McGill Law Journal \u2014 Revue de droit de McGill<\/p>\n
Introduction: Moving from the Why<\/em> to the How<\/em> of Indigenous Law<\/p>\n Fraser Harland*\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Si un num\u00e9ro sp\u00e9cial portant sur \u00ab\u00a0Le droit autochtone et le pluralisme juridique\u00a0\u00bb avait \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 il y a vingt-cinq ans, il est probable que ses contributeurs autochtones aient eu \u00e0 expliquer et \u00e0 justifier l\u2019existence m\u00eame du droit autochtone et sa relation avec le droit canadien.[1]<\/a> Certains auteurs non autochtones auraient peut-\u00eatre d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 des arguments concernant la possibilit\u00e9 que le droit autochtone informe le travail de juges canadiens, de n\u00e9gociateurs de revendications territoriales et de l\u00e9gislateurs. D\u2019autres auraient peut-\u00eatre pos\u00e9 que les ordres juridiques qui ont form\u00e9 et continuent de former les communaut\u00e9s autochtones ne constituent pas le droit<\/em> du tout.[2]<\/a> En d\u2019autres mots, le d\u00e9bat aurait pu \u00eatre centr\u00e9 sur pourquoi <\/em>il faut engager avec le droit autochtone.<\/p>\n Today, questions around the need to engage with Indigenous law have given way to an emerging consensus that extends far beyond the legal academy. Law schools[3]<\/a> and law societies[4]<\/a> increasingly recognize the importance of teaching and making space for Indigenous law. The Supreme Court of Canada has explicitly required that courts account for Indigenous law when adjudicating Aboriginal title claims.[5]<\/a> And the Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued numerous calls to action pertaining to Indigenous law in its recently published final report.[6]<\/a> If it is no longer controversial to assert the relevance of Indigenous legal orders, however, there is significant divergence on where we go from here. In other words, the debate has shifted from why<\/em> Indigenous law matters to how <\/em>it should be taught, recognized, interpreted, and understood.<\/p>\n En f\u00e9vrier 2016, dans le cadre du symposium annuel de la Revue de droit de McGill<\/em>, les contributeurs de ce num\u00e9ro sp\u00e9cial se sont rassembl\u00e9s pour pr\u00e9senter leurs textes aux \u00e9tudiants, professeurs de droit et aux membres des communaut\u00e9s mcgilloise et montr\u00e9alaise. La version publi\u00e9e des textes para\u00eet maintenant dans ce num\u00e9ro sp\u00e9cial pour la toute premi\u00e8re fois. \u00c0 partir de perspectives toutes aussi vari\u00e9es l\u2019une que les autres, les auteurs tentent de trouver une r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la tr\u00e8s importante question\u00a0: comment<\/em> approcher le droit autochtone?<\/p>\n Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland offer a method for using common law techniques to engage with the legal principles in Indigenous stories, narratives, and oral histories. Lara Ulrich and David Gill employ this method, applying the legal principles from Mi\u2019kmaq stories to the question of forestry use and management in New Brunswick. Robert Clifford, on the other hand, draws from the context of a fuel spill to argue that non-Indigenous approaches to issues like jurisdiction and remedy fail to understand the cosmological and ontological framework of W<\/u>S\u00c1NEC\u0301 law. From a pedagogical angle, John Borrows argues that Indigenous law is best taught using Indigenous frameworks and offers a proposed categorization for teaching Anishinaabe law. Aaron Mills contends that Indigenous law can only be safely and respectfully taught if students are first given tools to understand the rooted (as opposed to liberal) constitutions and lifeworlds of Indigenous legal orders, before they begin to study Indigenous laws.<\/p>\n D\u2019autres auteurs consid\u00e8rent la fa\u00e7on dont les institutions non autochtones pourraient interagir avec les ordres juridiques autochtones. S\u00e9bastien Grammond et Christiane Guay exposent les lacunes de mesures l\u00e9gislatives r\u00e9cemment propos\u00e9es au Qu\u00e9bec, limit\u00e9es par leur incapacit\u00e9 de comprendre et d\u2019adresser ad\u00e9quatement les diff\u00e9rences inh\u00e9rentes dans l\u2019\u00ab\u00a0adoption coutumi\u00e8re\u00a0\u00bb innue. Pour sa part, Kirsten Manley-Casimir milite pour une interpr\u00e9tation bijuridique du principe du respect, qui pourra guider la jurisprudence reli\u00e9e au titre autochtone. Finalement, Genevi\u00e8ve Motard pose que, malgr\u00e9 le niveau important d\u2019autonomie que pourrait garantir le principe de personnalit\u00e9 aux peuples autochtones dans le contexte d\u2019accords territoriaux, les accords actuels n\u2019ont pas employ\u00e9 le principe \u00e0 son potentiel complet.<\/p>\n These articles share a number of important unifying premises and themes. All agree on the existence of Indigenous law, on its relational nature, on the importance of Indigenous law being shaped first and foremost by Indigenous communities themselves, on the requirement that Indigenous law be approached with respect by non-Indigenous peoples, and on the fundamental significance of these questions for the development of legal theory and practice in Canada. As is the case in any good special issue, however, they also uncover some key strands of disagreement. For example, Napoleon and Friedland see common law lawyers as equipped to interpret Indigenous law\u2014a task taken up by Ulrich and Gill. Borrows, too, does not dispute the possibility of organizing Indigenous law with common law concepts, though it is clearly not his preference. Yet, Mills issues a strong caution that common law lawyers may actually cause harm unless given tools to understand the rooted nature of Indigenous constitutional orders and Clifford calls for Indigenous law to be understood on its own terms. Meanwhile, Manley-Casimir offers a hopeful theoretical framework for addressing Indigenous law while Motard and Grammond and Guay offer more sobering analyses of how (in)effectively state institutions are engaging with Indigenous law in practice.<\/p>\n This brief reflection only scratches the surface of the rich connections and tensions that are disclosed when these articles are read together. As such, I am optimistic that this special issue will make a lasting impact on the scholarly field of Indigenous law. More than that, I hope that it will contribute to a much wider and ongoing dialogue as citizens, law schools, legal scholars, lawyers, judges, courts, legislatures, and Indigenous communities grapple with the complex and immensely important questions raised in these pages.<\/p>\n \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/u><\/p>\n <\/a>[1]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 En effet, dans un article de John Borrows, un des contributeurs \u00e0 ce num\u00e9ro sp\u00e9cial, qui par\u00fbt au sein de la\u00a0<\/span>Revue de droit de McGill<\/em>\u00a0il y a vingt ans, ceci \u00e9tait pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment le but (voir John Borrows, \u00ab\u00a0With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada)\u00a0\u00bb (1996) 41:3 RD McGill\u00a0629).<\/span><\/p>\n [2]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Pour une formulation inf\u00e2me de cet argument, voir l\u2019analyse du juge McEachern dans Delgamuukw v British Columbia<\/em>, 79 DLR (4th) 185, 1991 CanLII 2372 (BC SC).<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Perhaps most ambitiously, the University of Victoria has approved in principle a joint common law\/Indigenous law (JD\/JID) program (see University of Victoria, Faculty of Law, \u201cJoint Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous Legal Orders\u201d, online: <www.uviclss.ca\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/02\/JID-Scope-and-Components-26-January-2016-1.pdf>). In its curriculum renewal, McGill University\u2019s Faculty of Law committed to \u201can integrated education\u201d that will be \u201cbroadened to include other legal traditions, including better understandings of indigenous law\u201d (McGill University, Faculty of Law, \u201cA Global Model of Legal Education: BCL\/LLB Curriculum Renewal\u201d, online: <www.mcgill.ca\/law\/future>).<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For example, in 2015, the Law Society of Upper Canada offered a full-day continuing professional development course on Indigenous law (see Law Society of Upper Canada, \u201cIndigenous Law Issues\u201d, online: <ecom.lsuc.on.ca\/cpd\/product.jsp?id=CLE14-0111901>).<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 See Delgamuukw v British Columbia<\/em>, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 147, 66 BCLR (3d) 285; Tsilhqot\u2019in Nation v British Columbia<\/em>, 2014 SCC 44 at paras 34\u201335, [2014] 2 SCR 257.<\/p>\n