A Review of Lucie Lamarche, Perspectives
occidentales du droit international des droits
economiques de la personne
Lucie Lamarche, Perspectives occidentales du droit international des droits
iconomiques de lapersonne. Brussels: Bruylant, 1995.
Pp. xiv, 513 [paper $175 (Cdn.)].
Reviewed by Colleen Sheppard*
Introduction
Economic well-being constitutes an essential prerequisite to the effective enjoy-
ment of civil, political, social, and cultural rights. So intricately interwoven are eco-
nomic well-being and human rights, that reliance on a discourse of economic rights be-
comes, at once, both necessary and problematic. It is necessary to ensure explicit rec-
ognition and inclusion of basic material well-being in the larger project of human-
rights protection. It is problematic to the extent that it risks permitting a conceptualiza-
tion of economic rights as separate from, rather than integral to, other types of human
rights. What remains clear is the need for a careful understanding of economic rights as
human rights. Lucie Lamarche’s book, Perspectives occidentales du droit international
des droits iconomiques de la personne,’ makes a significant contribution to this proj-
ect.
In her book, Professor Lamarche explores the emergence of economic rights in
international law and, then, considers their applicability and relevance to industrialized
nations in an era of economic globalization. Lamarche observes a significant increase
in economic vulnerability and poverty in advanced industrialized countries as a result
of the emergence of structural unemployment and the erosion of the social welfare
state. She contends that both of these phenomena must be challenged, and that the eco-
nomic rights protected in international law provide a potential source of normative and
legal assistance in this struggle.
Faculty of Law and Institute of Comparative Law, McGill University.
McGill Law Journal 1996
Revue de droit de McGill
To be cited as: (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 907
Mode de r6fdrence : (1996) 41 R.D. McGill 907
(Brussels: Bruylant, 1995) [hereinafter Perspectives].
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[Vol. 41
I. The Emergence of Economic Rights in International Human-Rights Law
Lamarche begins her analysis by reviewing the emergence of the international
protection of economic rights in three different arenas. First, she traces the emergence
of the International Labour Organization (“I.L.O.”) following World War I and dis-
cusses the significant inroads it has made in developing an international consensus
about basic rights in the workplace. Lamarche suggests that the conceptualization of
economic rights during this first period was premised on the worker’s need for con-
crete and specific workplace-related rights.! The I.L.O.’s focus, therefore, was on
regulating certain aspects of employer-employee relations rather than on the larger
macro-economic dimensions of economic and social policy While the centrality of the
worker to the vision of economic rights at the heart of the I.L.O.’s raison-d’9tre made
sense historically, Lamarche suggests that it is becoming increasingly inadequate in the
face of the dramatic changes accompanying economic globalization. Although the
I.L.O. enlarged the scope of its objectives, as reflected in the emphasis on the broader
dimensions of social justice in the Philadelphia Declaration4 of 1944, it has not yet de-
veloped adequate implementation mechanisms for ensuring the realization of pro-
grammatic economic rights that transcend the employment context
The second forum of international protection of economic and social rights that
Lamarche discusses is the United Nations. She emphasizes that the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights’ recognized the centrality of economic and social rights to so-
cial justice and respect for human dignity. Lamarche draws our attention to the basic
economic and social rights included in the Universal Declaration, including, for ex-
ample, “the right to social security”, “the right to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment[,] …
the right to equal pay for equal work[,] … the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring … an existence worthy of human dignity[,] … the right to form and to join
trade unions”,8 “the right to a standard of living adequate for … health and well-being…
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old
age …”,’ and “the right to education”. Lamarche maintains that the Universal Decla-
2 See ibid at 35.
3 See ibid. at 36.
4 I.L.O., Declaration Concerning the Goals and Objectives of the LLO., reproduced in I.L.O., Ac-
tion Plan, Programme and Rules of the LLO., 26th Session, Report 1 (1944).
‘ See Perspectives, supra note 1 at 47, 50.
6GA Res. 217 (II), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [hereinafter
Universal Declaration]. For a discussion of the Universal Declaration, see J.P. Humphrey, “The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and Juridical Character” in B.G. Ramcharan,
ed., Human Rights: Thirty Years after the Universal Declaration (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979) 21.
7 Universal Declaration, ibid. at art. 22.
8 Ibid at art. 23.
91bid at art. 25.
‘0 Ibid at art. 26.
1996]
C. SHEPPARD – PERSPECTIVES OCCIDENTALES
ration made clear the integral connection between the protection of economic and so-
cial rights and respect for human dignity. It also treated economic, social, and cultural
rights in exactly the same way as civil and political rights, thereby reinforcing both
their equality and their interdependence.”
With this historical appreciation of the inclusion of economic and social rights in
the Universal Declaration Lamarche outlines the elaboration of economic and social
rights in the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,’2 which she describes as “le trait fondamental de reconnaissance effective d’un
ensemble de droits 6conomiques et sociaux de la personne”.’ 3 While acknowledging its
importance to the development of effective and meaningful economic rights in interna-
tional law, Lamarche also provides a detailed discussion of the debates and problems
surrounding its adoption.
The third branch of Lamarche’s analysis focuses on the European Social Charter,”
adopted by the Council of Europe in 1961. Her focus on the relevance of economic
rights to Western industrialized nations explains her choice of this regional charter
rather than other charters, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’Rights,”
which encompass the economic concerns of developing countries. Although she ac-
knowledges the significance of the European Social Charter, Lamarche concludes that
it does not provide a basis for the effective protection of economic rights.’ 6 She cri-
tiques it for its failure to advance the international protection of economic and social
rights and suggests that as a result of political compromise, certain rights were actually
weakened rather than strengthened by the European Social Charter.’7
II. The Relevance of International Economic Rights to Industrialized Countries
The second half of Lamarche’s book is devoted to an exploration of the signifi-
cance of international economic rights to those social groups in Western industrialized
“See Perspectives, supra note I at 53.
2 19 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976)
[hereinafter Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
‘ Perspectives, supra note 1 at 58. Both the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can.
T.S. 1976 No. 47 [hereinafter I.C.C.PR.] were derived from the basic principles set out in the Univer-
sal Declaration. The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, accordingly, builds on the
general principles of the Universal Declaration, providing more concrete detail and delineation of the
various economic, social, and cultural rights.
,4 18 October 1961, Eur. T.S. 1961 No. 35.
‘ 26 June 1981, OAU Doec. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (entered into force 21 October
1986).
16 See Perspectives, supra note I at 83.
,See ibid. at 112-13. Lamarche’s book provides an extensive overview of the European Social
Charter and its effectiveness in terms of implementation, which will not be examined at length in this
book review.
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countries which are economically vulnerable. Lamarche suggests that economic
globalization has had two major deleterious effects on workers’ rights. It has both un-
dermined traditional employee protections and rights in the workplace and has con-
tributed to a new structural form of unemployment.” The heightened concern with
flexibility in the workplace is a response to economic pressures to reduce production
costs to maintain international competitiveness. As a result, we are witnessing massive
layoffs, an increase in involuntary part time work, and the growing predominance of
temporary, contingent employment arrangements. The historical employee-employer
paradigm of permanent, long-term employment, characteristic of the post-World War II
era is rapidly disappearing.”
It is at this economic and historical juncture that Lamarche observes what she calls
the “fragilisation'” of the legal protection of employment-related rights.2 Given the
massive structural readjustments in Western economies, traditional approaches to
workplace rights are rapidly losing their effectiveness. It is no longer adequate to focus
on the individual worker, when the most extreme problems of poverty are faced by in-
dividuals who are, largely, excluded from the workplace. Moreover, as the substantive
scope of economic and social rights expand, they are increasingly conceptualized as
being programmatic or promotional in nature and, ironically, treated as less legally
binding.
In the face of the failure of employment-related international economic rights to
reduce the growing impoverishment related to economic globalization, Lamarche
turns, instead, to the more general economic right to an adequate standard of living.
Understood as a broader, more global source of protection for economic well-being, it
encompasses the right to work and employment-related protections, as well as protec-
tions such as the right to food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare. Lamarche evaluates its
potential to provide an effective source of protection against poverty and economic
distress.2′ She notes that the right to an adequate standard of living was initially associ-
ated with ensuring adequate levels of employment remuneration. With the rise of un-
employment, the adequacy of social-assistance programs has also been assessed under
the rubric of this right. In encompassing general economic and social well-being, it has
the most potential to provide an effective source of protection in an era of economic
restructuring. Thus, according to Lamarche, we need to elaborate the more general
right to personal dignity and the right to an adequate standard of living.’
” See ibid. at 235-40.
‘9 See: E. Hagen & J. Jenson, “Paradoxes and Promises: Work and Politics in the Postwar Years” in
J. Jenson, E. Hagen & C. Reddy, eds., Feminization of the Labour Force: Paradoxes and Promises
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) 1; J. Jenson & R. Mahon, The Challenge of Restructuring: North
American Labor Movements Respond (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); J. Holmes & C.
Leys, Frontyard/Backyard: The Americas in the Global Crisis (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1987); B.
Bluestone & B. Harrison, The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Aban-
donment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
20 Perspectives, supra note I at 251.
22 See ibid. at 330-3 1.
22See ibid. at 448-49.
19961
C. SHEPPARD – PERSPECTIVES OCCIDENTALES
H. Recurring Debates about Economic Rights
Many of the conceptual debates about the meaning of economic rights and the ap-
propriate mechanisms for their effective realization resonate throughout Lamarche’s
book. Having provided a detailed analysis of the historical emergence of economic
rights in three international contexts, Lamarche provides a rich and textured theoretical
analysis of the legal nature of economic rights. While acknowledging the obstacles to
the effective elaboration of an international law of economic and social rights, La-
marche remains optimistic about the potential and importance of engaging in such a
project. In so doing, she emphasizes the importance of recognizing the global interde-
pendence of economic and social rights and of insisting on the intimate connection
between economic, social, and other human rights.
A. Economic Rights and the Idea of a Hierarchy of Rights
Economic rights, along with social and cultural rights, are often conceptualized as
“second generation” rights. As such, they risk being treated as less fundamental than
the classic civil and political rights at the heart of Western liberal democracies.’ In-
deed, in his preface to Lamarche’s book, Philip Alston, the current Chairperson of the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, suggests that
economic rights are often “marginalized” in international human-rights law.’ While
recognizing this tendency, Lamarche forcefully challenges the legitimacy of any hier-
archical categorization of human rights and insists on equality between civil and politi-
cal rights, on one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights, on the other.
Lamarche also reminds us that the international protection of economic rights pre-
dates any international protection of civil and political rights. The I.L.O.’s foray into
worker protection emerged following World War I; whereas the Universal Declaration,
the I.C.C.P.R., and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were
adopted in the post-World War HI era. In this regard, economic rights are effectively the
oldest international human rights, although Lamarche acknowledges that they are also
among the most recent to be conceptualized as human rights. The concreteness of eco-
nomic well-being, captured by such basic rights as the right to food, shelter, clothing,
healthcare, and education, underscores the need to include the devastating problem of
poverty on the international human-rights agenda.’
2 See: P. Alston, “A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfusca-
tion of International Human Rights Law?” (1982) 29 Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. 307, citing, inter alia,
K. Vasak, “For the Third Generation of Human Rights: The Rights of Solidarity” (Inaugural Lecture
to the Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2-27 July 1979)
[unpublished]. See also SJ. Toope, “Cultural Diversity and Human Rights” (F.R. Scott Lecture,
McGill University, 8 May 1996) [unpublished].
2 p Alston, “Preface” in Perspectives, supra note 1 at xi.
See Perspectives, ibid. at 2.
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Nevertheless, economic rights are understandably conceptualized as different from
civil and political rights because they are separated into distinct categories of rights in
international human- rights law. This is revealed by the division of the two covenants
into the I.C.C.PR. versus the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In
Qu6bec, the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,”6 in effect, reproduces the sepa-
ration evident in international human-rights law.27 In interpreting the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,” which does not contain any explicit protection of economic
and social rights, courts have also endeavoured to categorize rights as either economic,
civil, legal, or political in nature.’
Despite this effort at categorization, the illusory nature of the distinction is becom-
ing increasingly apparent. Pierre Bosset has identified a number of examples in the
Qu6bec context where the conceptual coherence of a distinction between economic and
civil rights is seriously challenged? As the interconnections between economic, social,
and cultural rights and civil and political rights repeatedly manifest themselves, it be-
comes imperative to contest any vestiges of the hierarchical categorization of rights
and to continue to emphasize their interdependence.
Beyond the dichotomy of economic and social rights versus civil and political
rights, Lamarche situates economic rights in the context of more recent “third genera-
tion” rights, or “solidarity” rights, such as the right to development, the right to peace,
and the right to a healthy environment.’ She maintains that socio-economic-rights dis-
course is both different and preferable to alternative concepts based on a discourse of
basic needs or extreme poverty.2 Her concern with developing normative international-
law concepts to challenge unemployment and poverty in industrialized countries ex-
plains, in part, her rejection of focusing on extreme poverty or basic needs, concepts
that direct us most immediately to the needs of developing countries.
2R.S.Q., c. C-12 [hereinafter Quibec Charter].
27For a discussion of economic and social rights in the Quebec Charter, see P Bosset, “Les droits
6conomiques et sociaux, parents pauvres de la Charte qudb6coise ?” (Paper presented to the joint
symposium of the Commission des droits de ]a personne et des droits de ]a jeunesse (“C.D.PD.J.”)
and the Association qu6b6coise de droit compar6, Les 20 ans de la Charte quibicoise des droits et li-
bertis: bilan et ddfis, 17 March 1996) [unpublished; manuscript available from the C.D.P.D.J.].
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11.
29 See: M. Jackman, “Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare Claims” (1994) 19
Queen’s L.J. 65; Bosset, supra note 27; M. Jackman, “The Protection of Welfare Rights under the
Charter” (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257.
‘0 See: Bosset, ibid at 17; C. Scott, “The Interdependence and Impermeability of Human Rights
Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights” (1989) 27 Os-
goode Hall L.J. 769; G.J.H. Van Hoof, “The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A
Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views” in P. Alston & K. Tomasevski, eds., The Right to Food (Boston:
Nijhoff, 1984) 97.
” See references, supra note 23.
312 See Perspectives, supra note I at 12-13.
1996]
C. SHEPPARD – PERSPECTIVES OCCIDENTALES
B. Economic Rights and Justiciability
Another significant concern about economic rights surrounds questions of their
justiciability.” The perceived non-justiciability of economic rights also represents one
of the most important lines of demarcation with civil and political rights and has con-
tributed to their characterization as less important human rights. Since they often can-
not be directly enforced through litigation, they are seen as mere inspirational guide-
posts for the development of future government policy. Some scholars suggest that this
non-justiciability means that economic rights are not considered “real” rights.’
Lamarche clarifies that despite the general presumption that economic rights are
not justiciable, a number of very specific employment-related economic rights have
been subject to enforcement through the courts. Moreover, she notes that civil and po-
litical rights can also often require judicial remedies mandating the expenditure of
public funds, a traditional concern associated with expanding the justiciability of eco-
nomic rights. She is also supportive of developing mechanisms for greater justiciability
of economic and social rights in the international arena. In particular, Lamarche en-
dorses recent initiatives of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights to develop more direct and justiciable enforcement mechanisms. 6
In addition to these arguments, Lamarche makes the vitally important point that
justiciability is not the only measure of legal legitimacy and emphasizes the importance
of reaffirming the legal significance of programmatic rights. She contests the idea that
rights of a programmatic nature, that require positive state action for their full enjoy-
ment and recognition, are any less important or binding from a legal perspective, than
the more traditional and justiciable individual civil rights. 7 Lamarche also points out
that many of the economic and social rights recognized in international law are con-
crete and clearly defined, despite the variety of different means and policy initiatives
that may be used to achieve them
” In the Canadian context, see J. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitu-
tion-Perspectives on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992).
, See discussion in E.W. Vierdag, “The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1978) 9 Netherlands YB. Int’l L. 69 at 77.
5 Lamarche does not appear to share the concerns about justiciability advanced by some progres-
sive scholars (contrast e.g. L. Lamarche, “Le d6bat sur les droits sociaux au Canada : respecte-t-il ]a
juridicit6 de ces droits ” in Bakan & Schneiderman, eds., supra note 33, 29, with: J. Bakan, “What’s
Wrong with Social Rights?” in Bakan & Schneiderman, eds., ibid, 85; H. Glasbeek, “The Social
Charter Poor Politics for the Poor” in Bakan & Schneiderman, eds., ibid., 115.
36 See Perspectives, supra note 1 at 449.
3 See ibid. at 114.
3″See ibid. at 116.
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C. Economic Rights versus Economic Privileges
The critical importance of economic rights has also been undermined by the prob-
lem of abstraction and de-contextualization 9 Most would agree that basic economic
well-being is a fundamental precondition to the enjoyment of civil and political rights.
From this perspective, economic rights are indeed just as important, or arguably even
more important, than the more traditional civil and political rights. Yet economic rights
have sometimes been conceptualized, particularly in domestic law, to include market-
related or commercial activities, such as freedom of contract without government
regulation or the freedom to engage in commercial activities without legal restraints.’
Thus, both commercial interests and basic economic security are sometimes catego-
rized under the general rubric of economic rights.
The protection of commercial interests, however, is significantly different from the
notion of a right to basic economic well-being.” Although Lamarche does not develop
this distinction, to underscore the difference, it may be helpful to refer to commercial
interests as “economic privileges”.’2 It is clear that these types of economic privileges
do not attract any universal normative support for their unfettered protection. Indeed, it
is precisely in limiting economic privileges in many instances that basic economic
rights will be effectively protected. Thus, it is critical not to confuse economic human
rights with economic privileges. Though the two share the adjective “economic”, they
are qualitatively different and capable of clear differentiation.
9 Throughout her book, Lamarche insists on the importance of developing a “contextualized” ap-
proach to economic rights.
‘ The most well-known example of this occurred during the Lochner Era in U.S. constitutional
history. Drawing on the constitutional protection of liberty, the United States Supreme Court accorded
constitutional protection to the freedom of contract of employers and employees, resulting in the ju-
dicial invalidation of a significant amount of progressive regulatory legislation aimed at protecting
workers from the worst excesses of industrial capitalism (see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.
Ct. 539 (1905)). See also, R. Pound, “Liberty of Contract” (1908-1909) 18 Yale L.J. 454.
4″ Some judges have explicitly recognized the difference between pecuniary interests and economic
rights (see e.g. Reference Re Public Service Employee Relation Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at
367-68, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 161, Dickson C.J. (dissenting) [hereinafter Re Public Service Employee cited
to S.C.R.]). In this decision, Dickson C.J. also affirms the relevance of international human-rights
norms to the interpretation of domestic human-rights protections (see ibid. at 349-50). Although
writing in dissent, Dickson C.J.’s general comments, above, continue to inform judicial decision-
making.
2 The conceptual distinction between rights and privileges is drawn from the classic work of W.N.
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923) at 36-50. See
also J.W. Singer, “The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence From Bentham to Hohfeld”
[1982] Wisc. L. Rev . 986 at 986-89, where he explains Hohfeld’s view that legal liberties or privi-
leges do not give rise to any legal duties against interference. Singer notes: “It is not true that merely
because one has the legal liberty to do an act that others have legal duties not to interfere with the
permitted act’ (Singer, ibid. at 988).
1996]
C. SHEPPARD – PERSPECTIVES OCCIDENTALES
IV. Economic Globalization and International Economic Rights
Lamarche’s book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of interna-
tional economic rights in an era of economic globalization. While the impact of eco-
nomic restructuring has been examined by a number of scholars,” Lamarche provides
unique insights into the ways in which international human-rights law must be elabo-
rated in light of the economic realities of globalization. The effects of globalization on
vulnerable groups in industrialized economies inform her rethinking of economic
rights. Her project includes reclaiming international economic rights as human rights in
local struggles linked to the deleterious effects of globalization. Thus, when workers
lack job security or basic employment-related protections, when social-welfare recipi-
ents are confronted with reductions in their social assistance, when structural unem-
ployment results in plant closures and a declining public sector, these phenomena can
be contested by drawing on the economic rights discourse of international human-
rights law.”
Furthermore, while Lamarche traces the decline in relevance of traditional em-
ployment protections at the international level, it is equally important to reassess the
efficacy of traditional strategies for advancing and protecting employment-related
rights in domestic law. Most of our employment-related benefits and protections are
provided only to workers with full-time, permanent jobs. As these jobs become more
difficult to obtain, it is critical to rethink the structure of employment protections that
are often available only to full-time, permanent workers.”
Economic globalization underscores the impossibility of developing national
strategies to promote economic rights in Western industrialized countries without con-
sidering the impact of these initiatives on struggles for an adequate standard of living
in developing countries. While Lamarche acknowledges the interconnection between
economic well-being in industrialized and developing economies, her focus is on the
relevance of international human-rights norms to economic vulnerability in industrial-
ized countries. This focus may be too limited. While it is true that struggles against
economic vulnerability occur locally, there is an asymmetry in that the actors on one
side are individuals, or locally organized groups, while those on the other side are mul-
tinational corporations. Moreover, the violation of economic rights in industrialized
43 See references, supra note 19.
“In this regard, it would have been interesting for Lamarche to examine the extent to which Cana-
dian tribunals have relied on international human-rights norms in interpreting domestic law (see e.g.
Re Public Service Employee, supra note 41, Dickson C.J. (dissenting)).
” See e.g. R. Warskett, “Can a Disappearing Pie be Shared Equally?: Unions, Women, and Wage
in L. Briskin & R McDermott, eds., Women Challenging Unions: Feminism Democracy
‘Fairness’
and Militancy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 249. In the Qudbec context, see: L.F
Dagenais, “Mutations dans les catdgories d’emploi et effets sur les personnes : Quelles stratdgies
possibles ?” (Quebec Human Rights Commission, November 1994) [unpublished; manuscript avail-
able from the C.D.RDJ.]; L.E Dagenais, “Diff~renciation des statuts d’emploi : Esquisse de typolo-
gie et rdflexion” (Quebec Human Rights Commission, December 1993) [unpublished; manuscript
available from the C.D.PDJ.].
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economies cannot be examined in isolation from economic rights debates in develop-
ing economies when the entire phenomenon of globalization teaches us that they are
strongly linked. Although Lamarche recognizes the global interdependence of human
rights, it might be beneficial for her to further explore the strategic dimensions of such
linkages.
Conclusion
Lamarche’s book provides informed insights into the substantive protection of
economic rights in international law and canvasses both the obstacles to and potential
for their realization. In outlining how the negative effects of economic globalization
have resulted in the systemic violation of economic and social rights in Western indus-
trialized economies, she reinforces the relevance and importance of international hu-
man-rights norms to the worsening problems of poverty and structural unemploy-
ment.’ By insisting on the legal dimension of international human rights of a pro-
grammatic nature, Lamarche also makes a timely and critical argument that the formu-
lation of social and economic policy in an era of economic globalization must be in-
formed by a commitment to economic and social human rights.
46See Perspectives, supra note I at 448.
