanc6s la perte de son par le choc 6motif qui perturberait le donneur potentiel suite jeune fr~re. Le juge autorise donc le pr6l vement chez 1'enfant. Rappelons que le don de tissus ne peut atre autoris6 chez le mineur non dou6 de discemement. Cela explique peut-etre la d6cision du juge de consid6rer que cet enfant de cinq ans 6tait dou6 de discemement. ,k premiere vue, le l6gislateur qu6b6cois semble 8tre tr~s lib6ral puisque l'enfant dou6 de discemement peut 8tre plus jeune que ce qui peut 8tre le cas pour toute autre 16gislation similaire. Toutefois, il faut sp6cifier que la disposi- tion qu6b6coise ne distingue pas entre les divers types de tissus impliqu6s lors de la transplantation et que, dans la majorit6 des provinces canadiennes, le texte 16gislatif relatif A la transplantation n'aurait pas eu d'application si la moelle osseuse est assimil6e A l'os. Le projet de loi 20 confirme le contr6le judiciaire en la mati~re 32. Toutefois, le l~gislateur innove en statuant que la Cour devra prendre en compte le refus de l'enfant233. 228Ibid. art. 10. 229Ibid. art. 11. 23Voir W.F. Bowker, Experimentation on Human and Gifts of Tissue: Articles 20-23 of the Civil Code>> (1973) 19 R.D. McGill 161.

23’Cayouette et Mathieu, [1987] R.J.Q. 2230 (C.S.). Voir P. Deschamps et D. Sauv6, < Aspects juridiques de la transplantation de moelle osseuse >> (1981) 16 Le m6decin du Quebec 51.

232Supra, note 36 art. 18.
2 3Ibid. art. 18-19.

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507

Une autre similitude entre la 16gislation qu6b~coise et manitobaine r6side
dans la primaut6 accord6e t l’int6rt du donneur et l’importance que revt
1’6tendue des risques encourus par le jeune donneur. Dans les deux cas, les
la sant6 du donneur doivent 6tre relativement faibles. La
risques A la vie et
transplantation de tissus peut, it certains 6gards, Atre considdr6e comme un trai-
tement exceptionnel et ainsi justifier la nature des contr6les mis en place.

II y a lieu de se demander si ces contr6les sont ad6quats lorsqu’il s’agit de
transferts de mat6riel gdn6tique. Est-il possible de concilier cette 16gislation
relative aux dons de tissus avec la situation particuli~re des th6rapies g6niques ?
L’application par analogie de ces dispositions 16gislatives laisse perplexe.
L’dtendue du contr6le sera-t-elle fonction de la nature du tissu ou de l’organe
duquel provient I’ADN ? Une telle approche peut mener A des aberrations alors
I’ADN compte
que l’objectif ultime est de garantir une protection appropri6e
tenu de l’information privil6gi6e qu’il renferme.

3.

Le traitement m6dical

Poursuivons notre 6tude en consid6rant comment ces contr6les se
modifient lorsqu’il s’agit de traitements et soins de sant6 qualifi6s d’usuels.
Tout d’abord, rappelons qu’en common law, il n’y a pas de linite d’age partir
de laquelle une personne est consid6r6e apte ou inapte A consentir h un traite-
ment m6dical. Ce qui importe, c’est qu’elle soit capable de comprendre et d’ap-
pricier la nature et les cons6quences du traitement envisag6d. A cet 6gard,
moins qu’il y ait une disposition 16gislative expresse h l’effet contraire, le droit
ne distingue pas entre les mineurs et les autres personnes ayant atteint l’Fge de
la majoritP’5. Le principe fondamental demeure l’inviolabilit6 de la personne,
qui se traduit par l’obligation d’obtenir un consentement libre et 6clair6 avant
d’entreprendre toute intervention sur le corps humain. Toutefois, le 16gislateur
pose des balises et exige le consentement des parents lorsqu’h son avis la
manoeuvre est physiquement << invasive >>.

De fagon gdn6rale, un mineur ne peut consentir seul h une intervention chi-
rurgicale. A titre d’exemple, la SaskatchewanO6 et l’Ile-du-Prince-tdouard”

231B.M. Dickens, Medico-Legal Aspects of Family Law, Toronto, Butterworths, 1979 h lap. 93
et s. ; L.E. Rozovsky et F.A. Rozovsky, Canadian Health Facilities Law Guide, Don Mills, Ont.,
CCH Canadian Limited, 1983 A la p. 1141 et s.; A. Wolfish, Consent and Young Persons >>
(1981) 2 Health L. Can. 78 ; W.F. Bowker, Minors and Mental Incompetents: Consent to Expe-
rimentation, Gifts of Tissue and Sterilization >> (1980-1981) 26 R.D. McGill 951 ; P.H. Osborne,
> dans Sneiderman, Irvine et Osborne, 6d., supra, note 218, 35 aux pp.
37-38.

235Johnston c. Wellesley Hospital (1970), [1970] 2 O.R. 103, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 139 (H.C.).
’36Hospital Standards Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. H-10 – The Hospital Standards Regulations, Sask.

Reg. 331/80, art. 55.

3 7Hospital Management Regulations (EC 574176).

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fixent A 18 ans l’Age A partir duquel une personne peut consentir h une interven-
tion chirurgicale alors que le Nouveau-Brunswick”‘, l’Ontario239 et la
Colombie-Britannique24’ optent pour I’age de 16 ans. Pour sa part, le Nouveau-
Brunswick assujettit le traitement dentaire, les proc6dures requises pour 6tablir
un diagnostic et les proc6dures A vis6e pr6ventive aux memes exigences que
l’intervention chirurgicale. La Colombie-Britannique 61argit quant A elle l’appli-
cation de sa limite d’Age aux traitements m6dical, mental et dentaire. Soucieux
de pr6server le principe de << mature minor rule >> reconnu en common law24 , le
l~gislateur de ces deux provinces 6nonce que le consentement d’un mineur de
moins de 16 ans A un traitement m6dical est aussi valable que s’il avait atteint
cet age si, de l’opinion de deux m6decins ou dentistes selon le cas, le mineur
est capable de comprendre la nature et les cons6quences du traitement m6dical
propos6 et que ce traitement et la proc6dure utilis6e est dans le meilleur int6ret
du mineur, de sa sant6 et de son bien-atre.

Ii importe de souligner que dans le cas des provinces ott le l6gislateur a
incorpor6 la limite d’age pour consentir A une intervention chirurgicale au texte
l6gislatif visant exclusivement les h6pitaux, cette limite ne s’applique qu’au
sein de telles institutions hospitalires. Par cons6quent, cette limite d’Wage n’a
plus de pertinence en cabinet priv6 et c’est la r~gle g6n6rale de common law qui
s’applique alors242. Rappelons qu’en Colombie-Britannique, la loi ne vise que le
m6decin et le dentiste243 ; par cons6quent, tout autre professionel de la sant6 est
exclu de son champ d’application.

Le consentement des parents est donc requis pour les enfants en degh de
la limite d’Age 16gale. En cas de refus de leur part, le tribunal peut intervenir et
autoriser le traitement2″. L’exemple le plus usit6 est le cas des transfusions san-
guines qui sont refus6es par les parents compte tenu de leurs convictions reli-
gieuses245.

Au Qu6bec, c’est t partir de l’age de 14 ans qu’un enfant peut obtenir, sans
l’autorisation du titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale, les soins ou traitements requis
par son 6tat de sante246. Compte tenu du libell6 du texte l6gislatif, cette mesure

2 38Loi sur le consentement des mineurs aux traitements m~dicaux, L.N.B. 1976, c. M-6.1,

art. 2.

2390. Reg. 518/88, art. 25.
24Infants Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 196, art. 16.
24’j.S.C. et C.H.C. c. Wren (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 419, 2 W.W.R. 669 (Alta C.A.).
242Rozovsky et Rozovsky, supra, note 234.
2431nfants Act, supra, note 240.
244Par exemple, via le Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 66.
245Re S.B. (1983), 36 R.F.L. (2d) 70 (C.P.Ont.) ; Re SM.B. and Children’s Aid Society of Metro-

politan Toronto (1983), 36 R.F.L. (2d) 80 (C.P.Ont.).

246Loi sur la protection de la santa publique, supra, note 193 art. 42 qui se lit comme suit:

Un dtablissement ou un m&lecin peut fournir les soins ou traitements requis par l’Ftat
de sant, d’un mineur ag6 de quatorze ans ou plus, avec le consentement de celui-ci,

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA G!NETIQUE

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s’applique tant en milieu hospitalier qu’en cabinet priv6 si, dans ce demier cas,
les soins ou traitements sont prodigu6s par un m6decin. Toutefois, le m6decin
ou l’6tablissement de sant6 a l’obligation d’aviser le titulaire de l’autorit6 paren-
tale en cas d’h6bergement de plus de douze heures ou de traitements prolon-
ges 247 . Dans le cas du mineur de moins de 14 ans, le consentement du titulaire
de l’autorit6 parentale est requis ; toutefois, advenant l’impossibilit6 d’obtenir
ce consentement ou face h un refus non justifi6 en regard de l’int6rt de l’enfant,
un juge de la Cour sup6rieure peut autoriser les soins ou les traitements24s.

En somme, pour les jeunes enfants et les nourrissons qui sont les personnes
les plus susceptibles d’8tre vis6es par les th6rapies g6niques, le consentement
des parents est requis. Toutefois, selon certains auteurs, le consentement substi-
tu6 des parents ne permet pas les interventions non th6rapeutiques comme la
recherche m6dicale249. Dans une telle hypothse, toute une portion de la popu-
lation est exclue tant que les techniques envisag6es dans le domaine de la g6ne-
tique ne seront pas consid6r6es comme un traitement m6dical.

Nous venons d’exposer les conditions requises t l’obtention d’un consen-
tement valable dans le cas d’incapacit6 de droit d6coulant de l’dge de la per-
sonne. Nous avons examin6 le cas du nourrisson, de 1’enfant et de l’adolescent.
Or, l’incapacit6 se rencontre aussi chez la personne adulte. Cette incapacit6 peut
6tre de deux types : l’incapable de droit, tel l’interdit; ou l’incapable de fait, tel
le comateux. R6cemment, certains l~gislateurs provinciaux ont d6cid6 de
prendre en consid6ration cette triste r6alit6 qu’est l’incapacit6 de fait.

La l6gislature de la Nouvelle-tcosse prit l’initiative en 1988’0. Depuis
lors, une personne majeure et capable peut mandater une personne majeure de
son choix h donner le consentement requis et les directives appropries a son
traitement m6dical dans l’6ventualit6 oii elle deviendrait inapte z ‘. La personne

sans qu’il soit n6cessaire d’obtenir le consentement du titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale;
l’tablissement ou le m6decin doit toutefois avertir le titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale
en cas d’hfbergement pendant plus de douze heures ou de traitements prolong6s.
Lorsqu’un mineur est Ag6 de moins de quatorze ans, le consentement du titulaire de
l’autorit6 parentale doit 8tre obtenu ; toutefois, en cas d’impossibilit6 d’obtenir ce con-
sentement ou lorsque le refus du titulaire de l’autorit6 parentale n’est pas justifi6 par
le meilleur int6rt de l’enfant, un juge de la Cour sup6rieure peut autoriser les soins ou
traitements.

Voir 6galement P.-A. Cr~peau, << Le consentement du mineur en mati~re de soins et traitements m6dicaux ou chirurgicaux selon le droit civil canadien >> (1974) 52 R. du B. can. 247.

247Loi sur la protection de la santi public, ibid.
24 8Couture-Jacquet c. Montreal Children’s Hospital, [1986] R.J.Q. 1221 (C.A.); Re Goyette:

Centre de services sociaux du Montrial Mitropolitain, supra, note 137.

249, Commentary on Model Consent Act >> (1981) 1 Health L. Can. 76.
250Medical Consent Act, S.N.S. 1988, c. 14.
5’Ibid. art. 2 qui se lit comme suit:

Sec. 2 [Purpose] – The purpose of this Act is to permit a person who is of the age
of majority and capable of giving consent to medical treatment or directions respecting

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ainsi d6sign6e est reconnue par les autorit6s hospitali~res comme 6tant le cura-
teur h la personne du patient252.

En modifiant la Loi sur la curatelle publique253, le l6gislateur qu6b6cois
adopte la mame approche. Depuis l’entr6e en vigueur de la Loi sur le curateur
public et modifiant le Code civil et d’autres dispositions lMgislatives54, le 15
avril 1990, il est possible pour une personne majeure et apte de choisir quel-
qu’un pour prendre en charge son avenir m6dical en cas d’inaptitude’. I1 est
maintenant 6tabli que le mandataire peut refuser ou consentir au traitement 56 et
qu’en toute circonstance, il doit agir dans le seul int6ret du patient en tenant
compte, dans la mesure du possible, des volont6s exprim6es par le mandant 25 7.
Ces dispositions 16gislatives seront d’un grand secours dans les cas de maladies
d6g6n6ratives comme la maladie d’Alzheimer ou la chor6e de Huntington255 . En
effet, les personnes porteuses ou 16g~rement atteintes peuvent dor6navant con-
fier leur avenir A une personne en qui elles ont confiance et esp6rer que les soins
seront prodigu6s en tenant compte des souhaits ant6rieurement exprim6s.

Par ailleurs, dans l’6ventualit6 oij le patient est incapable de consentir et
qu’il n’a pas d6sign6 de mandataire, le texte de loi 6tablit qui peut consentir 4

medical treatment to authorize another person of the age of majority to give that con-
sent in the future at any time when the person who gave the authorization is no longer
capable of giving such consent.

2521bid., art. 4 qui se lit comme suit:

Sec. 4 [Deemed guardianship] – A person to whom an authorization is given pursuant
to this Act is and is deemed to be a guardian for the person giving the authorization
for the purpose of giving consent to medical treatment and for that purpose is a guar-
dian pursuant to the Hospitals Act.

253L.R.Q. c. C-80.
254L.Q. 1989, c. 54.
255Art. 1701 C.c.B.-C. qui se lit comme suit:

Le mandat peut avoir pour objet l’accomplissement de toute espce d’acte juridique se
rapportant aux affaires du mandat, y compris les actes juridiques destin6s, meme prin-
cipalement, h assurer, dans l’6ventualit6 de l’inaptitude du mandant t prendre soin de
lui-meme ou I administrer ses biens, la protection de sa personne, l’administration, en
tout ou en partie, de son patrimoine et, en g6n6ral, son bien-etre moral et materiel.

256 Art. 19.1(1) C.c.B.-C. qui se lit comme suit: < Nul ne peut etre soumis sans son consente- merit I des soins, quelle qu'en soit la nature, qu'il s'agisse d'examens, de pr61 vements, de trai- tements ou de toute autre intervention >>.

257Art. 19.3 C.c.B.-C. qui se lit comme suit:

Celui qui consent It des soins pour autrui ou qui les refuse est tenu d’agir dans le seul
intdrat de cette personne en tenant compte, dans la mesure du possible, des volont6s
que cette demi~re a pu exprimer.
S’il exprime un consentement, il doit s’assurer que les soins sont b6n6fiques, malgr6
leurs effets, qu’ils sont opportuns dans les circonstances et que les risques pr6sent6s ne
sont pas hors de proportion avec le bienfait esp&r6.

258Rozovsky et Rozovsky, supra, note 234.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtN]TIQUE

511

sa placen 9. Cette personne dolt etre motiv6e par le seul int6rat du patient260 . Pour
l’aider dans sa prise de d6cision, le l6gislateur 6nonce les facteurs h prendre en
consid6ration. Ainsi les soins doivent &re b6n6fiques, opportuns dans les cir-
constances et les risques associ6s au traitement ne doivent pas 6tre hors de pro-
portion avec le bienfait esp6r6 61. Advenant un refus injustifi6 de la part du man-
dataire, le tribunal a le pouvoir d’intervenirl 6z.

La situation des personnes dites incomp~tentes de par leur 6tat de sant6
mentale est fort complexe. Tout d’abord, il n’existe pas qu’une seule cat6gorie
de malades mentaux. Ainsi, une distinction existe entre la d6ficience mentale
consecutive h la trisomie 21 et la maladie mentale telle une psychose maniaco-
d6pressive. De plus, les I6gislations des diff6rentes provinces sont h6las loin
d’6tre uniformes263 . Au surplus, elles varient selon que le patient est qualifi6 de
volontaire ou d’involontaire (cure ferm6e) et selon qu’il est hospitalis6 dans une
institution psychiatrique ou dans un h6pital g6n6ral2 4. Outre cela, la l6gislation
applicable est ambigud et cela est sans doute reli6 au fait qu’initialement le
16gislateur 6tait surtout pr6occup6 par la protection du patrimoine de
l’incapable.

Examinons, dans un premier temps, la situation lorsque le traitement m6di-
cal est r6alis6 en milieu hospitalier autre que psychiatrique. Le principe en com-
mon law est t l’effet que dans le cas des personnes majeures d6clar6es interdites
et pourvues d’un curateur priv6, c’est ce demier qui donne un consentement
valide h l’acte m6dical. Le curateur priv6 devrait alors prendre en consid6ration
les souhaits qu’aurait exprim6 son prot6g6 compte tenu de sa personnalit6, de
ses gofits et de ses aversions 265. Ce pouvoir d6cisionnel serait implicitement

259Art. 19.2 C.c.B.-C. qui se lit comme suit:

Lorsque l’inaptitude d’un majeur A consentir aux soins exig6s par son dtat de sant6 est
constat~e, le consentement est donn6 par le mandataire qu’il a d~sign6 alors qu’il 6tait
apte, par le tuteur ou le curateur. S’il n’est pas ainsi repr6sent6, le consentement est
donn6 par le conjoint, ou A d6faut de conjoint ou en cas d’empechement de celui-ci,
par un proche parent ou par une personne qui d~montre pour le majeur un int6r&t
particulier.

26Art. 19.3(1) C.c.B.-C.
261Art. 19.3(2) C.c.B.-C. Voir M. Ouellette, La loi sur le curateur public et la protection des

incapables >> (1989) 3 C.P. du N. 9.

262Art. 19.4 C.c.B.-C. qui se lit comme suit:

L’autorisation du tribunal est requise en cas d’empechement ou de refus injustifi6 de
celui qui peut consentir A des soins pour un mineur ou un majeur inapte A donner son
consentement ; elle l’est 6galement si le majeur inapte refuse cat~goriquement de rece-
voir les soins, moins qu’il ne s’agisse d’un cas d’urgence ou de soins d’hygi~ne.

263J.-L. Baudouin, La libert6 du patient devant le traitement et la mort >> dans D. Turp et G.-A.
Beaudoin, dd., Perspective canadiennes et europgennes des droits de la personne, Cowansville,
Yvon Blais, 1986, 505

264G.B. Robertson, Mental Disability and the Law in Canada, Toronto, Carswell, 1987.
265B.M. Dickens, The Role of the Family in Surrogate Medical Consent >> (1980) 1 Health L.

Ia p. 515.

Can. 49.

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[Vol. 36

inclus dans le mandat du curateur puisqu’il a la garde de la personne et doit s’as-
surer du bien-6tre de son prot6g6 comme le font les parents pour leur enfant
mineur. Toutefois, si la personne interdite est capable de comprendre la nature
et les consequences du traitement medical proposa, le curateur n’aurait plus
autorit6 pour consentir A sa place2′. Les textes de lois des diffdrentes provinces
ont, A certains 6gards, pond6r6 le pouvoir du curateur. Ainsi, en Alberta 67, le tri-
bunal reconnalt le concept de garde limitde; il fixe l’6tendue des pouvoirs du
curateur priv6. Ces pouvoirs sont 6num6rds dans le texte de loi et on y fait
expressdment r6f6rence au consentement substitu6 pour les traitements m6di-
caux26 . Par consequent, cette d6l6gation de pouvoir doit 8tre stipul6e dans le
mandat du curateur pour que ce demier puisse 1’exercer.

Par ailleurs, en Nouvelle-tcosse, le curateur ou, en son absence, un proche
un traitement hospitalier en lieu et place du patient269.
parent doit consentir
Dans 1’6ventualit6 oit personne ne peut consentir, il est possible d’obtenir une
autorisation du tribunal pour fournir un traitement medical ou chirurgica 270 . En
Saskatchewan271, en Ontario272, A l’le-du-Prince-douard2 73, et au Yukon274 le
consentement substitu6 n’est requis que pour un traitement chirurgical.

Soulignons qu’en vertu de sa juridiction de parens patriae, la Cour peut
intervenir et passer outre A la decision du curateur en ce qui a trait aux traite-
ments m6dicaux. I1 importe de rappeler que depuis l’affaire Re Eve, il est admis
que le pouvoir du curateur n’est pas absolu et que sa preoccupation premiere
doit toujours etre l’intdrt de la personne protdgde.

En vertu de la l6gislation qu6b6coise, la meme pr6occupation doit animer
le curateur. En effet, le curateur consent ou refuse le traitement en prenant en
consid6ration le seul int6r& de la personne qu’il reprdsente275 . Pour ce faire, il
doit s’assurer que les soins propos6s sont b6n6fiques, opportuns et que les

266Robertson, supra, note 264 A la p. 135.
267Dependent Adults Act, R.S.C. 1980, c. D-32.
26 1bid., art. 10(2)(h) qui se lit comme suit: << the right to consent to any health care that is in the best interests of the dependant adult >>. Par ailleurs, le terme << health care > est ddfini Ai ‘art.
1(h) et correspond A:

(i) any examination, diagnosis, procedure or treatment undertaken to prevent any
disease or ailment, (ii) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of preventing pre-
gnancy, (iii) any procedure undertaken for the purpose of an examination or a diagno-
sis, (iv) any medical, surgical, obstetrical or dental treatment, and (v) anything done
that is ancillary to any procedure, treatment, examination or diagnosis […]

269Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, art. 54(2).
2 7Ibid. art. 9(1).
2 7 1Hospitals Standards Regulations, Sask. Reg. 331/80, art. 55.
2720. Reg. 518/88, art. 25.
2 73Hospital Management Regulations (EC 574/76).
2 74Hospital Standards Regulations, Y.T.O.I.C. 1977/130, art. 72.
2 75Art. 19.3 al. 1 C.c.B.-C.

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LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNETIQUE

513

risques pr6sent6s ne sont pas hors de proportion avec le bienfait anticip6276. I1
importe de souligner que la personne inapte est consult6e et que son refus de
recevoir les soins est pris en consid6ration. En effet, dans de telles circons-
tances, le tribunal doit intervenil 77 .

En milieu psychiatrique (tant centre hospitalier que d6partement), il existe
deux cat6gories de patients. Tout d’abord, on reconnait les patients volontaires,
c’est-h-dire ceux qui, de leur propre chef, se pr6sentent pour un traitement. I1 y
a aussi le groupe des patients involontaires qui inclut les personnes sous la
bonne garde du lieutenant-gouvemeur h la suite d’une d6fense d’ali6nation
mentale278. Ce groupe inclut 6galement celles qui furent intem6es it la suite d’un
examen psychiatrique 6tablissant que la personne est un danger pour elle-meme
ou pour la socid6t et que son 6tat n6cessite un traitement.

R~gle g6n6rale, le 16gislateur reconnait la n6cessit6 d’obtenir le consente-
ment du patient volontaire ou de son repr6sentant 16gal (curateur ou le plus
proche parent279) avant d’entreprendre un traitement. On lui accorde meme dans
certains cas un droit de refusuo. Toutefois, on passe plus facilement outre A l’ob-
tention du consentement du patient involontaire lorsqu’il s’agit de traitements
reli6s h son d6sordre mental28 . Si un droit de refus est reconnu au patient invo-
lontaire, le l6gislateur pr6voit un m6canisme pour ne pas tenir compte de ce
refus quand le traitement est jug6 essentiel 2.

ttant donn6 les cons6quences potentielles, le 16gislateur pr6voit habituelle-
ment des mesures sp6ciales en ce qui conceme la psychochirurgie et les 6lectro-
chocs. En Saskatchewan le consentement de l’incapable involontaire n’est pas
requis dans le cas des 61ectrochocs ; le patient, a toutefois la possibilit6 de s’op-
poser an traitement envisag P 3. Dans cette meme province, il y a interdiction
formelle de recourir ? la psychochirurgie et au traitement exp6rimental sur des
patients involontaires2 4. Par ailleurs, en Ontario, un comit6 de r6vision peut
autoriser les traitements requis par 1’6tat de sant6 du patient involontaire? 5. Tou-
tefois, ce comit6 ne peut permettre la psychochirurgie et les 6lectrochocs5 6 .

2 76Art. 19.3 al. 2 C.c.B.-C.
277Art. 19.4 C.c.B.-C.
278Code criminel, art. 614-619.
279En Saskatchewan, il est possible pour le patient volontaire suite h l’autorisation d’un juge, de
designer une personne autre que son plus proche parent pour consentir k sa place: The Mental
Health Services Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. M-13.1, art. 26.
280Par exemple, Loi sur la santj mentale, L.R.M. 1987, c. M-110, art. 24(1); Rozovsky et

Rozovsky, supra, note 234 h la p. 6039.

28 1The Mental Health Services Act, supra, note 279, art. 25(d); Loi sur la santj mentale, ibid.

art. 24(8).

282Loi sur la santg mentale, supra, note 280 art. 25.
283Mental Health Services Regulations, R.R.S. c. M-13.1, Reg. 1, art. 14.
284Mental Health Services Act, supra, note 279, art. 25(5).
28 5Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, art. 35.
2861bid. art. 35(5).

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[Vol. 36

Cette restriction quant aux 6lectrochocs fait suite h l’affaire Re T and Board of
Review for the Western Region et al. 7 qui motiva l’intervention du 16gislateur.

Depuis le ler janvier 1990, l’Alberta ne classe plus les patients en volon-
takes et involontaires en ce qui a trait au consentement au traitement. La nou-
velle loi donne une d6finition de la competence A consentir au traitement qui
reprend les principes de common law, soit la capacit6 de comprendre la nature
du traitement suggr6 de m~me que celle d’appr6cier les cons6quences de la
d6cision prise”‘. Si le patient ne r6pond pas aux crit~res de comp6tence, son
curateur, s’il existe, ou le plus proche parent pourra donner le consentement
requis” 9 . En cas de refus tant du patient consid&6r comp6tent en vertu de l’ar-
ticle 26 de la loi que du repr6sentant du patient jug6 incomp6tent, le m~decin
traitant peut s’adresser h un comit6 qui d6cidera de la pertinence du traitement
en fonction du meilleur int6r&t du patient29 . Un 616ment important de cette nou-
velle loi est la cr6ation d’un poste de d6fenseur des patients en milieu psychia-
trique291.

Avant de clore ce survol de la 16gislation provinciale, il importe de souli-
gner 1’existence d’une d6marche chez les l6gislateurs provinciaux visant A uni-
formiser la protection accord6e aux patients involontaires. En 1988, la Loi uni-
forme sur la sant6 mentale29 fut proposee.

Pour faciliter la mise en application de cet 6ventuel texte de loi, on propose
une d6fmition particuli~re de la competence. Ainsi, une personne sera jugde
comp~tente si elle est meme de comprendre les trois 616ments suivants : son
6tat de sant6, la nature du traitement sugg~r6 et les cons6quences d’un refus ou
d’un consentement293 . Par ailleurs, on peut d6duire des autres dispositions
l’existence d’un pr&requis ; cette personne doit avoir au moins seize ans pour
6tre capable d’6valuer ad6quatement la situation294 .

217(1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 153, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 442 (H.C.).
218Mental Health Act, S.A. 1988, c. M-13.1, art. 26.
2S91bid. A l’art. 28.
29Jbid. a l’art. 29.
29 11bid. h l’art 44 et s. de meme que Alta. Reg. 310/89.
292Loi uniforme sur la santg mentale, Conf&ence sur l’uniformisation des lois au Canada, actes

de ]a 70e runion annuelle, Toronto, aofit 1988, 185.

2931bid. art. 1(2) qui se lit comme suit:

Pour les besoins du consentement pr6vu par la prsente loi, une personne jouit de toutes
ses facult6s mentales si elle est capable de comprendre l’objet du consentement qu’on
lui demande et les consequences qui peuvent r6sulter du fait qu’elle donne ou refuse
son consentement. Si le consentement a trait t un traitement propose pour ]a personne,
celle-ci jouit de toutes ses facult6s mentales si elle est capable de comprendre ]a nature
de la maladie et du traitement propos6.

2941bid., voir par exemple, art. 24(1) qui se lit comme suit:

Quiconque a atteint l’fge de seize ans, jouit apparemment de toutes ses facult6s men-
tales, et est disponible et pr& prendre la d6cision de donner ou de refuser de donner
son consentement peut donner ou refuser un consentement, pour l’application de la pr6-

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GENETIQUE

515

Ce texte prrvoit 6galement la possibilit6 pour un patient en psychiatrie qui
est ag6 d’au moins seize ans et qui est competent, de d6signer la personne qui
prendra les ddcisions i sa place advenant qu’il devienne un patient involon-
taire295. Ce pouvoir drcisionnel inclut le consentement h l’acte mrdica1296. La
ddsignation est revocable et le patient peut nommer une autre personne s’il
satisfait toujours au crit~re de la comp6tence297.

Dans 1’6ventualit6 oii un consentement est requis et qu’un mrdecin 6tablit
l’incomp6tence d’un patient involontaire, 1’6ventuel texte 16gislatif pr6voit une
liste de personnes qui pourront donner ce consentement si le patient ne s’est pas
prrvalu de la possibilit6 de designer un mandataire298. La hirrarchie proposde
doit 8tre respectre299. Advenant un conflit parmi les personnes d’une mme
classe, le mddecin peut demander au Comit6 de r6vision de trancher s’il s’agit
d’une decision relative A un traitement. Par ailleurs, pour s’assurer de la repre-
sentativitd du membre de la famille qui souhaite intervenir dans la prise de ddci-
sion, il faut que cette personne ait entretenu des contacts personnels avec le
patient dans les douze mois prrcrdant son intervention”‘. Ce crit~re se justifie
par la ndcessit6 pour le reprrsentant du patient de respecter les souhaits expri-
mrs par ce dernier alors qu’il 6tait competent et ag6 d’au moins seize ans32.
En l’absence de tels souhaits, le reprrsentant du patient devrait prendre la drci-
sion dans le meilleur intdrt du patient. En vue d’6tablir ce meilleur intdrt, le

sente loi, au nom d’un malade en cure obligatoire d’un 6tabIissement psychiatrique qui
n’a pas atteint l’Age de seize ans ou qui ne jouit pas de toutes ses facult~s mentales.
La personne qui donne un consentement au nom d’une autre personne doit appartenir
t l’une des categories suivantes :
1. Le tuteur du malade nomm6 par un tribunal competent.
2. La personne nommre en vertu de ]a prsente loi pour prendre des decisions au nom
du malade.
3. Une personne qui vit avec le malade dans une union conjugale.
4. L’enfant du malade, le p~re ou la mre du malade ou une personne qui est 16gitime-
ment en droit de remplacer le p~re ou la m~re du malade.
5. Le fr~re ou ]a soeur du malade.
6. Un autre parent du malade.

2951bid. art. 19(1) qui se lit comme suit:

Le malade d’un 6tablissement psychiatrique qui a au moins seize ans et qui jouit de
toutes ses facultrs mentales pour ce faire a le droit de nommer par 6crit une personne
qui prend des decisions, pour l’application de la prsente loi, en son nom pendant qu’il
est un malade en cure obligatoire.

296Ibid. art. 25(1).
2971bid. art. 19(5).
29 tIbid. art. 24(1).
2991bid. art. 24(2), (3).
30Ibid. art. 26()().
3Ibid. art. 24(4)(a).
321bid. art. 24(5).

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[Vol. 36

texte 6nonce les param~tres dont il faut tenir compte dans le processus d6ci-
sionnel 3.

En cas de refus de la part du patient de se soumettre h un traitement psy-
chiatrique ou t des soins relies A son 6tat de sant6 mentale, le m~decin ne pourra
procdder, m~me avec l’autorisation du reprdsentant du patient, h moins qu’un
second mddecin corrobore l’opinion du mrdecin traitant h l’effet que le patient
est incapable de consentir au traitement3 . Le mddecin traitant a aussi la possi-
bilit6 de s’adresser au Comit6 de rdvision si le patient ou son reprdsentant refuse
un traitement psychiatrique ou un traitement reli6 au traitement psychiatrique 3 .
Ce Comit6 interviendra aussi si le patient n’a pas de reprrsentant et qu’il est soit
qualifi6 d’involontaire et d’incomp6tent, soit ag6 de moins de seize ans306. L’au-
torisation du Comit6 de rdvision doit, entre autres, faire mention de la p6riode
pendant laquelle sa decision est effective 3″.

Soulignons que, dans sa forme actuelle, ce texte l6gislatif ne prdvoit pas de
mesures particuli~res pour des traitements tels la psychochirurgie ou les
6lectrochocs.

I1 est intdressant de noter une 6volution dans la classification des patients
en milieu psychiatrique. Toutefois, l’existence d’un contr6le institutionnel
illustre une attitude timorde face aux d6cisions prises par le malade ou son
reprrsentant. I1 faut se questionner sur la qualification qui sera donnre au pr6-
lvement de matdriel gdnrtique et aux traitements qui en d6coulent. Seront-ils
assimilds aux traitements mrdicaux usuels ou peut-on croire plut6t qu’ils seront
inclus dans la classe des interventions extraordinaires telles la psychochirurgie
et les 6lectrochocs ? De cette classification drcouleront les caractristiques du
consentement requis et 1’6tendue de son contr6le.

3031bid. art. 24(6) qui se lit comme suit:

Afin d’6tablir I’int~rt vrritable du malade en ce qui conceme le traitement psychia-
trique et l’autre traitement m6dical connexe precis, il faut tenir compte de ce qui suit :
a) ]a question de savoir si le traitement psychiatrique prdcis permettra ou permettra pro-
bablement d’am~liorer dans une grande mesure l’6tat mental du malade;
b) la question de savoir si l’6tat mental du malade s’am~liorera ou s’amliorera proba-
blement s’il ne suit pas le traitement psychiatrique precis;
c) la question de savoir si les avantages prrvus du traitement psychiatrique et de l’autre
traitement medical connexe precis l’emportent sur le risque d’effets n~fastes sur le
malade;
d) la question de savoir si le traitement psychiatrique precis est le traitement le moins
contraignant et le moins perturbateur qui satisfait aux exigences des alinras a), b) et c).

3 1Ibid. art. 25(3).
3051bid. art. 26(1)(a).
3 1 bid. art. 26(1)(b).
371bid. art. 26(4).

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNtTIQUE

517

E. Les lignes directrices canadiennes

Comme nous avons pu le constater, le droit canadien tant constitutionnel,
criminel que provincial ne vise pas sp~cifiquement la mise en oeuvre de la th6-
rapie g~nique et ses repercussions sur la population canadienne. Devant ce
silence, les milieux scientifique et medical ont d~cid6 de se pencher sur cette
question. ls se sont interrog6s sur les mesures adopter pour assurer la protec-
tion de la population canadienne tout en permetttant le d~veloppement des con-
naissances. Le fruit de leur rdflexion a donn6 lieu divers documents que nous
examinerons selon l’ordre chronologique de leur publication. Nous d6buterons
donc par les premieres lignes directrices 6mises par le Conseil de recherches
m6dicales du Canada en 1978308.

En publiant ce rapport, le Conseil de recherches m6dicales du Canada vou-
lait s’assurer que tout projet de recherche qu’il subventionnerait rdpondrait aux
normes 6thiques les plus 6lev6es. C’est pourquoi ces lignes directrices traitent
principalement de l’6thique en mati~re de recherche et reprennent
leur compte
les grands principes 6nonc6s dans les documents intemationaux comme le Code
de Nuremberg et la Diclaration d’Helsinki. Le rapport traite, entre autres, de la
recherche avec des sujets humains dont la capacit6 h donner un consentement
est r6duite ou inexistante. Cette situation est h ce point complexe que les
membres du Groupe de travail n’ont pu en arriver h un consensus. La position
minoritaire 6tait h l’effet d’interdire toute recherche qui ne b6n6ficierait pas
directement au sujet non apte h donner un consentement, par exemple aux
enfants et aux incapables. Tous 6taient cependant d’accord pour exiger, dans un
premier temps, le consentement des parents ou du repr6sentant 16gal de 1’enfant
ou de l’incapable. Le refus de ces personnes devait obligatoirement exclure
l’6ventuel sujet du protocole de recherche. Dans le cas d’un accord, le Groupe
de travail proposait la cr6ation d’un second niveau de contr6le: l’avocat du
sujet ou un d6fenseur des droits de l’homme. Ce dernier, affili6 au centre hos-
pitalier oia se d6roulerait la recherche, devait lui aussi consentir. Cette seconde
6tape du processus menant i l’obtention du consentement 6tait modul6e selon
le niveau de compr6hension de l’6ventuel sujet. Par ailleurs, le Groupe de tra-
vail insistait pour respecter le refus du sujet, quelle que soit la fagon qu’il mani-
feste ce d6sir.

Ayant constat6 l’existence de certaines lacunes, notamment en regard du
contr6le exerc6 sur le d6roulement de la recherche, le Conseil de recherches
m6dicales du Canada d6cide de r6viser ses lignes directricesc 9. En 1987, il pr6-
sente h la communaut6 scientifique et m6dicale une nouvelle version de ses exi-
gences”‘. II est int6ressant de noter que cette fois-ci le Conseil distingue le cas

30sSupra, note 40.
3gVoir R. Birenbaum, < MRC Issues Ethics Guidelines >> (1987) Hosp. Products & Tech. 17.
310Supra, note 39.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

des enfants de celui des personnes majeures incapables. En ce qui conceme la
protection particuli~re accord6e aux enfants et aux incapables, la distinction
majeure entre les deux versions r6side dans la disparition de la seconde 6tape
dans le processus d’obtention du consentement3 . Le nouveau texte ne fait nul-
lement r6f6rence h ce contr6le ext6rieur au milieu familial. Cons6quemment, ou
en r6action h la ddcision de la Cour supreme du Canada dans l’affaire Re Eve,
le Conseil restreint la notion de risques auxquels peut etre expos6 un enfant.
Ainsi le seuil applicable est celui des risques de la vie courante. De plus, les pr6-
lvements effectuds sur l’enfant ne doivent occasionner aucune douleur ou gene
< au-delh de certaines limites pr6cis6ment d6finies >32. Bien que dans cette nou-
velle version, il semble y avoir un consensus sur la possibilit6 de recourir aux
enfants dans le cadre de la recherche, les crit~res foumis pour 6valuer les risques
constituent dans les faits, une n6gation de cette possibilit6. Paradoxalement, une
telle conception de la notion de risque pourrait exclure toute manipulation sur
la personne de l’enfant; seules les 6tudes sur dossier semblent demeurer pos-
sibles. Une telle interprdtation expose les maladies infantiles A devenir des
maladies orphelines de la science m6dicale.

Nanmoins, le Conseil a reconnu l’importance de la notion d’assentiment
et rappelle que les voeux de l’enfant doivent etre respect6s et ce, malgr6 le con-
sentement des parents. De plus, il pr6conise une attitude lib6rale pour les ado-
lescents qui peuvent comprendre mais qui ne peuvent l6galement consentir. En
invoquant un droit h la confidentialit6, le Conseil laisse entendre que l’on pour-
rait, dans leur cas, passer outre
l’obligation d’obtenir le consentement des
parents.

Dans le cas des adultes mentalement incapables, le Conseil commence par
r6affirmer l’obligation de respecter la dignit6 de la personne humaine et, par
cons6quent, l’interdiction de soumettre ces personnes des pratiques suscep-
tibles de les humilier ou d’accentuer leur d6pendance 313. De plus, on soul~ve
le probl~me des personnes incapables de fait de meme que celui des personnes
en institution sans vraiment y apporter de solution. Le Conseil demande d’etre
tr~s vigilant lors de la d6marche en vue d’obtenir un consentement. Le membre
de la famifle consult6 n’est peut-atre plus au courant des d6sirs de l’6ventuel
sujet. Le Conseil rappelle lobligation d’obtenir l’autorisation du tribunal
lorsque le protocole de recherche comprend des manoeuvres < invasives et qui ne sont pas directement bdn6fiques au sujet. En somme, dans cette deuxi~me version, le Conseil de recherches m6di- cales du Canada 61imine la deuxi~me 6tape de contr6le externe, limite la notion 311'bid. A ]a p. 29 et s. 3121bid. t Ia p. 30. Soulignons que ni 1'6tendue, ni ]a nature des risques de la vie courante, ni 3 13 1bid. A lap. 31. les limites hL la douleur ne sont sp6cifides dans le document. 1991] LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GENETIQUE 519 de risques, assouplit les r~gles relatives aux adolescents et met toute sa con- fiance dans le comit6 local d'6thique de la recherche A qui il confie le mandat de s'assurer du respect de la personne humaine. Ii importe de rappeler que ces lignes directrices ne lient que les chercheurs d6sireux d'obtenir des subsides de cet organisme. La protection de la personne humaine soumise A l'exp6rimentation a aussi int6ress6 la Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada. Ainsi, en 1989, elle publiait un document de travail consacr6 cette probl6matique" 4. Une partie de ce document traite express6ment des enfants"5 et des personnes souffrant de d6ficience mentale16. La Commission recommande, sous certaines conditions, de reconnaitre 16galement 1'exp6rimentation biom6dicale non th6rapeutique r6a- lisle chez l'enfant. Tout d'abord, la recherche doit pouvoir 6tre qualifi6e de fort importante au plan scientifique et ne doit pouvoir 8tre pratiqu6e que chez ce groupe de sujets ; de plus, elle doit avoir un rapport direct et 6troit avec les maladies ou pathologies infantiles. En outre, les risques ne doivent pas 6tre graves pour l'enfant. La Commission reprend l'id6e 6nonc6e dans la premiere version des lignes directrices du Conseil de recherches m6dicales du Canada relativement au processus d6cisionnel. Ainsi, la Commission recommande un double consentement, celui du d6tenteur de l'autorit6 parentale et celui d'un tiers ind6pendant qui peut 8tre un juge, un ombudsman ou un avocat l'enfant. Enfm, l'assentiment de l'enfant doit 6tre obtenu et son refus doit en toutes cir- constances 8tre respect6. La Commission adopte la meme position dans le cas des personnes souffrant de d6ficience mentale. Elle pose des conditions iden- tiques i la r6alisation de la recherche chez des personnes appartenant h ce groupe. Comme on peut le constater, la Commission de r6forme du droit du Canada adopte une position beaucoup plus rigoureuse que celle du Conseil de recherches m6dicales du Canada. Elle pr6conise des contr6les qui ressemblent davantage it ceux qui furent sugg6r6s par le Conseil en 1978, soit le recours a un tiers. Toutefois, en ce qui a trait aux risques, la Commission semble admettre des risques plus s6rieux puisqu'elle r6fere A des risques << graves >. Par ailleurs,
un point que ces deux organismes ont en commun est l’importance qu’ils accor-
dent au d6sir de participer de l’6ventuel sujet. Ainsi, tous les deux recom-
mandent d’obtenir l’assentiment de la personne et de respecter, le cas 6ch6ant,
le refus manifest6.

Conscient du progr~s consid6rable de la g6n6tique et du d6veloppement
pr6visible de th6rapies g6niques, le Conseil de recherches m6dicales du Canada
a d6cid6 de consid6rer sp6cifiquement ce secteur d’activit6s. Compte tenu de la

314Supra, note 36.
3151bid.
la p. 44 et s.
3161bid. k la p. 47 et s.

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[Vol. 36

singularit6 de la probl6matique, le Conseil a jug6 bon d’6mettre des lignes direc-
trices particuli~res. En effet, son document de 1987 ne faisait qu’effieurer le
problme31 . En 1990, le Conseil publiait un document 6tablissant sa position”‘.
Le Conseil n’envisage que la th6rapie g6nique somatique, c’est–dire celle qui
n’affecte que les cellules somatiques319. Le Conseil rejette, pour l’instant, le
recours it la th6rapie germinale, c’est-h-dire celle qui toucherait les cellules des
organes sexuels, 6tant donn6, entre autres, notre ignorance de ses r6percussions
sur l’esp~ce humaine. Dans le document, le Conseil examine la situation parti-
culi~re de la recherche sur des enfants 30 .

Comme la th6rapie g6nique vise principalement les nourissons et les jeunes
enfants, la possibilit6 d’obtenir leur consentement ou leur assentiment est
r6duite voire inexistante. A ce probl~me s’ajoute celui du droit de retrait. De
fagon g6n6rale, le sujet a toujours la possibilit6 d’interrompre sa participation ?
un protocole de recherche. Or, ce droit de retrait devient illusoire compte tenu
de la n6cessit6 de surveiller A long terme l’6volution de l’6tat de sant6 du sujet
ayant subi une th6rapie g6nique somatique. En effet, selon le Conseil, le suivi
s’impose. Pour faire face A toutes les particularit6s de cette recherche, le Conseil
recommande de bien informer le parent ou le tuteur de la nature de la recherche
et de l’dtendue de son engagement. Malgr6 l’ampleur des probl~mes qu’il
expose, le Conseil ne sugg~re pas le recours h un tiers arbitre pour s’assurer de
la qualit6 du consentement. Le document ne traite pas sp6cifiquement du cas des
adultes incapables.

Tous ces textes bas6s sur des normes 6thiques sont unanimes h reconnaitre
la n6cessit6 d’accorder une protection particuli~re aux enfants et aux incapables.
Toutefois, les moyens pr6conis6s pour atteindre cet objectif different. Ainsi, cer-
tains documents, comme celui 6manant de la Commission de r6forme du droit
du Canada, optent pour la mise en place d’un pallier suppl6mentaire de con-
tr6le : l’autorisation d’un tiers (repr~sentant des malades, avocat, tribunal) est
requise. Cette personne neutre serait en meilleure position pour 6valuer les
risques et les inconv6nients associ6s h la recherche propos~e. D’autres docu-
ments, comme les lignes directrices du Conseil de recherches m~dicales du
Canada, 6dition 1987, favorisent plutft une restriction de la notion de risques.
Selon eux, une protection ad6quate serait assur6e si les risques accept6s se
limitent h ceux auxquels nous faisons face dans la vie de tous les jours et si dou-
leur et inconfort sont bannis chez les sujets. Toute la difficult6 r6side donc dans
le choix des mesures h privil6gier pour atteindre un 6quilibre souhaitable entre
le d6veloppement des connaissances scientifiques, qui englobe sans aucun doute
les th6rapies g6niques, et la protection ad6quate des enfants et des incapables.

31TSupra, note 39 4 la p. 17.
318Supra, note 4.
3191bid. a la p. 7.
32Ibid.

la p. 26 et s.

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNtTIQUE

Conclusion

Rappelons que le postulat h l’origine de cette 6tude est h l’effet que la meil-
leure connaissance de la g6n6tique humaine que nous avons acquise au cours
des derni~res ann6es nous permettra rapidement une approche th6rapeutique
plus efficace face aux maladies h6r6ditaires. Or, les enfants et les incapables
sont au coeur de cette probl6matique. La plupart des maladies ou des anomalies
g6n6tiques vont etre d6pist6es et se d6velopper dans les premieres semaines ou
les premieres ann6es de leur existence. Si l’enfant survit, les d6ficiences dont il
pourra rester atteint feront de lui un incapable de fait ou de droit. Les interven-
tions th6rapeutiques seront tent6es sur eux3zl, pour les memes raisons, par
priorit6.

Cette r~alit6 nous a amen6 nous interroger sur les attributs du consente-
ment requis pour promouvoir la concr6tisation de notre pr~misse. Les r~gles
applicables h l’exp6rimentation,
la transplantation et au traitement m6dical
sont-elles approprides ? Y-a-t-il lieu de les modifier en regard de la population
susceptible d’etre sollicit6e, h savoir les enfants et les personnes incapables ?
Vaut-il mieux assimiler les thdrapies g~niques h des traitements m6dicaux
usuels on h de la recherche h vis6e th6rapeutique ou faut-il encore favoriser la
creation d’un ensemble de r~gles sp~cifiques h ce type d’activit~s ?

Pour r6pondre h ces questions, nous avons, dans un premier temps, exa-
min6 les documents de droit international traitant de chacune de ces preoccupa-
tions, h savoir: l’exp6rimentation chez l’humain, la transplantation d’organes et
les traitements et soins de sant6 prodigu6s aux enfants et aux incapables. Le
Canada 6tant signataire de pactes internationaux reli6s au theme de notre
recherche, il 6tait aussi essentiel d’examiner comment les grands principes
d6gag6s h l’6chelle internationale ont 6t6 ou seront transposes dans notre droit
inteme. De plus, cette 6tape de l’analyse s’imposait h cause de le r6f6rence
constante aux l6gislations nationales an sein m~me des textes internationaux.
Nous avons donc consider6 en deuxi~me lieu le droit constitutionnel et le droit
criminel. Nous terminions ce tour d’horizon 16gislatif en portant une attention
particuli~re h la legislation provinciale et territoriale canadienne. Cette analyse
6tait essentielle puisque les lois qui gouvement la pratique m~dicale sont de
juridiction provinciale. Pour compl6ter notre 6tude, certains documents cana-

321Rcemment, les comit6s institutionnels d’6thique (IRB) du < National Cancer Institute >> et du
< National Heart, Lung and Blood > ont approuv6 le recours un transfert de g~nes pour traiter
des enfants atteints d’une d~ficience enzymatique grave (ad6nosine-d~aminase). Si les autorisa-
tions suppl~mentaires requises sont obtenues, il s’agira alors du premier projet h vis6e thrapeu-
tique A etre mis en oeuvre aux ttats-Unis. Voir << Gene Therapy on the Horizon > (1990) 20 Hasting
Center Report 48.

McGILL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

diens proposant des lignes directrices en mati~re d’intervention m6dicale furent
examines.

Toute notre analyse gravite autour de la mise en oeuvre d’un principe fon-
damental, soit l’inviolabilit6 de la personne. Les documents intemationaux de
m~me que le droit canadien dans son ensemble consacrent ce principe. La per-
sonne humaine est inviolable, nul ne peut y porter atteinte sans son consente-
ment. Or, cette personne, c’est 6galement l’enfant et l’incapable. Conscient de
l’impossibilit6 16gale pour ces membres de la soci6t6 de donner un consente-
ment valable, divers processus sont propos6s pour pallier A la situation. Ainsi,
r~gle g6n6rale, le repr6sentant 16gal sera la personne h quiil faudra s’adresser
pour obtenir une autorisation avant d’entreprendre une recherche, un don d’or-
ganes ou un traitement m6dical.

Dans le cas de l’enfant, l’identification du repr6sentant 16gal ne semble pas
poser de difficult6 ; on se r6fere habituellement aux parents, aux d6tenteurs de
l’autorit6 parentale ou aux tuteurs. Par contre, la situation de l’incapable est
beaucoup plus complexe. On d6c~le, pr6sentement, un courant qui pr6conise
que soit reconnue h l’adulte la possibilit6 de d6signer la personne qui pourra
consentir pour lui. Autrement, les textes proposent un liste de personnes, habi-
tuellement des membres de la famille, pour prendre en charge le sort de l’inca-
pable. On note aussi une importance accrue accord6e aux relations personnelles
entretenues par le repr6sentant 16gal avec la personne incapable. Ces nouvelles
avenues se veulent des moyens approprids pour faire respecter les souhaits
exprim6s par l’incapable.

Tant dans le cas de l’enfant que dans celui de l’incapable qui n’a pas mani-
fest6 ses d6sirs, la poursuite de leur meilleur int6rt dolt motiver la d~cision du
repr6sentant. I ne fait aucun doute que lorsqu’il s’agit de maladies h6r6ditaires
pour lesquelles il existe pr6sentement une th6rapie, le meilleur int6ret de l’en-
fant ou de l’incapable milite en faveur d’un consentement
ce traitement. On
peut m~me pr6tendre qu’en vertu de son obligation de procurer un secours
m6dical, le repr6sentant se dolt d’agir ainsi. La situation devient beaucoup plus
probl6matique lorsqu’il s’agit d’une maladie incurable ou encore lorsque ce que
l’on propose est sans b6n6fice direct et imm6diat pour l’enfant ou l’incapable.
On peut assimiler A cette dernire possibilit6 la recherche non th6rapeutique,
r6alit6 t laquelle correspondent, dans l’6tat actuel des connaissances, les th6ra-
pies g6niques. Or, comme l’ont soulign6 certains documents canadiens, la
recherche non th6rapeutique pratiqu6e sur des enfants et des incapables soul~ve
de grandes controverses. Comment s’assurer que l’avancement des connais-
sances scientifiques et m6dicales ne se fasse au d6triment des plus vuln6rables ?
Une protection particuli~re s’impose certes, mais il ne faut pas que les r~gles
juridiques mises en place se transforment en obstruction syst6matique et proba-
blement discriminatoire.

1991]

LES ENFANTS, LES INCAPABLES ET LA GtNItTIQUE

523

Dans un souci de contrler ou de surveiller l’exercice de cette autorit6 A
consentir pour autrui, il est possible que cette permission du repr6sentant 16gal
soit doubl6e d’une autorisation judiciaire. Plus l’intervention est exceptionelle
et < invasive >>, plus les contr6les sont rigoureux. Toutefois, n’y-a-t-il pas lieu
d’6viter la judiciarisation susceptible de cr6er des conflits non th6rapeu-
tiques > et d’offrir plut6t une protection ad6quate grace A un < ombudsman >> ou
un protecteur des enfants et des incapables ? Cette personne rattach6e t l’ins-
titution hospitali~re sera mieux m~me d’identifier les difficult6s inh6rentes h
ces proc6dures et de d6fendre les int6r~ts de ces personnes plus vulndrables. Par
ailleurs, il importe de souligner que tant A l’6chelle intemationale que nationale,
on cherche h valoriser l’opinion de l’enfant et de l’incapable. On discute d’une
fagon de plus en plus pressante de la possibilit6 de reconnaltre aux enfants et
aux incapables, une capacit6 de fait h consentir A l’acte m6dical. Ainsi, lors-
qu’un repr6sentant ou un tribunal a h intervenir, il doit s’enqu6rir de l’avis de
ces personnes et doit en tenir compte dans sa d6cision. Certains documents
16gislatifs et tous les documents proposant des lignes directrices en la mati~re
pr6conisent de respecter le refus d’une personne de se soumettre h une
recherche m~me si l’autorisation de son repr~sentant a 6t6 obtenue.

Apr~s avoir examin6 les r~gles canadiennes applicables aux dons de tissus
et d’organes, il nous semble que les dispositions 16gislatives canadiennes actuel-
les ne rdpondent pas ad6quatement t cette nouvelle r6alit6 qu’est la recherche
et la th6rapie g6niques.

Bien que l’utilisation des th6rapies geniques puisse poser probl~me, surtout
dans l’6tat actuel des connaissances (puisqu’elles sont assimilables h des
recherches non th6rapeutiques) ce qui requiert une attention toute particuli~re
est le sort rdserv6 A l’information g6ndtique unique qui d6coule du recours h ces
th6rapies. L’inviolabilit6 de la personne doit 6tre prot6g6e et cette inviolabilit6
s’6tend A l’identit6 biologique (ADN) autant qu’
l’6tat
mental. Ce sujet m6rite une 6tude h part.

l’tre physique et