A Political Agenda for Arms Control: A Canadian View
Allan Gotlieb and Jeremy Kinsman*
In the interwoven complex of politics, security and arms control, Cana-
da, like other non-nuclear powers, has only limited influence over strategic
negotiations, though Canadians have as much interest as anyone in their
outcome. Is there a role available, for which Canada is specifically suited?
What is the most effective way Canada can contribute to the stabilization of
international relations? As an advanced industrialized country with a global
foreign policy, Canada should continue to use its influence on a comprehen-
sive and global level to help define the direction and character of arms control.
This involves playing a creative role in establishing the minimum level of
confidence in East-West political relations which viable arms control agree-
ments require.
“It wouldn’t take much to disarm Canada”, General Burns is said to have
remarked once.
Canada may seem to be an under-spender on the military side of the
Government budget, by the norms of most NATO countries, Warsaw Pact
countries and many in the Third World. But Canadians generally consider our
spending levels – which, incidentally, meet recent NATO numerical com-
mitments –
as being in line with our national needs and international role.
We have a distinguished war record and a respected peace-keeping record,
but less of an arms tradition than most countries, due no doubt to the security
of our borders in our 116 years of nationhood.
Our economic and other interests support an active multilateral and
bilateral diplomacy, as well as a strong development assistance programme.
But Canadian interests also argue decisively for active participation in both
collective security and disarmament activity. Canada’s commitment to
NATO is a function not only of our international role but of the way in which
we have linked Canadian interests to the allies with which we have most in
common as a nation.
*Allan Gotlieb is the author of Disarinament and International Law (1965) and of several
articles on disarmament. He served on Canada’s disarmament delegation in Geneva from
1960-64, and has collaborated before on articles with Jeremy Kinsman, notably as Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, when Mr Kinsman was Chairman of the Policy Planning
Secretariat. Mr Gotlieb is presently Canadian Ambassador in Washington and Mr Kinsman is
the Embassy’s Minister for Political Affairs, but the following article represents the entirely
personal reflections of these foreign service officers.
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NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
Canada’s strong role in disarmament activity has always been a natural
calling, with broad public support and strong specialized constituencies.
While arms control is now publicly appreciated as the great over-arching
international issue of our times, to the point where public concern approaches
a level of crisis, this appreciation has been sporadic, rising with periods of
East-West or, more specifically, U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. tension. But Canada has
been active throughout the years since World War II. There is not a multilater-
al arms control discussion in which Canada has not played a leading part.
While the intermediate-range nuclear force [INF] discussions have been
the object of almost unprecedented consultations in NATO, strategic arms
control negotiations are basically bilateral, between the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. Canada, like other non-superpowers, has limited influence over
developments. In a general and comprehensive sense, Canada may have a
position of some abstract moral authority as the first state which voluntarily
eschewed nuclear weapons, particularly in respect of the vital issue of nuclear
non-proliferation. But the key negotiations today are exercises in comparative
strategic security analysis. Canadians consider that our location is strategic in
a global sense, and that Canada’s vast expanse of territory makes it particular-
ly so in terms of the calculations of distance and speed which, along with the
accuracy and destructibility of modem nuclear weapons systems, form the
context for strategic arms control negotiations. In a palpable way, Canadians
know that the factor of space in these calculations is often our space.
This is not a distinction which has very much impact internationally. We
seem to others a relatively secure state which has decided, in its own interests,
not to have any strategic arms, nuclear or conventional, which need be
controlled. As such, we do not seem to be in a primary position to influence
the points of view of countries which do live with a more concrete sense of
threat to their security.
Yet, of course, Canadians judge their security to be very much affected
by world events. We feel vulnerable. The controversy over the possibility of
testing over Canadian territory the guidance systems for U.S. cruise missiles
has become a focus for this concern about nuclear risk, as well as the junction
point for these different streams of perception of Canadian policy, practice
and geography.
Those who oppose the testing of cruise missiles over Canada generally
reflect the view that there is an advantage in influence to be gained by Canada
not being associated with the testing of this weapon system, even in such an
indirect and conditional way, because it diminishes their sense of Canada’s
moral authority. In their eyes, the exercise would seem to taint us in a way we
have not been tainted before, and in their view we shall have helped to
accelerate the arms race. The point of view deserves respect.
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But we are members of an alliance which has judged the cruise missile as
necessary because of Soviet deployments and developments, and unless the
U.S.S.R. changes its position on the matter, it is politically essential for the
allies to go through with deployment in Europe. As to the cruise missile itself,
its introduction is less destabilizing than not responding as an alliance to the
U.S.S.R. SS-20s, whose introduction is indeed destabilizing. Only an ade-
quate military balance can bring about the stability necessary for arms reduc-
tion. The cruise is a significant change in weapons development but is not in
itself particularly destabilizing because it is not in any sense a first-strike
weapon. It poses verification challenges, but these are less daunting than the
risks represented by other weapons systems of far greater destructive and
destabilizing potential, and of more ominous innovative significance, such as
small, mobile, multi-warhead ICBMs. In its air-launched mode, cruise mis-
sile verifiability is dependent on that of its aircraft launcher, a relatively
feasible act of verification by national technical means. In a sea-launched
mode, the missile is similarly dependent on ships and submarines which may
not always be verifiable, but which possess other, more destructive, missiles
as part of their inventory. The ground-launched cruise missile is already
almost unique in that its deployment, at least in Europe, is subject to the arms
control negotiations (in which Canada does have a consultative part) under the
NATO two-track decision of 1979. In other words, there is something of a
brake on the deployment of the system, if both East and West together choose
to use it.
This is not to dismiss the cruise missile controversy as being irrelevant.
But the more pertinent questions are of a broader nature: What can Canada do
to promote the increase of mutual security that Mr MacEachen noted in
Geneva is “the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament”
so that the arms race can truly be “suffocated” as Pierre Trudeau proposed to
the United States in 1979, by agreement and action on both sides?
There are ways. Arms control efforts over time have generally focused
on weapons hardware and technology. They still need to pursue that track.
But the link between this track and practical political competition at the basis
of the arms race needs much more explicit examination. For years, arms
control diplomacy has lagged behind developments in technology, political
relationships and, ultimately, strategies. The technology curve has outpaced
consistently the content of agreements to control weapons. The world has not
been able to harness and limit the increasingly menacing threats of new
technology, with the exceptions, perhaps, of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the Outer Space Treaty
which limits the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit in outer
space. In one of the seminal observations of our century, Einstein judged that
the “splitting of the atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking
and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe”. The drift is in the be-
1983]
PERSPECTIVES NATIONALES
haviour of nations, as well as in our inability to devise and negotiate viable
arms control agreements, or more precisely, to define the inextricable rela-
tionship between the two. Political relations between the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. have deteriorated, for a variety of reasons, to a point where arms
control agreements which must be founded in mutual confidence and security
are much more difficult to negotiate.
The combination of technological advance and political distrust also
encouraged the apparent proliferation of war-fighting strategies on both sides
which have left the Western public aghast. Strategy, moreover, is adapted to
weapons development, rather than vice-versa. However, strategy seems to be
determined by the emergence of weapons meant tofight nuclear wars, rather
than to deter them, making a military banality of the dangerous doctrine of
nuclear use. The public’s anxiety has been stirred by offhand public remarks
by strategists. In recent months, such loose talk of “prevailing” in a nuclear
war or a “limited” war has pretty much ceased. That is good because, as Mr
MacEachen noted, any “attempt by any power to develop a policy which
assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity”.
There are few in authority in the West prepared to believe that there can be a
“victor” in a nuclear war. There are few now arguing that a “limited” nuclear
war, involving controllable exchanges, can be a legitimate or sensible nation-
al pursuit or possibility. The political sentiments in Western Europe have
demonstrated amply the unacceptability of such doctrine: a nuclear war
“limited” to Europe would of necessity be “total” for Europeans.
All leaders in the West appear genuinely committed to arms control
agreements with the U.S.S.R. But views of what is possible inevitably vary.
Canada’s contribution to the process should be diplomatic and political,
as well as technical. East-West relations have always been an area of empha-
sis in Canadian foreign policy activity: adapted to the arms control context,
this emphasis has the potential for a contribution of real value. Our influence
has to be spent on improving the means of preventing nuclear war. We should
help to clarify the essential elements in arms control. Canada can continue to
contribute to the development of an adequate comprehensive and universal
framework for viable arms control agreements between the U.S.A. and the
U.S.S.R. Countries other than the superpowers have specific views and
interests, and Canada is aptly placed to understand and represent them.
Multilateral negotiations toward international agreements on the comprehen-
sive banning of nuclear test explosions, chemical weapons and all weapons
for use in outer space remain vital. Moreover, like other countries such as
Sweden, the Canadian reputation for multilateral diplomacy and technical
skill enables a national contribution to the technical side of arms control
negotiations –
such as on the principles and techniques of verification.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
In our stress on the political and diplomatic context for international
security, we should also employ as much diplomatic leverage as possible in
favour of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We should
continue to pursue peaceful means for resolving conflicts, in the United
Nations and elsewhere.
But above all, we need to do what we can to promote the return of some
confidence in the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. relationship. That relationship is key to
arms control and world peace. Without a minimum of confidence in each
other, the great powers are inherently insecure, and the rest of the world is
hostage to their insecurity. Basic security against nuclear war is unavailable if
one side or the other is seeking competitive advantage. Arms control is an act
of security. The security of one superpower has to reside in the security of the
other. The concept of strategic advantage must be abandoned.
The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. need to recognize mutually that arms
control agreements require the confidence of better mutual relations. The
notion that the negotiation of arms control agreements will in itself be the only
real test whether better relations are possible is false, though undoubtedly
arms control negotiations are an important test. Better relations are important
prior ingredients of arms control negotiations because arms control agree-
ments are by definition rooted in confidence, and the security which only
justified confidence can impart.
International behaviour is vital to the process. The negotiations which
we associate with the process of detente more than a decade ago did not
attempt to determine what sort of international behaviour was acceptable
outside the area of Europe. The United States was, after all, heavily engaged
in Vietnam at the time, in large part because of the perceived activities of the
North Vietnamese, Russian allies. Since then, the Soviet Union has invaded
Afghanistan, and has acted elsewhere in ways which have undermined Amer-
ican official confidence in Soviet intentions. Behaviour is vital to building the
confidence which permits the sense of security necessary for viable arms
control agreements. If arms control agreements are to be viable, they must be
supported by restrained international behaviour, both to prevent crisis, and to
restore and sustain confidence.
On the other hand, arms control agreements cannot be linked to ex-
traneous disputes between East and West. They are objectively in our interest,
if they are fair, and should not be held hostage to concessions somewhere
else. Prime Minister Trudeau stressed at The University of Notre Dame that
arms control agreements are of such overwhelming importance to the interest
of all humanity that they must be set above and apart from the normal
intercourse of international politics.
1983]
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
We must be realistic. In saying that improved U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. rela-
tions are the key, our concept of “better relations” is of necessity a limited
one. We cannot ignore the obstacles to better relations across the board which
are formidable. The Soviet Union is a closed, totalitarian society having to
cope with threats to its hegemony in Eastern Europe from the open, more
attractive societies of the West. As Soviet inability to observe the principles of
the Helsinki Accords indicates, truly improved relations across the board of
activities are proscribed by the closed nature of Soviet society. However,
there are real possibilities for improvement in the Soviet-American rela-
tionship if we take specific and objective aim at the primary target of reducing
tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., so as to build the necessary political
and security confidence, and thus permit viable understandings in the areas of
mutual security and arms control.
For this to happen, we need better communication between the princi-
pals and better international machinery for dealing with crises. Canada should
encourage both. We should not over-estimate our influence over either
superpower; each is unwilling to derogate to any third party any part of its
control over vital interests in relations with the other.
The U.S. does consult with its NATO allies but on strategic questions it
is motivated primarily by its unique responsibilities. But at least Canada can
work on encouraging the development of a comprehensive international
political framework, leading to consensus about international behaviour.
Such a comprehensive, conceptual framework should reflect the belief that
disarmament is bound up with concepts of security, stability, confidence, and
political relations in such a way and to such an extent that the discussion or
presentation of such techniques in a vacuum is without substantive purpose.
The framework could be a check list of rules of the game by which the
negotiators and the international community could judge the validity of arms
control proposals. Canadian diplomacy could promote the acceptance of the
rules and promote the conditions whereby each rule could be validated,
thereby also contributing to a political consensus.
Here, then, are ten suggested rules of the game:
Rule 1. Simple and urgent proposals: Because there is clearly a climate of
public anxiety and confusion over the strategic arms control situation, propos-
als for arms reductions must be understandable enough to address public
concern. They must be aimed as well at a relatively urgent conclusion, since
there is instability in prolonged negotiations. Moreover, prolonged negotia-
tions become a self-defeating process because technological change makes
established positions obsolete.
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Rule 2. Comprehensiveness: Proposals should be framed in as comprehen-
sive a strategic-security framework as possible. This means that nuclear
equality can probably not be achieved system-by-system across the board.
Rule 3. No strategic gain: Arms control proposals should not be attempts to
make strategic gains at an adversary’s expense. They should not be attempts
to win the war by other means.
Rule 4. Enhance mutual security: Arms control agreements must have as
their objective the provision of greater security for both sides, but at a lower
level of armament, reinforcing the need that they be as comprehensive as
possible. Obviously, both sides have to be convinced that any agreement does
enhance its security and the United States has special requirements to be able
to sell an agreement publicly and politically on that basis.
Rule 5. Emphasize the destabilizing systems: Since arms control negotia-
tions should be as comprehensive in approach as possible, they should
emphasize the most destabilizing factors and features. For this purpose, they
should try to address these issues at the outset, to seek agreement on respec-
tive perceptions.
Rule 6. Protect the future: Proposals should address explicitly the issue of
new weapons systems as well as specific existing ones. They should be
careful not to make the environment for arms development innovation in the
future too permissive because of vagueness or omission of constraints on
novelty.
Rule 7. Quality as well as quantity: – A qualitative freeze: The emphases
of arms control proposals should be qualitative as well as quantitative, and the
end effect of these proposals should be to bring about a qualitative freeze on
testing, development and production of new weapons systems. Obviously,
such a freeze has to be verifiable. Research cannot realistically be included.
We must assume that research into a higher state of the arms art will not be
verifiable, and continuing research can be a function of continuing security.
Rule 8. A code of conduct: Proposals for arms control and reduction should
be accompanied by political understandings, such as an agreed code of
conduct, to increase confidence on both sides regarding respective intentions
and interests. Without linking arms control to extraneous political issues, the
ground rules for international behaviour bearing upon security interests
should be clarified, something which detente did not accomplish.
Rule 9. Crisis communications: Disarmament proposals should be rein-
forced by more explicit and effective provisions for better crisis communica-
tion between all parties, allowing for constant monitoring and interpretation
of events. Such crisis communication should be within the context of regular
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communication in the sense of continuing meetings and dialogue between the
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., including summits.
Rule 10. Verification is key: The validity of any proposal has to be subject
to reasonably thorough agreed provisions for verification. Indeed, general
principles of verification should be explored and negotiated as objective
entities. Canada could announce its own special contribution to the develop-
ment of such principles –
an international disarmament verification centre.
These are rules of the game which arms control negotiators will obvious-
ly recognize. Indeed, in recent months, some have been given prominent
emphasis. However, we suggest them as a balanced set of possible political
and behavioural checkpoints along the way to a reliable arms control process.
For decades, Canadians have been at the front of arms control efforts at
the United Nations and elsewhere. But our own security position has often
seemed to put us more or less on the outside of critical bilateral strategic
negotiations. This is more apparent than real. We do have a role in promoting
essential arms control. Even though, for the most part, the main burden of
negotiations is bilateral, we can try to make better sense of our political world,
and assist in the development of international instruments which can provide
real security for all the countries concerned.
BOOK REVIEWS
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
The Fate of the Earth. By Jonathan Schell. New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1982. Pp. 256 [$11.95
U.S.].
I have read this book three times, and I intend to read it again; for it is one
of the most important books that I have ever read. Its message is clear and
compelling and, unlike many “serious” books, it is extremely well written. It
is even eloquent, but at the same time as logical in its presentation as a
mathematical formula. It may even be a masterpiece.
But reading Schell’s book is not exactly a pleasant experience. For the
conundrum posed – one which our generation must answer –
is perhaps the
hardest question with which mankind has ever had to cope. Can we save our
world, ourselves, the yet unborn, and indeed the very memory of civilization
from the imminent peril of nuclear extinction?
There is much about physics and about philosophy in the book, but its
central message is political. And that is one reason why the book is especially
important for lawyers and law students. For lawyers have a special responsi-
bility and a key role to play in the creation and development of the new world
political structures that must be set up if the threat of nuclear extinction is to be
met. The contemporary state system is, as Schell demonstrates conclusively,
obsolete. It must be replaced by a new and radically different world political
and legal order. What is necessary is nothing less than a revolution in world
politics and institutions. “We are speaking”, he writes, “of revolutionizing
the politics of the earth”.
Self-styled “realists” may argue that this task is impossible given the
kind of people we are and the kind of world we live in. God help us, they may
be right. But true realists will put their money on the possibility that they may
be wrong. All of Schell’s readers may not agree with this analysis or his
conclusions; but even the sceptics must agree that, as long as there is even the
possibility of a nuclear holocaust, or even of something “less” than that, it is
only elementary prudence to begin to take steps to prevent it. The priority item
on the world’s political agenda is therefore to find a solution to the conun-
drum. Our political leaders (and we the people who are responsible for
keeping them in power) must address themselves, at our peril and without
further delay, to the business of creating the new kind of world order that the
situation demands. If “reality” means anything, this goal is its urgent busi-
ness. What may now seem impossible must be made possible. We have no
other choice.
