BOOK REVIEWS

CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE

The Fate of the Earth. By Jonathan Schell. New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1982. Pp. 256 [$11.95 U.S.].

I have read this book three times, and I intend to read it again; for it is one of the most important books that I have ever read. Its message is clear and compelling and, unlike many "serious" books, it is extremely well written. It is even eloquent, but at the same time as logical in its presentation as a mathematical formula. It may even be a masterpiece.

But reading Schell's book is not exactly a pleasant experience. For the conundrum posed — one which our generation must answer — is perhaps the hardest question with which mankind has ever had to cope. Can we save our world, ourselves, the yet unborn, and indeed the very memory of civilization from the imminent peril of nuclear extinction?

There is much about physics and about philosophy in the book, but its central message is political. And that is one reason why the book is especially important for lawyers and law students. For lawyers have a special responsibility and a key role to play in the creation and development of the new world political structures that must be set up if the threat of nuclear extinction is to be met. The contemporary state system is, as Schell demonstrates conclusively, obsolete. It must be replaced by a new and radically different world political and legal order. What is necessary is nothing less than a revolution in world politics and institutions. "We are speaking", he writes, "of revolutionizing the politics of the earth".

Self-styled "realists" may argue that this task is impossible given the kind of people we are and the kind of world we live in. God help us, they may be right. But true realists will put their money on the possibility that they may be wrong. All of Schell's readers may not agree with this analysis or his conclusions; but even the sceptics must agree that, as long as there is even the possibility of a nuclear holocaust, or even of something "less" than that, it is only elementary prudence to begin to take steps to prevent it. The priority item on the world's political agenda is therefore to find a solution to the conundrum. Our political leaders (and we the people who are responsible for keeping them in power) must address themselves, at our peril and without further delay, to the business of creating the new kind of world order that the situation demands. If "reality" means anything, this goal is its urgent business. What may now seem impossible must be made possible. We have no other choice.

There is little room in the world in which we now live for happy-go-lucky optimism. But optimism is still the best working hypothesis. Time however is not on our side. "Evolution was slow to produce us", says Schell, "but our extinction will be swift; it will be literally over before we know it. We have to match swiftness with swiftness".

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The Global Politics of Arms Sales. By Andrew J. Pierre. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. 352 [Cloth $20.00 U.S.; Paper $7.95 U.S.]

Influence or Quid-Pro-Fiasco?: The Global Predicament of Arms Sales

In global terms, measured in constant dollars, arms sales more than doubled from U.S. $9.4 billion in 1969 to U.S. $19.1 billion in 1978. Currently, over seventy-five *per cent* of total arms transfers are destined for the Third World. The United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany supply over eighty-five *per cent* of these weapons. Nations supplying arms have justified this activity as an instrument of their respective foreign policies. Yet, the ability of arms sales to bolster or undermine a supplier's foreign policy depends upon a mixture of national motives and often unpredictable international conditions and circumstances. These dynamic variables include: the potential political influence and leverage to be gained against an ideological adversary; the potential access to military bases; the trade-offs of long-term risks and short-term benefits; the dovetailing of weapon sales with other foreign policy goals; the effect of sales on regional stability; the political stability of the recipient nation; and the use to which the delivered weapons are put.

Such a complicated business does carry inherent risks for the "merchants of foreign policy"; what one day was a measure of political influence could the next become a foreign policy fiasco. Examples of *quid pro quos* turned *quid pro fiascos* are easy enough to find. Witness President Nixon's sales of "any arms short of nuclear weapons" to the Shah of Iran, weapons which later fell into the hands of the revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini; or the Soviet expulsion from Egypt after many years of committing substantial numbers of arms and advisers to that country. Arms transfers can also act as a source of both domestic and foreign political division as was seen in the American sale of Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and as is currently being illustrated by the divisive European debate over nuclear arms transfers, namely United States Pershing II and cruise missiles.

Risks for Third World recipients are also considerable. The drive toward nationalism and self-reliance, combined with an inadequate technological base for arms production, serves to spur on Third World demand for the acquisition of sophisticated weapons from abroad. One result is that expendi-

tures on arms have risen twice as fast as development assistance. Scarce resources that could be used more efficiently for economic development are often diverted for arms purchases, making domestic stability even less firm. Guns instead of butter may cause local populations to take up guns in the name of butter; of course, guns can be used to stifle domestic opposition as well. In this way, arms transfers can create fiascos in the developing world.

Andrew Pierre explores this global predicament in his Council on Foreign Relations book, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales*. Pierre, travelling to twenty countries to compile his well-researched findings, concludes that "arms sales are foreign policy writ large" and "must be seen, essentially, in political terms".[1] Organizing his work into sections on dilemmas, suppliers, recipients, and restraints, the author has added constructively to an increasing body of literature on this complicated subject. Much academic attention has already been focused upon these issues by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], the International Institute of Strategic Studies [IISS], and by the Council on Foreign Relations [CFR].[2] A more journalistic treatise, by Anthony Sampson,[3] has discussed the Realpolitik of "the merchants of death". Pierre's book is a balanced blend of academic research and anecdotal journalism, making for an informative and readable volume.

There do seem to be, however, some lacunae in Pierre's analysis. The author expressly delineates the problems that arms transfers pose for the suppliers *as nations*, with particular emphasis on the United States, without discussing adequately the role that private companies play in creating these dilemmas. The politics of arms sales also involve the corporate politics of contracts and profits. A chapter on the "politics of financial reward" would help explain the micro-economic motivations of the arms trade.

While suggesting that President Reagan replaced an inconsistent Carter Administration arms sales policy with an "overly permissive" one, Pierre could have gone further to elaborate upon the ramifications of transfers for regional security and nuclear proliferation. In his short subsection on "Nuclear Proliferation and Conventional Arms Sales",[4] the author says that "the Reagan administration is far more inclined to sell arms for the purpose of reducing motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons",[5] but he does not seem to recognize that this very policy could serve to create the regional instability that whets the atomic appetite.

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[1] A. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (1982) 3.

[2] See, *e.g.*, A. Cahn, *et al.*, *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (1977). See also United States Congress, *Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy* (1981) (A Library of Congress Congressional Research Study).

[3] A. Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar* (1978).

[4] *Supra*, note 1, 29-31.

[5] *Ibid.*, 30.

Pierre prefers instead to focus upon proliferation in the quantity and sophistication of conventional arms sales. In the past, most arms transfers to less-developed countries were made up of obsolete weapons of the major powers. Increasingly, and particularly in the case of American and Soviet exports, more advanced weaponry has been delivered. In 1960, for instance, only four developing nations had supersonic aircraft; by 1977, the total was forty-seven. The Middle East receives fifty *per cent* of total world arms sales and holds the largest regional share of transferred sophisticated weaponry. Latin American acquisitions have tripled over the last decade, and the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Venezuela will introduce one of the world's most advanced weapons into that region for the first time.

The proliferation of sophisticated arms transfers, according to Pierre, is an integral element in the conduct of foreign policy, especially for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. As an intended vehicle for the extension of ideological influence through the demonstration of technological prowess, arms sales have become a prime element in superpower competition. Though ideological concerns dominate the arms transfer policies of the superpowers, other suppliers such as France, the U.K. and West Germany are motivated primarily by other national concerns: access to vital raw materials, maintenance of employment in industry and balance of trade. France continues to pronounce a goal of national independence and autonomy, even though its arms industry has become excessively dependent on exports.

Considering the diverse motives of both suppliers and recipients, is there any real hope for controlling arms sales? Fuelled by competing national interests, the increasing volume and sophistication of arms transfers is fast racing beyond the international political means of control. It is paradoxical that international law is predicated upon the principle of cooperation between sovereign states, and yet the self-defined interests of states act consistently as obstacles to agreement and consensus. Pierre calls for a "supplier's code of conduct". In so doing, he is not the first to suggest the need for multilateral restraint. Unfortunately, effective multilateral mechanisms have proven more elusive than the general recognition of the need for them. Perhaps Mr Pierre can elaborate upon this dilemma in his next book. For the time being, however, he has accomplished what he set out to do in his preface: he has increased our knowledge of this perplexing global predicament.

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New Directions in Disarmament. By William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld, eds. New York: Praeger, 1981. Pp. 222 [$31.95 U.S.].

The efforts to work out meaningful disarmament arrangements through treaties and other less explicit understandings which are designed to arrest nuclear proliferation and to achieve control over conventional armaments have confounded for far too long both political leaders and international negotiators. The management of this man-made disaster has remained beyond the grasp of world leaders, whether they are relatively strong and in office for extended periods, or refreshingly new and blessed by the imprint of open democracy. The agony and frustration of this failure, with its attendant consequences for human survival, have been the subject of scholarly analysis for the past four decades. In the vast literature on disarmament, the writings of William Epstein have been outstanding and widely influential.

New Directions in Disarmament, edited by Epstein and Bernard Feld, is a compilation of short papers prepared by a group of some twenty scholars drawn from varied social, political and physical science backgrounds. They met informally as an international Pugwash group to search for new ideas and new directions. They hoped that their contribution would be helpful to the ensuing deliberations of the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. For a number of reasons, this goal remained unfulfilled. Not unexpectedly, the Soviet side found itself unable to take part in the Pugwash deliberations, and the resulting product reads more like the reports on disarmament we are accustomed to reading in *Scientific American* or *Time* magazines. It is not that the product is pedantic or its treatment pedestrian; the perspectives brought to bear on this, the most important and vital issue confronting humanity remain, nevertheless, those of North American liberal thinkers, mostly from the United States. There is a token Canadian presence and some less prominent "international" participation. In any case, the events of the past two years have largely overtaken the limited hope or guarded optimism manifested by the participants at this symposium. Despite all these negative aspects, *New Directions in Disarmament* is a most useful and admirably written book.

In the substantive introduction to the book, the editors explain the history, purpose and nature of their deliberations. The issues they cover extend, happily, beyond the highly technical, acronym-jargoned specifics to include such matters as confidence-building measures, the scope for a global monitoring system through the United Nations, the problems of arresting new armament technologies in outer space and on the deep seabed, unilateral initiatives, and the role of non-nuclear states in achieving a balance and, possibly, some progress in disarmament negotiations.

Alessandro Corradini discusses the role of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the usefulness of a smaller working body such as the Committee on Disarmament. Herbert Scoville Jr, a retired United States Government official, describes the problems created by advancing military technology. Paul Warnke and George Ignatieff both deal with reforms of the SALT negotiating process. Bernard Feld, a physicist, proposes a freeze on the development and deployment of new weapons. William Epstein makes a strong argument for cutting off the production of fissionable material, for a phased reduction in the militarized uses of such material, and for its ultimate transformation to peaceful uses. Rod Byers and Joel Wit discuss "sanctuary" proposals.

An equally important aspect discussed in the book is the role of non-nuclear-weapon states in disarmament negotiations. Sayed Yassin (Egypt), Shalheveth Freier (Israel) and Joseph Rotblat (United Kingdom) explore in a scholarly manner the value of the presence of a third party in negotiations. Hans Christian Cars of the Swedish Ministry of Defence presents a thoughtful paper on military budgets, and points out the need for standardized procedures for monitoring military expenditures. Daniel Gallick of the U.S. State Department points out the difficulties of verifying any actions by governments purporting to comply with such measures.

There is an awareness among participants that one of the crucial questions facing any analyst is: What is it that must be "negotiated" to achieve disarmament? Is it merely the numerical strength of the military arsenals in each other's possession? Or, more subtly, the reliability of the political strategies at the disposal of each side? Do the governments of the superpowers believe they can achieve strength and security through military means? Do the leaders of the superpowers believe that their mutual policy of excessive militarization can achieve for them anything other than a myopic vision of their own virtuousness? What role, if any, do the smaller, economically- and technologically-advanced nations, such as Canada, Japan and West Germany, have in this foolish but deadly game of chess in which they have unwittingly become the expendable pawns? Some of these issues are raised and discussed in the papers of Jonathan Alford (British Army) and Hans Gunter Brauch (Heidelberg University) in their analysis of confidence-building measures. This discussion is the most useful part of the book because confidence-building measures can lead to meaningful measures of actual disarmament. Examples such as the *Simla Agreement* (on the Kashmir issue) and the Helsinki "non-binding" international treaty are mentioned. However, the crucial issues remain unanswered.

How can one "build" confidence if, despite advanced technology and extensive military saturation, the necessary spiritual strength is lacking? Professor Charles Osgood (Illinois), George Rathjens (M.I.T.) and Betty Lall

(a U.S. disarmament expert) all examine this question from their respective vantage points when they raise for discussion the possibilities for taking unilateral initiatives aimed at achieving a modicum of self-imposed discipline and restraint in the military field. If negotiations *proceed* from a premise of sustained spiritual strength, it will negate the idea that "a chip, once acquired, may not be expendable".[1] However, the vision projected here appears to be somewhat too simplistic: "[C]onfidence-building agreements are essentially declarations of intent and are not enforceable. They need to have a mandatory character".[2] But, is virtue verifiable?

The high level of discussion brought to bear by the participants in the symposium on these and many other related issues makes this book a useful and stimulating study. In a book of such broad focus and such diversity of participant skills and expertise, it is unfair to expect greater uniformity in treatment and more depth of analysis or detail. That is not to suggest that the Pugwash Movement cannot bring original ideas to light in exploring the specific reasons for reticence on each side. For example, serious analysis of why each superpower has not found the negotiating process useful or successful to achieve concrete and enduring results might reveal unique attitudes that are susceptible to modification. If a nation's armament policy is, in fact, "controlled" by its military commanders — the least likely sector in any society to be enlightened enough to see the wisdom of unilateral disarmament — who then makes the policies pertinent to the negotiation process? It is not helpful to assert simply that both superpowers are *equally* guilty of spoiling the broth.[3] If a third, fourth or fifth cook were to enter the negotiating "kitchen", is there any guarantee that they will not be one too many? One should also examine carefully the essential dissimilarity of the interests of the two powers engaged in the negotiating process. Any threat, real or imagined, from land-based installations in Europe is far greater to the U.S.S.R. than to the U.S. If so, why can't the European Community declare *unilaterally*, and without any caveats, a nuclear weapon-free zone on the condition of a joint superpower guarantee of non-intervention? Would that make the United States more vulnerable in the negotiation process?

The concern for nuclear disarmament, it is worth noting, is beginning slowly but unmistakeably to slip away from the traditional confines of secret diplomacy into the realm of public, open and populist debate. Indeed, this movement is gaining ground not only within the constituencies of those two superpowers but in the public domains of their surrogates as well. The threat of unilateral reform championed by *private groups* may yet have a destabiliz-

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[1] W. Epstein and B. Feld, eds, *New Directions in Disarmament* (1981) 174.
[2] *Ibid.*, 132.
[3] As is done *ibid.*, 2.

ing effect. The momentum is in favour of a reform, notwithstanding the seeming lack of interest, or more plausibly, the incapacity, of political leaders to deliver the goods. Therefore, the public pressure in favour of a "total freeze" cannot be ignored for too long without an inevitable institutionalized backlash in one form or another. That is why, at every level of public discourse and decision-making, it is important to be informed of the complex issues involved and of the critical choices required to be made by the world public. Toward that end, *New Directions in Disarmament* is an important contribution.

Perhaps the inclusion of a brief current bibliography and an appendix of international conventions relevant to the topic would have enhanced the value of the book as a tool for instruction. Even so, this is an excellent source book and an important addition to the ongoing process of public education.

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