Arms Limitation and Disarmament Talks: Soviet Approach

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The pursuit of arms limitation and disarmament has been and remains the most important orientation of U.S.S.R. foreign policy, which is pursued in close cooperation with the community of socialist states. These goals stem from the very nature of socialist states, where there are no classes or social groups attempting to enrich themselves on arms production and who are interested in an ever-increasing spiral of the arms race, unleashing predatory wars. Peace is a necessary prerequisite of progress; only peace creates conditions favourable to the construction of a new social system — socialism and communism. War and the arms race divert tremendous material and moral forces from the process of creation. The Soviet people, perhaps unlike any other people on our planet, have experienced all the horrors of war. Twenty million Soviet people sacrificed their lives to the altar of the Second World War. That is why the struggle against the threat of a new war, for arms race limitation and disarmament, is the main subject of numerous statements, meetings and rallies of the Soviet public.

Article 28 of the *Constitution* of the U.S.S.R. states clearly that Soviet foreign policy is aimed at "achieving universal and complete disarmament and consistently implementing the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems".

The banner of disarmament as a practical task of the foreign policy of the Soviet State was raised by its founder, V.I. Lenin. As far back as 1922, at the very first meeting of the conference in Genoa, People's Commissar on foreign affairs G.V. Chicherin stated, on Lenin's instruction, that the Soviet Union intended to propose general arms reduction and to support all the proposals aimed at lessening the burden of militarism, providing the reduction of armies of all the states. At the initiative of the Soviet Government in December of the same year, an international disarmament conference was held in Moscow, and though only six states took part, it was the first conference after the World War of 1914-18 to be devoted specifically to disarmament.

The Soviet Union has conducted a particularly active struggle for arms limitation and disarmament since World War II. If one brings together all the Soviet proposals aimed at détente and providing for peace, disarmament and

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the improvement of relations between the states, which have been put forward during the post-war period for consideration of international fora and of other governments, they would fill a large number of sizable volumes.

The aim of the Soviet proposals in the field of disarmament is to prevent a new World War, and to strengthen peace and international security. The Soviet Union is making persistent efforts so that the question of the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security is always of paramount concern both at bilateral talks and at international conferences.

Despite the will of the peoples to prevent nuclear catastrophe manifested so brightly in the course of the anti-war demonstrations held recently all over the world, and in spite of the efforts of many people from many states over many years, mankind has failed to attain notable progress in arms limitation. In this context, doubts are sometimes expressed about the possibility of overcoming the difficulties and differences which have appeared in the course of disarmament talks. The question arises whether the long cherished goal of mankind — complete and general disarmament under effective international control — is achievable.

We believe that this goal is quite achievable. However, success at the talks on disarmament can be attained only under certain conditions. One of the most important is the political will of state leaders and governments to conclude appropriate agreements. Even complicated problems arising in the course of arms limitation and disarmament talks can be resolved if the participants in the negotiations display good will and a sincere interest in the search for an acceptable solution. It is clear that otherwise an agreement cannot be reached. The history of the talks on disarmament reveals many examples which confirm this belief. It is enough to remember the Soviet-American talks, completed in the 1970s by the signing of a number of agreements on the most important questions of arms limitation.

Another key prerequisite for success at the disarmament talks is acceptance of the premise that any agreement should be based on the principle of undiminished security of states. This principle was set forth in the *Final Document* of the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by a consensus of all the member-states of that organization. Paragraph 29 states: "The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces".

This principle, of course, is central to any political, but not only political, talks among states. At talks involving problems of arms limitation and

disarmament, it has particular importance. What is involved is the vital sphere of security interests of each state. Soviet diplomacy is always guided by this principle. Thus, in 1958, the Soviet government, making a proposal to prohibit the military use of outer space, declared that it was necessary to find a solution which would not put into advantageous position either the United States or the Soviet Union, or any third state and would equally take into account the interests of security.

The principle of undiminished security of states, as a basis for agreements on disarmament, is also included in a number of bilateral documents. For example, the joint Soviet-American declaration on agreed principles for the talks on disarmament, published in September 1961, emphasizes that all measures on general and complete disarmament should be balanced in such a way that, at any stage of treaty implementation, no single state or group of states could obtain military superiority and equal security could be provided for all. The final communiqué of the preparatory consultations relating to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe contains an agreement of the participants at the Vienna talks to the effect that any concrete measures should be elaborated carefully with respect to their substance and timing so that, in all respects and at any moment, the principle of undiminished security of each state would be upheld.

Finally, one of the most important documents of Soviet-American relations — *Basic guidelines of mutual relations between the USSR and USA* — signed at the highest level in 1972, recognises that the attempts aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages, directly or indirectly, on the account of the other side are incompatible with these goals (proclaimed in the agreement). The necessary prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. are the recognition of the security interests of the sides based on the principle of equality and renunciation of use or threat of use of force.

As is noted in United Nations research into the interrelation between disarmament and international security, the particular form of the general principle of equal security can be applied to negotiations between sides of approximately equal military strength. This principle is, of course, particularly relevant for relations between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A., between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states. In the 1970s, the principle of equality and equal security received wide recognition in Soviet-American documents signed at the highest level. As an example, one could refer to the Soviet-American communiqué on the occasion of the visit to the U.S.S.R. of American President Nixon in May 1972. It declared that the two sides intend to continue active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct those negotiations in a spirit of respect for the legitimate

interests of each other and in observance of the principle of equal security. The well-known Vladivostok Declaration of 24 November 1974, of which President Ford was a signatory, underlined that the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms was based on the principle of equality and equal security. Finally, the *Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, signed by President Carter for the American side, expressed the agreement of the parties to consider in the future any measure to ensure the equality and equal security of the sides.

Thus, at Soviet-American arms limitation talks, the principle of equality and equal security was recognised by at least three previous United States Administrations, both Republican and Democratic. Unfortunately, today we cannot but note that President Reagan's Administration has taken another course. It refuses flatly to deal with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of equality and equal security. It is suitable to rehearse here the words of Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Central Committee: "Let no one expect from us unilateral disarmament. We are not naive people. We do not demand the unilateral disarmament of the West, we are in favour of equality, account of interests of both sides, fair agreement".

The Soviet point of view is that the use, in practice, of the principle of equality and equal security presupposes an objective assessment of the existing balance of world military forces, an unprejudiced analysis of the armaments and armed forces of the parties to negotiations and of other states and a realistic approach toward the international situation as a whole.

Security of the state is not an abstract notion. It is made concrete in the joint elaboration by states of such principles in their mutual relations which may become a political and legal basis for the security of each state while creating the conditions for security for all. In addition, the collective interstate mechanism for maintaining general security — the United Nations Security Council — is empowered by the *Charter* to adopt concrete collective measures preventing and averting any threat to peace, and to suppress any act of aggression. International trade, as well as mutually-beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation also create a tangible fabric of mutual interest in long-term relations. All these are the elements of security of states. There is another side of the security notion, which, under certain conditions, may become decisive for the destiny of both individual peoples and of mankind as a whole. I have in mind the military aspects of security. Undoubtedly, national security is the direct responsibility of a state on behalf of its people; it is its duty and right. The inalienable right of states to provide for individual and collective self-defence, and consequently to possess the means necessary to that end, is recognised by the *United Nations Charter* in art. 51. Within the limits set out in that article, the concern of states for their national security cannot have negative effects on international security.

However, the essence of the problem is the rational determination of those limits. Experience shows that it is in resolving the question: How much is enough for security?, that the sense of proportion often escapes the statesmen and politicians of the West and primarily of the U.S.A. Frequently, military programmes are adopted which in no way can be justified by the interest in strengthening security, and which may indeed destabilize the strategic situation in the world.

One of the manifestations of such a trend is a myth about the so-called "Soviet military threat", or "Soviet military superiority". To justify the myth, juggled data, evidence of "experts" and conclusions of "analysts" are put forward in the West. Numerous channels of propaganda are very active in exaggerating the myth.

But if one stands on the solid soil of the facts, and there cannot be another basis for the objective assessment of the correlation of forces, one has to recognise that in strategic nuclear arms, in medium-range nuclear arms in Europe and in conventional armaments and armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty nations, there exists, in all cases, an approximate equilibrium between the sides. There is no "Soviet superiority". This fact is also recognised by many authoritative figures in the West.

As has been stressed repeatedly by the Soviet leadership, Soviet military doctrine has a strictly defensive orientation. The character of the Soviet Armed Forces, the principles of their composition and the strategy and tactics of their use have been and continue to be formed with a view to repelling any aggression or threats aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies. The general defensive orientation of Soviet doctrine has been and is now being expressed in the military and technical policy of the Soviet State. The U.S.S.R. has never taken the lead in creating weapons which are particularly dangerous for peoples, but which could destroy every living thing on Earth. On the contrary, it has always strived, and is still striving, to prevent warfare from becoming more cruel, and to inhibit the spread of the arms race to new spheres.

It was so with nuclear and many other types of weapons of mass destruction. It was not the U.S.S.R., but the U.S.A., which was the first state to create atomic weapons and then the H-bomb. It was not the U.S.S.R., but the U.S.A., which was the first to build nuclear submarines, inter-continental bombers, nuclear aircraft carriers, and to equip missiles with independently-targeted warheads. Washington has recently taken a new and heavy responsibility upon itself for initiating the production of the neutron bomb.

Of course, one cannot determine with scientific precision the approximate balance of military forces between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. It does not mean that the quantitative and qualitative indices of the sides coincide completely on all types of armed forces and armaments. It is only natural that

the military posture of each side consists of priorities which are determined by an entire complex of factors, each of which has its own specific character. The comparison of even roughly equivalent items of the military forces of each side is an extremely difficult matter. Therefore, when the word "equilibrium" is used to reflect the correlation of forces between two states or two groups of states, it means that, in considering the general military and strategic balance, both sides are approximately in a similar position; neither of them has military superiority over the other.

Recently, the U.S.A. has undertaken a programme of military build-up which is in no way justified by the defensive needs of the country. It should be noted that although the maintenance of a necessary level of defence capability is lawful for each state as long as it threatens no-one, an unrestrained military build-up conducted by some states endangers the foundation of security of others and undermines international security as a whole, creating the threat of war. The quest for military superiority by one side, particularly in the nuclear field, compels the other side to adopt necessary measures for strengthening its defence capability, thereby ensuring a military balance.

Experience has confirmed that the idea of achieving military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and its allies is completely barren. It failed during the period of formation of our socialist state; it is all the more incredible now that the U.S.S.R. and other countries of the socialist community possess tremendous economic potential which continues to grow steadily. However, attempts to achieve military superiority are extremely dangerous in that they lead inevitably to further expansion of the arms race. In a nuclear age, the fundamental truth is that the higher the level of military confrontation, even while maintaining the strategic balance, the less stable that balance becomes. The greater the number of elements of uncertainty, the greater the possibility of a nuclear conflict. The Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member-states of 5 January 1983 emphasizes that recently adopted, and already implemented United States programmes of development and production of nuclear weapons are dangerous: "[T]he policy of arms build-up pursued by the USA and some of its allies to achieve military superiority is leading to the frustration of international stability". The Declaration stresses that, under such conditions, "peace will become less stable and more fragile". Finally, the Soviet Union has repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that a new round of the arms race will make nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction still more complicated; consequently, it will be much more difficult to elaborate international agreements on arms limitation and reduction.

In recent years, the policy approach of the socialist states has gained international recognition. For example, in the previously mentioned United Nations study on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, in which experts from the U.S.A. and other NATO countries

participated, the distinguished experts stated unanimously that a new stage of the arms race, and the development of new types of weapons, which will be extremely difficult to control or limit by mutual agreements, may undermine international stability and increase considerably the danger of war.

Of course, maintaining the established balance is not an end in itself. The Soviet Union is in favour of starting to curve down the arms race, reducing gradually the level of military confrontation. The interests of national security of all states can best be ensured by pursuing peace and the relaxation of international tension, supplemented by concrete measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The more durable and stable the peace, the greater the security in which states and peoples will live. It is not the quest for military superiority over other states, the notorious policy of "strength position", that enhances general peace and security, but rather a sober and responsible approach toward the assessment of events in international life, a readiness to adopt concrete and effective measures in the field of disarmament based upon strict observance of the principle of undiminished security for each side.

In this connection, of particular importance is the unilateral commitment of the Soviet Union, undertaken in 1982, not to be the first state to use nuclear weapons. This commitment is not simply a declaration about the peaceful intentions of the U.S.S.R.; it is a concrete step introducing important new elements into the strategy and tactical planning of the Soviet Armed Forces, a development serving to strengthen the material basis of international security. As Dmitry Ustinov, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Defence stated: "It means that in training the Armed Forces, more attention will be paid to the tasks of preventing military conflicts from developing into nuclear ones. These tasks, in all their diversity, become an irrevocable part of our military activity. Every expert versed a little in military questions, understands that they establish a strong framework for the training of the troops and headquarters staff, they determine the composition of armaments, and the organization of still more strict control in order to preclude an unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic ones."

The world community is entitled to expect that, after the commitment undertaken unilaterally by the Soviet Union not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, all the nuclear powers which have not done so will follow suit. The 37th Session of the United Nations General Assembly supported the Soviet initiative in a most unambiguous manner, expressing hope, in a special resolution, that other states possessing nuclear weapons would follow the example of the U.S.S.R.

The leaders of the Western powers, at a recent Council of NATO, elaborated a collective commitment according to which none of their arma-

ments would be used other than in the course of a retaliatory strike. By this declaration, they attempted to counter the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have noted this declaration. The sincerity and seriousness of the declaration will be tested by the reply of the West to the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member-states to conclude a treaty with the NATO member- countries which would establish the principle of the mutual non-use of military force and would promote the maintenance of peaceful relations.

The core of the treaty would be the mutual commitment of the member-states of both alliances not to be the first to use either nuclear *or* conventional weapons against each other. It is clear that such a proposal unmasks completely the allegations of the West that the appeal of the Soviet Union to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons is designed to leave it free to benefit from its "superiority" in conventional armaments. The Soviet Union and its allies do not seek unilateral advantages; they are seeking such mutually acceptable steps as would divert the military threat and strengthen the security of all. A positive reaction by the NATO member-states to this proposal of the socialist countries would undoubtedly exert favourable influence on the future development of international law and politics.

The peoples of the world follow with great attention the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation and reduction talks and the discussions on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. These two sets of talks have encountered great difficulties; these difficulties are rooted in the unwillingness of the United States to achieve an agreement on a fair basis, on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

As far as the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks are concerned, the U.S.A. has brought to them proposals which are aimed clearly at upsetting the existing strategic parity and at achieving advantages for itself. As a basis for the negotiations at Geneva, the U.S.A. has singled out ballistic missiles from the totality of the strategic systems, laying special emphasis on ground-based ICBMs especially the heavy ICBMs of the SS-18 type. It is this type of strategic system that the American side declares to be the most "destabilizing".

This posture has been adopted because the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. differ considerably in their structure. For several decades they have developed differently under the influence of such factors as the military and political situation in specific time periods, the individual character of the geographic and strategic situation of each side, and the selected technological solutions. As a result, seventy *per cent* of the strategic potential of the U.S.S.R., measured by counting warheads, is represented by ground-based ICBMs, while in the U.S.A., more than eighty *per cent* is

represented by submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs] and heavy bombers.

Aware of these structural differences, the U.S.A. put forward a proposal which, when implemented, would mean that the Soviet strategic nuclear potential, measured by the number of charges, would be almost three times less than the American one, while the U.S.A. would be allowed to build up freely its strategic armaments by deploying new ICBMs, the MX missile, sea-based ballistic Trident-1 and Trident-2 missiles, the B-1 strategic bomber, and long-range cruise missiles.

If the U.S.S.R. followed the example of the U.S.A. and declared to be most destabilizing those components of strategic forces in which the U.S.A. has clear superiority, one could consider, as the most destabilising factor, the almost threefold American superiority in SLBM warheads. One could also note the particularly destabilizing nature of the United States strategic Air Force, and the deployment of nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers, in which the U.S.A. has manifold superiority over the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union is not taking this course because it observes strictly and honestly the principle of equality and equal security which requires each side to take into account *all* the components of strategic forces.

On the basis of this approach, the U.S.S.R. proposes to reduce, stage-by-stage, the total quantity of ICBM and SLBM launching pads as well as heavy bombers to 1,800 units for each side by 1990, that is, to reduce by twenty-five *per cent* the initial ceiling for these systems established by the SALT-II Treaty. The number of nuclear charges on these delivery vehicles would also be reduced to the agreed equal levels. It should be emphasized, and this is a matter of principle, that at all stages of the reduction, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would remain in essential equality regarding their national security. The parity between them in the strategic field would be maintained.

Putting forward these proposals, the Soviet Union takes into account the existence of American forward-based nuclear forces, located in direct proximity to the borders of the U.S.S.R. and its allies. For the U.S.S.R., these armaments have a strategic character. Because they are not counterbalanced by anything on the Soviet side (the U.S.S.R. does not possess similar systems near United States territory), then, with the reduction of the number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the weight of the United States forward-based forces in the strategic balance would increase steadily. Therefore, the Soviet proposals envisage that during the mutual reduction of strategic nuclear forces, the United States, at the very least, should not increase other nuclear systems capable of reaching Soviet territory. Otherwise, the U.S.A. would benefit from a significant loophole to circumvent the agreements on

strategic arms limitation and reduction. The Soviet proposals also contemplate the limitation of qualitative improvement of strategic armaments. In particular, the U.S.S.R. favours the total prohibition of cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 kilometres whether air-, land- or sea-based, and promotes, within agreed parameters, the limitation of research and development geared to the upgrading of existing weapons. If these constructive proposals are rejected by the American side, and its plans to create new types of weapons are implemented, then as was stated by Y.V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "We will be compelled to counter the challenge of the American side by deploying corresponding weapons systems of our own — an analogous missile to counter the MX missile, and our own long-range cruise missile, which we are now testing, to counter the U.S. long-range cruise missile." However, we would not choose such a development. We are in favour of ending the arms race by concluding agreements on strengthening security at lower levels of armaments.

As far as the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe are concerned, the position of the U.S.S.R. is also based clearly on the principle of equality and equal security. On 21 December 1982, Y.V. Andropov stated that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France. This means that the Soviet Union would remove hundreds of missiles, including scores of the most advanced Soviet missiles, known in the West as the SS-20. In this case, as far as the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. are concerned, this would be a really honest "zero" option for medium-range missiles. Along with such an agreement, there must be also an accord on reducing to equal levels the number of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft stationed in Europe by the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries.

In connection with these Soviet proposals, attempts are being made by some interest groups in the West to prove something that cannot be proved: that the Soviet Union should not take into account the threat to its security represented by the missiles of the United Kingdom and France. These arguments are beneath criticism. It is known generally that in the total balance of nuclear forces in Europe, the British and French armaments are on the same scale as the United States weapons. These states are allies in the North Atlantic military and political bloc, a fact which speaks for itself. The British and French nuclear armaments are taken into account by the Soviet Union now, and they should and will be taken into account in the future, be it in an agreement or in some other manner. The U.S.S.R. does not demand anything from Britain and France. But it has many reasons to demand from the U.S.A. that any treaty on nuclear arms reduction and limitation in Europe should correspond to the principle of equality and equal security for each side. There

cannot be equal security in Europe, however, if the British and French nuclear armaments are not taken into account.

The continued blocking of negotiations on such important problems as a general and complete nuclear weapons test ban, a prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles, the limitation and further reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean, the limitation of conventional weapons sale and supply, as well as the talks on the anti-satellite systems — all these are links in the same chain, connected inseparably with the American quest for military superiority.

It is important to examine the verification problem also, for verification is one of the measures which builds confidence in observing agreements. The U.S.S.R. approach to verification is based upon the well-known provisions of the *Final Document* of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, which states in particular that disarmament and arms limitation agreements should envisage verification measures sufficient to satisfy all states-parties, and to create confidence that would promote observance by all sides. The forms and terms of verification provided for in any concrete agreement must depend upon the objectives, scope and character of that agreement. The Soviet Union also attributes great importance to the provision of the *Final Document* which states that methods and procedures for verification should be non-discriminatory and should not interfere unduly with the internal affairs of other states or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Some Western observers have attempted recently to limit the principle of verification to only one of its forms: that is, on-site verification. An agreement on the question of control through on-site inspection has been made a prerequisite to talks on the substance of disarmament. Other approaches to control which have won broad international recognition are ignored, as are the opinions of eminent specialists. An example of this narrow approach, and a striking one, is the position of the United States regarding a nuclear weapons test ban. After long negotiations on a test ban, which led to an agreement on a general approach to all aspects of the problem, and after many years of studying related questions of control, the United States is now suggesting that we start the whole thing right from the beginning. At the same time, it has refused to become involved in the drafting of a treaty on this important subject.

Moreover, the provisions of the *Final Document* of the First Special Session on Disarmament, and the experience that has been gained in the consideration of control and verification matters, indicate clearly that these issues should be discussed and dealt with simultaneously, as an organic part of our consideration of specific arms limitation and disarmament problems,

rather than being divorced from them. Experience has also shown that national technological means constitute a very reliable method of verifying the extent to which an agreement has been implemented. At the same time, where necessary, various methods of verification should be combined with other control procedures, including international procedures such as on-site verification on an agreed basis. The strengthening of trust would help to ensure the application of additional control measures. This approach, based on a combination of national and international means of control, is also reflected in the new proposals for prohibiting chemical weapons and for banning nuclear weapons tests put forward by the Soviet Union in 1982.

Many of our proposals for control in connection with the nuclear weapon test ban go even further than the provisions of the relevant tripartite communiqué to the Committee on Disarmament, which reflected the degree of agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Additional functions would be performed by experts who would then deal not only with the international exchange of seismological data and the promotion of international consultation and cooperation, but would also play some part in on-site verification.

Not all states have highly developed national technology available to them for effecting control. That being so, a number of Soviet documents put before the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament envisage the possibility of releasing information gathered by means of national control technology to those states-parties that do not possess such technology. On the whole, the Soviet Union is ready to undertake business-like discussions to resolve the question of control and verification of various arms limitation and disarmament measures. This readiness is equally apparent in our approach to the question of freezing nuclear arsenals.

At the same time, one cannot fail to see that certain measures, which themselves do not represent arms reduction and disarmament, may not require any elaborate system of control. This is particularly true of any pledge or treaty calling for the non-use of nuclear weapons. We believe that the concern expressed in some quarters that the Soviet Union's undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that the Indian draft convention which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, do not envisage sufficient control and are not subject to verification, is beneath criticism. It would be appropriate to recall that a few years ago the United States, the United Kingdom and France made unilateral declarations that they would not use nuclear weapons against a limited number of states that did not possess such weapons. At that time, they did not link their declarations to any verification procedure.

In principle, one should not rule out the possibility of creating international machinery to verify the implementation of major steps in the process of

genuine disarmament, provided that the need is dictated by the substance of the steps themselves. It should be remembered that the Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament, which was put forward in the United Nations as far back as the beginning of the 1960s, provided for the creation of just such an international control organization, ensuring general and complete verification. However, at that time we believed, and we continue to believe, that to divorce control measures from the substance of disarmament agreements is unwarranted and serves only to jeopardize the cause of disarmament. There cannot be control without disarmament. If there is, in fact, genuine disarmament, then any method of control, even the most far-reaching, should be utilized.

The disarmament problem today is a universal problem, concerning every state. All peoples of the world are interested in a positive solution to the disarmament dilemma and every people, without exception, can make a contribution to its solution.