Is Establishment Consistent
with Religious Freedom?
Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh*
Are religious freedom and religious establishment
mutually exclusive? This question evokes a classic
dichotomy that is at the heart of many legal systems,
notably that of the United States-the separation of
church and state. The prevailing view appears to be that
these notions are indeed mutually exclusive and that
nations that single out a specific religion and accord it a
privileged position
inevitably discriminate against
adherents of other faiths.
is
a
law and
legislation
The authors argue, however, that a weak form of
in fact consistent with religious
establishment
freedom. Examining case
in
countries such as England, Canada, Australia, and
South Africa, they maintain that a state that explicitly
acknowledges
or
compelling
is
compatible with religious freedom. Moreover, the
is
authors
inescapable insofar as all liberal democracies have an
establishment.
coercing
religious practice or observance
religious establishment
religion without
suggest
that
La libertd de culte et l’establishment religieux
sont-ils mutuellement exclusifs ? La question 6voque
une dichotomie classique au cceur de nombre d’ordres
juridiques, en particulier celui des Etats-Unis, qui
consacre la separation entre Eglise et Etat. Le point de
vue dominant semble 8tre A l’effet que ces notions sont
en effet exclusives et que les nations qui isolent et
accordent un statut privil6gi6 A une religion parficuli~re
les fideles de
ne peuvent que discriminer contre
confessions diff6rentes.
en
Les auteurs soutiennent pour leur part qu’une
forme modeste d’establishment est
ralit
compatible avec la libert6 de culte. S’appuyant sur un
examen de la jurisprudence et de la 16gislation en
vigueur dans des pays comme l’Angleterre, le Canada,
l’Australie et l’Afrique du Sud, ils soutiennent qu’un
ttat peut reconnaltre une foi particuli~re, sans pour
autant y compromettre la libert6 de culte, A condition
que la pratique ou l’observance de cette foi ne soit ni
forcde ou
sugg~rent de plus que
l’establishment religieux est inevitable, dans la mesure
ots toutes les democraties liberales en ont un.
requise.
lls
* Rex Ahdar, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago; Ian Leigh, Professor of
Law, Human Rights Centre, University of Durham. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the
British Academy and the Association of Commonwealth Universities in awarding us a research grant
under their joint program to support international collaboration. We are grateful also for the comments
of three anonymous referees on an earlier draft of this article.
McGill Law Journal 2004
Revue de droit de McGill 2004
To be cited as: (2004) 49 McGill L.J. 635
Mode de r6f6rence: (2004) 49 R.D. McGill 635
636
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Introduction
I. Clarifying the Critical Concepts
A.
B.
“Establishment”
“Religious Freedom”
II. The Incompatibility Position
III. The Compatibility Position
A. Generally
B.
C. European Case Law under the ECHR
International Stance
IV. Answering the Objections
A. The Alienation Charge
B. The Inequality Charge
C. The Neutrality Mirage
Conclusion
637
638
638
648
651
654
654
657
660
663
663
671
677
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R. AHDAR & I. LEIGH – ESTABLISHMENTAND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
637
Introduction
Can a state have an establishment of religion and religious liberty? Or is freedom
of religion necessarily a condition that can exist only in the absence of an established
church or faith? The prevailing view appears to be the latter: a nation that singles out
a church for special privileges or accords it a unique status is, broadly speaking, being
unfair.’ It is, so the argument often goes, unjustly discriminating against adherents of
other faiths, including those of no religion. Those who do not belong to the
established faith may feel marginalized, perhaps even demeaned.
In
this article we seek to challenge the prevailing view. We argue that
establishment (at least in its contemporary, milder form) is not antithetical to religious
freedom. As a matter of principle, religious liberty properly understood can coexist
with religious establishment. In terms of current law, it is interesting to note that the
relevant international conventions and the case law of the European Convention on
Human Rights’ do not see the two as inconsistent. This reflects, we believe, the
correct appreciation of the theoretical problem.
Much of the criticism of establishment today derives from the voluminous
American First Amendment jurisprudence on non-establishment. This case law-
which, as many United States scholars concede,
confused 3-should not dictate the answer to the question we address.
is highly controversial and
Establishment is, in fact, consistent with religious freedom. Establishment, we
shall explain, is inescapable, and thus if religious liberty is to be realized at all it is
always under the auspices of a state orthodoxy on religious matters. Even if a state
does not have an established church, it will have an established position on religion. A
secular, liberal state is not “neutral”. It tolerates religions on its own terms. Religious
liberty is always exercised in the shadow of establishments, whether conventionally
religious or not.
In Part I we define the key concepts at issue, providing a thorough account of
both “establishment” and “religious liberty”. In Part II we examine the incompatibility
See Sebastian Poulter, Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998) at 62; Peter W. Edge, “Religious Remnants in the Composition of the
United Kingdom Parliament” in Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis, eds., Law and Religion: Current
Legal Issues, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 443 at 454-55 [Edge, “Religious
Remnants”]; Paul Weller, “Equity, Inclusivity and Participation in a Plural Society: Challenging the
Establishment of the Church of England” in Peter W. Edge & Graham Harvey, eds., Law and Religion
in Contemporary Society: Communities, Individualism and the State (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate,
2000) 53.
2 [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4
November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR].
3 See e.g. Michael W. McConnell, “Neutrality, Separation and Accommodation: Tensions in
American First Amendment Doctrine” in Rex. J. Ahdar, ed., Law and Religion (Aldershot, U.K.:
Ashgate, 2000) 63.
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position, namely, that the concepts of religious freedom and establishment are
inherently at odds with one another. The compatibility position, which sees no
inherent dissonance between the two concepts, is then outlined in Part I. In Part IV
we address the principal objections to the compatibility defence-the alienation and
inequality charges-and explain the practical impossibility of absolute neutrality.
I. Clarifying the Critical Concepts
A. “Establishment”
“Establishment” is an ambiguous term, “a word of no certain meaning”,4 never “a
legal term of art”;5 a concept that is “vague, imprecise and ever-changing”. 6 There are
several overlapping meanings. In a judgment discussing section 116 of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900,’ Gibbs J. identified four distinct
senses in which a religion could be established by law:
The widest of these meanings is simply to protect by law … Secondly, and this
is the most usual modem sense, the word means to confer on a religion or a
religious body the position of a state religion or a state church… Thirdly, when
used in relation to the establishment principle … the word means to support a
church in the observance of its ordinances and doctrines … [T]he establishment
principle can be held by churches that are unconnected with the state, and are
supported by voluntary contributions alone. … A fourth possible meaning of the
word “establish” is simply to found or set up a new church or religion, but that
is obviously not the meaning used in s. 116.
This section will consider the first three senses of establishment in detail, beginning
with a familiar exemplar of an established church
the Church of England (“the
Church”)-before moving further afield.
In England the legal incidents of establishment are often thought of primarily with
reference to the interpenetration of state and religious institutions, reflected in three
aspects.’ First is the position of the sovereign as head of state and Supreme Governor
of the Church of England.1 Second, there is state involvement in church procedures,
4 Julian Rivers, “Irretrievable Breakdown? Disestablishment and the Church of England” (1994) 3
Cambridge Papers 1.
5 M.H. Ogilvie, “What is a Church by Law Established?” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 179 at 195.
6 Ibid. at 196.
7 (Cth) [Australian Constitution].
8 A.G (Vict.); Ex rel. Black v. The Commonwealth (1981), 146 C.L.R. 559 at 595-97 (H.C.A.)
[Black v. The Commonwealth].
9 See Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) c. 7; Frank
Cranmer, “Church-State Relations in the United Kingdom: A Westminster View” (2001) 6 Ecc. L.J.
111; Richard Davies, “Church and State” (1976) 7 Cambrian L.R. 11-12.
10 See Ian Bradley, God Save the Queen: The Spiritual Dimension of Monarchy (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 2002).
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R. AHDAR & L LEIGH – ESTABLISHMENTAND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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in senior ecclesiastical appointments. 2 Third,
be it the requirement of parliamentary approval for church legislation,” or the
is church
Crown’s role
involvement in state processes, such as the coronation of a new monarch 3 and the
representation of senior bishops in the House of Lords. 4 To these constitutional
dimensions should be added the status of ecclesiastical law as part of Britain’s
common law, and the position of church courts.
there
Judges have been careful, however, to distinguish the Church of England from the
state. 5 Recently, in Parochial Church Council of the Parish of Aston Cantlow and
Wilmcote with Billesley, Warwickshire v. Wallbank,16 the House of Lords held that the
Parochial Church Council of the Church of England was not a “public authority”
under the Human Rights Act 1998.7 Lord Hope of Craighead stated that the Church
of England
plainly has nothing whatever to do with the process of either central or local
government. It is not accountable to the general public for what it does. It
receives no public funding, apart from occasional grants from English Heritage
“Ecclesiastical measures are made under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, 9
& 10 Geo. V., c. 76, as am. by the Synodical Government Measure 1969 (U.K.), 1969 No. 2. To
become law a measure must first be passed by the General Synod of the Church of England, be
approved by parliamentary resolution (where it is scrutinized by a special ecclesiastical committee),
and then receive royal assent. See Norman Doe, The Legal Framework of the Church of England: A
Critical Study in a Comparative Context (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) c. 3.
12 Bishops are appointed by the Queen, as Supreme Governor, on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister chooses from two names that are proposed in a ranked order by the
Crown Appointments Commission, a church body. Prime Ministers are not obliged to follow the order
in which the Commission ranks candidates and may ask for alternative names. See Prime Minister
James Callaghan’s description when introducing the procedure: U.K., H.C., vol. 912, col. 612-14 (8
June 1976); Bernard Palmer, High and Mitred: A Study of Prime Ministers as Bishop-Makers, 1837-
1977 (London: Cromwell, 1992).
13 See Bradley, supra note 10 at c. 8-9 (the Coronation Oath includes a promise to defend the
Church of England).
14 Twenty-six bishops are entitled to sit-the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishops of
London, Durham, and Winchester, and twenty-one other diocesan bishops according to seniority,
amounting to approximately four per cent of the membership of the interim House of Lords. Due to
the failure to reach political consensus on further reform of the House of Lords, following the removal
of most hereditary peers, the government has proposed that the bishops remain entitled to sit for the
foreseeable future. See U.K., Department for Constitutional Affairs, Next Steps for the House of Lords
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2003); Charlotte Smith, “The Place of Representatives of
Religion in the Reformed Second Chamber” (2003) P.L. 674 (for discussion of earlier proposals).
15 See Phillimore J. in Marshall v. Graham, [1907] 2 K.B. 112 at 126: “A Church which is
established is not thereby made a department of the State. The process of establishment means that the
State has accepted the Church as the religious body in its opinion truly teaching the Christian faith,
and given to it a certain legal position, and to its decrees, if rendered under certain legal conditions,
certain civil sanctions.”
16 [2003] 3 All E.R. 1213, [2003] UKHL 37 [Wallbank].
17 Human Rights Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42, s. 6(3) [Human Rights Act 1998].
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for the preservation of its historic buildings. In that respect it is in a position
which is no different from that of any private individual….
… The state has not surrendered or delegated any of its functions or powers to
the Church. None of the functions that the Church of England performs would
have to be performed in its place by the state if the Church were to abdicate its
responsibility … The relationship which the state has with the Church of
England is one of recognition, not of the devolution to it of any of the powers
or functions of government. 18
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry stated that
The mission of the Church is a religious mission, distinct from the secular
mission of government, whether central or local … This is true even though the
Church of England has certain important links with the state. Those links,
which do not include any funding of the Church by the government, give the
Church a unique position but they do not mean that it is a department of state…
In so far as the ties are intended to assist the Church, it is to accomplish the
Church’s own mission, not the aims and objectives of the government of the
United Kingdom. 19
Nevertheless, by virtue of its role as a national church, citizens have a number of legal
entitlements against the Church of England that they do not have against other
religious bodies. The Church of England is the only religious body legally bound to
provide ministry to the whole population (anyone living within parish boundaries),
and not just to its own members, as evidenced by the duties in canon law to baptize,
marry, and bury parishioners.2
The chaplaincy responsibility of the Anglican Church is also reflected in a small
number of technical provisions affording it preferential treatment in order to pursue its
national ministry in education and prisons.21 These duties are cited by some modem
defenders of establishment in response to the claim that the Anglican Church’s status
should be diminished, notwithstanding declining attendance at services and the
increasing pluralism and secularism of British society. Its supporters argue that the
Church of England has a distinctive status because it is a national church, and that
this depends on its societal role rather than on strength of numbers. The geographical
reach of the parish system, together with chaplaincy responsibilities and heavy
involvement in church schools are all evidence of a national role. Some distinguish
18 Supra note 16 at paras. 59-61.
19 Ibid. at para. 156 [emphasis in original].
20 See Augur Pearce, “Religious Denomination or Public Religion? The Legal Status of the Church
of England” in Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis, eds., Law and Religion: Current Legal Issues, vol.
4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 457 at 462-63; Mark Hill, Ecclesiastical Law, 2d ed.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) c. 5; Doe, supra note 11 at 226-28, 317-18, 358 ff., 386-88.
In Wallbank, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead characterized the rights of parishioners to attend services
and in respect of marriage and burial as “public” in nature under the Human Rights Act 1998 (ibid. at
para. 16); see also Lord Scott of Foscote, ibid. at para. 130, and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, ibid. at
para. 170.
21 See text accompanying notes 50-51.
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R. AHDAR & L LEIGH – ESTABLISHMENTAND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
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between “earthed” or “low” establishment, by which they mean the daily on-the-
life, and “high”
ground presence of the Church of England
establishment, referring to the church’s constitutional status. 22 It is argued that
“earthed” establishment justifies the elements of “high” establishment.23
in community
Establishment is not uniquely English and need not take the form modelled in that
country. Among other European states, Denmark, 24 Finland,25 Norway,2 6 and Greece 7
all have established churches. By contrast, in several European countries commonly
thought of as traditionally Catholic, the trend has been to clearly separate church and
state; constitutional references to a separation of church and state can be found in
Spain,28 Portugal, 29 and Ireland.3″ Rather than looking for a uniform pattern among
established churches, it is probably safer to look instead for characteristics that may
be present to a greater or lesser degree across different contexts. This approach is
geographically inclusive3 and has received a measure of judicial backing.32
22 See Wesley Car, “A Developing Establishment” (1999) 102 Theology 2; David McClean, “The
Changing Legal Framework of Establishment” (2004) 7 Ecc. L.J. 292.
23 In contrast, a recent report from a left wing think-tank suggests that partial disestablishment
(severing the connection between the monarch and the Church of England) need not affect the
Church’s national role. See Fabian Society, The Future of the Monarchy: The Fabian Commission on
the Future of the Monarchy (London: Fabian Society, 2003) at 64-79; this point is also discussed in
Ian Leigh, “By Law Established?: The Church of England and Constitutional Reform?” [2004] P.L.
266 [Leigh, “By Law Established?”].
24 “The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it
shall be supported by the State” (Constitution, 1953 (Denmark), s. 4); “The King shall be a member
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church” (ibid., s. 6).
25 Constitution Act of Finland, 1999 (731/1999), s. 76.
26 The Evangelical-Lutheran religion is the “official religion” of Norway (The Constitution of the
Kingdom of Norway, 1814, s. 2(2)); the King of Norway must belong to the Church and “uphold and
protect the same” (ibid., s. 4).
27 Constitution of Greece, 1975, s. 3.1.
28 Constitution, 1978 (Spain), s. 16(3).
29 Constitution of the Portugese Republic, 1976, s. 41(4).
30 Constitution of Ireland, 1937, s. 44(2.2) [Constitution of Ireland]. This follows an amendment in
1972, which removed reference to the “special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman
Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens”; other provisions
(also repealed) “recognized” several of the other denominations (David Feldman, Civil Liberties and
Human Rights in England and Wales, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 909). On the
state of the constitution prior to the amendment, see Quinn’s Supermarket v. Attorney-General, [1972]
I.R. 1 at 23-4, Walsh J.
31 See e.g. Gerhard Robbers, ed., State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1996); Gerhard Robbers, ed., Church Autonomy: A Comparative Survey (Frankfurt: Peter Lang,
2001).
32 Comparing the position of the Church of England to section 116 of the Australian Constitution,
Stephen J. stated: “It may be accepted that there is no single characteristic of that Church which of
itself constitutes the touchstone of its establishment. Over the centuries the rights enjoyed by the
Church of England, as the established church, have greatly changed, as has that subjection to
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The potential forms of establishment vary.3 There can be formal, de jure
establishments or informal, de facto establishments. These establishments may be
symbolic or substantive in nature, and may render official a generic religion, a
collection of faiths (or denominations), or just one faith.
A formal establishment of a symbolic kind is illustrated by nations whose
constitutions invoke dependence upon a deity.34 Several examples can be given. The
preamble to Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982 commences: “Whereas Canada is
founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law
… ,35 The Australian constitution recites that the people of its various states were
“humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God” in resolving to form a federal
Commonwealth.36 Ireland’s constitution commences: “In the name of the Most Holy
Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of
men and States must be referred, We, the people of Ireland, humbly acknowledging
all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ … ,,3 The preamble to the Polish
constitution of 1997 refers to “those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice,
good and beauty, As well as those not sharing such faith, … our culture rooted in the
Christian heritage of the Nation” and “recognizing our responsibility before God … ,31
Religious establishment may end at the point of symbolic acknowledgement, with no
further translation of religious doctrine into public policy and institutions.
to Europe’s Christian heritage or Judaeo-Christian
Even a symbolic reference may, however, be divisive, as shown by the
negotiations over the new Constitution for the European Union. Proposals to include
reference
inheritance were
supported by several Catholic countries but were opposed by other states, France
especially, which saw even a historical reference of this kind as compromising the
secular nature of the union. The eventual compromise, reached by the Inter-
Governmental Conference in June 2004, was the includsion in the text of a bland
temporal authority which is the concomitant of establishment” (Black v. The Commonwealth, supra
note 8 at 606).
33 See Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper, The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State
in Five Democracies (Lanham, Md.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1997) at 11; Rivers, supra note 4. Rivers
cautions: “Every establishment must be looked at in detail first” (ibid. at 4).
34 See Rivers, ibid. at 3; George Witerton, “A New Constitutional Preamble” (1997) 8 Pub. L. Rev.
186 at 186.
35 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. The Ontario Court of Appeal has
held that the reference to the “supremacy of God” does not limit the meaning to be given to freedom
of religion under section 2 of the Charter: Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director)
(1988), O.R. (2d) 641 at 657, 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Zylberberg].
36 Australian Constitution, supra note 7, Preamble.
37 Constitution of Ireland, supra note 30, Preamble.
38 Constitution, 1997 (Poland), Preamble.
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statement referring to the signatories’ “inspiration from the cultural, religious and
humanist inheritance of Europe”.39
A formal, de jure establishment may be substantive when a specific religion is
identified and promoted. Contemporary examples include the Church of England, the
Church of Scotland, and the Lutheran Church in Scandinavian countries (i.e.,
Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland). More than one religion may be favoured
above others in this way. In Germany, for example, a diluted form of state supported,
quasi-establishment persists in that the three main historical religious communities-
Evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish-are public corporations and qualify for support
pursuant to the church tax.40 In addition, clergy and church officials have the right to
take part in rendering public services. Compared to Islam or other religions, these
religions could be said to be established in a formal de jure sense.4
Finally, there may exist an informal, de facto establishment of religion. One
particular faith may be favoured by the state in practice due to its “overwhelming
numerical or cultural strength in that country.”42 Alternatively, the state may promote a
generic form of religion by passing laws and implementing public policies that reflect
the broad tenets and ideals of one religion in particular-for example, laws that
broadly concur with Judaeo-Christian principles.43 This approach might entail the
enactment of legislation recognizing religious holidays or festivals,’
the adoption of
blasphemy laws that refer to only one religion,45 or the preference of a given religion
in legislative provisions governing collective worship in schools.46
39 Provisional Consolidated Version of the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (25
June 2004) CIG 86/04, online: Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States
40 See Monsma & Soper, supra note 33 at 172-92.
41 See Peter W. Edge, “Reorienting the Establishment Debate: From the Illusory Norm to Equality
of Respect” (1998) 27 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 265 at 269. If the essence of establishment is special legal
treatment then there may be more than one established religion or church. Edge’s own definition is:
“A religious organization is established where there are laws which apply to that particular religious
organization … which do not apply to the majority of other religious organizations” (ibid. at 271).
42 Monsma & Soper, supra note 33 at 11.
43 See Rex J. Ahdar, “A Christian State?” (1998-1999) 13 J. L. & Religion 453.
44 See infra discussion of R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321
[Big MDrug Mart cited to S.C.R.] and S. v. Lawrence, [1997] 4 S. Afr. L.R. 1176 [Lawrence].
45 Or in the United Kingdom, to the established church: “A person may, without being liable to
prosecution for it, attack Judaism, or Mahomedanism, or even any sect of the Christian Religion (save
the established religion of the country); and the only reason why the latter is in a different situation
from the others is, because it is the form established by law, and is therefore a part of the constitution
of the country” (Alderson B. in Gathercole’s Case (1838), 168 E.R. 1140 at 1145). See R. v Chief
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Choudhury, [1991] 1 Q.B. 429, confirming that the
common law offence of blasphemy does not apply in the case of an attack on Islam (the case
concerned an abortive prosecution for publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses).
46 The legal requirement is for a collective act of worship “wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian
tradition (Schools Standards and
character,” but not reflecting a particular denominational
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It is the second of these types-the legal promotion of a particular religion-that
is most commonly referred to as establishment (and which the remainder of this
section will consider), but the other two should be borne in mind, and we will return
to them. The extent of the connection between a religious body and the state can be
measured in two distinct ways: by legal privileges granted to the body that other
religions do not enjoy and by powers that the state has over the body in question (e.g.,
to appoint or dismiss clergy and other staff and to approve or veto certain decisions).
Privileges raise questions of religious liberty for other, less favoured religious bodies.
State controls, on the other hand, raise questions of liberty for the established religion
itself.
Religious privilege and state control are both matters of degree. Under some
constitutional arrangements the established church enjoys considerable advantages,
both symbolic and practical, over other religions. For instance, where it is legally
declared to represent the state religion,47 the state may collect taxes on a church’s
behalf,4″ membership may be a precondition for access to public education or
participation in public life,49 or public recruitment by non-established religions may be
prohibited or controlled. A few examples of privileges afforded to Christian churches
along these lines can still be found in some European states, but the clearest examples,
from the contemporary Islamic world, are beyond the scope of this article.
In other cases establishment amounts to a weak preference-for example, minor
relaxation of the formalities that apply to other religious bodies in conducting
Framework Act 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 31, s. 70 and Sch. 20). Legal protection is given to children and
teachers who do not wish to participate (ibid., ss. 71 and 59, respectively).
47 See e.g. Constitution of Greece, 1975, supra note 27; Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway,
1814, supra note 26.
48 As in Germany and Scandinavia.
49 As in Britain prior to An Act for the Relief of His Majesty’s Roman Catholic Subjects, 1829
(U.K.), 10 Geo. IV., c. 7 [Roman Catholic Relief Act]. Until 1974, the Lord Chancellor could not be a
Roman Catholic since he was “keeper of the Queen’s conscience” and had certain ceremonial roles-
for example, the appointment of a bishop. The Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of
Ecclesiastical Functions) Act 1974 (U.K.), 1974, c. 25, ss. 1-2 now enables the office to be held by a
Roman Catholic, in which case some functions are transferred to another minister.
The remaining elements of official Anglican establishment affect the sovereign personally. The
sovereign is required to join in communion with the Church of England and to make a declaration on
accession to the throne that he or she is a faithful Protestant and will uphold the enactments securing
the Protestant succession to the throne: An act for establishing the coronation oath, 1688 (U.K.), 1
Will. & Mar., c. 6, s. 3; An act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the
succession of the Crown, 1688 (U.K.), 1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2, c. 2, s. 1 [U.K. Bill of Rights, 1688]; Act
of Settlement 1700 (U.K.), 12 & 13 Will., c. 2, s. 2 [Act of Settlement]; Accession Declaration Act,
1910 (U.K.), 10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 29, Sch. I. The Act of Settlement (ibid.) also prevents the
sovereign or the heir to the throne from marrying a Roman Catholic (it does not, however, forbid
marriage to someone of any other non-Anglican religion, or of no religion). The Fabian Commission
report regarded these provisions as a form of outmoded religious discrimination and called for their
repeal. See Fabian Society, supra note 23 at 49.
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R. AHDAR & L LEIGH – ESTABLISHMENTAND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
645
marriages or in the entitlements of prison chaplains.5″ Another example would be an
automatic right to representation in public bodies, whether it is the House of Lords or
a local education committee,”M which other religious groups do not have. Even these
examples, drawn from the UK, are ambiguous since the purpose of these advantages
is to enable the church to carry out a national ministry and pastoral duties that are
supposedly wider than those of other religious organizations.
State control also comes in varying degrees. In its strongest form, government and
the relevant religious organization may be inseparable. One thinks, for example, of
the Ministry for Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Virtue under the Taleban in
Afghanistan. A government minister may be the ultimate authority for important
decisions about church property, appointments, and finance. Significantly weaker are
arrangements where legal authority is vested in the state but a degree of practical
autonomy is granted to the church, as with arrangements in the UK for church
legislation and the appointment of bishops.
Legal recognition does not always result in state control over church affairs. In
Belgium 2 and Luxembourg53 legal recognition is given to several churches, but
without state interference. This approach stresses the value of religion to the state,
without prescribing a single, official religion or diminishing church autonomy (for
example, by control of ecclesiastical appointments).
It can be argued that the Church of Scotland is established in the sense of being
recognized and protected by statute.54 But the state is, nevertheless, jealous of its
independence. The sovereign swears an oath to protect the Church of Scotland, but
(unlike with the Church of England) does not make ecclesiastical appointments.55
50 See Marriage Act, 1949 (U.K.), 12-13-14 Geo. VI., c. 76; the Prison Act, 1952 (U.K.), 15 & 16
Geo. VI & 1 Eliz. II, c. 52, s. 7(1) requires the appointment of an Anglican chaplain to every prison.
The rights (and duties) of these chaplains are broader than those of other “Prison Ministers”. See
Peter W. Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 2002) at 220-21.
51 Under the Education Act 1996 (U.K.), 1996, c. 56, ss. 390-93 and Sch. 31, ss. 2, 4(2), revision of
religious education syllabuses is in the hands of local Standing Advisory Committees on Religious
Education-one of which is reserved for the Church of England, while other Christian denominations
and other religions are grouped together. The result is to give an effective veto to the Church of
England.
52 Constitution, 1970 (Belgium). Note the following provisions: s. 20 (forbids forced religion); s. 21
(freedom of religious groups to appoint ministers); s. 181 (establishes state remuneration of religious
and moral leaders).
53 Constitution, 1868 (Luxembourg), s. 22 (imposes limits on state intervention
in religious
appointments).
54 Church of Scotland Act, 1921 (U.K.), 11 & 12 Geo. V., c. 29, s. 1. The Church of Wales was
disestablished by the Welsh Church Act, 1914 (U.K.), 4 & 5 Geo. V., c. 91, s. 1 (which took effect in
1920 by virtue of the Welsh Church (Temporalities) Act 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. V., c. 65, s. 2); similarly,
the Church of Ireland was disestablished in 1869 by the Irish Church Act, 1869 (U.K.), 32 & 33 Vict.,
c. 42, s. 2.
55 See Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the Law of Scotland (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press, 1980) c. 2-5; T.M. Taylor, “Church and State in Scotland” (1957) 2 Jurid.
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Since the Treaty of Union56 the Church of Scotland has enjoyed constitutional
guarantees for its status against adverse legislation.” The Appendix to the Church of
Scotland Act, 192158 contains Declaratory Articles affirming the church’s long-
standing claim to self-government and reflecting its “two kingdom” theology,59 which
the Scottish courts have used as a reason for non-intervention in the church’s affairs.’
We have seen that establishment of religion is a question of the degree of
connection, state influence, and support. This, however, has a radical implication: it
suggests that other religious bodies not normally regarded as established may enjoy
some, though not as many, of the privileges of the established church. We return in
Part IV to the inevitability of establishment in this broader sense.
We conclude this section with a brief account of why establishment is thought to
be worthwhile. Anyone defending establishment today must remind its numerous
critics that establishment does have certain virtues, unquantifiable as they may be.
Nevertheless, two significant caveats should be entered. First, the question itself is
misleading, as no country with an established religion now has a clean slate on which
to debate the merits of introducing such an arrangement. In practice the debate is
about the merits of disestablishment (or incremental changes in that direction). Paul
Avis paraphrases T.S. Eliot’s argument in the Idea of a Christian Society:
[W]e are not being asked whether we want to invent an establishment, but what
would be the consequences of dismantling the establishment we have … the
very act of disestablishing a church separates it more definitely and irrevocably
from the life of the nation than if it had never been established in the first
place.
6 1
Second, the notion of a cost-benefit analysis presupposes a utilitarian world view. Part
of the classical argument was, however, that establishment was the working out of
transcendent reality-a recognition of the impossibility of separating the spiritual
from the secular. It is hard to understand or reclaim this perspective in a society whose
dominant world view assumes the privatization of religion. Classical exponents of
Rev. 121; R. King Murray, “The Constitutional Position of the Church of Scotland” [1958] EL. 155;
C.R. Munro, “Does Scotland Have an Established Church?” (1997) 4 Ecc. L.J. 639.
56 Union with Scotland Act 1706,6 Anne, c. 11.
57 Ibid., s. 2. Although the efficacy of these provisions is a matter of debate among constitutional
lawyers. See Lyall, supra note 55, c. 3; Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law, 2d ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1999) at 137-42; Michael Upton, “Marriage Vows of the Elephant: The
Constitution of 1707″ (1989) 105 Law Q. Rev. 79.
” Church of Scotland Act, 1921, supra note 54, Sch., s. 4.
59 The conundrum of self-government free from parliamentary control yet legally recognized by
Parliament itself was resolved by a formula under which the Appendix became operative only after
aproval by the church’s General Assembly.
See e.g. Ballantyne v. Presbytery of Wigtown (1936), S.C. 625; Logan v. Presbytery of
Dumbarton, [1995] S.L.T. 1228; Percy v. Church of Scotland Board of National Mission, [2001]
S.L.T. 497.
61 Paul Avis, Church, State and Establishment (London: Society for Promoting Christian
Knowledge, 2001) at 35.
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establishment based it on a theology of the state. They saw establishment as the
natural and proper relationship between two divinely ordained institutions-the
Church and the State.6z
With those qualifications in mind, what claims do exponents of establishment
make? Historical champions of establishment such as Hooker, Burke, Coleridge,
Gladstone, and Arnold based their defence of the concept on several overlapping
ideas about the state and society.63 These were the moral purpose and personhood of
the state, the divine calling and purpose for different nations, the “dual citizenship”
(i.e., of the state and of the church) of individual Christians, and the unification and
identification of these two spheres in the dual authority of the sovereign (in England,
the Supreme Governor of the Church).64 Modem arguments emphasize
that
establishment is a reminder that God, rather than the state, is the ultimate source of
authority and, conversely, that “secular”
institutions such as monarchies draw
legitimacy and strength from religious underpinnings. A pluralist version of the same
argument is that the spiritual sphere cannot simply be ignored; hence, it is appropriate
for religious representatives to take part in the legislative process alongside many
other groups.65
A further aspect of the classical argument was the assumption that the state had a
responsibility for the spiritual welfare of its citizens. The established church
discharged
this by providing religious services to the population (christening,
marriage, and funerals) rather than to members alone. In some places (in Scandinavia,
for example) this responsibility was reflected in the absence of formal criteria for
membership in the established church; the entire population were deemed to be
members. Responsibility for spiritual welfare may find expression also in an official
chaplaincy role-for example, to prisons, the armed forces, hospitals, and educational
bodies. In many cases, the church was the sole provider of education or health care
long before the state assumed these roles. The territorial responsibility of the church is
a further aspect of the provision of services. In rural England, for example, although
many community facilities such as village shops, post offices, banks, and even public
houses have closed on economic grounds, the parish system ensures that the Church
of England continues to offer ministry throughout the entire country.
What does an established church gain from such arrangements? Certainly
establishment constitutes official recognition of a church’s theological position.
Professor Ogilvie claims that when a state establishes a church, it confers upon it
62 Ibid. at 35-36, c. 6.
63 See ibid. at c. 6; Jeremy Morris, “The Future of Church and State”, in Duncan Dormor, Jack
McDonald & Jeremy Caddick, eds., Anglicanism: The Answer to Modernity (London: Continuum,
2003) 161.
64 Arguably, however, it has never been fully possible to identify nation with church in England
because there have always been religious minorities-Jews and Roman Catholics especially. See
Avis, supra note 61 at 19.
65 In the case of the UK, by membership in the House of Lords.
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recognition as the “truest expression of … faith.”‘
In that sense it is necessarily
considered officially superior to other religions, even if adherents of other religions
suffer no formal
is a degree of
endorsement, even where this does not amount to the grant of a monopoly by the
state. In the mild form of establishment, however, the state’s commendation amounts
to little more than, say, the public recognition given to a national sports team.
legal disadvantage as a consequence. There
The institutional trappings of establishment may be seen as symbolizing the now
controversial
idea of “Christian nationhood”. Proponents of establishment are
probably not so naive, however, as to ignore statistics on religious diversity and
unbelief in contemporary societies. Rather, they probably advocate recognition of one
of two things: the place of Christianity as the dominant religion numerically,
culturally, and historically within the state; and/or that the state is not a secular one in
which religion is legally privatized. The second of these arguments attracts wider
support for the symbolism of establishment from writers of non-Christian religions on
the basis that it is a reminder of the spiritual sphere of life.67 In this second symbolic
sense, establishment is more anti-secularist than it is religious.
Of course, there are critics of establishment within the church itself who argue
that even the mild form, found in England, for example, compromises the church’s
integrity and autonomy, because the state has a say in approval of church legislation
and appointments.68 We have seen earlier that state control is a matter of degree. In
England, at least, establishment does not leave the church financially beholden to the
state and the church has a large measure of independence over doctrinal matters under
its system of synodical government.
B. “Religious Freedom”
Article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights69
international and domestic
in many subsequent
contains a definition echoed
instruments.70 It states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
66 Ogilvie, supra note 5 at 235.
67 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
68 See e.g. Colin Buchanan, Cut the Connection: Disestablishment and the Church of England
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1994).
69 GA Res. 217(R), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71.
70 See e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999
U.N.TS. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR];
ECHR, supra note 2, art. 9(1); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.), 1990/109 [N.Z Bill of
Rights].
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alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.7 1
Religious freedom is a malleable concept. 72 A helpful judicial attempt to define it
is that made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Big M Drug Mart:
The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such
religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs
openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest belief
by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept
means more than that. Freedom can primarily be characterized by the absence
of coercion or constraint. If a person is compelled by the State or the will of
another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have
chosen, he is not acting of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly
free.
73
Coercion, in the Supreme Court of Canada’s view, “includes not only such blatant
forms of compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of
sanction, coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit courses
of conduct available to others.”74
Religious freedom is not absolute and is limited by public order considerations of
the sort found in article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.”75
Most definitions of religious liberty do not expressly mention the right to abstain
from religious belief and practice, but it is not doubted that freedom from religion
71 Supra note 69, art. 18.
72 See e.g. M. Searle Bates, Religious Liberty: An Inquiry (New York: International Missionary
Council, 1945). Searle Bates writes: “The term ‘religious liberty’ is used in a wide range of meanings,
often ill-determined. Part of this vagueness in usage derives from the complex relationships in issues
of religious liberty, involving the individual, the religious body, the community, and the state” (ibid. at
295). We shall use the terms “religious freedom”, “freedom of religion”, and “religious liberty”
interchangeably.
73 Supra note 44 at 336, Dickson J. (as he then was). The South African Constitutional Court judge,
Chaskalson P., enthused: “I cannot offer a better definition than this of the main attributes of freedom
of religion” (Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 92). For a similar definition see Vatican II, Declaration
on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) (7 December 1965) c. 1 at para. 2, in Walter Abbott, ed.,
The Documents of Vatican II (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966) 679 [Dignitatis Humanae]:
This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of
individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such ways that in matters
religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is
anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether
privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits.
74 Ibid.
75 Supra note 70. See also art. 9(2) of the ECHR, supra note 2.
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must inhere in the concept of religious freedom as well.76 If, as the Supreme Court of
Canada has suggested, the underlying philosophic premise is that every individual be
free to hold and manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her conscience dictates,
then freedom to disbelieve must also be included: “Equally protected, and for the
same reasons, are expressions and manifestations of religious non-belief and refusals
to participate in religious practice.”77
The particular facets of this compendious concept of religious freedom are as
varied as religion itself. First, religious liberty has internal and external dimensions.
Internal religious freedom, as a purely internal freedom to believe, has sometimes
been described as an “absolute””8 religious freedom. There appears to be no way a
state could breach this inner right, the so-calledforum internum,79 even if it wished.”0
The external dimension can be divided into positive religious liberty and negative
religious liberty. Positive religious liberty is the freedom to actively manifest one’s
religion or belief in various spheres (public, private, etc.) and in a variety of ways
(worship, teaching, and so on). Positive religious liberty, being a social freedom, is
subject to certain limitations to preserve social order and the rights of other citizens.
Negative religious liberty is the freedom from coercion or discrimination on the
ground of religious (or nonreligious) belief. Article 1(2) of the United Nations
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, for example, states that: “No one shall be subject to
coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.”‘
Immunity from coercion implies that people not be subjected
to penalties or
disadvantageous
religious beliefs: “Religious
discrimination by officials or by Courts is unacceptable in a free society.” 2 It would
treatment on account of their
76 See e.g. James E. Wood, Jr., “An Apologia for Religious Human Rights” in John Witte, Jr. &
Johan D. van der Vyver, eds., Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perpsectives
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996) 455 at 469.
77 Big M Drug Mart, supra note 44 at 347. See also Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 73, at n. 5:
“the unbeliever or atheist makes with equal right this claim to immunity from coercion in religious
matters.”
78 Philip Wogaman, Protestant Faith and Religious Liberty (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967) at
185-86.
79 First referred to in C. v. U.K. (1983), 37 D & R 142 at 147. See also Carolyn Evans, Freedom of
Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
at 72.
80 As put in the Vatican II document, Dignitatis Humanae: “[o]f its very nature, the exercise of
religion consists before all else in those internal, voluntary and free acts whereby man sets the course
of his life directly toward God. No merely human power can either command or prohibit acts of this
kind” (supra note 73 at 681) [emphasis added].
l GA Res. 36/55, UN GAOR, 1981, Supp. No. 51, UN Doc. A/36/684,71 [Declaration on the
Elimination of Intolerance]. Art. 18(2) of the ICCPR (supra note 70) is phrased in nearly identical
terms.
82 Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (1883), 154 C.L.R. 120 at 150,
Murphy J. (H.C.A.). As John Locke wrote: “No private person has any right in any manner to
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be wrong, then, for the government to precondition housing, education, medical
treatment, public office, and other benefits on the claimant professing a certain belief.
Likewise, it would be wrong for government to subject people to special penalties on
account of their religion.83
Direct coercion of this type is relatively straightforward. More testing are claims
by persons said to be subject to “indirect” or “subtle” coercion. If the government
favours and promotes one religious perspective, does this constitute a form of
coercion, intangible to be sure, but nonetheless still very “real” to those concerned?” n
Do those who neither subscribe to nor support the officially endorsed religion feel
pressured into conforming? The terms commonly used to describe the psychological
and social harms experienced by such persons are feelings of being “alienated”,
“stigmatized”, or “ostracized”. Granted that such assertions are sincere, is this the sort
of harm that merits prohibiting the religious practices, symbols, or institutions in
question? We return to this challenging question later.
II. The Incompatibility Position
The view that establishment is starkly at odds with religious freedom is most
closely associated and forcefully espoused by an impressive cadre of American
scholars. The American understanding is traceable in large measure to the way the
First Amendment was drafted: “Congress shall make no
law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
“85 The two limbs
or clauses of the article suggest that religious freedom itself could be envisaged as
comprising two elements: non-establishment and free exercise. We agree with those
who contend that the two clauses are not in opposition but are complementary, both
tending toward the same end.8” Justice Goldberg, for example, once observed: “[The]
single end [of the clauses] … is to promote and assure the fullest possible scope of
religious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the
prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments, because he is of another church or religion … If any
man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune, not injury to thee: nor therefore art thou to
punish him in the things of this life, because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to
come” (John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Epistola de Tolerantia) (1689) in John Horton
& Susan Mendus, eds., John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration: In Focus (London: Roufledge,
1991) at 23).
83 To quote Locke, ibid. at 50: “The sum of all we drive at is, that every man enjoy the same rights
that are granted to others.”
84 See Oliver O’Donovan, The Desire of Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 221.
85 U.S. Const. amend. I, 1.
86 See e.g. Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The
Constitutional Heritage of the Religion Clauses (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1990) at 37; Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, “Structural Free Exercise” (1991) 90 Mich. L. Rev.
477 at 492; Carl H. Esbeck, “A Restatement of the Supreme Court’s Law of Religious Freedom:
Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?” (1995) 70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 581 at 594.
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best hope of attainment of that end.”87 The two clauses, some argue, each have their
own sphere of independent operation: “Neither clause is merely instrumental to the
other’s role, nor is either subordinate to the other… “8 Rather, the religion clauses are
“best envisioned as a draft team pulling together in the direction of full freedom for
religion.” 9
While neither clause is ascendant, the non-establishment aspect has, in the
opinion of many commentators, become so. Many consider that non-establishment or
“separationism” has become the dominant goal, the US Supreme Court being more
concerned with enforcing a rigid separation of church and state than with protecting
the free exercise of religion.’ Whether the critics are correct is an intriguing issue
beyond the scope of this essay. Even if separation was the dominant motif, some
suggest the trend is moving away from this.9
American scholars typically view religious freedom as being different from and
superior to religious tolerance. A policy of tolerance is denigrated as a mere
intermediate or “half-way step” in the development of liberal thought toward a true
religious liberty premised on notions of equality and neutrality.92 Religious tolerance
implies that religious exercise is a mere favour or privilege granted by the state:
religion is something tolerated, but no more. Paul Kauper’s explanation is helpful:
[R]eligious freedom is deemed to be not a concession or grant by the state but
an indefeasible right of the person, which the government must recognize,
respect and protect. Religious liberty is not to be confused with religious
tolerance. Tolerance as a legal concept is premised on the assumption that the
state has ultimate control over religion and the churches, and that whether and
to what extent religious freedom will be granted and protected is a matter of
state policy. Tolerance of minority religious groups and of nonconformists was
87 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 at 305 (1963).
8 Esbeck, supra note 86 at 594. See also Derek H. Davis, “Editorial: Resolving Not to Resolve the
Tension Between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses” (1996) 38 J.C.S. 245 at 258: “It is
undisputed that the founders were not content to let religious liberty rest on the strength of either
clause alone.”
89 Esbeck, ibid.
90 See e.g. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 86 at 492 and 535:
But the [Supreme] Court’s early resort to the simplistic “wall” metaphor ensconced
separationism as an end in itself, thereby driving a wedge between the free exercise
and establishment provisions and creating the appearance of tension between them …
Over time, court majorities gave a narrow construction to free exercise, neglecting its
associational and
institutional aspects. These important dimensions of religious
freedom further suffered from the Court’s broad constitution of the First Amendment’s
establishment language. The effect was to regularly subordinate the free exercise of
religion to the policy of enforcing a rigid separation of church and state. In case after
case … the First Amendment was thus turned on its head.
91 See Ira C. Lupu, “The Lingering Death of Separationism” (1994) 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 230.
92 See Steven D. Smith, “The Restoration of Tolerance” (1990) 78 Calif. L. Rev. 305 at 308-12
[Smith, “Restoration”].
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an important half-way step in the struggle for religious liberty … But our
constitutional system embodies the full-blown concept of religious freedom as
a natural right which limits the government, rather than a privilege dispensed
by governmental authority in pursuing a policy of benevolent toleration.93
There has been a tendency by some scholars to simply equate separationism with
religious liberty.94 As we noted, it is easy to see why such an equation is made given
the drafting of the First Amendment.” The danger is, however, that separation may
become the pre-eminent goal-an end in itself. The better view, we submit, is that
separation is an important instrumentalist means toward the larger end of protecting
religious freedom. As Adams and Emmerich argue: “The separation concept … is
really a servant of an even greater goal; it is a means, along with concepts such as
accommodation and neutrality, to achieve the ideal of religious liberty in a free
society.”96 As they point out, disestablishment alone does not guarantee religious
freedom, as some of “the most disestablished societies in the twentieth century are
those governed by totalitarian regimes.”97 On the other hand, many countries with a
religious establishment enjoy a degree of religious freedom. Americans largely believe,
however, that the full realization of religious freedom requires non-establishment. 9 For
them, establishment has both adverse consequences for society and is palpably wrong
in principle. In terms of societal consequences, establishment can be deleterious both
for religion and for the government. For the “Pietistic Separationists”, such as Roger
Williams and William Penn, separation was necessary to protect the authenticity and
purity of the faith. It was the church, not the state, that needed protection. By contrast,
to the “Enlightenment Separationists”, the suspicion and hostility were the other way
around.99 Institutional religion had the very real potential to corrupt government and
93 Paul G Kauper, “Legal Aspects of Religious Liberty” in Cedric W. Tilberg, ed., Religious Liberty
(New York: Lutheran Church in America, 1968) 25 at 25 [emphasis added]. See Scott C. Idleman,
“The Sacred, the Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief’ (1994)
142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1313 at 1369.
94 See Leo Pfeffer, “Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First
Amendment” (1980) 64 Minn. L. Rev. 561 at 564: “[Sleparation guarantees freedom and freedom
requires separation. The draftsmen of the [first] amendment regarded freedom of religion and
establishment as incompatible.”
95 See Francesco Ruffini, Religious Liberty (New York: GP Putnam’s Sons, 1912) at 16:
mhe principle of [religious] liberty was transplanted to North America … and became
imposed as a principle connected with that of separatism. It is easy, therefore, to
understand why the American writers are unable to conceive the idea of true liberty
apart from separatism. And thus it is that religious liberty and separatism have become
in America two terms which, ideally, historically, and practically, are inseparable.
Ruffmi uses the word “separatism” for what we refer to as “separationism”.
96 Adams & Emmerich, supra note 86 at 37.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid. See also Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967) at
70 [Pfeffer, Church and Freedom]: “Religious liberty is generally most secure where church and state
are most completely separated.”
99 See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 86 at 21-31.
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destroy the liberties of the people. Hence the “wall of separation” was needed to keep
the church at bay.”
Perhaps the most recurrent and forceful objection is that a policy of orthodoxy
coupled with tolerance is both offensive and alienating towards those who do not
adhere to the established faith. Who wants to be merely tolerated? Does one need a
constant, state-sanctioned reminder that one’s particular faith is officially disapproved,
albeit not suppressed? Steven Smith summarizes this concern:
[T]olerance suggests condescension. Even if the regime never resorts to
repression, the persistence of orthodoxy may still
indicate the regime’s
disapproval of those who dissent; dissenters’ beliefs or way of life, though
legally protected, are nonetheless wrong from the orthodox perspective. The
symbolic condescension and disapproval implicit in an attitude of tolerance
might make dissenters feel that they are not fully accepted as citizens. This
symbolic ostracism might inhibit the realization of an inclusive, harmoniously
integrated political community.t
Ill. The Compatibility Position
A. Generally
The compatibility view is that religious freedom is consistent with establishment,
at least establishment in its modem, diluted, symbolic form. Professor Ruffini reached
this conclusion a century ago:
[T]rue and complete religious liberty can exist also apart from Separatism [i.e.,
Separationism]. When the State has assured full liberty of belief or disbelief to
its own citizens, without this implying the least prejudice in the enjoyment of
their rights as citizens; when the State has guaranteed to religious associations
full liberty for the manifestation of their forms of worship, protecting them
against any sort of attack, the State has done all that can be demanded of it in
regard to religious liberty.102
Fr. John Courtney Murray believed that it was “not at all incompatible” with
religious freedom that there should exist an “orderly relationship” between the public
100 See John Witte, Jr., “That Serpentine Wall of Separation” (2003) 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1869.
101 Smith, “Restoration”, supra note 92 at 310 [emphasis added, citations omitted]. Justice
O’Connor has judicially expressed this concern in her so-called “endorsement test”, which we will
analyze in-depth in Part IV.
102 Ruffini, supra note 95 at 521. The italicized words are important. It is the “weak”, symbolic
form of establishment that is being considered here, not the “strong” form of establishment, or
theocracy, which existed in medieval Europe and exists today in some Islamic states. “Strong”
establishment accompanies state privilege for the favoured religion with distinct civil and legal
disabilities for the nonadherents of the official religion. Religious tolerance of this kind (perpetuating
lesser civil rights for dissident religions) is certainly an altogether different creature and there could be
no argument that this is inferior to religious freedom. Hereafter, then, it is the “weak” form that is
being referred to.
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power and the Catholic Church.” 3 Such a statement, to him, may be no more than “a
statement of fact”, an acknowledgement of history.” 4 The Irish Constitution, he
argued, affirms Christianity, yet this is “not meant to insult or demean anyone; it is
meant merely to express the most fundamental convictions of the vast majority of the
people of Ireland.”‘ 5
A similar point can be made about England. The criticism that establishment
equates to religious discrimination 6
is plainly informed by modem notions of
religious pluralism, but in fact echoes a much older debate. In a recent study, Avis
argues that it has never been possible to identify fully nation and church in England in
the way romanticized by the classical Anglican theorists, because the state has always
had religious minorities, particularly Jews and Roman Catholics. In that sense the
Church of England has never been a state church.0 7 Similar considerations provoked
anxious re-evaluation of the established church following the Roman Catholic Relief
Act 8 and again when the first Parliament to be dominated by non-Anglicans was
returned in 1909 with the Welsh nonconformist, David Lloyd George, as Prime
Minister.”
In practice, since the mid-nineteenth century, when any legal disabilities or
penalties for nonattendance at worship were removed,” 0 the Church of England has
shared with other religious bodies many of the characteristics of a voluntary body. The
state’s legal provisions relating to individuals and concerning religion impose duties
upon the church, rather than vice versa.”‘ Hence, any argument that the establishment
is discriminatory rests primarily on the symbolic effect of the link with state
institutions.
103 John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1965)
at 96.
104 Ibid.
‘0 Michael J. Perry, “Religion, Politics and Human Rights” in Bernard Treacy & Gerry Whyte,
eds., Religion, Morality and Public Policy (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1995) 16 at 19.
106 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
107 Avis, supra note 61 at 19.
’08 Supra note 49.
109 See e.g. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, On the Constitution of the Church and State (London: J.M.
Dent & Sons, 1972).
11o Toleration Act 1688, 1 Will. & Mar., c. 18, s. 16; Roman Catholic ReliefAct 1791, (U.K.) 7 & 8
Vic., c. 102 (1844); Religious Disabilities Act 1846, (U.K.) 9 & 10 Vict., c. 59 (1846). Pearce notes,
however, that aspects of the Act of Uniformity, (U.K.) 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 1 (1551) remained in force,
although without penalties, until repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1969, (U.K.) 1969, c. 52
(Pearce, supra note 20 at 461). See also St. John A. Robilliard, Religion and the Law: Religious
Liberty in Modem English Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) at 199-203.
111 See generally Wallbank, as considered supra note 16. The sole exception is the position of the
sovereign and the heir to the throne, but this is justifiable in view of the sovereign’s position as
Supreme Governor of the Church of England. An heir to the throne who is unable in conscience to
take the Accession and Coronation oaths always has the option of abdication.
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The experience of other European nations also shows that it is simplistic to regard
establishment as a zero-sum question where a special status for one religion
necessarily implies a disadvantage for other faiths. In Italy, for example, the amended
1947 constitution specifically protects the separate sphere of the Catholic church, with
which the state has detailed pacts, while guaranteeing equal legal rights for other
religions.2
Finally we can consider the case of one state-Australia-whose constitution
prohibits establishment and whose courts have clearly recognized that restrictions on
religious liberty are a separate issue. The drafting of the relevant provision, section
116 of the constitution, makes this quite clear by dealing with them distinctly. It reads:
mhe Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or
for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of
any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any
office or public trust under the Commonwealth.13
In Black v. The Commonwealth, a majority of the High Court of Australia found
that the provision of financial assistance to church schools by the state of Victoria did
not amount to a law establishing religion. In doing so the court rejected the argument
(derived from US First Amendment jurisprudence) that the establishment provision
requires a strict separation of church and state.’ The court was quite explicit in
rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a generous interpretation should be given to the
words “shall not make any law for establishing any religion” in section 116. In the
words of Stephen J.:
The very form of s. 116, consisting of four distinct and express restrictions
upon legislative power, is also significant. It cannot readily be viewed as the
repository of some broad statement of principle concerning the separation of
church and state, from which may be distilled the detailed consequences of
such separation. On the contrary, by fixing upon four specific restrictions of
legislative power, the form of the section gives no encouragement to the
undertaking of any such distillation. 15
Gibbs J. stated that:
[T]he establishment clause imposes a fetter on legislative power, and unlike the
words which forbid the making of any law prohibiting the free exercise of any
religion, does not do so for the purpose of protecting a fundamental human
right.’ 16
112 Constitution, 1947 (Italy), arts. 7-8. This is also the case in Spain. See Iglesia Bautista “El
Salvadore” and Ortega Moratilla v. Spain (1992), 72 Eur. Comm H.R.D.R. 256 [Iglesia Bautista];
Alujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain (2001), Application No. 53072/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R.),
online: European Court of Human Rights
113 Australian Constitution, supra note 7.
114 Black v. The Connonwealth, supra note 8 at 602-603, Gibbs J., 609, Stephen J.
.5 Ibid at 609. See also ibid. at 616, Mason J., and 653, Wilson J.
116 Ibid at 603.
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The way in which the Australian provision has been approached by the court
turns, of course, on its drafting. However, that fact alone demonstrates clearly that
there is no reason to take the equally particular words of the US First Amendment, nor
the way the courts have interpreted them, as embodying either necessary or universal
truths about the nature of establishment.
From this comparative review, it is clear that state legal recognition of a religion
does not always equate with positive disadvantages and inequalities for other (non-
in contemporary
established) religions. These are often conflated, especially
discussion about the future of the Church of England, but they need not be.
B. International Stance
When one turns to international law there is an enigmatic and perhaps discreet
silence on the establishment question. International treaties and covenants are worded
in free exercise terms only. In 1956, the United Nations commissioned a Special
Rapporteur, Arcot Krishnaswami, to report on religious discrimination. The result
four years later was the Krishnaswani Report,117 “still regarded as a classic study.11.
The author, drawing upon the monographs of eighty-six countries, concluded that it
was impossible to recommend a particular form of judicial relationship between the
state and religion. 9 As Brice Dickson noted more recently: “International law-not
just UN law-at present contains no norms purporting to determine the nature of the
relationship between a State and the church or churches within that State.”‘ 2 John
Witte, Jr. similarly detected the “conspicuous absen[ce]” in international norms of the
more radical demands for separationism reified in the American “wall of separation”
metaphor.12’ He observed:
International law and many domestic laws regard the material and moral
cooperation of the church and state as conducive, and sometimes essential, to
the achievement of religious liberty … Absolute separationists in this country
have fewer allies abroad than is conventionally assumed. 2 2
The Krishnaswami Report concluded that there was no necessary correlation
between legal or formal church-state relations and violations of freedom of religion. 123
Of course, whether the same conclusion would be reached today is perhaps debatable,
117 Arcot Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices
(New York: UN, 1980) [“Krishnaswami Report”].
18 Brice Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion” (1995) 44 I.C.L.Q. 327 at 334.
1
119 Ibid. at 335.
120 Ibid. at 351.
121 John Witte, Jr., “The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional
Experiment” (1996) 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 371 at 439.
12 2 Ibid. at 440.
123 “Krishnaswami Report”, supra note 117 at 64-5.
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especially in the light of the systematic denial of religious rights largely sponsored or
tolerated by many Islamic states 24
There is no presumption against the existence of an established church under
United Nations sponsored international human rights treaties.’25 The ICCPR refers to
a person’s right “to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice,”‘ 26 and to be
free from coercion in so choosing.’27 It does not, however, prohibit a state religion that
acts noncoercively.
In addition, there is the more specific 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.’ This,
however, does not have the status of a binding international agreement.’29 The
declaration provides in article 2(1) that “[n]o one shall be subject to discrimination by
any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the grounds of religion or other
belief.”‘3 By virtue of article 4, states are to take measures to enact protections
against
Adherence to the detailed list of the incidents of freedom of religion in article 6 would
to nonpreferred religions.3 2
prevent the denial by a state of these entitlements
religious discrimination and
rescind discriminatory
legislation.’
to
124 See Paul Marshall, Their Blood Cries Out: The Worldwide Tragedy of Modern Christians who
are Dying for Their Faith (Dallas: Word, 1997) (Marshall provides a well-documented, country-by-
country analysis).
125 See Dickson, supra note 118; Malcolm D. Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) c. 8-9.
126 ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 18.
127 Ibid., art. 18(2).
128 Declaration on the Elimination of Intolerance, supra note 81. See Evans, supra note 125, c. 9;
Donna J. Sullivan, “Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the
Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination” (1988) 82 Am. J. Int. L. 487.
129 See Sullivan, ibid. 488-89 (recommendations from two Special Rapporteurs that a convention of
this kind be adopted have so far come to nothing).
130 Supra note 81.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.:
[F]reedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the
following freedoms:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and
maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and institutions;
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Nevertheless, Donna Sullivan concludes
the
Declaration are not premised upon the separation of church and state and are clearly
distinguished in this regard from First Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution.” ‘133 An earlier draft made this clearer; it contained a statement indicating
that neither establishment of religion, nor formal separation of state and religion,
would in themselves constitute religious intolerance or discrimination.’34
the “protections offered
that
in
More general provisions prohibiting discrimination on religious grounds also
appear in the ICCPR.’33 The Human Rights Committee has tended to run these
together with religious liberty as such in an indiscriminate fashion.136 Nevertheless, by
cautioning against a state, official, traditional, or majority religion impairing the rights
of others, the Human Rights Committee has acknowledged that arrangements that do
not restrict religious liberty are possible. We can deduce their form from the features
that are singled out for negative comment-measures that discriminate against
adherents of other religions or nonbelievers by restricting access to government posts,
conferring economic privileges on majority groups, or imposing special restrictions
on minority
in several
contemporary European states does none of these.’38
religions.’37 Weak establishment of the
found
type
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by
the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance
with the precepts of one’s religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in
matters of religion and belief at the national and international levels.
133 Sullivan, supra note 128 at 490.
134 Art. I (d) Draft Convention. (Note by the Secretary-General: The Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. A/8730 (1972)). See Sullivan, ibid.
135 Supra note 70. Notably, discrimination on religious grounds is prohibited under article 26 (non-
discrimination and equality before the law) and under article 27 (group rights for religious minorities
to profess and practice their own religion).
136 See Evans, supra note 79 at 208-209.
1’ UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comments on Freedom of Thought, and on Minority
Rights” (1994) 15 H.R.L.J. 233 at para. 9.
138 The Human Rights Committee has, however, taken a mixed approach toward state preference
for religious schools in a series of complaints from Canada. Provincial funding of Roman Catholic
schools in Ontario has been found not to be discriminatory under article 26 of the ICCPR against
complainants who, as parents of children at other (nonreligious) publicly funded schools, merely
wished to see such funding removed: Tadman v. Canada, Communication No. 816/1998, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/67/D/816/1998 (4 November 1999), online: Officer of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights
whole cost of sending his child to a private Jewish school the Committee found there had been
discrimination: Waldman v. Canada, Communication No. 694/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/
694/1996 (5 November 1999), online: Officer of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
require the separation of church and state,” but that countries that fail to do so “often encounter
specific problems
in securing compliance with articles 18, 26 and 27.” See T. Choudhury,
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C. European Case Law under the European Convention on Human
Rights’39
Despite being a regional system for human rights protection, the European
Convention on Human Rights'” (“the Convention”) is of some importance to this
discussion-it is the oldest and most developed international system for human rights
protection; it applies to countries with a total population of some eight hundred
million; and several of the paradigmatic examples of mild establishment fall under its
supervision.
Although the ECHR forbids discrimination by member states in the enjoyment of
Convention rights on various grounds, including religion or belief,’
the European
Court of Human Rights has held that mild forms of state preference for one religion
over another do not violate the Convention. Thus, in Otto-Preminger Institute, the
European Court of Human Rights held that the Austrian authorities were permitted,
when deciding to ban a film that was offensive to Roman Catholics, to take account of
the clear Roman Catholic majority (estimated at eighty-seven per cent of the
population) in the region concerned-the Tyrol.’
In considering the “margin of
appreciation” to be granted to the authorities under article 10 of the ECHR, the court
could not “disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the
overwhelming majority of Tyroleans.”‘ 43
Similarly, in Choudhury, the European Commission held that the failure of UK
law to criminalize publications offending non-Christians did not of itself amount to a
violation of freedom of religion. It thus followed that no issue of discrimination in the
enjoyment of an article 14 Convention right arose where the law of blasphemy in
England applied to Christianity only.'”
Article 9 of the ECHR protects freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The
state is permitted without infringing article 9 to make some variations in the legal
in Jewish Liturgical
treatment of different
religious groups. For
instance,
“Interpreting the Right to Equality under Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights” [2003] Eur. H.R.L. Rev. 24 at 32-33.
139 See Evans, supra note 79 at 80-87; Javier Martinez-Torr6n, “Religious Liberty in European
Jurisprudence” in Mark Hill, ed., Religious Liberty and Human Rights (Cardiff- University of Wales
Press, 2002) 99 at 104-11.
40 ECHR, supra note 2.
1
14A’Article 14, ibid. See e.g. Hoffman v. Austria (1994), 17 E.H.R.R. 293, Appliction No.
00012845/87 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), online: European Court of Human Rights
discriminated in denying custody of a child to a mother because she was a Jehovah’s Witness).
142 Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria (1994), 19 E.H.R.R. 34 at para. 52, 69 Eur. Comm. H.R.D.R.
173.
14 Ibid. at para. 56.
144Choudhury v. United Kingdom (1991), 12 H.R.L.J. 172 at 173.
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Association,145 the French authorities had restricted the number of licences granted to
orthodox Jewish groups for the ritual slaughter of animals. A minority, ultra-orthodox
group that was unable to obtain meat that satisfied its religious dietary requirements
from a licenced slaughterer in France nevertheless failed in its challenge under article
9. A majority of the European Court found that the group concerned was not impeded
in practice from manifesting
its religion since satisfactory meat could be easily
imported from Belgium.’46
There are clear limits, however, to permissible state preference. Where the state
denies legal recognition entirely to certain minority religious groups, the Convention
organs have found there to be a breach of both article 9147 and article 6 (the right to a
fair trial), in conjunction with article 14.’4
The absence of a uniform European pattern for the treatment of religion by the
state means that a variety of state-religion relationships between states and religion
have been accepted by the Convention. There has been no attempt to impose
uniformity, despite a recent tendency in the jurisprudence to refer to the state’s duty of
impartiality in religious matters. 149
The existence of a church established under national law has been held not to
violate the Convention per se. In Darby v. Sweden, the Commission of Human Rights
found that:
A State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 9 of the
Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting States and
existed there when the Convention was drafted and when they became parties
to it. However, a State Church system must, in order to satisfy Article 9,
include specific safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion. 150
The question at stake was the liability of a non-national to pay a tax that went in part
to the Swedish Lutheran church to support its religious activities. The European
Commission on Human Rights had found a violation of article 9, since the only way
that the applicant could avoid paying the tax was to change nationality. The European
Court of Human Rights approached the issue differently. It found that the tax
European Court of Human Rights
145 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France (2000), Application No. 27417/95 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), online:
146 ibid.
147 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova (2002), 35 E.H.R.R. 306.
148 Canea Catholic Church v. Greece (1999), 27 E.H.R.R. 521, Application No. 00025528/94 (Eur.
Ct. H.R.)
(holding that denial of legal personality to
some churches–prohibiting the capacity to litigate unless registered with the state-violates articles
6 and 14).
149 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey (2003), 37 E.H.R.R. at paras. 90-92; Martinez-
150 (1991), 13 E.H.R.R. 774 at para. 45; 56 Eur. Comm. H.R.D.R. 166.
Torr6n, supra note 139 at 106-107.
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constituted discrimination in the enjoyment of property since Swedish nationals could
opt out of supporting the Lutheran church while foreigners were denied this choice.151
The existence of an established church does not necessarily mean that it is to be
treated as an arm of the state under the Convention system. Two (minor) Strasbourg
cases involving human rights complaints against the Church of England have both
resulted in findings that the complaints were inadmissible without reaching an
authoritative determination of whether the UK is liable under the Convention for the
actions of the church’s institutions. 5 ‘ Better guidance can be obtained from decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights concerning other national churches.
In one case, the court upheld a claim against Greece for the forcible transfer to the
state of land belonging to monasteries of the Greek Orthodox Church, finding that it
violated the monasteries’ right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions under article 1
of the First Protocol to the Convention.’53 In reaching this conclusion, the court
dismissed the Greek government’s argument that because of the constitutional status
of the Greek Orthodox Church, the monasteries were not entitled to complain as
victims under the Convention since they did not qualify as “non-governmental”
organizations under article 34. 154 The constitutional and legislative recognition of
church institutions as public law entities ascribed with legal personality was found not
to be determinative of the monasteries’ status under the Convention.’55 The objectives
of the monasteries (whether ecclesiastical, spiritual, social, or cultural) were not
analogous to those of government organizations; their legal powers were confined to
spiritual questions, and supervision was conducted by the local archbishop, not by the
state.
Similarly, in an admissibility decision from Sweden, the Commission found that
the status of the Church of Sweden and its parishes as public law corporations did not
preclude
treated as a “non-governmental
organization” for the purpose of making a Convention complaint. It also followed
from the non-governmental status of the church, however, that the state could not be
individual parish
from being
an
… Ibid. at paras. 28-34.
152 See Tyler v. U.K. (1994), 77A Eur. Comm. H.R.D.R. 81 (no violation of article 6(1) in consistory
court and Court of Arches procedure and composition) and Williamson v. UK, Application No.
00027008/95, 17 May 1995 (challenge to Ordination of Women Measure for violating individual
priest’s rights under article 9 held inadmissible).
153 Holy Monasteries v. Greece (1995), 20 E.H.R.R. 1, Application No. 0073092/87 (Eur. Ct. H.R.),
online: European Court of Human Rights
154 Ibid. at paras. 48-49.
155 See article 3 of the Greek Constitution of 1975, discussed in Kokkinakis v. Greece (1993), 17
E.H.R.R. 397 at paras. 13-14, Application No. 00014307/88 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), online: European Court
of Human Rights
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liable for alleged violations of freedom of religion resulting from a decision of the
Church Assembly about the form of liturgy to be used in the parish.” 6
Recently, this approach was explicitly followed by several members of the House
of Lords in Wallbank, 57 which arose under
the Human Rights Act 19985′
(incorporating the ECHR into United Kingdom law). Indeed, the House of Lords
found that the Parochial Church Council of the Church of England was not acting as a
“public authority” for the purpose of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 when
enforcing liability for chancel repairs upon a landowner. As a consequence, and in
line with the Strasbourg jurisprudence discussed above, the Convention right of
peaceful enjoyment of property (Protocol 1, Article 1) could not be invoked against
the Parochial Church Council.
It can be seen, then, that the European Convention draws a clear line between
state institutions, which can be liable for human rights violations, and non-state
actors, which cannot. The fact that established churches have been treated as being in
the latter category further undercuts the argument that all forms of establishment
involve restrictions on religious liberty.
IV. Answering the Objections
A. The Alienation Charge
Some, but by no means all, non-adherents of the established religion might
complain that they feel excluded or alienated; that they are being relegated to the
status of second-class citizens by the state’s favouring of a particular faith. Perhaps
the most cited judicial articulation of this concern is Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s
so-called “endorsement test” for potential establishment clause violations under the
First Amendment of the US Constitution. The actual context was a challenge to a city-
sponsored and funded Christmas display in a privately owned park, which included a
nativity scene featuring the birth of Christ. The government, said Justice O’Connor,
ought to be wary of endorsing religion in these instances of public religious
symbolism since
[e]ndorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
156 Hautanemi v. Sweden (1996), 22 E.H.R.R. CD155; Frank Cranmer, “The Church of Sweden and
the Unravelling of Establishment” (2000) 5 Ecc. L.J. 417 (on establishment in Sweden).
157 Supra note 16. See discussion of Wallbank in Ian Leigh, “Freedom of Religion: Public/Private,
Rights/Wrongs” in Mark Hill, ed., Religious Liberty and Human Rights (Cardiff: University of Wales
Press, 2002) 128 at 149-52.
158 Supra note 17.
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adherents that they are insiders, favoured members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message.1 59
Sachs J. of the South African Constitutional Court aptly described the harm involved
here as a “negative radiating symbolic effect”.”w
The endorsement test has a certain facile attraction, but its flaws are well-
documented. 16 1 The majority in Lynch warned of the danger of “a stilted overreaction
contrary to our history”‘162 in the course of ruling (by a bare majority of five to four)
that there had been no violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
Just what criteria ought to guide decision-makers in determining whether the test
has been satisfied? This is a difficult question to answer. The predictable, albeit
unhelpful answer is that each
instance must be judged on its merits: “[Tihe
endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstances and context of
a particular challenged practice.”‘ 6 3 Admittedly, as Justice O’Connor noted, the
endorsement test “may not always yield results with unanimous agreement at the
margins. But that is true of many standards in constitutional law.”‘”
In County of
Allegheny-where, by contrast to Lynch, a creche (on the grand staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse) was held (again by a bare majority)
to be
unconstitutional-the minority expressed unease at
the
endorsement test. The question of whether a “reasonable observer” might “fairly
understand” a government action to send an alienating message to nonadherents was
derided for being “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice”. 65 Indeed,
the test was described as a “most unwelcome … addition to our tangled Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.” 166
the application of
159 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 at 688 (1984) [Lynch, emphasis added]. The test has been
applied in, for example, County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 at 595, 625
(1989) [County of Allegheny] and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)
at 309-10 and most recently by Justice O’Connor in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,
124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) at 2321 [Newdow (Sup. Ct.)]. See generally Steven B. Epstein, “Rethinking
the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism” (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083.
160 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 138. For discussion of this case and religious freedom in South
Africa, see Lourens du Plessis, “Freedom of or Freedom from Religion?: An Overview of Issues
Pertinent to the Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in ‘the New South
Africa’
161 See Steven D. Smith, “Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test” (1987) 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266; Jesse H. Choper, Securing Religious
Liberty Principles for Judicial Interpretation of the Religion Clauses (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1995) at 27-34.
[2001] B.YU. L. Rev. 439.
162 Lynch, supra note 159.
163 County ofAllegheny, supra note 159 at 629.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid. at 669.
6 Ibid. at 668.
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Similarly, Sachs J. in Lawrence noted that the all-encompassing breadth of the
endorsement test was both its strength and its weakness: “It indicates the broad
question to be asked, but not the specific criteria to be used for the answer. More
especially, it does little to establish from whose standpoint the message by the State
should be considered.” ’67 Trifling and apparently innocuous matters to some sections
(perhaps the majority) may be experienced as most hurtful and
of society
exclusionary
in County of
Allegheny held that this called for a double-barrelled approach, in which the court
ascertains whether the practice in question would likely be perceived by adherents as
endorsement, and by nonadherents as disapproval of their religion.168 For Sachs J., the
sensibilities and perspective of the reasonable Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, or
atheist were all inappropriate. The correct formulation was:
to those possessing different beliefs. The majority
mhe reasonable South African (of any faith or none) who is neither
hypersensitive nor overly insensitive to the belief in question, but highly
attuned to the requirements of the Constitution. In my opinion, such a
reasonable South African is a person of common sense immersed in the cultural
realities of our country and aware of the amplitude and nuanced nature of our
Constitution. He or she neither attempts relentlessly to purge public life of even
the faintest association with religion for fear of otherwise descending the
slippery slope to theocracy, nor, at the other extreme, regards the religiously-
based practices of the past to be as natural and non-sectarian as the air one
breathes simply because of their widespread acceptance. 169
It is difficult to surpass this statement of the desirable, indeed ideal, attributes of
the reasonable citizen when it comes to religious issues. The reasonable person is, of
course, as Lord Radcliffe pointed out,7 simply the anthropomorphic conception of
justice. Here, just as the American Supreme Court had done, the Constitutional Court
divided on the fulfillment of the test. On whether the designation of Sundays, Good
Friday, and Christmas Day as “closed days” for the purposes of liquor sales by
grocers was a breach of religious freedom guaranteed by section 14 of the Interim
Constitution,’7 ‘ four judges answered in the negative. There might be circumstances
where state endorsement of religion would contravene section 14-where the
endorsement has a coercive effect’ 72-but
this was not one of them. The five other
judges saw it differently. In their opinion, an “inescapable message” sent out by the
legislation was that the state still showed special solicitude to Christians. The
negative, symbolic harm was present; the implicit message communicated was that
167 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 161.
168 County of Allegheny, supra note 159 at 597, citing School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 at 390 (1985).
169 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 162.
170 Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956 A.C. 696 at 728 (H.L.).
171 Section 14 of the Interim Constitution (1993) retained its wording to become section 15 of the
final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996 (see du Plessis, supra note 160 at
439-40).
172 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 104.
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“Christians occupy central positions in the political kingdom, while non-Christians
live on the periphery.” ’17 3
Another objection to the endorsement test is its secularizing potential. Justice
Kennedy in County of Allegheny noted that few traditional practices reflecting
America’s religious roots could withstand scrutiny from this test.174 Examples were,
he noted, the Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation,
legislative prayers and
chaplains, the national motto (“in God we trust”), and the Pledge of Allegiance’s
reference to the United States being “one nation under God”. 7 ‘ Kennedy J. discerned
that the minority or majority status of the religion would become critical
in
determining whether state recognition constituted a forbidden endorsement:
If there is such a person as the “reasonable observer,” I am quite certain that he
or she will take away a salient message from our holding in these cases: the
Supreme Court of the United States has concluded that the First Amendment
creates classes of religions based on the relative numbers of their adherents.
Those religions enjoying the largest following must be consigned to the status
of least favored faiths so as to avoid any possible risk of offending members of
minority religions.176
In other words, under the endorsement test the followers of the majority faith must
respect the sensibilities of others, and the US Supreme Court will ensure as much
should the state venture to reinforce majority wishes. But the Court is not obliged to
respect the majority’s sensibilities when it overturns existing state sponsored, public
celebrations of the dominant religion. The Court is cast in the role of “censor” issuing
national decrees as to what is orthodox, and “[w]hat is orthodox, in this context,
means what is secular.” 17 7 Kennedy J. was adamant that the Court was “ill equipped to
sit as a national theology board.”’78
Admittedly, there may be situations where state-favouring or endorsement of a
particular religion does violate religious freedom; however, a carefully developed
concept of coercion catches these. Chaskalson P. in Lawrence observed that state
endorsements of religion would contravene the religious freedom guarantee
173 Lawrence, ibid. at para. 164, Sachs J. (Mokgoro J. concurring). Three other justices, O’Regan,
Goldstone, and Madala JJ. agreed that there had been an endorsement of religion sufficient to breach
the constitution but, unlike Sachs and Mokgoro JJ., they concluded that the infringement was not
justified “in an open and democratic society” according to s. 33.
174 Supra note 159 at 670-74.
175 Ibid. The last example was, of course, to prove eerily prophetic given the recent Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision impugning the constitutional propriety of those fateful words in the Pledge:
Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F. 3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003) [Newdow (C.A.)]. An appeal to the Supreme
Court was dismissed on procedural grounds: Newdow (Sup. Ct.), supra note 159. Three judges
(Renquist C.J., O’Connor J., and Thomas J.) ruled, on the merits, that the Pledge did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
176 County ofAllegheny, supra note 159 at 677.
‘ Ibid. at 678.
178 Ibid.
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if such endorsement has the effect of coercing persons to observe the practices
of a particular religion, or of placing constraints on them in relation to the
observance of their own different religion. The coercion may be direct or
indirect, but it must be established to give rise to an infringement of the
freedom of religion.179
Kennedy J. in County of Allegheny correctly summarized, we believe, the true
situation: “Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or
symbolic accommodation is minimal.” I
Coercion is a difficult concept to define, especially when one moves beyond
“blatant” or “direct” instances of coercion (where the government expressly forbids or
compels certain behaviour) to instances of “subtle” or “indirect” coercion (where
government action merely makes non-compliance more difficult).”‘ John Locke drew
a distinction between persuasion and force. ,He saw a limited role for the magistrate to
make use of arguments to teach, instruct, and redress the “erroneous” by reason. For
Locke, “it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one thing to press with
arguments, another with penalties.” ‘182 Like all dichotomies, the practical drawing of
the line is often contentious. Jeremy Waldron observes:
It is notoriously difficult to draw a sensible line between conduct that counts as
coercive and conduct that merely counts as persuasive. Knowing how to draw
this line is not a matter of being familiar with a dictionary. It is a matter of
knowing how and why coercion is thought to be a worry, and of working out
how far and to what extent the grounds of that worry apply in a particular
case.1
8 3
illustrates the point by echoing and updating Locke’s example:
Waldron then
“Suppose a government makes no attempt to impose a Christian ethic with sanctions,
but its most powerful orators constantly use broadcasting media to preach Christian
values. Is this coercion or not? ‘
In Canada, indirect coercion has been found with regard to certain long-standing
religious practices or observances. As we noted in Part II, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Big M Drug Mart referred not only to “blatant” coercion, but to “indirect”
or “subtle” forms of coercion as well. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a law
whose avowed purpose was to prohibit Sunday trading worked “a form of coercion
179 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 104.
180 County ofAllegheny, supra note 159 at 662.
181 See Michael W. McConnell, “Religious Freedom at a Crossroads” (1992) 59 U. Chicago L. Rev.
115 at 160. Thomas J. in Newdow criticized the adoption of a notion of coercion based on subtle
psychological pressure. Instead, “[t]he kind of coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses is that
(supra note 159 at 2330, citing Lee v.
accomplished ‘by force of law and threat of plurality’
Weizman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) at 640, Scalia J., dissenting).
182 Locke, supra note 82 at 18.
183 Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and Moral Neutrality” in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Liberal Rights:
Collected Papers: 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 143 at 156.
184 Ibid.
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inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all non-Christians.”‘ 85 The
Court held that non-Christians-whether Jews, agnostics, atheists, or Muslims-were
not required or compelled to observe the Christian Sabbath in the sense that they were
compelled to attend Church or pray that day. But they were required to “remember the
Lord’s day of the Christians and to keep it holy” insofar as they were “prohibited for
religious reasons from carrying out activities which are otherwise lawful, moral and
normal.” ‘186 If one is precluded from doing an everyday secular activity (working,
shopping, playing sport) to preserve the religious sensibilities of others, a form of
coercion is arguably occurring. One is being indirectly forced to observe a religious
practice, a practice not of one’s choosing and which may directly offend one’s own
conscience. The “arm of the State”’87 ought not promote this effect.
Similarly, if a child is required to take positive steps to excuse herself or himself
from religious instruction in the classroom, an embarrassment or “stigmatization” is
likely to occur. For that reason, Canadian courts have ruled that religious exercises in
public schools are not saved from infringing the Charter’s guarantee of religious
freedom by allowing children the ability to opt out of such exercises.’88 Likewise, the
ability of an adult citizen to opt out of the reciting of the Lord’s prayer at the opening
of a town council meeting does not prevent Charter infringement.’89
Surely the outer limit of coercion was reached, if not breached, when the majority
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Newdow held that the Pledge of Allegiance
was coercive. Even though the school pupil in that case was not obliged to recite the
pledge, she was compelled to watch and listen to the ritual, and the court held: “[T]he
mere presence in the classroom everyday as peers recite the statement ‘one nation
under God’ has a coercive effect.’ 9
Many of the Canadian instances are ones where state endorsement of a religious
practice produces, in the Supreme Court’s view, tangible, adverse consequences for
the non-adherent. A shopkeeper cannot sell on a certain day and, indeed, may suffer a
further economic loss by having to also close on a holy day dictated by his or her own
religion. But, to return to the central focus of our paper, what of the situation where
the mere existence of an established church is said to be offensive? The US public
nativity display cases provide a useful focus. As we have seen, some non-adherents
may feel slighted and relegated to the position of outsiders by the mere presence of
such a display; their dignity is, they contend, diminished by the very act of
government favouritism.
185 Supra note 44 at 354.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 See Zylberberg, supra note 35; Canadian Civil Liberties v. Ontario (Education Minister) (1990),
71 O.R. (2d) 341, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (C.A.).
189 Freitag v. Penetanguishene (Town) (1999), 47 O.R. (3d) 301,179 D.L.R. (4th) 150 (C.A.).
190 Newdow (C.A.), supra note 175 at 488.
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We agree that it is no response to glibly argue that the aggrieved citizen should
simply be less sensitive. Sachs J. in Lawrence explained that the functional impact of
a law endorsing a religion may be “marginal, and its symbolic effect muted,”
but
the message it sends ought not to be disregarded out of hand. One must be most wary
in applying the de minimis non curat lex maxim (the law does not concern itself with
trifles) to these situations. The de minimis principle
should be used with extreme caution when it comes to deciding such sensitive
and not easily measurable questions as freedom of conscience, religion and
belief. One of the functions of the Constitution is precisely to protect the
fundamental rights of non-majoritarian groups, who might well be tiny in
number and hold beliefs considered bizarre by the ordinary faithful. In
constitutional terms, the quality of a belief cannot be dependent on the number
of its adherents nor on how widespread or reduced the acceptance of its ideas
might be, nor, in principle, should it matter how slight the intrusion by the State
is. 192
In principle, as Sachs J. contends, it should not matter how slight the offence is,
but in practice there must be some limit: “trivial or insubstantial”’93 burdens upon
religion are not candidates for constitutional
infringement, nor should “every
miniscule state-imposed cost associated with the practice of religion”‘ 94 be prohibited.
In Newdow, Fernandez J., dissenting, believed that it was “obvious” that the tendency
of the Pledge’s “under God” phrase to interfere with the free exercise (or non-
exercise) of religion was de minimis 95 There was no coercion of anyone’s religious
liberty “except in the fevered eye of persons who most fervently would like to drive
all tincture of religion out of the public life of our polity.”‘”
We agree that personal offence cannot lightly be ignored unless, it seems, the
offended citizen is a member of the majority religion. Thick skin must be possessed
by the adherents of the dominant (and in some nations, established) faith. Our point is
that ostracism or alienation in this area can, and does, cut both ways. The angst
experienced by those not adhering to the established faith must be set alongside the
slight felt by religionists when their faith, often the dominant one in the nation, is
ignored. As Fernandez J. in Newdow (C.A.) stated: “[S]ome people may not feel good
about hearing the phrases recited in their presence, but, then, others might not feel
good if they are omitted.”‘ 9 It is easy to focus on alienation on one side only, yet
191 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 106.
192 Ibid. at para. 160. O’Connor J. in Newdow (Sup. Ct.) similarly commented: ‘There are no de
minimis violations of the Constitution-no constitutional harms so slight that the courts are obliged to
ignore them” (supra note 159 at 2323).
193 Jones v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 at 314, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 569, Wilson J. dissenting on
other grounds.
194 Edwards Books and Art v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 759, 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, Dickson
CJ.C.
195 Newdow (C.A.), supra note 175 at 493.
196 Ibid. at 492.
197 Ibid.
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believers or religionists may feel equally alienated by a secular political regime that
extirpates religious symbolism and practice from the public square. 9
In a nation such as the United Kingdom where a recent census indicated that
some 72 per cent of respondents identified themselves as Christian,'”
it seems
plausible to believe that a significant portion of these would be offended should a
thoroughgoing expunging of Christian
symbols and practices be
implemented.
religious
There is, moreover, perhaps wider support for the rejection of the notion of a
secular state (in which religion is legally privatized) than one might initially think.
Writers from other religions, such as the British Muslim scholar Tariq Modood and
the Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, have defended establishment on the basis that it is a
symbolic reminder of the spiritual sphere of life.2″ Modood has recently rejected the
plea for disestablishment of the Church of England and the creation of a thoroughly
secular state. It is, he noted, “a brute fact” that not a single article or speech could be
found by any non-Christian faith in favour of disestablishment. Rather, secular
reformers have been using minorities by claiming the desire to accommodate them in
order to justify courses of action that advance secular purposes. Modood charges that
“proposals to dismantle establishment in the name of multi-faithism must be viewed
as disingenuous,”2 1 and castigates the attempt “to wrap a homogenising secular
hegemony in the language of multi-culturalism and rights of minorities.”‘2 He
supports an established religion (albeit in a weak form) on the basis that all religions
stand and fall together.2 3 An inclusive and accommodating Church of England that
198 Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious
Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 114 [Smith, Foreordained Failure]. See also
Robert Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 2003) at 65-66: “Apparently those who do not like religion are exquisitely
sensitive to the pain of being reminded of it, but the religious are assumed to have no right to such
feelings about the banishment of religion from the public arena.”
1’ U.K., National Statistics, “Religion in Britain”, online: National Statistics Online
out of base of 58.7 million. Some 92 per cent of the people surveyed chose to answer this voluntary
question.)
200 See Tariq Modood, “Establishment, Multiculturalism and British Citizenship” (1994) 65 Pol. Q.
53; Jonathan Sacks, The Persistence of Faith: Religion, Morality & Society in a Secular Age
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) at 97.
201 Modood, ibid. at 61.
202 Ibid. at 63.
203 Modood, ironically, cites Dr. Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregation
and distills Sacks’ argument as follows: (i) in the context of massive but incomplete secularization, the
fate of all religions, minority and majority, hang together; (ii) moreover, diversity requires that there
also be an overarching public culture; (iii) if this public culture is to have a religious dimension, it will
be that of the premier religion, which for historical reasons is the Church of England, consequently all
minorities ought to support it as a national institution (ibid. at 63-64).
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retains its special privileges is preferable to a thoroughly secular public square where
all reference to the sacred and transcendental is extirpated. Modood comments:
[The minimal nature of the Anglican establishment, its proven openness to
other denominations and faiths seeking public space, and the fact that its very
existence is an ongoing acknowledgement of the public character of religion,
are all reasons why it may be far less intimidating to the minority faiths than a
triumphal secularism. 204
Support for establishment can thus be located squarely within an anti-secularist
agenda and is not an exclusively Christian plea. The most vocal critics of
establishment in the name of religious pluralism are, in fact, usually secularists, rather
than the adherents of minority religions, whose views, Modood wryly notes, are
rarely solicited. 25 Religious liberty is similarly seized upon as a vehicle to secure
greater economic liberty. In Lawrence, Sachs J. noted that the challenge to the ban of
liquor sales based on an alleged violation of religious freedom did not come from
believers whose religion was being threatened, but from grocers whose profits were
being limited. The “result was an air of artificiality in relation to this aspect of the
case.”
206
B. The Inequality Charge
To single out and favour one religion is, the critics contend, unjust. “Religious
freedom”, insisted Philip Kurland, “must mean that whatever special place one
religion may have in the eyes of God, all religions are equal in the eyes of the law. ‘ 2
Spanish legal scholar ivan Ibbtn maintains: “If religious equality does not exist (I refer
to purely formal equality), then I do not believe we can say that full religious freedom
exists.””
The short answer to this argument is that religious freedom and religious equality
are two different things. 9 Ex hypothesi, establishment contravenes the ideal of formal
religious equality. But the point is surely not to treat all religions equally in an abstract
sense but to treat all religions with due concern and respect. Conceivably, an historic
religion supported by a majority of citizens performing valuable social, educational,
204 Ibid. at 72-73.
205 Tariq Modood, “Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism” in Tariq Modood,
ed., Church, State and Religious Minorities (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1997) 3 at 9 [Modood,
“Introduction”].
206 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 140.
201 Philip B. Kurland, “The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court”(1984) 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. I at 3.
208 Ivan C. Ibidn, “Religious Tolerance and Freedom in Continental Europe” (1997) 10 Ratio Juris
90 at 97.
209 See e.g. Mason J. in Black v. The Commonwealth, supra note 8 at 617.
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and cultural functions might well be more “deserving”, in a broad sense, of state
assistance than a recent, tiny, insular religious community.2
Sir Isaiah Berlin once warned of the danger of “confounding liberty with her
sisters, equality and fraternity.” ‘211 It may well be that freedom by itself, shorn of the
conditions necessary to effectively exercise it, is a hollow thing. This simply indicates
that there are other values or goals–equality, justice, and so on-besides liberty.
Berlin urged: “But nothing is gained by a confusion of terms … Everything is what it
is: liberty is liberty, not equality nor fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness
or a quiet conscience.”’21 2
infringement of
religious
Admittedly, claims of
freedom and unequal,
discriminatory
treatment on the basis of religion can sometimes be difficult to
distinguish. Sopinka J. of the Supreme Court of Canada in Adler v. Ontario noted this
difficulty and the overlap between claims based on subsection 2(a) (religious liberty)
and section 15 (equality and religious nondiscrimination) of the Canadian Charter.2 3
Nonetheless, the claims are conceptually distinct. In Adler, parents who, for religious
reasons, sent their children to independent, private religious schools challenged the
absence of public funding for such schools as a violation of their rights to religious
freedom and equality under the Charter. The Supreme Court held that there was no
infringement of the appellants’ freedom of religion. The situation here did not involve
the prohibition of a religious practice, but rather the absence of state funding for one.
This, noted L’Heureux-Dub6 J., “has not historically been considered a violation of
the freedom of religion.”2 4 McLachlin J. similarly commented: “Absence of state
funding for private religious practices, as distinct from prohibitions on such practices,
‘ “Never”, continued McLachlin J.,
has never been seen as religious persecution.
“has it been suggested that freedom of religion entitles one to state support for one’s
religion. 2 6 A failure to render state-assistance to all religious communities and to
210 See Ruffini, supra note 95 at 520: “A perfect equality of legal treatment must presuppose an
equality in the actual conditions.” Yet in many European nations this equality of conditions was
plainly lacking (in Ruffini’s native Italy, a huge Catholic majority existed alongside a tiny non-
Catholic minority). Thus,
in order to realise a perfect parity or equality it would be necessary that the State, in
homage to pure abstractions and theories, should ignore the concrete reality of facts-
which the State cannot possibly do, since it is an entity which lives and works
exclusively in the world of reality. And from another point of view, an equality of legal
treatment, in actual conditions so monstrously dissimilar, would not constitute practical
justice, but merely abstract justice (ibid. at 520).
211 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford
University Press, 1969) 118 at 154.
212 Ibid. at 125 [emphasis added].
213 Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 at para. 166, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 385 [Adler].
214 Ibid. at 410
215 Ibid. at 454.
216 Ibid.
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treat them all with strict equality was not a violation of religious freedom. Cases such
as Adler thus bear out Richard Moon’s recent assessment that “the Canadian courts
have been hesitant to state clearly that freedom of religion does not simply prohibit
in spiritual matters (protects spiritual autonomy), but also prohibits
coercion
Interestingly,
something more, the unequal
L’Heureux-Dub6 J. in Adler pointed out that the potential for greater redress under
section 15 may not be realized: “The protections afforded in s. 15 may thus be of
greater scope than those in s. 2(a), as our concern moves from the coercive aspect of
the state action to its impact on the individual’s and group’s sense of dignity and
worth in the socio-economic context of the day. ‘ 218 Under section 15, a minority of
the Court held that there had indeed been a breach of the Charter.219
treatment of different religions.” ‘217
If we return to our definition of religious freedom in Part II, it seems clear that
establishment per se does not infringe religious freedom. Positive religious liberty
remains similarly unimpaired. Regarding negative religious liberty, establishment (in
the weak form) ipso facto does not produce any direct or indirect coercion or
compulsion in religious matters.
Empirically speaking, one can point to examples of nations with established
churches whose citizens enjoy religious liberty. As Carillo de Albomoz suggested in
his 1963 study: “It seems obvious … that countries which officially protect a particular
religion may have a correct conception of religious liberty. We think, for instance, that
the British understanding of religious freedom in the modem times is a perfect one, in
spite of having an established Church.”22 The description of the British church-state
structure as “perfect” despite establishment is hardly an assessment with which
American scholars would concur. Staunch separationists retort: “It is of course true
there is a large measure of religious liberty in England; whether there is complete
religious liberty depends largely on one’s viewpoint. “221 However, aside from the
symbolic alienation some non-Christians may experience, it is difficult to pinpoint
precisely how religious freedom is less than complete. If there is an “absolute and
religious
indissoluble nexus” between non-establishment
freedom, then many European nations such as England and Italy “should resign
themselves to remaining forever excluded from a regime of full and true religious
liberty. ‘ 222 This is a view that would find little favour outside of the US.
(separationism) and
217 Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41 Brandeis L.J. 563 at 565.
218 Supra note 213 at 414.
219 McLachlin J. and L’Heureux-Dub6 J. held that section 15’s equality guarantee had been
breached, although McLachlin J. found that the infringement was justified under section 1 of the
Charter (Adler, ibid.).
220 A.F. Carrillo de Albomoz, The Basis of Religious Liberty (London: SCM, 1963) at 51 [emphasis
in original].
221 Pfeffer, Church and Freedom, supra note 98 at 52 [emphasis added].
222 Rutfmi, supra note 95 at 521.
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To vigorously pursue separationism and dismantle the established church would,
in some countries, cause much offence. To dismantle state churches in pursuit of some
abstract or idealized conception of equality would do violence to history and the
actual exigencies of religious life in certain nations.
There is, we concede, the strongly held view that religious equality or even-
handedness is an intrinsic part of religious freedom. For example, five judges of the
South African Constitutional Court in Lawrence were adamant that this was so. For
them, to refrain from state coercion with respect to citizens’ religious choices did not
go far enough. O’Regan J. insisted:
mhe requirements of the Constitution require more of the Legislature than that
it refrain from coercion. It requires in addition that the Legislature refrain from
favouring one religion over others. Fairness and evenhandedness in relation to
diverse religions is a necessary component of freedom of religion.223
In the South African context, any state endorsement of Christianity would not only
“disturb the general principle of impartiality in relation to matters of belief and
opinion,” but might also serve to activate memories of past discrimination since
the past coincided strongly … with racial
religious marginalization had “in
discrimination, social exclusion and political disempowerment. 224
Chaskalson P. (along with three other concurring judges) saw no need, however,
to overlay section 14, the religious freedom guarantee, with American-style
establishment interpretations that mandate strict religious equality and a secular public
sphere. As a matter of drafting, section 14 of the Interim Constitution did not contain
an establishment clause and he saw no need to read one into the section. Another
section of the Interim Constitution (section 8, now section 9 of the Final Constitution)
dealt with unequal treatment and religious discrimination. More importantly, to read
anti-establishment principles into the religious freedom guarantee would have “far-
reaching implications”. 22 Chaskalson P. proceeded to give a short litany of practices
that would be vulnerable: public holidays at Christmas and Good Friday, the
to
broadcasting of church services by
denominational schools, and so on.226
the state broadcaster, state subsidies
It may be that the unequal treatment accusation is another way of levelling the
charge of unjustified discrimination. But, as we discussed in Part H, there may be
objective reasons why the established church is given certain advantages vis-A-vis
other faiths. The “benefits” it receives from the state are a quid pro quo for the
national pastoral tasks it undertakes for society at large.
223 Lawrence, supra note 44 at para. 128.
224 Ibid. at para. 152, Sachs J.
225 Ibid. at para. 101.
226 Ibid.
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To suggest that an established church is given “advantages” over other religions
can, in any event, be somewhat misleading, certainly
in the case of “mild”
establishment. In Britain, for example, it is often claimed that the position of the
twenty-six senior bishops in the House of Lords constitutes preferential treatment for
the church.227 This is at best a simplification, as any “advantage” is purely formal. The
Anglican bishops do not sit in the House of Lords to defend the interests of the
Church of England, either
in theory or in practice. The justification (itself
controversial) is that they add to the range of views in the legislative process by
contributing a religious or moral perspective.228 Far from benefitting the church (since
the bishops hardly ever speak as Anglicans), if this practice has any benefit, it is to
add richness to the legislative process. Objectors can, and still do, argue that other
religious and nonreligious groups do not enjoy this privileged access.229 In reality,
however, the bishops’ influence is negligible-they constitute a small percentage of
the membership of House of Lords, it is rare for more than two of them to speak or
vote in any debate, and the last significant occasion on which their votes changed the
outcome was nearly a century ago (in passing the Parliament Act, 1911).230 Although
(mysteriously) the Church of England has fought to retain its place in a reformed
Upper House, if they were to be removed, the main casualty would be critics of the
current arrangements who would then be deprived of a superficially plausible but
thoroughly misleading argument.
Equally, it is easy to misunderstand another aspect of the English arrangements-
the connection between the Crown and the Church of England. To portray this
relationship as conveying undue privilege is to suggest that the Church benefits from
the arrangement. Arguably, however, it is the monarchy which has been the net
beneficiary. Spiritual underpinning for what Bagehot described as the “magic” of
monarchy,’
for a long time distracted attention from the otherwise anomalous nature
227 See e.g. Edge, “Religious Remnants”, supra note I at 454-55.
228 U.K., Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future
(London: The Stationary Office, 2000) c. 15 at paras. 4-5 (Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Lord Wakeham
DL); U.K., Parliament, “The House of Lords: Completing the Reform”, Cmd 5291, para. 83, online:
Department for Constitutional Affairs
229 See e.g. U.K., H.C., “Public Administration-Fifth Report: The Second Chamber: Continuing
the Reform”, Cm 494 in Sessional Papers, 2001-2002, at para. 158, online: The United Kingdom
Parliament
230 See Francis Brown, “Influencing the House of Lords: the Role of the Lords Spiritual 1979-
1987” (1994) 42 Pol. Stud. 105; Gavin Drewry & Jenny Brock, “Prelates in Parliament” (1970-1971)
24 Parliamentary Aff. 222. For an analysis of recent voting figures, see U.K., Joint Committee on
House of Lords Reform, House of Lords Reform: First Report (London: The Stationary Office, 2002)
at para. 38, online: The United Kingdom Parliament
211 Paul Smith, ed., Bagehot: The English Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), 43-44, 54. See generally Bradley, supra note 10; Leigh, “By Law Established?”, supra note
23.
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of hereditary succession to the throne. That there is now serious discussion of cutting
the connection between the sovereign and the Church is, in large part, the result of
reformers perceiving a benefit to the monarchy in presenting a more religiously
inclusive face.232
What the Church of England gains from the role of the monarch as Supreme
Governor is the dubious privilege of a degree of state interference in senior
ecclesiastical appointments (in practice through the Prime Minister, rather than the
sovereign herself)233 and in church legislation (which is subject to Royal Assent). It is
far from clear that this constitutes preferential treatment.
These examples demonstrate
the importance of evaluating any supposed
privileges that an established religion receives in the context of and with regard to
corresponding duties. Formal equality (requiring complete parity of treatment of all
religion) is too blunt a measure of difference, unless one starts from the position that
any distinction in treatment is unjustifiable. To do so would be to give absolute
priority to formal equality. The better measure, we submit, is a notion of substantive
equality-only if differences in treatment are excessive or disproportionate to the
distinctive roles and responsibilities of the established church should they be suspect.
It should be noted that the case law on both section 15 of the Canadian Charter and
article 14 of the ECHR follows a similar approach to the equality guarantee. Under
the Charter, provisions that offend section 15 may nevertheless be justified under
section 1.114 Under article 14 of the ECHR, the case law treats discrimination as
suspect only if there is “no reasonable and objective justification.” ‘235 This does not
mean that a court is required to defer uncritically to all existing differences; rather, it
promotes a discriminating approach to testing the legitimacy of different treatment.236
Two decisions under article 14 of the ECHR hold that the preferential tax
treatment of the Catholic Church in Spain over that of Protestant churches is justified,
referring to the former’s responsibilities to provide public access to its monuments
and artefacts under a concordat with the state. 7 These decisions are of some
232 See Fabian Society, supra note 23 at 72: “A continuing close and fonmal relationship between
the Head of State and one faith-or indeed with organised religion of any kind-is no longer
appropriate for modem Britain.”
See Palmer, supra note 12.
234 See Andrews v. Law Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1. See also Peter W.
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 1252-53 (suggesting that
this is a preferable approach to reading reasonable limitations into section 15).
23 Belgian Linguistics Case No. 2 (1968), 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at 284.
236 Moreover, in one striking case the European Court of Human Rights has held that article 14
imposes an obligation to treat different cases differently: Thlimmenos v. Greece, (2001) 31 E.H.R.R.
411 at para. 44 (in the application of subsequent civil penalties, failure to distinguish between those
who refuse to comply with a law for religious reasons and other law-breakers amounted to unequal
treatment).
2 3 7 Iglesia Bautista, supra note 112; Fernandez, supra note 112.
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significance in justifying preferential treatment in other countries.238 In some contexts,
then, the apparently privileged position of an established church can be justified
despite differences in treatment that appear to violate formal equality.
C. The Neutrality Mirage
The liberal state’s claim to religious neutrality is decidedly shaky if not wholly
repudiated. There is, we contend, always an establishment or state orthodoxy. This is,
of course, a large and contentious claim deserving of expansive argument.239 In what
is already a lengthy essay, we will confine ourselves to a brief explanation.
Liberal democracies may aim to be neutral as between competing values,
interests, and conceptions of individuals belonging to different faiths. They may assert
that “there is no orthodoxy on religious matters in the secular state,” as Blackmun J.
did in County of Allegheny.z” But in practice there is always an orthodoxy, and not all
ways of life can be treated the same. Neutrality of consequences or outcomes-the
notion that the institutions of public policy must take care to ensure that the effects of
state policies upon different religious communities are even-handed
(neither
increasing the chance of one way of life flourishing nor another diminishing)–is
unsustainable in the opinion of many theorists. John Rawls comments: “[I]t is surely
impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional regime not to have important
effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents
over time; and it is futile to counteract these effects and influences.”24 ‘ Some liberal
theorists have been prepared to abandon the claim to neutrality entirely.242 William
Galston, for example, concedes that liberalism “cannot, as many contemporary
238 For example, in the United Kingdom with regard to the arrangements reached under the
Education Act, 1944 for state funding of denominational schools operated in premises owned by
church authorities, and the exemption of Church buildings from secular planning control. Neither
applies solely to the Church of England but in each case that church benefits substantially more than
minority religions.
239 See generally Rex J. Ahdar, Worlds Colliding: Conservative Christians and the Law (Aldershot,
U.K.: Ashgate, 2001) c. 3-4; lain T. Benson, “Notes Towards a (Re)definition of the ‘Secular’
(2000)
33 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519; Samuel Gregg, Morality, Law and Public Policy (Sydney: St. Thomas More
Society, 2001) c. 2; Phillip E. Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in
Science, Law & Education (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1995) c. 2; David N. Cinotti, “The
Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from Religion Clause Jurisprudence”
(2003) 45 J. Church & St. 499.
240 Supra note 159 at 611. See also ibid. at 610: “A secular state, it must be remembered, is not the
same as an atheistic or antireligious state. A secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its
official creed.”
241 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) at 193. “The
principles of any reasonable political conception must
impose restrictions on permissible
comprehensive views, and the basic institutions those principles require inevitably encourage some
ways of life and discourage others, or even exclude them altogether” (ibid. at 195).
242 See e.g. Stephen Macedo, “The Politics of Justification” (1990) 18 Pol. Theory 280 at 298: “The
liberal must, in the end, defend his partisanship and not evade it.”
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theorists suppose, be understood as broadly neutral concerning the human good. It is
rather committed to a distinctive conception of the human good, a conception that
undergirds the liberal conception of social justice.””
A secular baseline is commonly admired by many liberals as a neutral, impartial
one, but that depends entirely upon one’s viewpoint. Few religious people believe that
secularism, in the guise of a strict separation between organized religion and public
institutions, is really neutral. As Tariq Modood observes: “There may be a neutrality
between religions, but there is less of an even-handed division of spoils between those
who believe religion is a matter of private faith, that the transcendental relates only to
the nonpolitical dimensions of the human condition, and those who deny this.”
Secular constitutions “seem to be the political expression of a particular philosophy
about religion and life.”245 Robert George concurs, noting that, increasingly, many
religionists
‘2 44
[q]uite reasonably reject secularism’s claim to constitute nothing more than a
neutral playing field on which other worldviews may fairly and civilly compete
for the allegiance of the people … [S]ecularism is itself one of the competing
worldviews. We should credit its claims to neutrality no more than we would
accept the claims of a baseball pitcher who in the course of a game declares
himself to be the umpire and begins calling his own balls and strikes …
[S]ecularism itself is a sectarian doctrine with its own metaphysical and moral
presuppositions and foundations, with its own myths, and, one might even
argue, its own rituals.246
As we have seen, critics of religious establishment point to the symbolic ostracism or
alienation experienced by those not adhering to the established faith. Yet, to reiterate,
it is easy to focus on alienation on one side only-believers may feel equally alienated
by a secular, political regime that extirpates religious symbolism and practice from the
public square. 24 7 This kind of secularism is experienced as “a competing partisan
position”. 248 Far from being neutral or inclusive, it resonates as an ordering of life in
accordance with the nonreligious values of some of the community at the expense of
the spiritual values of others. Kennedy J. in Allegheny captures this concern:
“[E]nforced
recognition of only the secular aspect would signify the callous
indifference toward religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require.” ‘249
243 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) at 18; See also William Galston, Liberal Pluralism:
The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) at 23, 26.
244 Modood, “Introduction”, supra note 205 at 13.
245 Ibid.
246 Robert P George, “A Clash of Orthodoxies” (August-September 1999) 95 First Things 33 at 34-
35.
247 Smith, Foreordained Failure, supra note 198 at 114.
248 Moon, supra note 217 at 571.
249 Supra note 159 at 663-64.
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For a modem state to remain entirely impartial is, we submit, an impossible feat.
The idea of a purely neutral state in which there is no official endorsement of the true
and “good”, of a political community that eschews the notion that it acts on the basis
of substantive values, is a mirage. As Lesslie Newbigin points out: “No state can be
completely secular in the sense that those who exercise power have no beliefs about
what is true and no commitments to what they believe to be right.”25 Paul Rishworth
similarly contends:
The reality, of course, is that states must inevitably pursue or affirm ideologies
upon which opinions may
its citizens. A
government’s position on matters such as free trade, universal access to public
health and pensions, employment law, the way it should treat its citizens, and
so on will all reflect some underlying vision and values.2 5
reasonably differ amongst
1
Once a state becomes more than a minimalist policeman and adopts a more pervasive,
cultural-formation role, it cannot help but advantage and disadvantage particular
world views.
Once government shakes off its limited role and concerns itself with the
general welfare of the people, including their cultural and intellectual lives, it
has leapt the “Wall” and entered the traditional sphere of religion. In contrast to
many of our Founders, [Edmund] Burke had a more modem conception of the
jurisdiction of the State, which did not permit him the easy answer of a “Wall
of Separation.” If the government is “a partnership in all science; a partnership
in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection,” then it necessarily
will be conveying a collective teaching on science, art, virtue and perfection
(whether we label the teaching a “religion” or not). It follows not that an
establishment is desirable, but that it is inescapable.252
In a society where the role of the state is minimal, where the state is merely
concerned with, say, defence and maintaining civil order, a commitment to secularism
arguably does not present great difficulties. But “in Western countries, as the role of
the state expands to cover health, education, employment and society security, the
space left to those of any religious convictions to mould their lives according to their
faith is correspondingly reduced.”2 53
The state’s position and resultant public policies will reflect its conception of the
than
its official world view. McConnell describes
this as no
less
good,
250 Lesslie Newbigin, Foolishness to the Greeks: The Gospel and Western Culture (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1986) at 132.
251 Paul Rishworth, “Liberty, Equality and the New Establishment” in Grant Huscroft & Paul
Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Oxford: Hart,
2002) 91 at 93.
252 Michael W. McConnell, “Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke’s ‘Constitution of
Freedom’
[1995] Sup. Ct. Rev. 393 at 444 [emphasis added].
253 Rivers, supra note 4 at 3.
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“establishmentarianism”.254 While establishmentarianism is ordinarily associated with
a religious orthodoxy, the orthodoxy may come in secular as well as religious
forms.255 The established position will inevitably exclude the world views of some
citizens. Take the state’s view on marriage. A choice must be made on the nature of
marriage: is it to be a lifelong commitment? Between persons of the opposite sex?
Confined to two persons only? The ultimate choice will be repugnant to those whose
religious beliefs and world view are different from the state’s value judgment. Is the
public school system to be strictly secular? If so, a pupil is likely to learn the lesson
that religion is of little relevance to the subject matter taught. This is, as McConnell
points out, a lesson about religion and is not neutral: “Studious silence on a subject
that parents may say touches all of life is an eloquent refutation.” ‘256 Issues of life and
death, such as abortion and euthanasia, will turn on fundamental moral and
metaphysical understandings “of whether bodily life is intrinsically good, as Judaism
and Christianity teach, or merely instrumentally good, as orthodox secularists
believe.” ‘257
Conclusion
Is a mild or weak form of establishment, where the state does not coerce or
compel religious practice or observance, compatible with religious freedom? We have
argued that it is. Weak establishment does not inhibit the religious beliefs or practices
of others. The US First Amendment caselaw and doctrine have produced a distorting
influence. Our survey of other countries, of international law, and in particular, of the
ECHR cases demonstrates that establishment is not generally judged as limiting
religious liberty. Nor are the arguments based on the alleged alienation of other
religions compelling. A state in which “religion” is disestablished cannot bask in self-
congratulation at having maximized religious liberty through its supposed neutrality
on religious matters.
To avoid the negative and distorting connotations of the word “establishment”, it
might be better to adopt a label such as “acknowledgement” for the sort of mild state
endorsement of religion we defend in this article. Some dicta in the US Supreme
Court have used this term in an effort to separate the chaff and the wheat in terms of
permissible state support for religion. O’Connor J. distinguished between government
endorsements versus mere “acknowledgements” of religion. 28 “Intuition tells us”,
explained Brennan J., “that some official
is inevitable in a
religious society if government is not to adopt a stilted indifference to the religious
‘acknowledgement’
254 Michael W. McConnell, “The New Establishmentarianism” (2000) 75 Chicago-Kent L. Rev.
453 at 453.
255 Ibid.
256 Michael W. McConnell, “Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses” (1986) 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 146
at 162.
257 George, supra note 246 at 35.
258 Lynch, supra note 159 at 692-93.
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life of the people.” ‘259 Kennedy J. urged that “[r]ather than requiring government to
avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits
government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion
plays in our society.”2”
There is no need to eradicate historic religious institutions and practices in the
name of religious freedom. Unless the notion of religious freedom is to be stretched
or, more accurately, distorted to embrace religious equality, noncoercive state
endorsement of religion is consistent with freedom of religion. It may be that a
particular governmental endorsement of religion is vulnerable to a constitutional
challenge on other grounds (for example, constitutional protection concerned with
equality), but that is another matter.
259 Lynch, ibid. at 714. Brennan J. was quick to add, however, that “overly broad acknowledgments”
toward one religion would not pass
that might “imply governmental favoritism”
of religion
constitutional muster (ibid).
260 County ofAllegheny, supra note 159 at 657.
