CASE AND COMMENT
UNION NATIONALE DES EMPLOYES DE VICKERS
v. CANADIAN VICKERS LTD.
LABOR UNION –
NON-STRIKING EMPLOYEES PREVENTED FROM WORKING
BY ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PICKETING EMPLOYEES –
DAMAGES TO EMPLOYER
–
CRIMINAL CODE ART. 336 –
ARTICLES 1053, 1054 C.C.
Articles 1053 and 1054 C.C. have again reared their controversial heads in
the recent case of Union Nationale des Employes de Vickers v. Canadia4
Vickers Ltd.’; moreover, as in most labour cases dealing with picketing by
striking unionists, section 366, sub-section 2, of the Criminal Code has been
invoked. Although these three articles have given rise to voluminous juris-
prudence and an abundance of opinion concerning their legal implications and
effects, the issues in the present case are primarily of factual rather than legal
nature. Nevertheless, the casting of these facts into the legal framework drawn
by the three articles is an interesting one and bears some consideration.
The question to be decided by the Court of Appeal was whether or not the
picketing organized by the appelant Union was legal in accordance with section
366, sub-section 2 of the Criminal Code; and, as a result, whether or not the
respondent was entitled to damages allegedly resulting from this picketing in
virtue of articles 1053 and 1054 C.C
During the period in which the facts occurred (August, 1952), Canadian
Vickers Ltd., a ship-building company, employed three shifts working twenty-
four hours daily. Only a segment of the workers belonged to the appellant
Union. The rest, with the exception of certain categories, were affiliated with the
American Federation of Labour. Trouble between the Union and the com-
pany arose over the signing of a collective agreement. Arbitration failed, and
Union officials called a strike early on the morning of the 19th of August.
At 5:30 A.M. workers began gathering outside the plant, and by 7:30 a crowd
numbering between one and two thousand had massed outside the company
property, as well as inside the yard and also between the plant and a near-
by plate shop belonging to the company. The crowd was made up both of
striking and non-striking workers and a sprinkling of onlookers and police-
men. Because of the large milling mob, many non-striking employees were
prevented from entering the plant, and consequently were not able to work
that day. The company, claiming the picketing to be illegal and directly res-
ponsible for preventing non-striking employers from working, subsequently
took action against the Union for damages incurred through the loss of work
of these n6n-striking workers.
1[1958] Q.B. 470. Appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court maintaining the
action. Appeal dismissed, Mr. Justice Bissonnette dissenting.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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In defense to the company’s allegations, the Union maintained that, although
admittedly it ordered the picketing, never did it intend it to be illegal; and
that, in fact, it never was illegal and could not be pointed to as the direct
cause for the stoppage of work.
The trial judge upheld the action and awarded the company $2000 in
damages. The picketing was held
illegal as it prevented the non-
striking employees from passing through the picket lines. It thus constituted
“un fait fautif de leur part iyant pour objet et pour 6ffet de violer le
droit d’autrui.”-2 Moreover, it had been established by the evidence that this
picketing was ordered by the Union officers who should have been aware
of the possible consequences of such action.
to be
Aussi bien, la difenderesse dolt 6tre tenue responsable, tant en vertu de l’art.
1053 C.C. pour avoir elle-m~me organis6 ce piquetage dans
les circonstances
susdites, qu’en vertu de I’article 1054 C.C. comme commettante de ses officiers. 3
The issues, then, before the Court of Appeal were both of fact and of law.
e the really conten-
In the view of the majority, the issue of fact proves to
tious point of the case, and thus the decision is made primiarily on the basis
of each judge’s appreciation of the factual evidence. The issue of fact is three-
fold:
a) was the picketing carried out in an illegal manner?
b) were such illegalities ordered or sanctioned by the Union?
c) did the plaintiff company suffer damages from the ille,,Ilities beyond
what it would have suffered from legal picketing?
The legal issue crystalizes itself in the question whether, under article 1053
C.C., the Union could be held liable for damages; and, in failure of this,
whether it could be held responsible for damages incurred by persons under
its control in virtue of article 1054 C.C.
In discussing the first issue of fact –
it
is necessary to consider section 366, sub-section 2 of the Criminal Code which
provides for peaceful picketing:
the legality of the picketing –
A person who attends at or near or approaches a dwelling house or place, for
the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information, does not watch,
or beset within the meaning of this section.
This is construed as an exception to the offense of intimidation by “watching
or besetting” a building as outlined in sub-section 1, paragraph (f) of the same
section. In other words, the picketing to be legal must not result in force-
ful, physical, or threatening acts which will tend to force others to act against
their will.
Mr. Justice Montgomery found that although the picketing was peaceful
(as testified by a police inspector), access to the entrance of the plant, and
2[1958] Q.B. 470 at 478.
SAt p. 478.
No. I ]
CASE AND COMMENT
to the plate shop was
especially
impossible because of the large crowds
milling about, and hence the picketing was of an illegal nature. “This certainly
went beyond what was necessary for obtaining or conveying information, and
I am of the opinion that numerous illegal acts were committed.”‘
In regard to the second question of whether such illegalities were ordered
or sanctioned by the Union, Montgomery J. pointed out that although the
contention by the Union that the illegal acts were simply those of individuals
acting on their own accord was largely justified, nevertheless the Union
“appears to have made a concerted effort to see that no hourly-paid employees,
whether legally on strike or not, entered the plant that day.”
He underlined specifically two facts to demonstrate this argument In the
first place, the plate shop, being a small and detached building, was extreme-
ly well picketed; yet many of the people who work in this shop belonged to
other unions and consequently were not on strike. Secondly, it was shown
by the evidence that all hourly-paid workers, both striking and non-striking,
were prevented from working. Passes were issued only to salaried workers.
On the third point of fact, Montgomery J. agreed in principle with the.
trial judge that the company did incur damages resulting from the illegal
picketing. He reduced these, however, from $2000 to $500 on the ground
that even if the picketing had been wholly legal, not very much work would
have been accomplished that day.
It is interesting to note that the majority judgment barely touches on the
legal issues involved in the case. One wonders whether this is due to lack
of emphasis by counsel, or whether the judges simply preferred to avoid the
knotty problems stirred up by articles 1053 and 1054 C.C. At any rate, very
little mention is made of these two vital articles. Under Quebec law a union
is a corporate body –
and hence can be sued in the
same capacity as an ordinary person. Thus both article 1053 CC. and 1054
C.C. can be applied to it:
a fictitious person –
1053 C.C.:
Every person capable of discerning right from wrong
is responsible for the
damage caused by his fault to- another, whether by positive act, imprudence,
neglect or-want of skill.
1054 C.C. (in part):
He is responsible not only for the damage caused by his own fault, but also for
that caused by the fault of persons under his control and by things he has under
his care.
Montgomery J. completely fails to mention these articles. Mr. Justice Hyde,
however, makes some reference to them. He concurs with Montgomery J. on
4At p. 472.
5At p. 473.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
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the issues of fact, but he does not appear to be as certain as the latter that
the picketing was directly responsible for the stoppage of work. He does not
say so explicitely but one may suppose that there is some doubt in his mind
as to the direct fault of the Union. Perhaps this is why he seems to rely
more on article 1054 than 1053. He directly adopts the view of the trial judge:
“whether the act was deliberate or not on the part of the Union is not estab-
lished, but that it was done by persons under its control was the view of
the trial judge with which I am not prepared to differ.”
In its formal judgment the Court does not even consider the issue and
simply rejects the appeal of the Union on the ground that the work in the
plaintiff’s plant was prevented “by the illegal activity of persons who were
picketing the respondent’s plant, and that the picketing was organized and
directed by representatives of the defendant.” 7
The dissenting judgment given by Mr. Justice Bissonnette
is a very
interesting one. Not only does his appreciation of the facts differ from the
rest of the Court, but he seems to be the only one who makes a genuine
effort to view these facts in the light of the legal issues involved.
He admits to nearly all the facts held material by the majority, and says,
in fact, that it is undeniable that members of the Union committed illegal
acts thus submitting themselves to the sanction of section 366 of the Criminal
Code. But it is in the appreciation and in the conclusion which he draws
from these facts that Bissonnette J. comes much closer to the true solution
of the case than do the other judges.
According to him, it is irrelevant that certain illegal acts were committed
by individuals, some of whom undoubtedly belonged to the appellant Union.
The action was not brought against these individual members, but against
the Union as a corporate body. To prove the fault of the Union, it would be
necessary to prove that the Union made a concerted effort to promote the
illegal picketing, or that it possessed the power to prevent this from happen-
ing. To put it in more practical terms, it would have to be shown that officers
of the Union, acting in their capacity as officers, encouraged or sanctioned
these illegal acts. Any acts these officers may have committed as private
individuals have no bearing on the responsibility of the corporate body of
the Union. While it is true that the picketing was organized by the Union,
the Union also organized a committee to prevent violence. Moreover, accord-
ing to the testimony of the police inspector, order was maintained throughout,
and an atmosphere of a picnic prevailed. Thus Bissonnette J. concludes, that
the Union could not be held responsible under article 1053 C.C.
As for article 1054 C.C., Bissonnette J. puts his finger directly on the
core of the problem when he states what for him is the real issue involved
in the case: “si le piquetage, en tant qu’il pourrait itre tenu pour illegal, a
sAt p. 475.
7At p. 471.
No. 1]
CASE AND COMMENT
6t6 la cause directe et immediate de l’arrt de travail.”‘8 In other words, this
is a pure and simple question of causality. The pickets, the persons under the
control of the Union, were undoubtedly present outside the plaintiff’s plant,
but so were hundred of other people. These contributed just as much, if not
more, to obstructing the entrances to the plant. Moreover, he ‘insists that it
would be false to say that it was because of the picketing that the crowd
gathered. Not the picketing, but the occurrence of the strike itself was the
real cause for the large crowd and the resulting obstruction. At 7:30 A.M.
the shifts were changing and everybody simply stayed to see what conse-
quences would result from the Union’s decision to strike. Very few people
were even aware of the picketing. In fact, organized picketing as such did
not take place until late that afternoon. Bissonnette J. admits that the Union
is responsible for its members when these act in their capacity as members,
but he maintains that it was because of the huge milling mob, and not because
of the picketing by Union members, that work was stopped.
Bissonnette J. thus absolves the Union of any responsibility for the stop-
page of work because of the picketing. He can find no conclusive proof that
any illegal picketing was condoned by the Union, and consequently he holds,
that the appeal of the Union be maintained and the action by the company
rejected.
Appreciation of facts is, in the final analysis, a matter of subjective judg-
ment. But it is not in this aspect that the dissenting judgment appears to be
more convincing than that of the majority. In reality, the issue is not which
facts ought to prevail, but rather what conclusion ought one to draw from these
facts, and how must one weigh these conclusions in the light of legal principles.
It is in this respect that the dissenting judgment seems the more tenable.
There
is ample
jurisprudence
to support the majority holding that a
Union is liable for illegal acts resulting from picketing.9 But in all these it is
clearly shown that the Union was directly responsible for the illegal acts.
Thus in Acton Vale Silk Mills Ltd. v. Le7eille, the Court found that “les
ttes dirig~antes de ladite grave, par leur conduite et leur agissement ont
non seulement autoris6 et ratifi6 les dits actes de violence et d’intimidation
de la part de ces ouvriers, mais ils y ont m6me particip, et ils sonten loi
solidairement r~sponsables du prijudice qui en r~sulte.”” 0
On the other hand it was held in Peerless Laundry v. Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Workers Union” that illegalities where picketing is concerned do
not create a presumption of fault on part of the union: “There is authority
for the view that it is not the mere commission of the offense under section
SAt p. 479.
9Acton Vale Silk Mills Ltd. v. Leveille (1939), 78 S.C. 19; Shane v. Lupovich
[1942] K.B. 523; Army and Navy Dept. Store Ltd. v. Retail, Wholesale, and Depart-
ment Store Union [1950] 2 W.W.R. 999.
19At p. 19.
11[1952] 6 W.W.R. 443.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol 5
501 of the Criminal Code (corresponding to section 366 in 1952 R.S.C.)
which vests a civil right of action in a plaintiff. The conduct complained of
should be otherwise tortious.”‘ 2
In conclusion, it is this point brought forth in the Peerless decision which
in the
is probably the most disturbing aspect of the majority decision
present case. One tends to feel that the Court impliedly adopted the notion
that illegal acts committed by members of the Union presume the fault of the
latter. The two points mentioned above on which Montgomery J. bases his
conclusion that the Union made a “concerted effort” to prevent non-striking
workers from entering the plant, both beg the issue. The fact that the plate
shop was extremely well picketed and the fact that some hourly-paid workers
were obstructed, simply point out that certain illegal acts were committed,
something which not even the Union denied. But what proof was there that the
Union sanctioned these illegalities? Large mobs have been known to commit
impulsive and illegal acts in the past. It is this implied presumption of fault,
then, which causes one to question the soundness of the ji dgment of the court.
It is a presumption which, if carried too far, could lead to dangerous conse-
quences.
GEORGE A. ROSENEERG*
CITE DE MONTRE&L v. CHAPLEAU
MuNIcIPAL LAW
–
FALL ON AN
ICEY SIDE-WALK
–
CLIMACTIC
CONDITIONS –
RuLEs WHICH GUIDE THE COURTS WITH RESPECT
TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MONTREAL
DAMAGES –
ART. 536 –
CrTES AND TOWNS
–
ACT s. 622(7)
the extent of an individual’s claim against a municipality
A recent decision by the Quebec Court of Queen’s Bench (Appeal Side)’,
for
illustrates
damages resulting from a fall on a slippery sidewalk within that city’s juris-
diction during inclement weather. The issues, reviewed by Mr. Justice Bis-
sonnette, although not of a controversial nature do summarize in a lucid
manner certain basic principles developed over the years by numerous “side-
walk damage” cases. The facts were simple: on 18 December, 1953 at about
8.30 P.M., the respondent Chapleau while walking along Roy St near the
32At p. 447.
*Of the Board of Editors, McGill Law Journal; second year law student.
1Citi de Montrial v.Chapleau, [1958] Q.B. 445, affirming the Superior Court deci-
sion (unreported).
No. 1]
CASE AND COMMENT
south-west comer of St. Denis St. in Montreal, slipped and fell, thereby
fracturing a leg. The accident was subsequently attributed to the dangerous
condition of the city’s sidewalk. Three witnesses were produced by the
plaintiff and their testimony, considered in relation to the official weather
report, seemed to suggest to the court “que le trottoir pouvait 8tre sinon en
glace, du moins glissant. ‘ 2
Proceeding from these facts the court was concerned with three basic issues:
1. What is the liability of a city in regard to the maintenance of side-
walks within its jurisdiction during the winter months?
2. What in essence must be included in the prior notice required by
the City of Montreal’s Charter when instituting an action for dama-
ges or for compensation against the city?
3. What basis of calculation should be used in determining the measure
of damages?
I.
Section 622(7) of the Cities and Towns Act4 states:
Notwithstanding any general law or special act, no municipal corporation may be
held liable for damages resulting from an accident, of which any person is the
victim, on the sidewalks, streets, or roads, by reason of the snow or ice, unless
the claimant establishes that the said accident was caused by the negligenc
or
fault of the said corporation, the court having to take into account the weather
conditions.
Previous to the passage of this statute the courts tended to consider city muni-
cipalities as insurers of the security of pedestrians; the presumption of fact
was, in a sense, against the city. The present context of the 1936 amendment
leaves no room for doubt: the claimant must in all cases establish two
factors :5 fiirst, the slippery or dangerous condition of the sidewalks; second,
he must dearly reveal the city’s negligence in failing to properly maintain
the sidewalk at the time of the accident Further, it may be noted that Quebec
Iourts currently tend to the view that the defendent municipality need no
longer refute the allegations of the plaintiff by establishing the contrary of
that which was alleged, it being sufficient to merely justify the condition
of the sidewalk.6
2Ibid. at p. 448.
3Although this discussion shall only involve
the city’s liability with regard to
sidewalks in a dangerous state due to the winter conditions, it follows that many
of the principles examined are applicable to litigation which
involves pedestrians’
safety and related municipal negligence. For instance, see Desormeaus v. City of
Verdun, [1958] S.C.R. 342.
4R.S.Q. (I”1),
5Bissonnette J. excludes the widely used Art. 1054 C.C. in his judgment, relying
c. 233, s.662(7).
instead on the basis of the contravention of a statute.
6 See for instance Naginska v. City of Outretnont, [1945] K.B. 495; Citi de Qudbe
v. Barbeau, [1948] K.B. 307; Citi de Sherbrooke v. Dawson, [1945] K.B. 486.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 5
That the court in the present case satisfied itself as to the discharge of the
plaintiff’s burden is evident by the following words of Bissonnette J.:
Si donc nous tenons pour vrai que le trottoir constituer un
reste i se demander si la d~fenderesse a iti diligente A parer A cette condition
du trottoir. I est reconnu de tous qu’aucune precaution n’a 6t6 prise pendant toute
cette journe …
tat de danger, il
7
The jurisprudence is well settled in that the City of Montreal is under a
legal obligation to keep its sidewalks in such a state as would not constitute
a danger to any pedestrian who may make use of them.8 A careful dis-
tinction, however, must be drawn: the fact that a sidewalk is slippery does
not necessarily constitute a fault. The court must also appreciate the sur-
rounding circumstances: was the weather such as to make any attempts at
temporarily impossible; what the lapse of time was from the
maintenance
end of a storm to that of the incident itself; the last time the sidewalk had
been sanded, grated, or salted. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the
city is not an insurer of persons using its sidewalks, and consequently there
is no liability upon a municipality from the mere fact that a person has fallen
because of ice or snow on a sidewalk. Whatever confusion has arisen in the
interpretation of what constitutes
past was caused by the varied
“proper” care and what was a “reasonable”
length of time under climatic
conditions. 9
judicial
La rigle qui doit nous guider c’est de rechercher, non pas si cette corporation
municipale a r~ussi A faire disparaitre l’tat glissant de tout trot Ir, mais si elle
a pris des precautions suffisantes et si elle s’est mise diligemmf ‘t L la tiche pour
parer aux dangers et, par Ia, s’affranchir de toute n6gligence, de toutes faute .. .
les 6lments
si elle a pris
de la nature.1 o
raisonnables pour
lutter contre
les moyens
Again,
La citi n’est pas tenue d’assurer que ses rues ou trottoirs ne seront jamais gls-
sants; elle est seulement oblig~e de prendre
les precautions qu prendrait un
homme diligent pour atteindre ce but. D’oh il suit que la cit6 ne sera pas
n~cessairement responsable chaque fois qu’une personne fera une chute sur un
trottoir glissant, mais que sa r~sponsabilit6 sera engag~e seulement lorsque l’6tat
du trottoir, s’il a W la cause du dommage, aura W le r~sultat d’une faute. 1I
7At p. 448.
8The jurisprudence only follows what
is in fact obvious from a perusal of the
City of Montreal charter. See especially, Arts. 300 par. 2, 375 par. 4, 379(e). Also note
Calascione v. City of Montreal, [1943] ILL. 260; Labonti v. City of Montreal, [1943]
S.C. 284; Citi de Montrial v. Tremblay (1926), 40 KB. 222; Liger v. Citi de
Montrial (1928), 34 R.L. 28.
*Westmount v. Peters (1940), 69 KB. 269; Proulx v. City of Hull, [1947] K-B.
135; City of Sherbrooke v. Lefebvre, [1950] ThL. 433.
lORemarks of Bissonnette J. in Citi de Sherbrooke v. Dawson, supra., as cited by
the then Chief Justice, Hon. T. Rinfret
1″See the remarks of Pratte J. in Citi de Quibec v. Barbeau, supra., at p. 315.
Also, Fee v. City of Montrial (1917), 52 S.C. 336; Naginska v. City of Outremont,
supra, at p. 500; Cit’ de Quebec v. Dame Dupont, [1941] K.B. 510.
No. 1]
CASE AND COMMENT
Hence, as Mr. Justice Bissonnette suggests in summarizing the present extent
of a city’s responsibility:
. l’obligation impos~e i la cit6 n’est pas une obligation de risultat, mais une
* .
obligation de moyen. 12
II.
A second question considered in the Chapleau case involved the proce-
dural issue of what is sufficient notice as required by the City of Montreal
Charter, Article 536,’ s which outlines the steps necessary in the institution
of any action in damages or compensation against the city. The text of the
article appears to be quite dear; in effect, it states that notwithstanding any
law to the contrary, no right of action shall exist against the city for damages
resulting from bodily injury, caused by a fall on the sidewalk or roadway,
unless within ten days from the date of such accident, a written notice has been
received by the city containing the particulars. An exception is provided in that
an injured person shall not be deprived of his right of action because of
a failure to give the notice if he shows a reasonable excuse which is acceptable
to the court.
In this instance the notice filed with the city on behalf of the claimant
was somewhat vague as to its charges. The notice did attribute responsibility
to the city, but it was insufficient with regard to the description of the injuries
sustained. There was no mention of fault but Mr. Justice Bissonnette stated
that:
Or, j’estime que qui dit responsabilit6 dit faute.14
A strange statement indeed when it is recalled that while a city may be
legally responsible for damages, it may not be at fault. This apparent incon-
sistency is partially explained by the honourable judge when he says that as
long as the intention of the patties is obvious the court should appreciate
the circumstances and not demand the required formality. This liberal inter-
pretation of the meaning of the .procedural clause closely follows a view
expressed in an earlier case by the same judge.”” However, a later appellate
decision voiced a contrary opinion, holding that a notice not adhering to the
strict formalities of section 536 was insufficient and consequently not accept-
able.16
Although a considerable amount of jurisprudence may be found in support
of both views, it must be acknowledged that the more liberal view is usually
invoked, especially once the negligence of the city has been established. 17
I2At p. 450
1sCorresponding to s.522 of the Cities and Towns Act, R-S.Q. (1941), c.233.
14At p. 451.
15Ville St. Laurent v. St. Aub4, [1941] K.B. 342 at 345.
1 6Patenaude v. Citi de Montrial, [1946] K.B. 554.
17Those cases advocating a strict interpretation, see: Fortune v. City of Montreal,
[1950] C.S. 111; Kemp v. Ste. Thirse, [19501 P.R. 404; Samson v. Quebec,
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 5
III.
J.,
involved
A third issue, considered by Montgomery
the measure
of compensatory damages to be awarded the claimant. As the term implies,
compensatory damages are awarded, in conformity with the principles under-
lying damages generally to make good or replace the loss caused by the
wrong or injury. Damages in such an accident as that under consideration
involve certain distinct criteria, such as hospital and medical expenses, physical
suffering, loss of earnings and impairment of earning capacity, and present
and future or permanent disability. The court must first establish that all
the injuries for which the plaintiff claims damages are properly attributable,
in a medical sense, to the accident; then it is a matter of determining the
veracity of the claimant’s total demands. Hospital and medical expenses are,
of course, easily ascertained. Similarly, loss of earnings may be fixed with
reasonable certainty. Of interest in Mr. Justice Montgomery’s award is the
fact that consideration was made of payments to the pla.–tiff’s family by the
Welfare Department of the City. It was reasonable to trtaz these payments
as mitigating the damages suffered by the plaintiff.18
Calculations of pain and suffering are not as easily ascertained. To justify
recovery on such grounds, it is reasonable to expect that there must be actual
in this instance, it would follow naturally from a compound-fracture of
pain –
the leg. But the calculations of these estimates are always open to contro-
versy, and Quebec jurisprudence has established no definite pr, -dent in this
matter and opinions may (and do) vary; although reasonable figures are
usually accepted by the courts. 9
Claims in regard to partial incapacity and the impairment of future earnings
should be supported by satisfactory proof of the allegations of the claimant,
and direct medical evidence should be sought to establish the extent of such
future impairment.*2
JoE A. PiNsKY*
1
[1952] S.C. 452. Those taking a more liberal view: Dupras and the City of Montreal
v. Johston (1937), 63 K.B. 496; Dufour v. City of Chioutimi, [1945] KB. 127;
Houle v. City of Montreal, [1955] S.C. 419.
bsAt p. 453.
1 1For example, Low v. Camaian Pacific Express (1938), 77 S.C. 31.
2OLaplante v. Deilauriers et Fils Lite., [1951] S.C. 93. For a discussion of the
general measure of damages in sidewalk injury cases see especially Mayer v. City
of Montreal (1941), 47 R.L.ms. 185 and Dame Ungar v. City of Montreal, [19501
R.L. 214.
*Of the Board of Editors, McGill Law Journal; second year law student.
