Michael Sikyea v. Her Majesty the Queen
A. L. C. de Mestral *
Despite the fact that Canadian Indians have been the subject of
treaties, Acts of Parliament and considerable litigation, their present
status seems neither clear at law nor consonant with the norms of
social justice which should prevail in this country. As it becomes
increasingly impossible for them to live apart from white society
it would appear that the “rights” and “privileges” of the Indians
will have to be radically redefined or clarified if these rights are
to survive at all. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of Michael Sikyea v. the Queen 1 has done much
to emphasize the uncertain legal status of the Treaty Indian.
In November of 1962 Michael Sikyea, a Treaty Indian, was
acquitted in a trial de novo 2 by Mr. Justice Sissons of the Territorial
Court of the Northwest Territories of a charge of unlawfully killing
a migratory bird in violation of regulations issued under the Migra-
tory Birds Convention Act.3 However, this decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeal of the Northwest Territories.4 On October
6, 1964 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal,
and, in a judgment delivered by the Honourable Mr. Justice Hall,
accepted the finding of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the
wording of the Migratory Birds Convention Act and of the Regulations
issued under it permitted no exceptions to be made in favour of the
appellant.
The charge which was brought by an R.C.M.P. officer who had
found Sikyea hunting near Yellowknife was founded on Section 5
(1) of the Migratory Birds Regulation, 5 which prohibits the killing
of migratory birds in the Northwest Territories except during the
season, which lasts from September 1 to October 15. Mr. Justice
Sissons noted that:
“From time immemorial the Indians and Eskimos of the North and their
wives and children have in the Spring taken migratory birds for food and
Of the Junior Board of Editors, McGill Law Journal; second year law student.
1 [1964] S.C.R. 642.
2 (1962) 40 W.W.R. 494.
3 R.S.C. 1952, c. 179.
4 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 325.
5 P.C. 1958 – 1079 S.O.R.158-308.
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CASE AND COMMENT
will continue to do so and this has been and is necessary for their survival
and well-being.”
The learned judge held that Sikyea, being a Treaty Indian, was not
bound by this Regulation. He based his decision on the terms of
Treaty 11 made in 1921 by the Federal Government with the Indians
occupying the Northwest Territories, from the 60th parallel to the
Arctic Ocean. The Treaty declared that:
“His Majesty the King hereby agrees with the said Indians that they shall
have the right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and
fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore described, subject to
such regulations as may be made from time to time by the Government of
the Country…”
The learned judge construed the final words of the citation as
referring only to the practice of prohibiting the hunting of species
in danger of extinction, and noted that in 1960 the Northwest Terri-
tories Act had been amended 6 to prohibit the Commissioner from
restricting the right of Indians and Eskimos to hunt for food on
unoccupied Crown lands, unless a species was in danger of extinction.
He cited the leading case of R. v. Wesley 7 in which it was held that
Indians hunting for food were not bound by the Alberta Game Act.8
Reasoning from these authorities, Section 87 of the Indian Act, 9
and the Canadian Bill of Rights,10 the learned judge concluded that
the ancient right of the Indians to hunt for food on unoccupied
Crown lands was one which could only be abrogated by “express
words or necessary intendment or implication.” He declared himself
unable to find such words in the Migratory Birds Convention Act.
In reversing the decision of Sissons, J.T.C., the Court of Appeal
based its judgment strictly on the words of the Act and Regulations.
Section 5
(1) of the Regulations provides:
(1) “Unless otherwise permitted under these Regulations
to do so, no
person shall
(a) in any area described in Schedule A, kill, hunt, capture, injure,
take or molest a migratory bird at any time except during an open
season specified…
(2) Indians and Eskimos may take auks, auklets, guillemots, murries,
puffins and scoters at any time for human food…”
6 S.C. 1960, c. 20, ss. 1, 2.
7 58 C.C.C. 269.
S R.S.A. 1922, c. 70.
9 R.S.C. 1952, c. 147 s. 87: “Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other
Act of the Parliament of Canada, all laws of general application from time to
time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the
province…”
10 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
Mr. Justice Johnson, who delivered the judgment of the Appeal Court,
found himself unable to agree with Mr. Justice Sissons that section
5 (2), in particular, indicated no intention to abrogate Indian hunting
rights. Thus, while describing the Regulations as an “apparent
breach of faith on the part of the government,” the learned judge
concluded: “It is difficult to see how this language admits of any
exceptions” 11
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous judgment delivered
by the Hon. Mr. Justice Hall, ruled that the mallard shot by Sikyea
must be deemed a “wild duck” within the terms of the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, and concurred fully with the reasons and the
conclusion of Mr. Justice Johnson who, in its opinion, had dealt
with the issues “fully and correctly.”
When based on the terms of the Migratory Birds Convention Act
and Regulations, this decision would seem to be the only one possible.
However, to admit that the Act must be so construed is also to
admit the possibility of two unfortunate hypotheses: either the
government agents treated with the Indians in bad faith, or they
treated in complete ignorance of the effects of the Act upon the
hunting rights of the Indians. The first hypothesis may be entertained
in the light of the fact that, fully three years before the signing of
Treaty 11, the following Regulations had been issued under the
Migratory Birds Convention Act,’ 2
“No person shall kill, capture, injure, take… any migratory game birds
during the following periods :
.. Northwest Territories and Yukon Terr:tory; Dec. 15 – August 31 both
days inclusive.
Provided however that:
Indians and Eskimos may take scoters or “Siwash Ducks” for food at any
time…,13
These regulations differ from those presently in force only with
respect to the length of the season. The second hypothesis may also
be entertained in the light of the Report of Commissioner H.A. Conroy
who was sent to negotiate the Treaty in 1921. At no point in the
Report did he make reference to the Act, and the following passage
would seem to indicate that he had no knowledge of it:
“The Indians seemed afraid, for one thing, that their liberty to hunt, trap
and fish would be taken away or curtailed, but they were assured by me
11 Op. cit., at p. 335.
12 S.C. 1917, c. 18.
13 Order-in-Council 23, April 1918, P.C. 871. While noting that the Act had
been passed before Treaty 11, Mr. Justice Johnson made no mention of these
regulations.
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CASE AND COMMENT
that this would not be the case, and the Government will expect them to
support themselves in their own way, and in fact, that more twine for nets
and more ammunition were given under the terms of this Treaty than under
any of the preceeding ones; this went a long way to calm their fears.”’14
This second hypothesis is also rendered plausible by the fact that
there appear to have been no prosecutions of Indians for violations
of the Act until very recently, and that it was the belief of Indians
that they were free to hunt migratory birds.”,
The leading cases in the field of Indian rights have, in large
measure, treated the Indians with greater liberality than the present
decision.’ Thus we read, in the first Privy Council case involving
the rights of Indians, the St. Catherine Milling and Lumber Co. Case,IT
that the lands given up by Treaty to the Crown were still subject to
hunting rights. In the leading case R. v. Wesley 18 Mr. Justice
McGillivray stated:
“It is true that Government regulations in respect of hunting are contem-
plated in the Treaty, but considering that Treaty in its proper setting I do
not think that any of the makers of it could by any stretch of the imagination
be deemed to have contemplated a day when the Indians would be deprived
of an unfettered right to hunt game of all kinds for food on unoccupied
Crown land.”
In the case of Regina v. Little Bear,19 it was held that the Alberta
Game Act did not apply to Indians hunting for food; in Regina v
Kogogolak 20 it was held that Northwest Territories game laws did
not apply to Eskimos. In the recent case of Regina v. Prince2′ the
Supreme Court held that Indians were not restricted as to their
manner of hunting by the Manitoba Game and Fisheries Act, when
hunting for food. In another very recent decision, Regina v. George,22
14This Report is appended to the Treaty.
Is Perhaps the ultimate irony of this case is that Sikyea had been an inter-
preter at the Treaty negotiations.
16 St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen [1889] A.C. 46; Ontario
v. Canada and Quebec (1896) 25 S.C.R. 434; Ontario Mining Co. V. Seybold [1903]
A.C. 73; “Indian Annuities Case” [1910] A.C. 637; R. v. Lady McMaster [1926]
Ex. C.R. 68; R. V. Sylibey 50 C.C.C. 389; R. v. Wesley 58 C.C.C. 269; R. v. Smith
[1935] 2 W.W.R. 433; Francis V. R. [1956] S.C.R. 622; The Queen v. Little Bear
(1958) 26 W.W.R. 335; The Queen v. Kogogolak (1959) 28 W.W.R. 376; Myron
and Prince v. The Queen [1964] 3 C.C.C. 2; The Queen V. George [1964] 1 O.R.
24; A.G. Canada v. George (1964) 45 D.L.R. 709.
17 Op. cit., at p. 52.
18 Op. cit., at p. 284.
19 Op. cit.
2 0 Op. cit.
21 Op. cit. A judgment rendered by the Honourable Mr. Justice Hall.
2-2 Op. cit. Judgment rendered on June 24, 1964. This decision was not comment-
ed upon in the Judgment of the Supreme Court, although it had the effect of
contradicting the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Sik yea.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 11
the Supreme Court of Ontario upheld the ruling of the High Court,
to the effect that an Indian hunting for food on the Kettle Point
Reservation was not bound by the Migratory Birds Regulations. The
basis of this decision was that by virtue of section 87 of the Indian
Act all laws of general application applied to Indians, but were
subject to the terms of any existing Treaties. This judgment would
seem to have been overruled by the present case.
Although it would appear from these decisions that Indian rights
have been protected by the Courts, closer examination reveals that
this protection has only gone half-way; Indian rights have been
protected in individual cases only and no general philosophy of their
rights has been propounded by the Courts. Thus it is impossible
to find a definitive statement of the status of Indian Treaties or a
consistent philosophy of their interpretation. Even the original rights
of the Indians in the lands they ceded by Treaty have not been
properly defined, and the Courts have continued to accept the
definition of “a personal and usufructuary interest” found in the
St. Catherines Milling and Lumber Case. Resting on this weak
foundation, it is not surprising to find that judicial dicta on the
effects of the Proclamation of 1763 on the rights of Indians are
many and varied. The judgment in R. v. Syliboy 23 cast grave doubts
on the propriety of calling such “agreements” treaties, and in R. v.
Wesley 24 Mr. Justice McGillivray stated:
“In Canada the Indian Treaties appear to have been judicially interpretcd
as being mere promises or agreements.”
It is interesting to compare the status and interpretation of Indian
Treaties in the United States with that in Canada, for although
American decisions have no authority in Canada they have dealt with
problems similar to those existing in this country. In 1871 an Act
was passed by Congress declaring that Indian Tribes would not be
considered capable of making treaties with the U.S. Government in
future, but that all existing Treaties were to be upheld by the Courts.’18
It has been held that. Indian Nations were capable of making treatics
with the Federal Government before the date of this act.26 On the
question of the interpretation of such treaties, the Supreme Court
held in U.S. v. Payne 27 that the intention to abrogate an Indian
Treaty would not be lightly attributed to Congress and that the Court
would consider the intention of the Act carefully before coming to
2 30Op. Cit.
2 4 Op cit., at p. 283.
25 March 3, 1871, Rev. St. 2079, 25 U.S.C.A. #71.
26 U.S. v. Fourty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188.
27 264 U.S. 446, 68 L.Ed. 782.
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CASE AND COMMENT
that conclusion. In the subsequent case of the Choctaw Nation of
Indians v. U.S. 28 the same Court held that Indian Treaties were to
be liberally interpreted in favour of the Indians. Thus, it would seem
that the Federal Courts of the U.S.A. have attempted to protect the
special rights of the Indians, which would seem to be the logical
course of action as long as these special rights are not abrogated by
the legislative body which sanctioned them. Is it too much to submit
that a different decision might have been rendered in the present
case if Canadian Courts had developed a similar approach to Indian
Treaties ?
In reply to the last submission it might well be said it has never
been the practice of the Supreme Court of Canada to legislate, and
that if the law needs to be changed Parliament must do so. It is
unfortunate, however, that the lot of the Indians will continue to
deteriorate until this debate is settled. Clearly, the present law
governing Canadian Indians suffers from a curious ambivalence, for
it both sets Indians apart from society and at the same time declares
them subject to many general laws. Two courses of action suggest
themselves therefore; either the existing laws and treaties should
be reinforced to permit the Indians to live apart from white society,
or these laws and treaties should be abrogated and a serious attempt
should be made to integrate the Indians into Canadian society. Of
the two alternatives, it appears to the present writer that only the
latter is consonant with the norms of social equality to which a
liberal democracy ought to aspire.29
28 318 U.S. 423, 87 L.Ed. 492.
29 See the excellent article by Howard E. Staats, Some Aspects of the Legal
Status of Canadian Indians [1964] Osgoode Hall L.J. 36.
