BOOK REVIEWS
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
The Fate of the Earth. By Jonathan Schell. New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1982. Pp. 256 [$11.95
U.S.].
I have read this book three times, and I intend to read it again; for it is one
of the most important books that I have ever read. Its message is clear and
compelling and, unlike many “serious” books, it is extremely well written. It
is even eloquent, but at the same time as logical in its presentation as a
mathematical formula. It may even be a masterpiece.
But reading Schell’s book is not exactly a pleasant experience. For the
conundrum posed – one which our generation must answer –
is perhaps the
hardest question with which mankind has ever had to cope. Can we save our
world, ourselves, the yet unborn, and indeed the very memory of civilization
from the imminent peril of nuclear extinction?
There is much about physics and about philosophy in the book, but its
central message is political. And that is one reason why the book is especially
important for lawyers and law students. For lawyers have a special responsi-
bility and a key role to play in the creation and development of the new world
political structures that must be set up if the threat of nuclear extinction is to be
met. The contemporary state system is, as Schell demonstrates conclusively,
obsolete. It must be replaced by a new and radically different world political
and legal order. What is necessary is nothing less than a revolution in world
politics and institutions. “We are speaking”, he writes, “of revolutionizing
the politics of the earth”.
Self-styled “realists” may argue that this task is impossible given the
kind of people we are and the kind of world we live in. God help us, they may
be right. But true realists will put their money on the possibility that they may
be wrong. All of Schell’s readers may not agree with this analysis or his
conclusions; but even the sceptics must agree that, as long as there is even the
possibility of a nuclear holocaust, or even of something “less” than that, it is
only elementary prudence to begin to take steps to prevent it. The priority item
on the world’s political agenda is therefore to find a solution to the conun-
drum. Our political leaders (and we the people who are responsible for
keeping them in power) must address themselves, at our peril and without
further delay, to the business of creating the new kind of world order that the
situation demands. If “reality” means anything, this goal is its urgent busi-
ness. What may now seem impossible must be made possible. We have no
other choice.
1983]
BOOK REVIEWS
There is little room in the world in which we now live for happy-go-
lucky optimism. But optimism is still the best working hypothesis. Time
however is not on our side. “Evolution was slow to produce us”, says Schell,
“but our extinction will be swift; it will be literally over before we know it. We
have to match swiftness with swiftness”.
John P. Humphrey*
*Of the Faulty of Law, McGill University.
The Global Politics ofArms Sales. By Andrew J. Pierre. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1981. Pp. 352 [Cloth $20.00 U.S.; Paper $7.95 U.S.]
Influence or Quid-Pro-Fiasco?: The Global Predicament of
Arms Sales
In global terms, measured in constant dollars, arms sales more than
doubled from U.S. $9.4 billion in 1969 to U.S. $19.1 billion in 1978.
Currently, over seventy-five per cent of total arms transfers are destined for
the Third World. The United States, the Soviet Union, France, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany supply over eighty-five per cent of these
weapons. Nations supplying arms have justified this activity as an instrument
of their respective foreign policies. Yet, the ability of arms sales to bolster or
undermine a supplier’s foreign policy depends upon a mixture of national
motives and often unpredictable international conditions and circumstances.
These dynamic variables include: the potential political influence and lever-
age to be gained against an ideological adversary; the potential access to
military bases; the trade-offs of long-term risks and short-term benefits; the
dovetailing of weapon sales with other foreign policy goals; the effect of sales
on regional stability; the political stability of the recipient nation; and the use
to which the delivered weapons are put.
Such a complicated business does carry inherent risks for the “merchants
of foreign policy”; what one day was a measure of political influence could
the next become a foreign policy fiasco. Examples of quid pro quos turned
quid pro fiascos are easy enough to find. Witness President Nixon’s sales of
“any arms short of nuclear weapons” to the Shah of Iran, weapons which later
fell into the hands of the revolutionary Ayatollah Khomeini; or the Soviet
expulsion from Egypt after many years of committing substantial numbers of
arms and advisers to that country. Arms transfers can also act as a source of
both domestic and foreign political division as was seen in the American sale
of Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] aircraft to Saudi Arabia,
and as is currently being illustrated by the divisive European debate over
nuclear arms transfers, namely United States Pershing II and cruise missiles.
Risks for Third World recipients are also considerable. The drive toward
nationalism and self-reliance, combined with an inadequate technological
base for arms production, serves to spur on Third World demand for the
acquisition of sophisticated weapons from abroad. One result is that expendi-
1983]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
tures on arms have risen twice as fast as development assistance. Scarce
resources that could be used more efficiently for economic development are
often diverted for arms purchases, making domestic stability even less firm.
Guns instead of butter may cause local populations to take up guns in the name
of butter; of course, guns can be used to stifle domestic opposition as well. In
this way, arms transfers can create fiascos in the developing world.
Andrew Pierre explores this global predicament in his Council on For-
eign Relations book, The Global Politics of Arms Sales. Pierre, travelling to
twenty countries to compile his well-researched findings, concludes that
“arms sales are foreign policy writ large” and “must be seen, essentially, in
political terms”.’ Organizing his work into sections on dilemmas, suppliers,
recipients, and restraints, the author has added constructively to an increasing
body of literature on this complicated subject. Much academic attention has
already been focused upon these issues by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute [SIPRI], the International Institute of Strategic Studies
[IISS], and by the Council on Foreign Relations [CFR].2 A more journalistic
treatise, by Anthony Sampson,3 has discussed the Realpolitik of “the mer-
chants of death”. Pierre’s book is a balanced blend of academic research and
anecdotal journalism, making for an informative and readable volume.
There do seem to be, however, some lacunae in Pierre’s analysis. The
author expressly delineates the problems that arms transfers pose for the
suppliers as nations, with particular emphasis on the United States, without
discussing adequately the role that private companies play in creating these
dilemmas. The politics of arms sales also involve the corporate politics of
contracts and profits. A chapter on the “politics of financial reward” would
help explain the micro-economic motivations of the arms trade.
While suggesting that President Reagan replaced an inconsistent Carter
Administration arms sales policy with an “overly permissive” one, Pierre
could have gone further to elaborate upon the ramifications of transfers for
regional security and nuclear proliferation. In his short subsection on “Nu-
clear Proliferation and Conventional Arms Sales”, 4 the author says that “the
Reagan administration is far more inclined to sell arms for the purpose of
reducing motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons”, 5 but he does not seem
to recognize that this very policy could serve to create the regional instability
that whets the atomic appetite.
I A. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (1982) 3.
2 See, e.g., A. Cahn, et al., Controlling Future Arms Trade (1977). See also United States
Congress, Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy (1981) (A Library of Congress
Congressional Research Study).
3A. Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (1978).
4Supra, note 1, 29-31.
5Ibid., 30.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
Pierre prefers instead to focus upon proliferation in the quantity and
sophistication of conventional arms sales. In the past, most arms transfers to
less-developed countries were made up of obsolete weapons of the major
powers. Increasingly, and particularly in the case of American and Soviet
exports, more advanced weaponry has been delivered. In 1960, for instance,
only four developing nations had supersonic aircraft; by 1977, the total was
forty-seven. The Middle East receives fiftyper cent of total world arms sales
and holds the largest regional share of transferred sophisticated weaponry.
Latin American acquisitions have tripled over the last decade, and the sale of
F-16 fighter aircraft to Venezuela will introduce one of the world’s most
advanced weapons into that region for the first time.
The proliferation of sophisticated arms transfers, according to Pierre, is
an integral element in the conduct of foreign policy, especially for the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. As an intended vehicle for the extension of ideological influ-
ence through the demonstration of technological prowess, arms sales have
become a prime element in superpower competition. Though ideological
concerns dominate the arms transfer policies of the superpowers, other
suppliers such as France, the U.K. and West Germany are motivated primari-
ly by other national concerns: access to vital raw materials, maintenance of
employment in industry and balance of trade. France continues to pronounce
a goal of national independence and autonomy, even though its arms industry
has become excessively dependent on exports.
Considering the diverse motives of both suppliers and recipients, is there
any real hope for controlling arms sales? Fuelled by competing national
interests, the increasing volume and sophistication of arms transfers is fast
racing beyond the international political means of control. It is paradoxical
that international law is predicated upon the principle of cooperation between
sovereign states, and yet the self-defined interests of states act consistently as
obstacles to agreement and consensus. Pierre calls for a “supplier’s code of
conduct”. In so doing, he is not the first to suggest the need for multilateral
restraint. Unfortunately, effective multilateral mechanisms have proven more
elusive than the general recognition of the need for them. Perhaps Mr Pierre
can elaborate upon this dilemma in his next book. For the time being,
however, he has accomplished what he set out to do in his preface: he has
increased our knowledge of this perplexing global predicament.
Ronald J. Bee*
*Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Palomar Corporation, Washington, D.C.
New Directions in Disarmament. By William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld, eds. New York:
Praeger, 1981. Pp. 222 [$31.95 U.S.].
The efforts to work out meaningful disarmament arrangements through
treaties and other less explicit understandings which are designed to arrest
nuclear proliferation and to achieve control over conventional armaments
have confounded for far too long both political leaders and international
negotiators. The management of this man-made disaster has remained beyond
the grasp of world leaders, whether they are relatively strong and in office for
extended periods, or refreshingly new and blessed by the imprint of open
democracy. The agony and frustration of this failure, with its attendant
consequences for human survival, have been the subject of scholarly analysis
for the past four decades. In the vast literature on disarmament, the writings of
William Epstein have been outstanding and widely influential.
New Directions in Disarmament, edited by Epstein and Bernard Feld, is
a compilation of short papers prepared by a group of some twenty scholars
drawn from varied social, political and physical science backgrounds. They
met informally as an international Pugwash group to search for new ideas and
new directions. They hoped that their contribution would be helpful to the
ensuing deliberations of the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the
United Nations General Assembly. For a number of reasons, this goal re-
mained unfulfilled. Not unexpectedly, the Soviet side found itself unable to
take part in the Pugwash deliberations, and the resulting product reads more
like the reports on disarmament we are accustomed to reading in Scientific
American or Time magazines. It is not that the product is pedantic or its
treatment pedestrian; the perspectives brought to bear on this, the most
important and vital issue confronting humanity remain, nevertheless, those of
North American liberal thinkers, mostly from the United States. There is a
token Canadian presence and some less prominent “international” participa-
tion. In any case, the events of the past two years have largely overtaken the
limited hope or guarded optimism manifested by the participants at this
symposium. Despite all these negative aspects, New Directions in Disarma-
ment is a most useful and admirably written book.
In the substantive introduction to the book, the editors explain the
history, purpose and nature of their deliberations. The issues they cover
extend, happily, beyond the highly technical, acronym-jargoned specifics to
include such matters as confidence-building measures, the scope for a global
monitoring system through the United Nations, the problems of arresting new
armament technologies in outer space and on the deep seabed, unilateral
initiatives, and the role of non-nuclear states in achieving a balance and,
possibly, some progress in disarmament negotiations.
REVUE DE DROIT DE McGILL
[Vol. 28
Alessandro Corradini discusses the role of the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission and the usefulness of a smaller working body such as the
Committee on Disarmament. Herbert Scoville Jr, a retired United States
Government official, describes the problems created by advancing military
technology. Paul Warnke and George Ignatieff both deal with reforms of the
SALT negotiating process. Bernard Feld, a physicist, proposes a freeze on the
development and deployment of new weapons. William Epstein makes a
strong argument for cutting off the production of fissionable material, for a
phased reduction in the militarized uses of such material, and for its ultimate
transformation to peaceful uses. Rod Byers and Joel Wit discuss “sanctuary”
proposals.
An equally important aspect discussed in the book is the role of non-
nuclear-weapon states in disarmament negotiations. Sayed Yassin (Egypt),
Shalheveth Freier (Israel) and Joseph Rotblat (United Kingdom) explore in a
scholarly manner the value of the presence of a third party in negotiations.
Hans Christian Cars of the Swedish Ministry of Defence presents a thoughtful
paper on military budgets, and points out the need for standardized proce-
dures for monitoring military expenditures. Daniel Gallick of the U.S. State
Department points out the difficulties of verifying any actions by govern-
ments purporting to comply with such measures.
There is an awareness among participants that one of the crucial ques-
tions facing any analyst is: What is it that must be “negotiated” to achieve
disarmament? Is it merely the numerical strength of the military arsenals in
each other’s possession? Or, more subtly, the reliability of the political
strategies at the disposal of each side? Do the governments of the superpowers
believe they can achieve strength and security through military means? Do the
leaders of the superpowers believe that their mutual policy of excessive
militarization can achieve for them anything other than a myopic vision of
their own virtuousness? What role, if any, do the smaller, economically- and
technologically-advanced nations, such as Canada, Japan and West Ger-
many, have in this foolish but deadly game of chess in which they have
unwittingly become the expendable pawns? Some of these issues are raised
and discussed in the papers of Jonathan Alford (British Army) and Hans
Gunter Brauch (Heidelberg University) in their analysis of confidence-
building measures. This discussion is the most useful part of the book because
confidence-building measures can lead to meaningful measures of actual
disarmament. Examples such as the Simla Agreement (on the Kashmir issue)
and the Helsinki “non-binding” international treaty are mentioned. However,
the crucial issues remain unanswered.
How can one “build” confidence if, despite advanced technology and
extensive military saturation, the necessary spiritual strength is lacking?
Professor Charles Osgood (Illinois), George Rathjens (M.I.T.) and Betty Lall
1983]
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE
(a U.S. disarmament expert) all examine this question from their respective
vantage points when they raise for discussion the possibilities for taking
unilateral initiatives aimed at achieving a modicum of self-imposed discipline
and restraint in the military field. If negotiations proceed from a premise of
sustained spiritual strength, it will negate the idea that “a chip, once acquired,
may not be expendable”.’ However, the vision projected here appears to be
somewhat too simplistic: “[C]onfidence-building agreements are essentially
declarations of intent and are not enforceable. They need to have a mandatory
character”. 2 But, is virtue verifiable?
The high level of discussion brought to bear by the participants in the
symposium on these and many other related issues makes this book a useful
and stimulating study. In a book of such broad focus and such diversity of
participant skills and expertise, it is unfair to expect greater uniformity in
treatment and more depth of analysis or detail. That is not to suggest that the
Pugwash Movement cannot bring original ideas to light in exploring the
specific reasons for reticence on each side. For example, serious analysis of
why each superpower has not found the negotiating process useful or success-
ful to achieve concrete and enduring results might reveal unique attitudes that
are susceptible to modification. If a nation’s armament policy is, in fact,
“controlled” by its military commanders –
the least likely sector in any
society to be enlightened enough to see the wisdom of unilateral disarmament
– who then makes the policies pertinent to the negotiation process? It is not
helpful to assert simply that both superpowers are equally guilty of spoiling
the broth.3 If a third, fourth or fifth cook were to enter the negotiating
“kitchen”, is there any guarantee that they will not be one too many? One
should also examine carefully the essential dissimilarity of the interests of the
two powers engaged in the negotiating process. Any threat, real or imagined,
from land-based installations in Europe is far greater to the U.S.S.R. than to
the U.S. If so, why can’t the European Community declare unilaterally, and
without any caveats, a nuclear weapon-free zone on the condition of a joint
superpower guarantee of non-intervention? Would that make the United
States more vulnerable in the negotiation process?
The concern for nuclear disarmament, it is worth noting, is beginning
slowly but unmistakeably to slip away from the traditional confines of secret
diplomacy into the realm of public, open and populist debate. Indeed, this
movement is gaining ground not only within the constituencies of those two
superpowers but in the public domains of their surrogates as well. The threat
of unilateral reform championed by private groups may yet have a destabiliz-
IW. Epstein and B. Feld, eds, New Directions in Disarmament (1981) 174.
2 lbid., 132.
3As is done ibid., 2.
McGILL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 28
ing effect. The momentum is in favour of a reform, notwithstanding the
seeming lack of interest, or more plausibly, the incapacity, of political leaders
to deliver the goods. Therefore, the public pressure in favour of a “total
freeze” cannot be ignored for too long without an inevitable institutionalized
backlash in one form or another. That is why, at every level of public
discourse and decision-making, it is important to be informed of the complex
issues involved and of the critical choices required to be made by the world
public. Toward that end, New Directions in Disarmament is an important
contribution.
Perhaps the inclusion of a brief current bibliography and an appendix of
international conventions relevant to the topic would have enhanced the value
of the book as a tool for instruction. Even so, this is an excellent source book
and an important addition to the ongoing process of public education.
K. Venkata Raman*
*Of the Faculty of Law, Queen’s University.
